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Introduction The business world is relocating to the cloud and the trend is strong. It has been predicted that by the end of 2020, 83% of all businesses will be in the cloud and by 2021, the percentage of workloads processed in cloud data centers will reach 94%. By 2022, cloud services will be three […]
The post Microsoft Azure job outlook appeared first on Infosec Resources.
When it comes to identity theft, trust your gut when something doesn’t feel right. Follow up. What you’re seeing could be a problem.
A missing bill or a mysterious charge on your credit card could be the tip of an identity theft iceberg, one that can run deep if left unaddressed. Here, we’ll look at several signs of identity theft that likely need some investigation and the steps you can take to take charge of the situation.
Unfortunately, it can happen in several ways.
In the physical world, it can happen simply because you lost your wallet or debit card. However, there are also cases where someone gets your information by going through your mail or trash for bills and statements. In other more extreme cases, theft can happen by someone successfully registering a change of address form in your name (although the U.S. Postal Service has security measures in place that make this difficult).
In the digital world, that’s where the avenues of identity theft blow wide open. It could come by way of a data breach, a thief “skimming” credit card information from a point-of-sale terminal, or by a dedicated crook piecing together various bits of personal information that have been gathered from social media, phishing attacks, or malware designed to harvest information. Additionally, thieves may eavesdrop on public Wi-Fi and steal information from people who’re shopping or banking online without the security of a VPN.
Regardless of how crooks pull it off, identity theft is on the rise. According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), identity theft claims jumped up from roughly 650,000 claims in 2019 to nearly 1.4 million in 2020—practically double. Of the reported fraud cases where a dollar loss was reported, the FTC calls out the following top three contact methods for identity theft:
However, phone calls, texts, and email remain the most preferred contact methods that fraudsters use, even if they are less successful in creating dollar losses than malicious websites, ads, and social media.
Identity thieves leave a trail. With your identity in hand, they can charge things to one or more of your existing accounts—and if they have enough information about you, they can even create entirely new accounts in your name. Either way, once an identity thief strikes, you’re probably going to notice that something is wrong. Possible signs include:
As you can see, the signs of possible identity theft can run anywhere from, “Well, that’s strange …” to “OH NO!” However, the good news is that there are several ways to check if someone is using your identity before it becomes a problem – or before it becomes a big problem that gets out of hand.
The point is that if you suspect fraud, you need to act right away. With identity theft becoming increasingly commonplace, many businesses, banks, and organizations have fraud reporting mechanisms in place that can assist you should you have any concerns. With that in mind, here are some immediate steps you can take:
Whether you spot a curious charge on your bank statement or you discover what looks like a fraudulent account when you get your free credit report, let the bank or business involved know you suspect fraud. With a visit to their website, you can track down the appropriate number to call and get the investigation process started.
Some businesses will require you to file a local police report to acquire a case number to complete your claim. Even beyond a business making such a request, filing a report is still a good idea. Identity theft is still theft and reporting it provides an official record of the incident. Should your case of identity theft lead to someone impersonating you or committing a crime in your name, filing a police report right away can help clear your name down the road. Be sure to save any evidence you have, like statements or documents that are associated with the theft. They can help clean up your record as well.
The FTC’s identity theft website is a fantastic resource should you find yourself in need. Above and beyond simply reporting the theft, the FTC can provide you with a step-by-step recovery plan—and even walk you through the process if you create an account with them. Additionally, reporting theft to the FTC can prove helpful if debtors come knocking to collect on any bogus charges in your name. You can provide them with a copy of your FTC report and ask them to stop.
You can place a free one-year fraud alert with one of the major credit bureaus (Experian, TransUnion, Equifax), and they will notify the other two. A fraud alert will make it tougher for thieves to open accounts in your name, as it requires businesses to verify your identity before issuing new credit in your name.
A credit freeze goes a step further. As the name implies, a freeze prohibits creditors from pulling your credit report, which is needed to approve credit. Such a freeze is in place until you lift it, and it will also apply to legitimate queries as well. Thus, if you intend to get a loan or new credit card while a freeze is in place, you’ll likely need to take extra measures to see that through. Contact each of the major credit bureaus (Experian, TransUnion, Equifax) to put a freeze in place or lift it when you’re ready.
This can run the gamut from closing any false accounts that were set up in your name, removing bogus charges, and correcting information in your credit report such as phony addresses or contact information. With your FTC report, you can dispute these discrepancies and have the business correct the record. Be sure to ask for written confirmation and keep a record of all documents and conversations involved.
If you receive a notice from the IRS that someone used your identity to file a tax return in your name, follow the information provided by the IRS in the notice. From there, you can file an identity theft affidavit with the IRS. If the notice mentions that you were paid from an employer you don’t know, contact that employer as well and let them know of possible fraud—namely that someone has stolen your identity and that you don’t truly work for them.
Also, be aware that the IRS has specific guidelines as to how and when they will contact you. As a rule, they will most likely contact you via physical mail delivered by the U.S. Postal Service. (They won’t call or apply harassing pressure tactics—only scammers do that.) Identity-based tax scams are a topic all of their own, and for more on it, you can check out this article on tax scams and how to avoid them.
Another downside of identity theft is that it can mark the start of a long, drawn-out affair. One instance of theft can possibly lead to another, so even what may appear to be an isolated bad charge on your credit card calls for keeping an eye on your identity. Many of the tools you would use up to this point still apply, such as checking up on your credit reports, maintaining fraud alerts as needed, and reviewing your accounts closely.
With all the time we spend online as we bank, shop, and simply surf, we create and share all kinds of personal information—information that can get collected and even stolen. The good news is that you can prevent theft and fraud with online protection software, such as McAfee+ Ultimate.
With McAfee+ Ultimate you can:
In all, it’s our most comprehensive privacy, identity, and device protection plan, built for a time when we rely so heavily on the internet to go about our day, whether that’s work, play, or simply getting things done.
Realizing that you’ve become a victim of identity theft carries plenty of emotion with it, which is understandable—the thief has stolen a part of you to get at your money, information, and even reputation. Once that initial rush of anger and surprise has passed, it’s time to get clinical and get busy. Think like a detective who’s building – and closing – a case. That’s exactly what you’re doing. Follow the steps, document each one, and build up your case file as you need. Staying cool, organized, and ready with an answer for any questions you’ll face in the process of restoring your identity will help you see things through.
Once again, this is a good reminder that vigilance is the best defense against identity theft from happening in the first place. While there’s no absolute, sure-fire protection against it, there are several things you can do to lower the odds in your favor. And at the top of the list is keeping consistent tabs on what’s happening across your credit reports and accounts.
The post Top Signs of Identity Theft appeared first on McAfee Blog.
The Domain Name System has provided the fundamental service of mapping internet names to addresses from almost the earliest days of the internet’s history. Billions of internet-connected devices use DNS continuously to look up Internet Protocol addresses of the named resources they want to connect to — for instance, a website such as blog.verisign.com. Once a device has the resource’s address, it can then communicate with the resource using the internet’s routing system.
Just as ensuring that DNS is secure, stable and resilient is a priority for Verisign, so is making sure that the routing system has these characteristics. Indeed, DNS itself depends on the internet’s routing system for its communications, so routing security is vital to DNS security too.
To better understand how these challenges can be met, it’s helpful to step back and remember what the internet is: a loosely interconnected network of networks that interact with each other at a multitude of locations, often across regions or countries.
Packets of data are transmitted within and between those networks, which utilize a collection of technical standards and rules called the IP suite. Every device that connects to the internet is uniquely identified by its IP address, which can take the form of either a 32-bit IPv4 address or a 128-bit IPv6 address. Similarly, every network that connects to the internet has an Autonomous System Number, which is used by routing protocols to identify the network within the global routing system.
The primary job of the routing system is to let networks know the available paths through the internet to specific destinations. Today, the system largely relies on a decentralized and implicit trust model — a hallmark of the internet’s design. No centralized authority dictates how or where networks interconnect globally, or which networks are authorized to assert reachability for an internet destination. Instead, networks share knowledge with each other about the available paths from devices to destination: They route “by rumor.”
Under the Border Gateway Protocol, the internet’s de-facto inter-domain routing protocol, local routing policies decide where and how internet traffic flows, but each network independently applies its own policies on what actions it takes, if any, with data that connects through its network.
BGP has scaled well over the past three decades because 1) it operates in a distributed manner, 2) it has no central point of control (nor failure), and 3) each network acts autonomously. While networks may base their routing policies on an array of pricing, performance and security characteristics, ultimately BGP can use any available path to reach a destination. Often, the choice of route may depend upon personal decisions by network administrators, as well as informal assessments of technical and even individual reliability.
Two prominent types of operational and security incidents occur in the routing system today: route hijacks and route leaks. Route hijacks reroute internet traffic to an unintended destination, while route leaks propagate routing information to an unintended audience. Both types of incidents can be accidental as well as malicious.
Preventing route hijacks and route leaks requires considerable coordination in the internet community, a concept that fundamentally goes against the BGP’s design tenets of distributed action and autonomous operations. A key characteristic of BGP is that any network can potentially announce reachability for any IP addresses to the entire world. That means that any network can potentially have a detrimental effect on the global reachability of any internet destination.
Fortunately, there is a solution already receiving considerable deployment momentum, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. RPKI provides an internet number resource certification infrastructure, analogous to the traditional PKI for websites. RPKI enables number resource allocation authorities and networks to specify Route Origin Authorizations that are cryptographically verifiable. ROAs can then be used by relying parties to confirm the routing information shared with them is from the authorized origin.
RPKI is standards-based and appears to be gaining traction in improving BGP security. But it also brings new challenges.
Specifically, RPKI creates new external and third-party dependencies that, as adoption continues, ultimately replace the traditionally autonomous operation of the routing system with a more centralized model. If too tightly coupled to the routing system, these dependencies may impact the robustness and resilience of the internet itself. Also, because RPKI relies on DNS and DNS depends on the routing system, network operators need to be careful not to introduce tightly coupled circular dependencies.
Regional Internet Registries, the organizations responsible for top-level number resource allocation, can potentially have direct operational implications on the routing system. Unlike DNS, the global RPKI as deployed does not have a single root of trust. Instead, it has multiple trust anchors, one operated by each of the RIRs. RPKI therefore brings significant new security, stability and resiliency requirements to RIRs, updating their traditional role of simply allocating ASNs and IP addresses with new operational requirements for ensuring the availability, confidentiality, integrity, and stability of this number resource certification infrastructure.
As part of improving BGP security and encouraging adoption of RPKI, the routing community started the Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security initiative in 2014. Supported by the Internet Society, MANRS aims to reduce the most common routing system vulnerabilities by creating a culture of collective responsibility towards the security, stability and resiliency of the global routing system. MANRS is continuing to gain traction, guiding internet operators on what they can do to make the routing system more reliable.
Routing by rumor has served the internet well, and a decade ago it may have been ideal because it avoided systemic dependencies. However, the increasingly critical role of the internet and the evolving cyberthreat landscape require a better approach for protecting routing information and preventing route leaks and route hijacks. As network operators deploy RPKI with security, stability and resiliency, the billions of internet-connected devices that use DNS to look up IP addresses can then communicate with those resources through networks that not only share routing information with one another as they’ve traditionally done, but also do something more. They’ll make sure that the routing information they share and use is secure — and route without rumor.
The post Routing Without Rumor: Securing the Internet’s Routing System appeared first on Verisign Blog.
Security resilience isn’t something that happens overnight. It’s something that grows with every challenge, pivot and plot change. While organizations can invest in solid technology and efficient processes, one thing is critical in making sure it translates into effective security: people.
What impact do people have on security resilience? Does the number of security employees in an organization affect its ability to foster resilience? Can a lower headcount be supplemented by automation?
In a world where uncertainty is certain, we recently explored how people can contribute to five dimensions of security resilience, helping businesses weather the storm.
Through the lens of our latest Security Outcomes Study – a double-blind survey of over 5,100 IT and security professionals – we looked at how people in SecOps teams can influence organizational resilience.
SecOps programs built on strong people, processes and technology see a 3.5X performance boost over those with weaker resources, according to our study. We know that good people are important to any organization, and they are fundamental to developing capable incident response and threat detection programs.
Why are detection and response capabilities important to look at? Because they are key drivers of security resilience. In the study, we calculated a ratio of SecOps staff to overall employees for all organizations. Then, we compared that ratio to the reported strength of detection and response capabilities.
What we can clearly see is that organizations with the highest security staffing ratios are over 20% more likely to report better threat detection and incident response than those with the lowest. However, the overall average highlights that organizations not on the extreme ends of the spectrum are more likely to report roughly equal levels of success with SecOps — indicating that headcount alone isn’t a sure indicator of an effective program or resilient organization. It can be inferred that experience and skills also play a pivotal role.
But what about when an organization is faced with a “people gap,” either in terms of headcount or skills? Does automating certain things help build security resilience? According to our study, automation more than doubles the performance of less experienced people.
In the graph above, the lines compare two different types of SecOp programs: One without strong people resources, and one with strong staff. In both scenarios, moving to the right shows the positive impact that increasing automation has on threat detection and incident response.
Out of the survey respondents, only about a third of organizations that lack strong security staff, and don’t automate processes, report sound detection and response.
When one of three security process areas (threat monitoring, event analysis, or incident response) is automated, we see a significant jump in capability among organizations that say their tech staff isn’t up to par. Automating two or three of these processes continues to increase strength in detection and response.
Why does this matter? Because over 78% of organizations that say they don’t have adequate SecOps staffing resources still report that they are able to achieve robust capabilities through high levels of automation.
When it comes to security resilience, however, we have to look at the whole picture. While automation seems to increase detection and response performance, we can’t count people out. After all, over 95% of organizations that have a strong team AND advanced automation report SecOps success. Organizations need to have the right blend of people and automation to lay the foundation for organization-wide security resilience.
As your business continues to look towards building a successful and resilient SecOps program, figuring out how to utilize your strongest staff, and where to best employ automation, will be a step in the right direction. Learn about other ways to build your organization’s security resilience to meet future challenges.
For more key findings, download the full
Security Outcomes Study
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The past couple of years have brought security resilience to the forefront. How can organizations around the world build resilience when uncertainty is the new normal? How can we be better prepared for whatever is next on the threat horizon? When threats are unpredictable, resilient security strategies are crucial to endure change when we least expect it.
In a previous blog post, we assessed security resilience in Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA). Now, we take a look at organizations in the Americas to find out how they fare across four security outcomes that are critical for building resilience, based on findings from Cisco’s latest Security Outcomes Study. These outcomes include:
Based on the following chart, clear differences emerge when we examine these outcomes at the country level. The chart shows the proportion of organizations in each country that are reportedly “excelling” in the four outcomes contributing to security resilience.
What we see is that 52.7% of organizations in Colombia, for example, say their security programs are excelling at keeping up with the business, while only 35.3% report that they are excelling at avoiding major incidents. You can follow each country’s path through the four outcomes to see how they view their respective performance in certain areas.
What’s really at the crux of these differences in security resilience among countries? Is Colombia that much more resilient than Mexico? Do organizations in different countries have varying definitions of what resilience is, and how they perceive their success? Reasons behind these country-level differences can be attributed to a variety of things, including security maturity, cultural factors and other organizational parameters.
Find out how our customers in the Americas
are staying cyber resilient with Cisco
Knowing what we know about how organizations across the Americas view their resilience, how can they improve it? The Security Outcomes Study, Volume 2, sheds some light here. In the study, we uncovered five practices proven to boost overall success in security programs, dubbed as the Fab Five:
So, how did countries in the Americas rank their implementation of these Fab Five practices? If we look at Colombia, for example, 64% of organizations say their capabilities for accurate threat detection are strong, while only 48.1% of Canadian organizations say the same. There is a lot of movement around the top three countries: Colombia, Mexico and Brazil. The U.S. ranks fourth consistently across the board.
You may be wondering if implementing these five security practices improved resilience across organizations in the Americas. Our study found that organizations in the Americas that do not implement any of these five practices rank in the bottom 25% for resilience, whereas those that reported strength in all five practices rose to the top 25%.
Resilience is a cornerstone of cybersecurity. The ability to quickly pivot while maintaining business continuity and robust defenses is increasingly important in today’s world. If you would like more insight on how to build a cyber resilient organization, please check out our resilience web page and the full Security Outcomes Study.
Watch video: What is security resilience?
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As the world continues to face formidable challenges, one of the many things impacted is cybersecurity. While recent challenges have been varied, they have all contributed to great uncertainty. How can organizations stay strong and protect their environments amidst so much volatility?
Lately we’ve been talking a lot about security resilience, and how companies can embrace it to stay the course no matter what happens. By building a resilient security strategy, organizations can more effectively address unexpected disruptions and emerge stronger.
Through our Security Outcomes Study, Volume 2, we were able to benchmark how companies around the world are doing when it comes to cyber resilience. Recent blog posts have taken a look at security resilience in the EMEA and Americas regions, and this post assesses resilience in Asia Pacific, Japan and China (APJC).
While the Security Outcomes Study focuses on a dozen outcomes that contribute to overall security program success, for this analysis, we focused on four specific outcomes that are most critical for security resilience. These include: keeping up with the demands of the business, avoiding major cyber incidents, maintaining business continuity, and retaining talented personnel.
The following chart shows the proportion of organizations in each market within APJC that reported “excelling” in these four outcomes:
There is a lot of movement in this chart, but if you take a closer look, you will see that many of the percentage differences between markets are quite small. For example, 44.9% of organizations in the Philippines reported that they are proficient at keeping up with the business, with Mainland China closely following at 44.4%.
The biggest difference we see between the top spot and the bottom spot is around retaining security talent—42.4% of organizations in Australia reported that they were successful in that area, while only 18.3% of organizations in Hong Kong reported the same.
Next, we looked at the mean resilience score for each market in the region:
When we look at this, we can see the differences between the top six and bottom seven markets a bit more clearly. However, as the previous chart also showed, the differences are very slight. (When we take into account the gray error bars, they become even more slight.)
There are many factors that could contribute to these small differences when it comes to security resilience. But the most important thing to be gleaned from this data is how each market can improve its respective resilience level.
The Security Outcomes Study revealed the top five practices—what we refer to as “The Fab Five”—that make the most impact when it comes to enhancing security. The following chart outlines the Fab Five, and demonstrates how each market in the APJC region ranked its own strength across these practices.
If we look at Thailand, for example, 69.1% of organizations say they are adept at accurate threat detection, while only 28% of organizations in Taiwan say the same. Like in the previous charts, there is a lot of movement between how various markets reported their performance against these practices. However, it’s interesting to note that Taiwan remained consistent.
So does implementing the Fab Five improve resilience across organizations in APJC? Looking at the chart below, it’s safe to say that, yes, implementing the Fab Five does improve resilience. Organizations in APJC that did not implement any of the Fab Five practices ranked in the bottom 30% for resilience, whereas those that reported strength in all five rose to the top 30%.
While building resilience can sometimes seem like an elusive concept, we hope this data provides some concrete benchmarks to strive for in today’s security programs.
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A cybersecurity firm says it has intercepted a large, unique stolen data set containing the names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, Social Security Numbers and dates of birth on nearly 23 million Americans. The firm’s analysis of the data suggests it corresponds to current and former customers of AT&T. The telecommunications giant stopped short of saying the data wasn’t theirs, but it maintains the records do not appear to have come from its systems and may be tied to a previous data incident at another company.
Milwaukee-based cybersecurity consultancy Hold Security said it intercepted a 1.6 gigabyte compressed file on a popular dark web file-sharing site. The largest item in the archive is a 3.6 gigabyte file called “dbfull,” and it contains 28.5 million records, including 22.8 million unique email addresses and 23 million unique SSNs. There are no passwords in the database.
Hold Security founder Alex Holden said a number of patterns in the data suggest it relates to AT&T customers. For starters, email addresses ending in “att.net” accounted for 13.7 percent of all addresses in the database, with addresses from SBCGLobal.net and Bellsouth.net — both AT&T companies — making up another seven percent. In contrast, Gmail users made up more than 30 percent of the data set, with Yahoo addresses accounting for 24 percent. More than 10,000 entries in the database list “none@att.com” in the email field.
Hold Security found these email domains account for 87% of all domains in the data set. Nearly 21% belonged to AT&T customers.
Holden’s team also examined the number of email records that included an alias in the username portion of the email, and found 293 email addresses with plus addressing. Of those, 232 included an alias that indicated the customer had signed up at some AT&T property; 190 of the aliased email addresses were “+att@”; 42 were “+uverse@,” an oddly specific reference to an AT&T entity that included broadband Internet. In September 2016, AT&T rebranded U-verse as AT&T Internet.
According to its website, AT&T Internet is offered in 21 states, including Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Wisconsin. Nearly all of the records in the database that contain a state designation corresponded to those 21 states; all other states made up just 1.64 percent of the records, Hold Security found.
Image: Hold Security.
The vast majority of records in this database belong to consumers, but almost 13,000 of the entries are for corporate entities. Holden said 387 of those corporate names started with “ATT,” with various entries like “ATT PVT XLOW” appearing 81 times. And most of the addresses for these entities are AT&T corporate offices.
How old is this data? One clue may be in the dates of birth exposed in this database. There are very few records in this file with dates of birth after 2000.
“Based on these statistics, we see that the last significant number of subscribers born in March of 2000,” Holden told KrebsOnSecurity, noting that AT&T requires new account holders to be 18 years of age or older. “Therefore, it makes sense that the dataset was likely created close to March of 2018.”
There was also this anomaly: Holden said one of his analysts is an AT&T customer with a 13-letter last name, and that her AT&T bill has always had the same unique misspelling of her surname (they added yet another letter). He said the analyst’s name is identically misspelled in this database.
KrebsOnSecurity shared the large data set with AT&T, as well as Hold Security’s analysis of it. AT&T ultimately declined to say whether all of the people in the database are or were at some point AT&T customers. The company said the data appears to be several years old, and that “it’s not immediately possible to determine the percentage that may be customers.”
“This information does not appear to have come from our systems,” AT&T said in a written statement. “It may be tied to a previous data incident at another company. It is unfortunate that data can continue to surface over several years on the dark web. However, customers often receive notices after such incidents, and advice for ID theft is consistent and can be found online.”
The company declined to elaborate on what they meant by “a previous data incident at another company.”
But it seems likely that this database is related to one that went up for sale on a hacker forum on August 19, 2021. That auction ran with the title “AT&T Database +70M (SSN/DOB),” and was offered by ShinyHunters, a well-known threat actor with a long history of compromising websites and developer repositories to steal credentials or API keys.
Image: BleepingComputer
ShinyHunters established the starting price for the auction at $200,000, but set the “flash” or “buy it now” price at $1 million. The auction also included a small sampling of the stolen information, but that sample is no longer available. The hacker forum where the ShinyHunters sales thread existed was seized by the FBI in April, and its alleged administrator arrested.
But cached copies of the auction, as recorded by cyber intelligence firm Intel 471, show ShinyHunters received bids of up to $230,000 for the entire database before they suspended the sale.
“This thread has been deleted several times,” ShinyHunters wrote in their auction discussion on Sept. 6, 2021. “Therefore, the auction is suspended. AT&T will be available on WHM as soon as they accept new vendors.”
The WHM initialism was a reference to the White House Market, a dark web marketplace that shut down in October 2021.
“In many cases, when a database is not sold, ShinyHunters will release it for free on hacker forums,” wrote BleepingComputer’s Lawrence Abrams, who broke the news of the auction last year and confronted AT&T about the hackers’ claims.
AT&T gave Abrams a similar statement, saying the data didn’t come from their systems.
“When asked whether the data may have come from a third-party partner, AT&T chose not to speculate,” Abrams wrote. “‘Given this information did not come from us, we can’t speculate on where it came from or whether it is valid,'” AT&T told BleepingComputer.
Asked to respond to AT&T’s denial, ShinyHunters told BleepingComputer at the time, “I don’t care if they don’t admit. I’m just selling.”
On June 1, 2022, a 21-year-old Frenchman was arrested in Morocco for allegedly being a member of ShinyHunters. Databreaches.net reports the defendant was arrested on an Interpol “Red Notice” at the request of a U.S. federal prosecutor from Washington state.
Databreaches.net suggests the warrant could be tied to a ShinyHunters theft in May 2020, when the group announced they had exfiltrated 500 GB of Microsoft’s source code from Microsoft’s private GitHub repositories.
“Researchers assess that Shiny Hunters gained access to roughly 1,200 private repositories around March 28, 2020, which have since been secured,” reads a May 2020 alert posted by the New Jersey Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Cell, a component within the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness.
“Though the breach was largely dismissed as insignificant, some images of the directory listing appear to contain source code for Azure, Office, and some Windows runtimes, and concerns have been raised regarding access to private API keys or passwords that may have been mistakenly included in some private repositories,” the alert continues. “Additionally, Shiny Hunters is flooding dark web marketplaces with breached databases.”
Last month, T-Mobile agreed to pay $350 million to settle a consolidated class action lawsuit over a breach in 2021 that affected 40 million current and former customers. The breach came to light on Aug. 16, 2021, when someone starting selling tens of millions of SSN/DOB records from T-Mobile on the same hacker forum where the ShinyHunters would post their auction for the claimed AT&T database just three days later.
T-Mobile has not disclosed many details about the “how” of last year’s breach, but it said the intruder(s) “leveraged their knowledge of technical systems, along with specialized tools and capabilities, to gain access to our testing environments and then used brute force attacks and other methods to make their way into other IT servers that included customer data.”
A sales thread tied to the stolen T-Mobile customer data.
A number of financial institutions in and around New York City are dealing with a rash of super-thin “deep insert” skimming devices designed to fit inside the mouth of an ATM’s card acceptance slot. The card skimmers are paired with tiny pinhole cameras that are cleverly disguised as part of the cash machine. Here’s a look at some of the more sophisticated deep insert skimmer technology that fraud investigators have recently found in the wild.
This ultra thin and flexible “deep insert” skimmer recently recovered from an NCR cash machine in New York is about half the height of a U.S. dime. The large yellow rectangle is a battery. Image: KrebsOnSecurity.com.
The insert skimmer pictured above is approximately .68 millimeters tall. This leaves more than enough space to accommodate most payment cards (~.54 mm) without interrupting the machine’s ability to grab and return the customer’s card. For comparison, this flexible skimmer is about half the height of a U.S. dime (1.35 mm).
These skimmers do not attempt to siphon chip-card data or transactions, but rather are after the cardholder data still stored in plain text on the magnetic stripe on the back of most payment cards issued to Americans.
Here’s what the other side of that insert skimmer looks like:
The other side of the deep insert skimmer. Image: KrebsOnSecurity.com.
The thieves who designed this skimmer were after the magnetic stripe data and the customer’s 4-digit personal identification number (PIN). With those two pieces of data, the crooks can then clone payment cards and use them to siphon money from victim accounts at other ATMs.
To steal PINs, the fraudsters in this case embedded pinhole cameras in a false panel made to fit snugly over the cash machine enclosure on one side of the PIN pad.
Pinhole cameras were hidden in these false side panels glued to one side of the ATM, and angled toward the PIN pad. Image: KrebsOnSecurity.com.
The skimming devices pictured above were pulled from a brand of ATMs made by NCR called the NCR SelfServ 84 Walk-Up. In January 2022, NCR produced a report on motorized deep insert skimmers, which offers a closer look at other insert skimmers found targeting this same line of ATMs.
Here are some variations on deep insert skimmers NCR found in recent investigations:
Image: NCR.
Image: NCR
The NCR report included additional photos that show how fake ATM side panels with the hidden cameras are carefully crafted to slip over top of the real ATM side panels.
Image: NCR.
Sometimes the skimmer thieves embed their pinhole spy cameras in fake panels directly above the PIN pad, as in these recent attacks targeting a similar NCR model:
Image: NCR
In the image below, the thieves hid their pinhole camera in a “consumer awareness mirror” placed directly above an ATM retrofitted with an insert skimmer:
Image: NCR
The financial institution that shared the images above said it has seen success in stopping most of these insert skimmer attacks by incorporating a solution that NCR sells called an “insert kit,” which it said stops current insert skimmer designs. NCR also is conducting field trials on a “smart detect kit” that adds a standard USB camera to view the internal card reader area, and uses image recognition software to identify any fraudulent device inside the reader.
Skimming devices will continue to mature in miniaturization and stealth as long as payment cards continue to hold cardholder data in plain text on a magnetic stripe. It may seem silly that we’ve spent years rolling out more tamper- and clone-proof chip-based payment cards, only to undermine this advance in the name of backwards compatibility. However, there are a great many smaller businesses in the United States that still rely on being able to swipe the customer’s card.
Many newer ATM models, including the NCR SelfServ referenced throughout this post, now include contactless capability, meaning customers no longer need to insert their ATM card anywhere: They can instead just tap their smart card against the wireless indicator to the left of the card acceptance slot (and right below the “Use Mobile Device Here” sign on the ATM).
For simple ease-of-use reasons, this contactless feature is now increasingly prevalent at drive-thru ATMs. If your payment card supports contactless technology, you will notice a wireless signal icon printed somewhere on the card — most likely on the back. ATMs with contactless capabilities also feature this same wireless icon.
Once you become aware of ATM skimmers, it’s difficult to use a cash machine without also tugging on parts of it to make sure nothing comes off. But the truth is you probably have a better chance of getting physically mugged after withdrawing cash than you do encountering a skimmer in real life.
So keep your wits about you when you’re at the ATM, and avoid dodgy-looking and standalone cash machines in low-lit areas, if possible. When possible, stick to ATMs that are physically installed at a bank. And be especially vigilant when withdrawing cash on the weekends; thieves tend to install skimming devices on Saturdays after business hours — when they know the bank won’t be open again for more than 24 hours.
Lastly but most importantly, covering the PIN pad with your hand defeats one key component of most skimmer scams: The spy camera that thieves typically hide somewhere on or near the compromised ATM to capture customers entering their PINs.
Shockingly, few people bother to take this simple, effective step. Or at least, that’s what KrebsOnSecurity found in this skimmer tale from 2012, wherein we obtained hours worth of video seized from two ATM skimming operations and saw customer after customer walk up, insert their cards and punch in their digits — all in the clear.
If you enjoyed this story, check out these related posts:
Crooks Go Deep With Deep Insert Skimmers
The social network TikTok is chockfull of interesting, fun, laugh-out-loud videos shared by creators worldwide. Kids, as well as parents, can easily spend hours glued to the platform. But as with most popular platforms, the fun can eventually turn dark, even deadly, when viral challenges make their rounds.
The latest viral challenge, the “blackout challenge,” first became popular online in 2008 and made its unfortunate comeback in 2021. Before this second round, the CDC attributed nearly 80 deaths to the dangerous online game. In the past month, authorities are attributing the tragic, high-profile deaths of Archie Battersbee, 12, and Leon Brown, 14 to the challenge.
The blackout challenge is a choking game that involves intentionally trying to choke oneself or another to obtain a brief euphoric state or “high.” Death or serious injury can result if strangulation is prolonged. Those doing the challenge do it privately or broadcast their attempt to friends or followers. The CDC also found that most deaths occurred when a child engaged in the choking game alone and that most parents were unaware of the game before their child’s death.
It’s easy to look at a challenge like this and dismiss it thinking your child would never be involved in such a dangerous game. However, in a recent post from HealthyChildren.org on why kids participate in online dares, pediatricians point to the reality that the teen brain is still developing. The part of the brain that processes rational thought, the prefrontal cortex, is not fully developed until a person’s mid-20s. This physiological reality means teens are naturally impulsive and can do things without stopping to consider the consequences.
Another lure that entices teens is that social media’s fast-moving, impulsive environment rewards outrageous behavior—the more outrageous the content, the bigger the bragging rights. The fear of losing out (FOMO is natural for teens.
According to the CDC, signs that a child may be engaging in the blackout challenge include:
Viral challenges will continue to emerge and shock us. There’s no way to anticipate them or control them. However, staying informed about dangerous online trends and keeping the lines of communication with your child open and honest is a big step toward equipping them to live a safe, balanced digital life.
The post Deadly Digital Dares: The Blackout Challenge on TikTok appeared first on McAfee Blog.
A recent proliferation of phony executive profiles on LinkedIn is creating something of an identity crisis for the business networking site, and for companies that rely on it to hire and screen prospective employees. The fabricated LinkedIn identities — which pair AI-generated profile photos with text lifted from legitimate accounts — are creating major headaches for corporate HR departments and for those managing invite-only LinkedIn groups.
Some of the fake profiles flagged by the co-administrator of a popular sustainability group on LinkedIn.
Last week, KrebsOnSecurity examined a flood of inauthentic LinkedIn profiles all claiming Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) roles at various Fortune 500 companies, including Biogen, Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Hewlett Packard.
Since then, the response from LinkedIn users and readers has made clear that these phony profiles are showing up en masse for virtually all executive roles — but particularly for jobs and industries that are adjacent to recent global events and news trends.
Hamish Taylor runs the Sustainability Professionals group on LinkedIn, which has more than 300,000 members. Together with the group’s co-owner, Taylor said they’ve blocked more than 12,700 suspected fake profiles so far this year, including dozens of recent accounts that Taylor describes as “cynical attempts to exploit Humanitarian Relief and Crisis Relief experts.”
“We receive over 500 fake profile requests to join on a weekly basis,” Taylor said. “It’s hit like hell since about January of this year. Prior to that we did not get the swarms of fakes that we now experience.”
The opening slide for a plea by Taylor’s group to LinkedIn.
Taylor recently posted an entry on LinkedIn titled, “The Fake ID Crisis on LinkedIn,” which lampooned the “60 Least Wanted ‘Crisis Relief Experts’ — fake profiles that claimed to be experts in disaster recovery efforts in the wake of recent hurricanes. The images above and below show just one such swarm of profiles the group flagged as inauthentic. Virtually all of these profiles were removed from LinkedIn after KrebsOnSecurity tweeted about them last week.
Another “swarm” of LinkedIn bot accounts flagged by Taylor’s group.
Mark Miller is the owner of the DevOps group on LinkedIn, and says he deals with fake profiles on a daily basis — often hundreds per day. What Taylor called “swarms” of fake accounts Miller described instead as “waves” of incoming requests from phony accounts.
“When a bot tries to infiltrate the group, it does so in waves,” Miller said. “We’ll see 20-30 requests come in with the same type of information in the profiles.”
After screenshotting the waves of suspected fake profile requests, Miller started sending the images to LinkedIn’s abuse teams, which told him they would review his request but that he may never be notified of any action taken.
Some of the bot profiles identified by Mark Miller that were seeking access to his DevOps LinkedIn group. Miller said these profiles are all listed in the order they appeared.
Miller said that after months of complaining and sharing fake profile information with LinkedIn, the social media network appeared to do something which caused the volume of group membership requests from phony accounts to drop precipitously.
“I wrote our LinkedIn rep and said we were considering closing the group down the bots were so bad,” Miller said. “I said, ‘You guys should be doing something on the backend to block this.”
Jason Lathrop is vice president of technology and operations at ISOutsource, a Seattle-based consulting firm with roughly 100 employees. Like Miller, Lathrop’s experience in fighting bot profiles on LinkedIn suggests the social networking giant will eventually respond to complaints about inauthentic accounts. That is, if affected users complain loudly enough (posting about it publicly on LinkedIn seems to help).
Lathrop said that about two months ago his employer noticed waves of new followers, and identified more than 3,000 followers that all shared various elements, such as profile photos or text descriptions.
“Then I noticed that they all claim to work for us at some random title within the organization,” Lathrop said in an interview with KrebsOnSecurity. “When we complained to LinkedIn, they’d tell us these profiles didn’t violate their community guidelines. But like heck they don’t! These people don’t exist, and they’re claiming they work for us!”
Lathrop said that after his company’s third complaint, a LinkedIn representative responded by asking ISOutsource to send a spreadsheet listing every legitimate employee in the company, and their corresponding profile links.
Not long after that, the phony profiles that were not on the company’s list were deleted from LinkedIn. Lathrop said he’s still not sure how they’re going to handle getting new employees allowed into their company on LinkedIn going forward.
It remains unclear why LinkedIn has been flooded with so many fake profiles lately, or how the phony profile photos are sourced. Random testing of the profile photos shows they resemble but do not match other photos posted online. Several readers pointed out one likely source — the website thispersondoesnotexist.com, which makes using artificial intelligence to create unique headshots a point-and-click exercise.
Cybersecurity firm Mandiant (recently acquired by Google) told Bloomberg that hackers working for the North Korean government have been copying resumes and profiles from leading job listing platforms LinkedIn and Indeed, as part of an elaborate scheme to land jobs at cryptocurrency firms.
Fake profiles also may be tied to so-called “pig butchering” scams, wherein people are lured by flirtatious strangers online into investing in cryptocurrency trading platforms that eventually seize any funds when victims try to cash out.
In addition, identity thieves have been known to masquerade on LinkedIn as job recruiters, collecting personal and financial information from people who fall for employment scams.
But the Sustainability Group administrator Taylor said the bots he’s tracked strangely don’t respond to messages, nor do they appear to try to post content.
“Clearly they are not monitored,” Taylor assessed. “Or they’re just created and then left to fester.”
This experience was shared by the DevOp group admin Miller, who said he’s also tried baiting the phony profiles with messages referencing their fakeness. Miller says he’s worried someone is creating a massive social network of bots for some future attack in which the automated accounts may be used to amplify false information online, or at least muddle the truth.
“It’s almost like someone is setting up a huge bot network so that when there’s a big message that needs to go out they can just mass post with all these fake profiles,” Miller said.
In last week’s story on this topic, I suggested LinkedIn could take one simple step that would make it far easier for people to make informed decisions about whether to trust a given profile: Add a “created on” date for every profile. Twitter does this, and it’s enormously helpful for filtering out a great deal of noise and unwanted communications.
Many of our readers on Twitter said LinkedIn needs to give employers more tools — perhaps some kind of application programming interface (API) — that would allow them to quickly remove profiles that falsely claim to be employed at their organizations.
Another reader suggested LinkedIn also could experiment with offering something akin to Twitter’s verified mark to users who chose to validate that they can respond to email at the domain associated with their stated current employer.
In response to questions from KrebsOnSecurity, LinkedIn said it was considering the domain verification idea.
“This is an ongoing challenge and we’re constantly improving our systems to stop fakes before they come online,” LinkedIn said in a written statement. “We do stop the vast majority of fraudulent activity we detect in our community – around 96% of fake accounts and around 99.1% of spam and scams. We’re also exploring new ways to protect our members such as expanding email domain verification. Our community is all about authentic people having meaningful conversations and to always increase the legitimacy and quality of our community.”
In a story published Wednesday, Bloomberg noted that LinkedIn has largely so far avoided the scandals about bots that have plagued networks like Facebook and Twitter. But that shine is starting to come off, as more users are forced to waste more of their time fighting off inauthentic accounts.
“What’s clear is that LinkedIn’s cachet as being the social network for serious professionals makes it the perfect platform for lulling members into a false sense of security,” Bloomberg’s Tim Cuplan wrote. “Exacerbating the security risk is the vast amount of data that LinkedIn collates and publishes, and which underpins its whole business model but which lacks any robust verification mechanisms.”
When people banking in the United States lose money because their payment card got skimmed at an ATM, gas pump or grocery store checkout terminal, they may face hassles or delays in recovering any lost funds, but they are almost always made whole by their financial institution. Yet, one class of Americans — those receiving food assistance benefits via state-issued prepaid debit cards — are particularly exposed to losses from skimming scams, and usually have little recourse to do anything about it.
California’s EBT card does not currently include a chip. That silver square is a hologram.
Over the past several months, authorities in multiple U.S. states have reported rapid increases in skimming losses tied to people who receive assistance via Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT), which allows a Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) participant to pay for food using SNAP benefits.
When a participant uses a SNAP payment card at an authorized retail store, their SNAP EBT account is debited to reimburse the store for food that was purchased. EBT is used in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam.
EBT cards work just like regular debit cards, in that they can be used along with a personal identification number (PIN) to pay for goods at participating stores, and to withdraw cash from an ATM.
However, EBT cards differ from debit cards issued to most Americans in two important ways. First, most states do not equip EBT cards with smart chip technology, which can make payment cards much more difficult and expensive for skimming thieves to clone.
Alas, it is no accident that all of the states reporting recent spikes in fraud tied to EBT accounts — including California, Connecticut, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia appear to currently issue chip-less cards to their EBT recipients.
The Massachusetts SNAP benefits card looks more like a library card than a payment card. Oddly enough, both are reliant on the same fundamentally insecure technology: The magnetic stripe, which stores cardholder data in plain text that can be easily copied.
In September, authorities in California arrested three men thought to be part of a skimming crew that specifically targeted EBT cards and balances. The men allegedly installed deep insert skimmers, and stole PINs using tiny hidden cameras.
“The arrests were the result of a joint investigation by the Sheriff’s Office and Bank of America corporate security,” reads a September 2022 story from The Sacramento Bee. “The investigation focused on illegal skimming, particularly the high-volume cash-out sequence at ATMs near the start of each month when Electronic Benefits Transfer accounts are funded by California.”
Armed with a victim’s PIN along with stolen card data, thieves can clone the card onto anything with a magnetic stripe and use it at ATMs to withdraw cash, or as a payment instrument at any establishment that accepts EBT cards.
Skimming gear seized from three suspects arrested by Sacramento authorities in September. Image: Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office.
Although it may be shocking that California — one of America’s wealthiest states — still treats EBT recipients as second-class citizens by issuing them chip-less debit cards, California behaves like most other states in this regard.
More critical, however, is the second way SNAP cards differ from regular debit cards: Recipients of SNAP benefits have little to no hope of recovering their funds when their EBT cards are copied by card-skimming devices and used for fraud.
That’s because in the SNAP program, federal law bars the states from replacing SNAP benefits using federal funds. And while some of these EBT cards have Visa or MasterCard logos on them, it is not up to those companies to replace funds in the event of fraud.
Victims are encouraged to report the theft to both their state agency and the local police, but many victims say they rarely receive updates on their cases from police, and, if they hear from the state, it’s usually the agency telling them it found no evidence of fraud.
Maryland’s EBT card.
That’s according to Brenna Smith, a reporter at The Baltimore Banner who recently wrote about the case of a Maryland mother of three who lost nearly $3,000 in SNAP benefits thanks to a skimmer installed at a local 7-Eleven. Maryland [Department of Human Services] spokesperson Katherine Morris told the Banner there was evidence of “a nationwide EBT card cloning scheme.”
The woman profiled in Smith’s story contacted all of the retailers where her EBT card was used to buy thousands of dollars worth of baby formula. Two of those retailers agreed to share video surveillance footage of the people making the purchases at the exact timestamps specified in her EBT account history: The videos clearly showed it was the same fraudster making both purchases with a cloned copy of her EBT card.
Even after the police officer assigned to the victim’s case confirmed they found a skimmer installed at the 7-Eleven store she frequented, her claim — which was denied — is still languishing in appeals months later.
(Left) A video still showing a couple purchasing almost $1,200 in baby formula using SNAP benefits. (Right) A video still of a woman leaving from the CVS in Seat Pleasant. Image: The Baltimore Banner.
The Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) recently published Five Ways State Agencies Can Support EBT Users at Risk of Skimming. CLASP says while it is true states can’t use federal funds to replace benefits unless the loss was due to a “system error,” states could use their own funds.
“Doing so will ensure families don’t have to go without food, gas money, or their rent for the month,” CLASP wrote.
That would help address the symptoms of card skimming, but not a root cause. Hardly anyone is suggesting the obvious, which is to equip EBT cards with the same security technology afforded to practically everyone else participating in the U.S. banking system.
There are several reasons most state-issued EBT cards do not include chips. For starters, nobody says they have to. Also, it’s a fair bit more expensive to produce chip cards versus plain old magnetic stripe cards, and many state assistance programs are chronically under-funded. Finally, there is no vocal (or at least well-heeled) constituency advocating for change.
A nonprofit organization is suing the state of Massachusetts on behalf of thousands of low-income families who were collectively robbed of more than a $1 million in food assistance benefits by card skimming devices secretly installed at cash machines and grocery store checkout lanes across the state. Federal law bars states from replacing these benefits using federal funds, and a recent rash of skimming incidents nationwide has disproportionately affected those receiving food assistance via state-issued prepaid debit cards.
The Massachusetts SNAP benefits card looks more like a library card than a payment card.
On Nov. 4, The Massachusetts Law Reform Institute (MLRI) filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of low-income families whose Supplemental Nutrition and Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits were stolen from their accounts. The SNAP program serves over a million people in Massachusetts, and 41 million people nationally.
“Over the past few months, thieves have stolen over a million SNAP dollars from thousands of Massachusetts families – putting their nutrition and economic stability at risk,” the MLRI said in a statement on the lawsuit. “The criminals attach a skimming device on a POS (point of sale) terminal to capture the household’s account information and PIN. The criminals then use that information to make a fake card and steal the SNAP benefits.”
In announcing the lawsuit, the MRLI linked to a story KrebsOnSecurity published last month that examined how skimming thieves increasingly are targeting SNAP payment card holders nationwide. The story looked at how the vast majority of SNAP benefit cards issued by the states do not include the latest chip technology that makes it more difficult and expensive for thieves to clone them.
The story also highlighted how SNAP cardholders usually have little recourse to recover any stolen funds — even in unlikely cases where the victim has gathered mountains of proof to show state and federal officials that the fraudulent withdrawals were not theirs.
Deborah Harris is a staff attorney at the MLRI. Harris said the goal of the lawsuit is to force Massachusetts to reimburse SNAP skimming victims using state funds, and to convince The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) — which funds the program that states draw from — to change its policies and allow states to replace stolen benefits with federal funds.
“Ultimately we think it’s the USDA that needs to step up and tell states they have a duty to restore the stolen benefits, and that USDA will cover the cost at least until there is better security in place, such as chip cards,” Harris told KrebsOnSecurity.
“The losses we’re talking about are relatively small in the scheme of total SNAP expenditures which are billions,” she said. “But if you are a family that can’t pay for food because you suddenly don’t have money in your account, it’s devastating for the family.”
The USDA has not said it will help states restore the stolen funds. But on Oct. 31, 2022, the agency released guidance (PDF) whose primary instructions were included in an appendix titled, Card Security Options Available to Households. Notably, the USDA did not mention the idea of shifting to chip-based SNAP benefits cards.
The recently issued USDA guidance.
“The guidance generally continues to make households responsible for preventing the theft of their benefits as well as for suffering the loss when benefits are stolen through no fault of the household,” Harris said. “Many of the recommendations are not practical for households who don’t have a smartphone to receive text messages and aren’t able to change their PIN after each transaction and keep track of the new PIN.”
Harris said three of the four recommendations are not currently available in Massachusetts, and they are very likely not currently available in other states. For example, she said, Massachusetts households do not have the option of freezing or locking their cards between transactions. Nor do they receive alerts about transactions. And they most certainly don’t have any way to block out-of-state transactions.
“Perhaps these are options that [card] processors and states could provide, but they are not available now as far as we know,” Harris said. “Most likely they would take time to implement.”
The Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) recently published Five Ways State Agencies Can Support EBT Users at Risk of Skimming. CLASP says while it is true states can’t use federal funds to replace benefits unless the loss was due to a “system error,” states could use their own funds.
“Doing so will ensure families don’t have to go without food, gas money, or their rent for the month,” CLASP wrote.
That would help address the symptoms of card skimming, but not a root cause. Hardly anyone is suggesting the obvious, which is to equip SNAP benefit cards with the same security technology afforded to practically everyone else participating in the U.S. banking system.
There are several reasons most state-issued SNAP benefit cards do not include chips. For starters, nobody says they have to. Also, it’s a fair bit more expensive to produce chip cards versus plain old magnetic stripe cards, and many state assistance programs are chronically under-funded. Finally, there is no vocal (or at least well-heeled) constituency advocating for change.
A copy of the class action complaint filed by the MLRI is available here.
ffs-2fa-1200
Have you ever been browsing online and clicked a link or search result that took you to a site that triggers a “your connection is not private” or “your connection is not secure” error code? If you’re not too interested in that particular result, you may simply move on to another result option. But if you’re tempted to visit the site anyway, you should be sure you understand what the warning means, what the risks are, and how to bypass the error if you need to.
A “your connection is not private” error means that your browser cannot determine with certainty that a website has safe encryption protocols in place to protect your device and data. You can bump into this error on any device connected to the internet — computer, smartphone, or tablet.
So, what exactly is going on when you see the “this connection is not private” error?
For starters, it’s important to know that seeing the error is just a warning, and it does not mean any of your private information is compromised. A “your connection is not private” error means the website you were trying to visit does not have an up-to-date SSL (secure sockets layer) security certificate.
Website owners must maintain the licensing regularly to ensure the site encryption capabilities are up to date. If the website’s SSL certificate is outdated, it means the site owners have not kept their encryption licensing current, but it doesn’t necessarily mean they are up to no good. Even major websites like LinkedIn have had momentary lapses that would throw the error. LinkedIn mistakenly let their subdomain SSL certificates lapse.
In late 2021, a significant provider of SSL certificates, Let’s Encrypt, went out of business. When their root domain officially lapsed, it created issues for many domain names and SSL certificates owned by legitimate companies. The privacy error created problems for unwitting businesses, as many of their website visitors were rightfully concerned about site security.
While it does not always mean a website is unsafe to browse, it should not be ignored. A secure internet connection is critical to protecting yourself online. Many nefarious websites are dangerous to visit, and this SSL certificate error will protect you from walking into them unaware.
SSL certification standards have helped make the web a safer place to transact. It helps ensure online activities like paying bills online, ordering products, connecting to online banking, or keeping your private email accounts safe and secure. Online security continues to improve with a new Transport Layer Security (TLS) standard, which promises to be the successor protocol to SSL.
So be careful whenever visiting sites that trigger the “connection is not private” error, as those sites can potentially make your personal data less secure and make your devices vulnerable to viruses and malware.
Note: The “your connection is not private” error is Google Chrome‘s phrasing. Microsoft Edge or Mozilla Firefox users will instead see a “your connection is not secure” error as the warning message.
If you feel confident that a website or page is safe, despite the warning from your web browser, there are a few things you can do to troubleshoot the error.
Remember, you are taking your chances anytime you ignore an error. As we mentioned, you could leave yourself vulnerable to hackers after your passwords, personal information, and other risks.
Your data and private information are valuable to hackers, so they will continue to find new ways to try and procure it. Here are some ways to protect yourself and your data when browsing online.
As we continue to do more critical business online, we must also do our best to address the risks of the internet’s many conveniences.
A comprehensive cybersecurity tool like McAfee+ Ultimate can help protect you from online scams, identity theft, and phishing attempts, and ensure you always have a secure connection. McAfee helps keep your sensitive information out of the hands of hackers and can help you keep your digital data footprints lighter with personal data cleanup.
With McAfee’s experts on your side, you can enjoy everything the web offers with the confidence of total protection.
The post “This Connection Is Not Private” – What it Means and How to Protect Your Privacy appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Two years ago, we asked the question: What actually works in cybersecurity?
Not what everyone’s doing—because there are plenty of cybersecurity reports out there that answer that question—but which data-backed practices lead to the outcomes we want to implement in cybersecurity strategies?
The result was the first Security Outcomes Report, in which we analyzed 25 cybersecurity practices against 11 desired outcomes. And thanks to a large international respondent group, together with the mighty data science powers of the Cyentia Institute, we got some good data that raised as many questions as it answered. Sure, we found some strong correlations between practices and outcomes, but why did they correlate?
Last year, our second report focused in on the top five most highly correlated practices and tried to reveal more detail that would give us some guidance on implementation. We found that certain types of technology infrastructure correlated more with those successful practices, and therefore with the outcomes we’re seeking. Is architecture really destiny when it comes to good security outcomes? It does appear to be the case, but we had more research ahead of us to be more confident in a statement that sweeping.
All the while, we’ve been listening to readers considering what they’d like to glean from this research. One big question was, “How do we turn these practices into management objectives?” In other words, now that we have some data on practices we should be implementing, how do we set measurable goals to do so? I’ve led workshops in the UK and in Colombia to help CISOs set their own objectives based on their risk management priorities, and we’ve worked to identify longer-term targets that require close alignment with business leaders.
Another question that took a front-row seat in our presentations and just wouldn’t leave: the topic of cyber resilience, or security resilience. It’s almost reached the status of a buzzword in the security industry, but you can understand why it’s ubiquitous.
“Among the upheaval of the pandemic, political unrest, economic and climate turbulence, and war, everyone is struggling to find a new ‘business as usual’ state that includes being able to adapt better to the shaky ground beneath them.”
But what exactly is security resilience, anyway? What does it mean to security practitioners and executives around the world? And what are the associated cybersecurity outcomes that we can identify and correlate? We know it doesn’t simply mean preventing bad things from happening; that ship has sailed (and sunk). We also know that security resilience doesn’t always mean full recovery from an event or condition that has knocked you down. Rather, it means continuing to operate during an adverse situation, either at full or partial capacity, and mitigating the effects on stakeholders. Ideally speaking, security resilience also means learning from the experience and emerging stronger.
Security resilience is the focus of the third volume of our Security Outcomes Report: Achieving Security Resilience. It tells us how 4,700 practitioners across 26 countries are prioritizing security resilience: what it means to them, what they’re doing successfully to achieve it, and what they’re struggling with. Once again, the data gives us interesting ideas to ponder.
A stronger security culture boosts resilience by as much as 46%. By “culture,” we don’t mean annual compliance-driven awareness training. Cybersecurity awareness is what you know; security culture is what you do. When organizations score better at being able to explain just what it is that they need to do in security and why, they make better decisions in line with their security values, and that leads to better overall security resilience.
It doesn’t matter how many people you have; it matters whether you have any of them available in reserve to respond to events. Organizations with a flexible pool of talent internally (or on standby externally) show anywhere from 11% to 15% improvement in resilience. Which makes sense, as a fully leveraged team will be strained if they have to work even harder to take on an incident.
Because so many organizations around the world are looking to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework as a guidepost for cybersecurity practices, we also analyzed which NIST CSF capabilities correlated most strongly with our list of resilience outcomes. For example, our survey respondents that do a great job tracking key systems and data are almost 11% more likely to excel at containing the spread and scope of security incidents. From one angle, this seems like an obvious result, hardly worth mentioning. On the other hand, it’s worth presenting to your management some data that shows that investing in asset inventory solutions really does have long-range effects on your ability to stop an intrusion.
And there’s much more. The report identifies—and then explores—seven success factors that, if achieved, boost our measure of overall security resilience from the bottom 10th percentile to the top 10th percentile. These include establishing a security culture and properly resourcing response teams, among others.
I hope this introductory blog—the first in a series exploring this latest report—whets your appetite to read the report itself. And remember, we are always aiming to reveal the next undiscovered insight that leads to better security outcomes. Please share your feedback and research requests with us in the comments below, or talk to us at the next security conference.
For more insights like what you’ve seen in today’s blog take a look at the Security Outcomes Report, Volume 3: Achieving Security Resilience.
Explore more data-backed cybersecurity research and other blogs on security resilience:
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Speaking to many CISOs, it’s clear that many security executives view zero trust as a journey that can be difficult to start, and one that even makes identifying successful outcomes a challenge. Simultaneously, the topic of security resilience has risen up the C-level agenda and is now another focus for security teams. So, are these complementary? Or will they present conflicting demands that will disrupt rather than assist the CISO in their role?
One of the most striking results coming from Cisco’s latest Security Outcomes Report is that organizations with a mature zero trust implementation – those with basic controls, constant validation and automated workflows – experience a 30% improvement in security resilience compared to those who have not started their zero trust journey. So, these two initiatives – implementing zero trust and working to achieve security resilience – appear to complement each other while supporting the CISO when a cyber black swan swims in.
Security resilience is the ability to withstand an incident and recover more strongly. In other words, ride out the storm and come back better. Meanwhile, zero trust is best known as a “never trust, always verify” principle. The idea is to check before you provide access, and authenticate identity based on a risk profile of assets and users. This starts to explain why the two are complementary.
The Security Outcomes Report summarizes the results of a survey of more than 4,700 security professionals. Among the insights that emerge are nine security resilience outcomes they consider most important. The top three outcomes for resilience are prevention, mitigation and adaptation. In other words, they prioritize first the ability to avoid an incident by having the right controls in place, then the ability to reduce and reverse the overall impact when an incident occurs, and then the ability to pivot rapidly without being bound by too rigid a set of systems. Zero trust will support these outcomes.
Preventing, or reducing the likelihood of a cybersecurity incident, is an obvious first step and no surprise as the most important outcome. Pursuing programs that identify users and monitor the health of devices is a crucial a preventative step. In fact, simply ensuring that multifactor authentication (MFA) is ubiquitous across the organization can bring an 11% improvement in security resilience.
When incidents occur, security teams will need a clear picture of the incident they are having to manage. This will help in them respond quickly, with a proactive determination of recovery requirements. Previous studies show that once a team achieves 80% coverage of critical systems, the ability to maintain continuity increases measurably. This knowledge will also help teams develop more focused incident response processes. A mature zero trust environment has also been found to almost double a team’s ability to streamline these processes when compared to a limited zero trust implementation.
When talking to CISOs about successful implementation programs, communication within the business emerges as a recurring theme. Security teams must inform and guide users through the phases of zero trust implementation, while emphasizing the benefits to them. When users are aware of their responsibility to keep the organization secure, they take a participatory role in an important aspect of the business. So, when an incident occurs, they can support the company’s response. This increases resilience. Research has shown that a mature program will more than double the effect of efforts to improve the security culture. Additionally, the same communication channels established to spread the word of zero trust now can be called upon when an incident requires immediate action.
Mature implementations have also been seen to help increase cost effectiveness and reduce unplanned work. This releases more resource to cope with the unexpected – another important driver of resilience surfaced in Volume 3 of the Security Outcomes Report. Having more efficient resources enables the security function to reallocate teams when needed. Reviewing and updating resource processes and procedures, along with all other important processes, is a vital part of any of any change initiative. Mature zero trust environments reflect this commitment continuous assessment and improvement.
Inherent in organizational resilience is the ability to adapt and innovate. The corporate landscape is littered with examples of those who failed to do those two things. A zero trust environment enables organizations to lower their risk of incidents while adapting their security posture to fit the ongoing changes of the business. Think of developing new partners, supporting new products remotely, securing a changing supply chain. The basic tenets of MFA – including continuous validation, segmentation and automation – sets a foundation that accommodates those changes without compromising security. The view that security makes change difficult is becoming obsolete. With zero trust and other keys to achieving security resilience, security now is a partner in business change. And for those CISOs who fear even starting this journey, understanding the benefits should help them take that first step.
Download the Security Outcomes Report, Vol. 3: Achieving Security Resilience today.
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I am excited to announce the release of Cisco’s annual flagship cybersecurity report, the Security Outcomes Report, Volume 3: Achieving Security Resilience. It’s about preparing, adapting, and overcoming security challenges and threats, and an organisation’s ability to respond and emerge stronger.It’s the organization’s ability to respond to the inevitable attacks and unexpected events that come our way. In a recent webinar on Security Trends for 2023, the team spoke about laying a good foundation, and when you do, good outcomes will come from that. The Security Outcomes Report, Vol.3 looks at the most important factors that will help you build that foundation and give you the most successful security outcomes.
When it came to the top priority security outcome for organisations, Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) were in line with global findings. Preventing major security incidents and losses, mitigating financial losses from security incidents, and adapting to unexpected external change events or trends, were the top three. Interestingly, security leaders prioritised mitigating financial losses whereas more technical and operational security respondents placed the highest importance on preventing major incidents. It’s of course understandable to have differing focuses at different levels but this highlights the importance of agreeing and communicating shared objectives and goals.
When asked to their rate overall resilience, respondents from France had the highest score in EMEA, closely followed by Italy and the Netherlands. Germany had the lowest score (significantly lower than the rest of region and the globe). Slightly contrary to this, when asked how confident they would be to remain resilient in a ‘worst case’ cybersecurity event, France came out second to last with only 27% saying they are strongly confident. The most confident country is the Netherlands with 54%.
Globally across all sizes of business the security outcome that organizations most struggle with is recruiting and retaining talented security personnel; the UK and Germany also noted this as top, reinforcing the ongoing battle against the security skills gap.
The report analyses the seven success factors that have shown to improve overall security resilience:
I’d encourage you to read the full report, there are some great takeaways on how organizations can improve their resilience with a focus on these areas.
The report is based on an anonymous survey 4,751 active cybersecurity experts from 26 countries. Analysis was done by the Cyentia Institute on behalf of Cisco. EMEA countries represented are France, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Spain, The Netherlands and the UK.
The report is available in English, German and French.
To learn more about the findings from this report and the Duo Trusted Access Report, join our webinar: Trust No One – Secure Everyone: EMEA insights into a Zero Trust approach
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“Where do we start?”
This is the question every CISO asks about every new program. In fact, I ask and answer that question many times a month. There’s a reason for this, of course. A strong start to any project builds momentum, reassures stakeholders, and sets the stage for what’s to come. Security resilience initiatives are no different. Security resilience is the ability to anticipate and respond to unpredictable threats or changes, and then emerge stronger. It’s hard to imagine a more vital undertaking for CISOs. And as with all initiatives, CISOs always want to know where to begin.
They’re likely to find some valuable starting points in the Security Outcomes Report, Volume 3: Achieving Security Resilience, the latest in a series of reports released by Cisco and reflecting the viewpoints of 4,700 IT and security professionals from 26 countries. The report identifies seven success factors CISOs can pursue to improve outcomes within their own enterprise security resilience programs, placing a high priority on security resilience. The seven success factors range in nature from the architectural—simplifying your hybrid IT environment, maximizing zero trust adoption—to more relationship-focused factors.
It’s the latter that caught my eye.
Seven success factors for resilience:
It shouldn’t surprise any CISO that the first two success factors are built around relationships. These factors zero in on relationships with company leadership (as measured by establishing executive support) and relationships with people across the organization (as measured by cultivating a culture of security). Experienced CISOs know that these factors can make or break security initiatives.
Given the objective of security resilience is to withstand threats and come back even stronger, it’s clear that resilience must exist before, during, and after a cybersecurity incident. This has repercussions on the executive level and throughout the business. Lack of executive support can lead to detection, response, and recovery capabilities that are chronically underfunded. This leaves CISOs at a disadvantage when security incidents do inevitably happen and panic strikes the C-suite. What’s more, CISOs who lack strong executive relationships may also find themselves struggling to oversee incident management and coordinate communications. And afterward? Remediating and improving the security posture, which often impacts multiple parts of the organization beyond IT and often requires significant investment, stalls without a necessary lift from leadership.
The security report, which scores resilience levels across a series of criteria, finds that organizations reporting a strong backing from leadership have resilience scores that are 39% higher when compared to organizations reporting weak support. “Bridges to the C-suite are built upon a solid understanding of how the business works and how security initiatives can make it work even better,” notes the report. “Support goes both ways in any relationship, after all.”
In addition to keeping the program aligned, CISOs must keep in communication with their peers and superiors. Those who share only transactional relationships within the C-Suite find their interactions limited to status updates and budget requests. Transformational relationships, however, involve more frequent and deeper communication and interactions, which cover a broader set of topics than submitting the latest budget ask. They are, in other words, more valuable.
Of course, executive support is just one crucial factor for success. Resilience programs need broad support from throughout the organization, not just at the top. Every time an employee picks up a mouse or accesses an app from their mobile phone, they make a choice to either strengthen or lessen the organization’s security posture. Every time an improvement is necessary following a security event, cultural buy-in determines whether this new request from security is implemented or circumvented.
According to the report, organizations that successfully foster a culture of security can see a 46% increase in resilience compared to those who lack such a culture. Much like aligning a program with the business direction furthers leadership buy-in, CISOs need to align security policy with the functional direction of the business—but in a way that helps employees see security measures as protecting not just corporate data and IT assets but also their own future. When employees aren’t on board or see security measures as IT concerns with no relation to them, resilience suffers. “Frequent security policy violations and workarounds,” notes the report, “are evidence of poor security culture.” By viewing policy exceptions as feedback, and investigating these from the perspective of identifying and correcting misalignment, security leaders can enroll employees as the willing participants in the solution—rather than contributors to the problem.
Security leaders know, by and large, what we need to do to secure our organizations. We have frameworks with pages of controls. We have risk registers with lists of action items. Where we often struggle is translating this knowledge into action. To do that, we must see our efforts within the strategic context of executive leaders and the tactical reality of the line managers in our organization. We must personalize and prioritize our efforts around what matters to the people we collaborate with. It is through engaging people that our security programs become human-centric and, in turn, become more resilient.
Where do we start? With relationships. Good relationships lead to good security programs, and good security programs lead to great relationships. And all of these contribute to security resilience.
Download the Security Outcomes Report, Vol. 3: Achieving Security Resilience today.
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Millions of Americans receiving food assistance benefits just earned a new right that they can’t yet enforce: The right to be reimbursed if funds on their Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards are stolen by card skimming devices secretly installed at cash machines and grocery store checkout lanes.
On December 29, 2022, President Biden signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023, which — for the first time ever — includes provisions for the replacement of stolen EBT benefits. This is a big deal because in 2022, organized crime groups began massively targeting EBT accounts — often emptying affected accounts at ATMs immediately after the states disperse funds each month.
EBT cards can be used along with a personal identification number (PIN) to pay for goods at participating stores, and to withdraw cash from an ATM. However, EBT cards differ from debit cards issued to most Americans in two important ways. First, most states do not equip EBT cards with smart chip technology, which can make the cards more difficult and expensive for skimming thieves to clone.
More critically, EBT participants traditionally have had little hope of recovering food assistance funds when their cards were copied by card-skimming devices and used for fraud. That’s because while the EBT programs are operated by individually by the states, those programs are funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which until late last year was barred from reimbursing states for stolen EBT funds.
The protections passed in the 2023 Appropriations Act allow states to use federal funds to replace stolen EBT benefits, and they permit states to seek reimbursement for any skimmed EBT funds they may have replaced from their own coffers (dating back to Oct. 1, 2022).
But first, all 50 states must each submit a plan for how they are going to protect and replace food benefits stolen via card skimming. Guidance for the states in drafting those plans was issued by the USDA on Jan. 31 (PDF), and states that don’t get them done before Feb. 27, 2023 risk losing the ability to be reimbursed for EBT fraud losses.
Deborah Harris is a staff attorney at The Massachusetts Law Reform Institute (MLRI), a nonprofit legal assistance organization that has closely tracked the EBT skimming epidemic. In November 2022, the MLRI filed a class-action lawsuit against Massachusetts on behalf of thousands of low-income families who were collectively robbed of more than $1 million in food assistance benefits by card skimming devices secretly installed at cash machines and grocery store checkout lanes across the state.
Harris said she’s pleased that the USDA guidelines were issued so promptly, and that the guidance for states was not overly prescriptive. For example, some security experts have suggested that adding contactless capability to EBT cards could help participants avoid skimming devices altogether. But Harris said contactless cards do not require a PIN, which is the only thing that stops EBT cards from being drained at the ATM when a participant’s card is lost or stolen.
Then again, nothing in the guidance even mentions chip-based cards, or any other advice for improving the physical security of EBT cards. Rather, it suggests states should seek to develop the capability to perform basic fraud detection and alerting on suspicious transactions, such as when an EBT card that is normally used only in one geographic area suddenly is used to withdraw cash at an ATM halfway across the country.
“Besides having the states move fast to approve their plans, we’d also like to see a focused effort to move states from magstripe-only cards to chip, and also assisting states to develop the algorithms that will enable them to identify likely incidents of stolen benefits,” Harris said.
Harris said Massachusetts has begun using algorithms to look for these suspicious transaction patterns throughout its EBT network, and now has the ability to alert households and verify transactions. But she said most states do not have this capability.
“We have heard that other states aren’t currently able to do that,” Harris said. “But encouraging states to more affirmatively identify instances of likely theft and assisting with the claims and verification process is critical. Most households can’t do that on their own, and in Massachusetts it’s very hard for a person to get a copy of their transaction history. Some states can do that through third-party apps, but something so basic should not be on the burden of EBT households.”
Some states aren’t waiting for direction from the federal government to beef up EBT card security. Like Maryland, which identified more than 1,400 households hit by EBT skimming attacks last year — a tenfold increase over 2021.
Advocates for EBT beneficiaries in Maryland are backing Senate Bill 401 (PDF), which would require the use of chip technology and ongoing monitoring for suspicious activity (a hearing on SB401 is scheduled in the Maryland Senate Finance Commission for Thursday, Feb. 23, at 1 p.m.).
Michelle Salomon Madaio is a director at the Homeless Persons Representation Project, a legal assistance organization based in Silver Spring, Md. Madaio said the bill would require the state Department of Human Services to replace skimmed benefits, not only after the bill goes into effect but also retroactively from January 2020 to the present.
Madaio said the bill also would require the state to monitor for patterns of suspicious activity on EBT cards, and to develop a mechanism to contact potentially affected households.
“For most of the skimming victims we’ve worked with, the fraudulent transactions would be pretty easy to spot because they mostly happened in the middle of the night or out of state, or both,” Madaio said. “To make matters worse, a lot of families whose benefits were scammed then incurred late fees on many other things as a result.”
It is not difficult to see why organized crime groups have pounced on EBT cards as easy money. In most traditional payment card transactions, there are usually several parties that have a financial interest in minimizing fraud and fraud losses, including the bank that issued the card, the card network (Visa, MasterCard, Discover, etc.), and the merchant.
But that infrastructure simply does not exist within state EBT programs, and it certainly isn’t a thing at the inter-state level. What that means is that the vast majority of EBT cards have zero fraud controls, which is exactly what continues to make them so appealing to thieves.
For now, the only fraud controls available to most EBT cardholders include being especially paranoid about where they use their cards, and frequently changing their PINs.
According to USDA guidance issued prior to the passage of the appropriations act, EBT cardholders should consider changing their card PIN at least once a month.
“By changing PINs frequently, at least monthly, and doing so before benefit issuance dates, households can minimize their risk of stolen benefits from a previously skimmed EBT card,” the USDA advised.
This blog was co-authored by Verisign Distinguished Engineer Mike Hollyman and Verisign Director – Engineering Hasan Siddique. It is based on a lightning talk they gave at NANOG 87 in February 2023, the slides from which are available on the NANOG website.
At Verisign, we believe that continuous improvements to the safety and security of the global routing system are critical for the reliability of the internet. As such, we’ve recently embarked on a path to implement Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) within our technology ecosystem as a step toward building a more secure routing system. In this blog, we share our ongoing journey toward RPKI adoption and the lessons we’ve learned as an operator of critical internet infrastructure.
While RPKI is not a silver bullet for securing internet routing, practical adoption of RPKI can deliver significant benefits. This will be a journey of deliberate, measured, and incremental steps towards a larger goal, but we believe the end result will be more than worth it.
Under the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) – the internet’s de-facto inter-domain routing protocol for the last three decades – local routing policies decide where and how internet traffic flows, but each network independently applies its own policies on what actions it takes, if any, with data that connects through its network. For years, “routing by rumor” served the internet well; however, our growing dependence upon the global internet for sensitive and critical communications means that internet infrastructure merits a more robust approach for protecting routing information. Preventing route leaks, mis-originations, and hijacks is a first step.
Verisign was one of the first organizations to join the Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) Network Operator Program in 2017. Ever since the establishment of the program, facilitating routing information – via an Internet Routing Registry (IRR) or RPKI – has been one of the key “actions” of the MANRS program. Verisign has always been fully supportive of MANRS and its efforts to promote a culture of collective responsibility, collaboration, and coordination among network peers in the global internet routing system.
Just as RPKI creates new protections, it also brings new challenges. Mindful of those challenges, but committed to our mission of upholding the security, stability, and resiliency of the internet, Verisign is heading toward RPKI adoption.
In his March 2022 blog titled “Routing Without Rumor: Securing the Internet’s Routing System,” Verisign EVP & CSO, Danny McPherson, discussed how “RPKI creates new external and third-party dependencies that, as adoption continues, ultimately replace the traditionally autonomous operation of the routing system with a more centralized model. If too tightly coupled to the routing system, these dependencies may impact the robustness and resilience of the internet itself.” McPherson’s blog also reviewed the importance of securing the global internet BGP routing system, including utilizing RPKI to help overcome the hurdles that BGP’s implicit trust model presents.
RPKI Route Origin Validation (ROV) is one critical step forward in securing the global BGP system to prevent mis-originations and errors from propagating invalid routing information worldwide. RPKI ROV helps move the needle towards a safer internet. However, just as McPherson pointed out, this comes at the expense of creating a new external dependency within the operational path of Verisign’s critical Domain Name System (DNS) services.
At NANOG 87, we shared our concerns on how systemic and circular dependencies must be acknowledged and mitigated, to the extent possible. The following are some concerns and potential risks related to RPKI:
Additional considerations include:
These items require careful consideration before implementing RPKI, not afterwards.
To better manage potential risks in our journey towards RPKI adoption, we established “day zero” requirements. These included firm conditions that must be met before any further testing could occur, including monitoring data across multiple protocols, coupled with automated ROA/IRR provisioning.
The deliberate decision to take a measured approach has proved rewarding, leaving us better positioned to manage and maintain our data and critical RPKI systems.
Investing engineering cycles in building robust monitoring and automation has increased our awareness of trends and outages based on global and local observability. As a result, operations and support teams benefit from live training on how to respond to RPKI-related events. This has helped us improve operational readiness in response to incidents. Additionally, automation reduces the risk of human error and, when coupled with monitoring, introduces stronger guardrails throughout the provisioning process.
Verisign’s core mission is to enable the world to connect online with reliability and confidence, anytime, anywhere. This means that as we adopt RPKI, we must adhere to strict design principles that don’t risk sacrificing the integrity and availability of DNS data.
Our path to RPKI adoption is just one example of how we continuously strive for improvement and implement new technology, all while ensuring we protect Verisign’s critical DNS services.
While there are obstacles ahead of us, at Verisign we strongly advocate for consistent, focused discipline and continuous improvement. This means our course is set – we are firmly moving toward RPKI adoption.
Our goal is to improve internet routing security programs through efforts such as technology implementation, industry engagement, standards development, open-source contributions, funding, and the identification of shared risks which need to be understood and managed appropriately.
Implementing RPKI at your own organization will require broad investment in your people, processes, and technology stack. At Verisign specifically, we have assigned resources to perform research, increased budgets, completed various risk management tasks, and allocated significant time to development and engineering cycles. While RPKI itself does not address all security issues, there are incremental steps we can collectively take toward building a more resilient internet routing security paradigm.
As stewards of the internet, we are implementing RPKI as the next step in strengthening the security of internet routing information. We look forward to sharing updates on our progress.
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