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Thread hijacking attacks. They happen when someone you know has their email account compromised, and you are suddenly dropped into an existing conversation between the sender and someone else. These missives draw on the recipient’s natural curiosity about being copied on a private discussion, which is modified to include a malicious link or attachment. Here’s the story of a thread hijacking attack in which a journalist was copied on a phishing email from the unwilling subject of a recent scoop.
In Sept. 2023, the Pennsylvania news outlet LancasterOnline.com published a story about Adam Kidan, a wealthy businessman with a criminal past who is a major donor to Republican causes and candidates, including Rep. Lloyd Smucker (R-Pa).
The LancasterOnline story about Adam Kidan.
Several months after that piece ran, the story’s author Brett Sholtis received two emails from Kidan, both of which contained attachments. One of the messages appeared to be a lengthy conversation between Kidan and a colleague, with the subject line, “Re: Successfully sent data.” The second missive was a more brief email from Kidan with the subject, “Acknowledge New Work Order,” and a message that read simply, “Please find the attached.”
Sholtis said he clicked the attachment in one of the messages, which then launched a web page that looked exactly like a Microsoft Office 365 login page. An analysis of the webpage reveals it would check any submitted credentials at the real Microsoft website, and return an error if the user entered bogus account information. A successful login would record the submitted credentials and forward the victim to the real Microsoft website.
But Sholtis said he didn’t enter his Outlook username and password. Instead, he forwarded the messages to LancasterOneline’s IT team, which quickly flagged them as phishing attempts.
LancasterOnline Executive Editor Tom Murse said the two phishing messages from Mr. Kidan raised eyebrows in the newsroom because Kidan had threatened to sue the news outlet multiple times over Sholtis’s story.
“We were just perplexed,” Murse said. “It seemed to be a phishing attempt but we were confused why it would come from a prominent businessman we’ve written about. Our initial response was confusion, but we didn’t know what else to do with it other than to send it to the FBI.”
The phishing lure attached to the thread hijacking email from Mr. Kidan.
In 2006, Kidan was sentenced to 70 months in federal prison after pleading guilty to defrauding lenders along with Jack Abramoff, the disgraced lobbyist whose corruption became a symbol of the excesses of Washington influence peddling. He was paroled in 2009, and in 2014 moved his family to a home in Lancaster County, Pa.
The FBI hasn’t responded to LancasterOnline’s tip. Messages sent by KrebsOnSecurity to Kidan’s emails addresses were returned as blocked. Messages left with Mr. Kidan’s company, Empire Workforce Solutions, went unreturned.
No doubt the FBI saw the messages from Kidan for what they likely were: The result of Mr. Kidan having his Microsoft Outlook account compromised and used to send malicious email to people in his contacts list.
Thread hijacking attacks are hardly new, but that is mainly true because many Internet users still don’t know how to identify them. The email security firm Proofpoint says it has tracked north of 90 million malicious messages in the last five years that leverage this attack method.
One key reason thread hijacking is so successful is that these attacks generally do not include the tell that exposes most phishing scams: A fabricated sense of urgency. A majority of phishing threats warn of negative consequences should you fail to act quickly — such as an account suspension or an unauthorized high-dollar charge going through.
In contrast, thread hijacking campaigns tend to patiently prey on the natural curiosity of the recipient.
Ryan Kalember, chief strategy officer at Proofpoint, said probably the most ubiquitous examples of thread hijacking are “CEO fraud” or “business email compromise” scams, wherein employees are tricked by an email from a senior executive into wiring millions of dollars to fraudsters overseas.
But Kalember said these low-tech attacks can nevertheless be quite effective because they tend to catch people off-guard.
“It works because you feel like you’re suddenly included in an important conversation,” Kalember said. “It just registers a lot differently when people start reading, because you think you’re observing a private conversation between two different people.”
Some thread hijacking attacks actually involve multiple threat actors who are actively conversing while copying — but not addressing — the recipient.
“We call these multi-persona phishing scams, and they’re often paired with thread hijacking,” Kalember said. “It’s basically a way to build a little more affinity than just copying people on an email. And the longer the conversation goes on, the higher their success rate seems to be because some people start replying to the thread [and participating] psycho-socially.”
The best advice to sidestep phishing scams is to avoid clicking on links or attachments that arrive unbidden in emails, text messages and other mediums. If you’re unsure whether the message is legitimate, take a deep breath and visit the site or service in question manually — ideally, using a browser bookmark so as to avoid potential typosquatting sites.
U.S. and U.K. authorities have seized the darknet websites run by LockBit, a prolific and destructive ransomware group that has claimed more than 2,000 victims worldwide and extorted over $120 million in payments. Instead of listing data stolen from ransomware victims who didn’t pay, LockBit’s victim shaming website now offers free recovery tools, as well as news about arrests and criminal charges involving LockBit affiliates.
Investigators used the existing design on LockBit’s victim shaming website to feature press releases and free decryption tools.
Dubbed “Operation Cronos,” the law enforcement action involved the seizure of nearly three-dozen servers; the arrest of two alleged LockBit members; the unsealing of two indictments; the release of a free LockBit decryption tool; and the freezing of more than 200 cryptocurrency accounts thought to be tied to the gang’s activities.
LockBit members have executed attacks against thousands of victims in the United States and around the world, according to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). First surfacing in September 2019, the gang is estimated to have made hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in ransom demands, and extorted over $120 million in ransom payments.
LockBit operated as a ransomware-as-a-service group, wherein the ransomware gang takes care of everything from the bulletproof hosting and domains to the development and maintenance of the malware. Meanwhile, affiliates are solely responsible for finding new victims, and can reap 60 to 80 percent of any ransom amount ultimately paid to the group.
A statement on Operation Cronos from the European police agency Europol said the months-long infiltration resulted in the compromise of LockBit’s primary platform and other critical infrastructure, including the takedown of 34 servers in the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, France, Switzerland, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. Europol said two suspected LockBit actors were arrested in Poland and Ukraine, but no further information has been released about those detained.
The DOJ today unsealed indictments against two Russian men alleged to be active members of LockBit. The government says Russian national Artur Sungatov used LockBit ransomware against victims in manufacturing, logistics, insurance and other companies throughout the United States.
Ivan Gennadievich Kondratyev, a.k.a. “Bassterlord,” allegedly deployed LockBit against targets in the United States, Singapore, Taiwan, and Lebanon. Kondratyev is also charged (PDF) with three criminal counts arising from his alleged use of the Sodinokibi (aka “REvil“) ransomware variant to encrypt data, exfiltrate victim information, and extort a ransom payment from a corporate victim based in Alameda County, California.
With the indictments of Sungatov and Kondratyev, a total of five LockBit affiliates now have been officially charged. In May 2023, U.S. authorities unsealed indictments against two alleged LockBit affiliates, Mikhail “Wazawaka” Matveev and Mikhail Vasiliev.
Vasiliev, 35, of Bradford, Ontario, Canada, is in custody in Canada awaiting extradition to the United States (the complaint against Vasiliev is at this PDF). Matveev remains at large, presumably still in Russia. In January 2022, KrebsOnSecurity published Who is the Network Access Broker ‘Wazawaka,’ which followed clues from Wazawaka’s many pseudonyms and contact details on the Russian-language cybercrime forums back to a 31-year-old Mikhail Matveev from Abaza, RU.
An FBI wanted poster for Matveev.
In June 2023, Russian national Ruslan Magomedovich Astamirov was charged in New Jersey for his participation in the LockBit conspiracy, including the deployment of LockBit against victims in Florida, Japan, France, and Kenya. Astamirov is currently in custody in the United States awaiting trial.
LockBit was known to have recruited affiliates that worked with multiple ransomware groups simultaneously, and it’s unclear what impact this takedown may have on competing ransomware affiliate operations. The security firm ProDaft said on Twitter/X that the infiltration of LockBit by investigators provided “in-depth visibility into each affiliate’s structures, including ties with other notorious groups such as FIN7, Wizard Spider, and EvilCorp.”
In a lengthy thread about the LockBit takedown on the Russian-language cybercrime forum XSS, one of the gang’s leaders said the FBI and the U.K.’s National Crime Agency (NCA) had infiltrated its servers using a known vulnerability in PHP, a scripting language that is widely used in Web development.
Several denizens of XSS wondered aloud why the PHP flaw was not flagged by LockBit’s vaunted “Bug Bounty” program, which promised a financial reward to affiliates who could find and quietly report any security vulnerabilities threatening to undermine LockBit’s online infrastructure.
This prompted several XSS members to start posting memes taunting the group about the security failure.
“Does it mean that the FBI provided a pentesting service to the affiliate program?,” one denizen quipped. “Or did they decide to take part in the bug bounty program? :):)”
Federal investigators also appear to be trolling LockBit members with their seizure notices. LockBit’s data leak site previously featured a countdown timer for each victim organization listed, indicating the time remaining for the victim to pay a ransom demand before their stolen files would be published online. Now, the top entry on the shaming site is a countdown timer until the public doxing of “LockBitSupp,” the unofficial spokesperson or figurehead for the LockBit gang.
“Who is LockbitSupp?” the teaser reads. “The $10m question.”
In January 2024, LockBitSupp told XSS forum members he was disappointed the FBI hadn’t offered a reward for his doxing and/or arrest, and that in response he was placing a bounty on his own head — offering $10 million to anyone who could discover his real name.
“My god, who needs me?,” LockBitSupp wrote on Jan. 22, 2024. “There is not even a reward out for me on the FBI website. By the way, I want to use this chance to increase the reward amount for a person who can tell me my full name from USD 1 million to USD 10 million. The person who will find out my name, tell it to me and explain how they were able to find it out will get USD 10 million. Please take note that when looking for criminals, the FBI uses unclear wording offering a reward of UP TO USD 10 million; this means that the FBI can pay you USD 100, because technically, it’s an amount UP TO 10 million. On the other hand, I am willing to pay USD 10 million, no more and no less.”
Mark Stockley, cybersecurity evangelist at the security firm Malwarebytes, said the NCA is obviously trolling the LockBit group and LockBitSupp.
“I don’t think this is an accident—this is how ransomware groups talk to each other,” Stockley said. “This is law enforcement taking the time to enjoy its moment, and humiliate LockBit in its own vernacular, presumably so it loses face.”
In a press conference today, the FBI said Operation Cronos included investigative assistance from the Gendarmerie-C3N in France; the State Criminal Police Office L-K-A and Federal Criminal Police Office in Germany; Fedpol and Zurich Cantonal Police in Switzerland; the National Police Agency in Japan; the Australian Federal Police; the Swedish Police Authority; the National Bureau of Investigation in Finland; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and the National Police in the Netherlands.
The Justice Department said victims targeted by LockBit should contact the FBI at https://lockbitvictims.ic3.gov/ to determine whether affected systems can be successfully decrypted. In addition, the Japanese Police, supported by Europol, have released a recovery tool designed to recover files encrypted by the LockBit 3.0 Black Ransomware.
In 2021, the exclusive Russian cybercrime forum Mazafaka was hacked. The leaked user database shows one of the forum’s founders was an attorney who advised Russia’s top hackers on the legal risks of their work, and what to do if they got caught. A review of this user’s hacker identities shows that during his time on the forums he served as an officer in the special forces of the GRU, the foreign military intelligence agency of the Russian Federation.
Launched in 2001 under the tagline “Network terrorism,” Mazafaka would evolve into one of the most guarded Russian-language cybercrime communities. The forum’s member roster included a Who’s Who of top Russian cybercriminals, and it featured sub-forums for a wide range of cybercrime specialities, including malware, spam, coding and identity theft.
One representation of the leaked Mazafaka database.
In almost any database leak, the first accounts listed are usually the administrators and early core members. But the Mazafaka user information posted online was not a database file per se, and it was clearly edited, redacted and restructured by whoever released it. As a result, it can be difficult to tell which members are the earliest users.
The original Mazafaka is known to have been launched by a hacker using the nickname “Stalker.” However, the lowest numbered (non-admin) user ID in the Mazafaka database belongs to another individual who used the handle “Djamix,” and the email address djamix@mazafaka[.]ru.
From the forum’s inception until around 2008, Djamix was one of its most active and eloquent contributors. Djamix told forum members he was a lawyer, and nearly all of his posts included legal analyses of various public cases involving hackers arrested and charged with cybercrimes in Russia and abroad.
“Hiding with purely technical parameters will not help in a serious matter,” Djamix advised Maza members in September 2007. “In order to ESCAPE the law, you need to KNOW the law. This is the most important thing. Technical capabilities cannot overcome intelligence and cunning.”
Stalker himself credited Djamix with keeping Mazafaka online for so many years. In a retrospective post published to Livejournal in 2014 titled, “Mazafaka, from conception to the present day,” Stalker said Djamix had become a core member of the community.
“This guy is everywhere,” Stalker said of Djamix. “There’s not a thing on [Mazafaka] that he doesn’t take part in. For me, he is a stimulus-irritant and thanks to him, Maza is still alive. Our rallying force!”
Djamix told other forum denizens he was a licensed attorney who could be hired for remote or in-person consultations, and his posts on Mazafaka and other Russian boards show several hackers facing legal jeopardy likely took him up on this offer.
“I have the right to represent your interests in court,” Djamix said on the Russian-language cybercrime forum Verified in Jan. 2011. “Remotely (in the form of constant support and consultations), or in person – this is discussed separately. As well as the cost of my services.”
A search on djamix@mazafaka[.]ru at DomainTools.com reveals this address has been used to register at least 10 domain names since 2008. Those include several websites about life in and around Sochi, Russia, the site of the 2014 Winter Olympics, as well as a nearby coastal town called Adler. All of those sites say they were registered to an Aleksei Safronov from Sochi who also lists Adler as a hometown.
The breach tracking service Constella Intelligence finds that the phone number associated with those domains — +7.9676442212 — is tied to a Facebook account for an Aleksei Valerievich Safronov from Sochi. Mr. Safronov’s Facebook profile, which was last updated in October 2022, says his ICQ instant messenger number is 53765. This is the same ICQ number assigned to Djamix in the Mazafaka user database.
The Facebook account for Aleksey Safronov.
A “Djamix” account on the forum privetsochi[.]ru (“Hello Sochi”) says this user was born Oct. 2, 1970, and that his website is uposter[.]ru. This Russian language news site’s tagline is, “We Create Communication,” and it focuses heavily on news about Sochi, Adler, Russia and the war in Ukraine, with a strong pro-Kremlin bent.
Safronov’s Facebook profile also gives his Skype username as “Djamixadler,” and it includes dozens of photos of him dressed in military fatigues along with a regiment of soldiers deploying in fairly remote areas of Russia. Some of those photos date back to 2008.
In several of the images, we can see a patch on the arm of Safronov’s jacket that bears the logo of the Spetsnaz GRU, a special forces unit of the Russian military. According to a 2020 report from the Congressional Research Service, the GRU operates both as an intelligence agency — collecting human, cyber, and signals intelligence — and as a military organization responsible for battlefield reconnaissance and the operation of Russia’s Spetsnaz military commando units.
Mr. Safronov posted this image of himself on Facebook in 2016. The insignia of the GRU can be seen on his sleeve.
“In recent years, reports have linked the GRU to some of Russia’s most aggressive and public intelligence operations,” the CRS report explains. “Reportedly, the GRU played a key role in Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and invasion of eastern Ukraine, the attempted assassination of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom, interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, disinformation and propaganda operations, and some of the world’s most damaging cyberattacks.”
According to the Russia-focused investigative news outlet Meduza, in 2014 the Russian Defense Ministry created its “information-operation troops” for action in “cyber-confrontations with potential adversaries.”
“Later, sources in the Defense Ministry explained that these new troops were meant to ‘disrupt the potential adversary’s information networks,'” Meduza reported in 2018. “Recruiters reportedly went looking for ‘hackers who have had problems with the law.'”
Mr. Safronov did not respond to multiple requests for comment. A 2018 treatise written by Aleksei Valerievich Safronov titled “One Hundred Years of GRU Military Intelligence” explains the significance of the bat in the seal of the GRU.
“One way or another, the bat is an emblem that unites all active and retired intelligence officers; it is a symbol of unity and exclusivity,” Safronov wrote. “And, in general, it doesn’t matter who we’re talking about – a secret GRU agent somewhere in the army or a sniper in any of the special forces brigades. They all did and are doing one very important and responsible thing.”
It’s unclear what role Mr. Safronov plays or played in the GRU, but it seems likely the military intelligence agency would have exploited his considerable technical skills, knowledge and connections on the Russian cybercrime forums.
Searching on Safronov’s domain uposter[.]ru in Constella Intelligence reveals that this domain was used in 2022 to register an account at a popular Spanish-language discussion forum dedicated to helping applicants prepare for a career in the Guardia Civil, one of Spain’s two national police forces. Pivoting on that Russian IP in Constella shows three other accounts were created at the same Spanish user forum around the same date.
Mark Rasch is a former cybercrime prosecutor for the U.S. Department of Justice who now serves as chief legal officer for the New York cybersecurity firm Unit 221B. Rasch said there has always been a close relationship between the GRU and the Russian hacker community, noting that in the early 2000s the GRU was soliciting hackers with the skills necessary to hack US banks in order to procure funds to help finance Russia’s war in Chechnya.
“The guy is heavily hooked into the Russian cyber community, and that’s useful for intelligence services,” Rasch said. “He could have been infiltrating the community to monitor it for the GRU. Or he could just be a guy wearing a military uniform.”
On Dec. 18, 2013, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that U.S. retail giant Target was battling a wide-ranging computer intrusion that compromised more than 40 million customer payment cards over the previous month. The malware used in the Target breach included the text string “Rescator,” which also was the handle chosen by the cybercriminal who was selling all of the cards stolen from Target customers. Ten years later, KrebsOnSecurity has uncovered new clues about the real-life identity of Rescator.
Rescator, advertising a new batch of cards stolen in a 2014 breach at P.F. Chang’s.
Shortly after breaking the Target story, KrebsOnSecurity reported that Rescator appeared to be a hacker from Ukraine. Efforts to confirm my reporting with that individual ended when they declined to answer questions, and after I declined to accept a bribe of $10,000 not to run my story.
That reporting was based on clues from an early Russian cybercrime forum in which a hacker named Rescator — using the same profile image that Rescator was known to use on other forums — claimed to have originally been known as “Helkern,” the nickname chosen by the administrator of a cybercrime forum called Darklife.
KrebsOnSecurity began revisiting the research into Rescator’s real-life identity in 2018, after the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed an indictment that named a different Ukrainian man as Helkern.
It may be helpful to first recap why Rescator is thought to be so closely tied to the Target breach. For starters, the text string “Rescator” was found in some of the malware used in the Target breach. Investigators would later determine that a variant of the malware used in the Target breach was used in 2014 to steal 56 million payment cards from Home Depot customers. And once again, cards stolen in the Home Depot breach were sold exclusively at Rescator’s shops.
On Nov. 25, 2013, two days before Target said the breach officially began, Rescator could be seen in instant messages hiring another forum member to verify 400,000 payment cards that Rescator claimed were freshly stolen.
By the first week of December 2013, Rescator’s online store — rescator[.]la — was selling more than six million payment card records stolen from Target customers. Prior to the Target breach, Rescator had mostly sold much smaller batches of stolen card and identity data, and the website allowed cybercriminals to automate the sending of fraudulent wire transfers to money mules based in Lviv, Ukraine.
Finally, there is some honor among thieves, and in the marketplace for stolen payment card data it is considered poor form to advertise a batch of cards as “yours” if you are merely reselling cards sold to you by a third-party card vendor or thief. When serious stolen payment card shop vendors wish to communicate that a batch of cards is uniquely their handiwork or that of their immediate crew, they refer to it as “our base.” And Rescator was quite clear in his advertisements that these millions of cards were obtained firsthand.
The new clues about Rescator’s identity came into focus when I revisited the reporting around an April 2013 story here that identified the author of the OSX Flashback Trojan, an early Mac malware strain that quickly spread to more than 650,000 Mac computers worldwide in 2012.
That story about the Flashback author was possible because a source had obtained a Web browser authentication cookie for a founding member of a Russian cybercrime forum called BlackSEO. Anyone in possession of that cookie could then browse the invite-only BlackSEO forum and read the user’s private messages without having to log in.
BlackSEO.com VIP member “Mavook” tells forum admin Ika in a private message that he is the Flashback author.
The legitimate owner of that BlackSEO user cookie went by the nickname Ika, and Ika’s private messages on the forum showed he was close friends with the Flashback author. At the time, Ika also was the administrator of Pustota[.]pw — a closely-guarded Russian forum that counted among its members some of the world’s most successful and established spammers and malware writers.
For many years, Ika held a key position at one of Russia’s largest Internet service providers, and his (mostly glowing) reputation as a reliable provider of web hosting to the Russian cybercrime community gave him an encyclopedic knowledge about nearly every major player in that scene at the time.
The story on the Flashback author featured redacted screenshots that were taken from Ika’s BlackSEO account (see image above). The day after that story ran, Ika posted a farewell address to his mates, expressing shock and bewilderment over the apparent compromise of his BlackSEO account.
In a lengthy post on April 4, 2013 titled “I DON’T UNDERSTAND ANYTHING,” Ika told Pustota forum members he was so spooked by recent events that he was closing the forum and quitting the cybercrime business entirely. Ika recounted how the Flashback story had come the same week that rival cybercriminals tried to “dox” him (their dox named the wrong individual, but included some of Ika’s more guarded identities).
“It’s no secret that karma farted in my direction,” Ika said at the beginning of his post. Unbeknownst to Ika at the time, his Pustota forum also had been completely hacked that week, and a copy of its database shared with this author.
A Google translated version of the farewell post from Ika, the administrator of Pustota, a Russian language cybercrime forum focused on botnets and spam. Click to enlarge.
Ika said the two individuals who tried to dox him did so on an even more guarded Russian language forum — DirectConnection[.]ws, perhaps the most exclusive Russian cybercrime community ever created. New applicants of this forum had to pay a non-refundable deposit, and receive vouches by three established cybercriminals already on the forum. Even if one managed to steal (or guess) a user’s DirectConnection password, the login page could not be reached unless the visitor also possessed a special browser certificate that the forum administrator gave only to approved members.
In no uncertain terms, Ika declared that Rescator went by the nickname MikeMike on DirectConnection:
“I did not want to bring any of this to real life. Especially since I knew the patron of the clowns – specifically Pavel Vrublevsky. Yes, I do state with confidence that the man with the nickname Rescator a.k.a. MikeMike with his partner Pipol have been Pavel Vrublevsky’s puppets for a long time.”
Pavel Vrublevsky is a convicted cybercriminal who became famous as the CEO of the Russian e-payments company ChronoPay, which specialized in facilitating online payments for a variety of “high-risk” businesses, including gambling, pirated Mp3 files, rogue antivirus software and “male enhancement” pills.
As detailed in my 2014 book Spam Nation, Vrublevsky not-so-secretly ran a pharmacy affiliate spam program called Rx-Promotion, which paid spammers and virus writers to blast out tens of billions of junk emails advertising generic Viagra and controlled pharmaceuticals like pain relief medications. Much of my reporting on Vrublevsky’s cybercrime empire came from several years worth of internal ChronoPay emails and documents that were leaked online in 2010 and 2011.
Pavel Vrublevsky’s former Facebook profile photo.
In 2014, KrebsOnSecurity learned from a trusted source close to the Target breach investigation that the user MikeMike on DirectConnection — the same account that Ika said belonged to Rescator — used the email address “zaxvatmira@gmail.com.”
At the time, KrebsOnSecurity could not connect that email address to anything or anyone. However, a recent search on zaxvatmira@gmail.com at the breach tracking service Constella Intelligence returns just one result: An account created in November 2010 at the site searchengines[.]ru under the handle “r-fac1.”
A search on “r-fac1” at cyber intelligence firm Intel 471 revealed that this user’s introductory post on searchengines[.]ru advertised musictransferonline[.]com, an affiliate program that paid people to drive traffic to sites that sold pirated music files for pennies apiece.
According to leaked ChronoPay emails from 2010, this domain was registered and paid for by ChronoPay. Those missives also show that in August 2010 Vrublevsky authorized a payment of ~$1,200 for a multi-user license of an Intranet service called MegaPlan.
ChronoPay used the MegaPlan service to help manage the sprawling projects that Vrublevsky referred to internally as their “black” payment processing operations, including pirated pills, porn, Mp3s, and fake antivirus products. ChronoPay employees used their MegaPlan accounts to track payment disputes, order volumes, and advertising partnerships for these high-risk programs.
Borrowing a page from the Quentin Tarantino movie Reservoir Dogs, the employees adopted nicknames like “Mr. Kink,” “Mr. Heppner,” and “Ms. Nati.” However, in a classic failure of operational security, many of these employees had their MegaPlan account messages automatically forwarded to their real ChronoPay email accounts.
A screen shot of the org chart from ChronoPay’s MegaPlan Intranet system.
When ChronoPay’s internal emails were leaked in 2010, the username and password for its MegaPlan subscription were still working and valid. An internal user directory for that subscription included the personal (non-ChronoPay) email address tied to each employee Megaplan nickname. That directory listing said the email address zaxvatmira@gmail.com was assigned to the head of the Media/Mp3 division for ChronoPay, pictured at the top left of the organizational chart above as “Babushka Vani and Koli.”
[Author’s note: I initially overlooked the presence of the email address zaxvatmira@gmail.com in my notes because it did not show up in text searches of my saved emails, files or messages. I rediscovered it recently when a text search for zaxvatmira@gmail.com on my Mac found the address in a screenshot of the ChronoPay MegaPlan interface.]
The nickname two rungs down from “Babushka” in the ChronoPay org chart is “Lev Tolstoy,” which the MegaPlan service showed was picked by someone who used the email address v.zhabukin@freefrog-co-ru.
ChronoPay’s emails show that this Freefrog email address belongs to a Vasily Borisovich Zhabykin from Moscow. The Russian business tracking website rusprofile[.]ru reports that Zhabykin is or was the supervisor or owner of three Russian organizations, including one called JSC Hot Spot.
[Author’s note: The word “babushka” means “grandma” in Russian, and it could be that this nickname is a nod to the ChronoPay CEO’s wife, Vera. The leaked ChronoPay emails show that Vera Vrublevsky managed a group of hackers working with their media division, and was at least nominally in charge of MP3 projects for ChronoPay. Indeed, in messages exposed by the leaked ChronoPay email cache, Zhabykin stated that he was “directly subordinate” to Mrs. Vrublevsky].
JSC Hot Spot is interesting because its co-founder is another ChronoPay employee: 37-year-old Mikhail “Mike” Shefel. A Facebook profile for Mr. Shefel says he is or was vice president of payment systems at ChronoPay. However, the last update on that profile is from 2018, when Shefel appears to have legally changed his last name.
Archive.org shows that Hot Spot’s website — myhotspot[.]ru — sold a variety of consulting services, including IT security assessments, code and system audits, and email marketing. The earliest recorded archive of the Hot Spot website listed three clients on its homepage, including ChronoPay and Freefrog.
ChronoPay internal emails show that Freefrog was one of its investment projects that facilitated the sale of pirated Mp3 files. Rusprofile[.]ru reports that Freefrog’s official company name — JSC Freefrog — is incorporated by a thinly-documented entity based in the Seychelles called Impex Consulting Ltd., and it is unclear who its true owners are.
However, a search at DomainTools.com on the phone number listed on the homepage of myhotspot[.]ru (74957809554) reveals that number is associated with eight domain names.
Six of those domains are some variation of FreeFrog. Another domain registered to that phone number is bothunter[.]me, which included a copyright credit to “Hot Spot 2011.” At the annual Russian Internet Week IT convention in Moscow in 2012, Mr. Shefel gave a short presentation about bothunter, which he described as a service he designed to identify inauthentic (bot) accounts on Russian social media networks.
Interestingly, one of r-fac1’s first posts to Searchengines[.]ru a year earlier saw this user requesting help from other members who had access to large numbers of hacked social media accounts. R-fac1 told forum members that he was only looking to use those accounts to post harmless links and comments to the followers of the hacked profiles, and his post suggested he was testing something.
“Good afternoon,” r-fac1 wrote on Dec. 20, 2010. “I’m looking for people with their own not-recently-registered accounts on forums, (except for search) Social networks, Twitter, blogs, their websites. Tasks, depending on your accounts, post text and a link, sometimes just a link. Most often the topic is chatter, relaxation, discussion. Posting my links in your profiles, on your walls. A separate offer for people with a large set of contacts in instant messengers to try to use viral marketing.”
Neither Mr. Shefel nor Mr. Zhabykin responded to requests for comment.
Mr. Zhabykin soon moved on to bigger ventures, co-founding a cryptocurrency exchange based in Moscow’s financial center called Suex. In September 2021, Suex earned the distinction of becoming the first crypto firm to be sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, which effectively blocked Suex from the global financial system. The Treasury alleged Suex helped to process millions in criminal transactions, including the proceeds of numerous ransomware attacks.
“I don’t understand how I got mixed up in this,” Zhabykin told The New York Times in 2021. Zhabykin said Suex, which is registered in the Czech Republic, was mostly a failure and had conducted only a half dozen or so transactions since 2019.
The Russian business tracking service Rusprofile says Zhabykin also is the owner of a company based in the United Kingdom called RideWithLocal; the company’s website says it specializes in arranging excursions for extreme sports, including snowboarding, skiing, surfing and parasailing. Images from the RideWithLocal Facebook page show helicopters dropping snowboarders and skiers atop some fairly steep mountains.
A screenshot from the Facebook page of RideWithLocal.
Constella Intelligence found a cached copy of a now-deleted LinkedIn profile for Mr. Zhabykin, who described himself as a “sporttech/fintech specialist and mentor.”
“I create products and services worldwide, focusing on innovation and global challenges,” his LinkedIn profile said. “I’ve started my career in 2002 and since then I worked in Moscow, different regions of Russia, including Siberia and in Finland, Brazil, United Kingdom, Sri Lanka. Over the last 15 years I contributed to many amazing products in the following industries: sports, ecology, sport tech, fin tech, electronic payments, big data, telecommunications, pulp and paper industry, wood processing and travel. My specialities are Product development, Mentorship, Strategy and Business development.”
Rusprofile reports that Mikhail Borisovich Shefel is associated with at least eight current or now-defunct companies in Russia, including Dengi IM (Money IM), Internet Capital, Internet Lawyer, Internet 2, Zao Hot Spot, and (my personal favorite) an entity incorporated in 2021 called “All the Money in the World.”
Constella Intelligence found several official documents for Mr. Shefel that came from hacked Russian phone, automobile and residence records. They indicate Mr. Shefel is the registrant of a black Porsche Cayenne (Plate:X537SR197) and a Mercedes (Plate:P003PX90). Those vehicle records show Mr. Shefel was born on May 28, 1986.
Rusprofile reveals that at some point near the end of 2018, Shefel changed his last name to Lenin. DomainTools reports that in 2018, Mr. Shefel’s company Internet 2 LLC registered the domain name Lenin[.]me. This now-defunct service sold physical USSR-era Ruble notes that bear the image of Vladimir Lenin, the founding father of the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, Pavel Vrublevsky remains imprisoned in Russia, awaiting trial on fraud charges levied against the payment company CEO in March 2022. Authorities allege Vrublevsky operated several fraudulent SMS-based payment schemes. They also accused Vrublevsky of facilitating money laundering for Hydra, the largest Russian darknet market. Hydra trafficked in illegal drugs and financial services, including cryptocurrency tumbling for money laundering, exchange services between cryptocurrency and Russian rubles, and the sale of falsified documents and hacking services.
In 2013, Vrublevsky was sentenced to 2.5 years in a Russian penal colony for convincing one of his top spammers and botmasters to launch a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against a ChronoPay competitor that shut down the ticketing system for the state-owned Aeroflot airline.
Following his release, Vrublevsky began working on a new digital payments platform based in Hong Kong called HPay Ltd (a.k.a. Hong Kong Processing Corporation). HPay appears to have had a great number of clients that were running schemes which bamboozled people with fake lotteries and prize contests.
KrebsOnSecurity sought comment on this research from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Secret Service, both of which have been involved in the Target breach investigation over the years. The FBI declined to comment. The Secret Service declined to confirm or dispute any of the findings, but said it is still interested in hearing from anyone who might have more information.
“The U.S. Secret Service does not comment on any open investigation and won’t confirm or deny the accuracy in any reporting related to a criminal manner,” the agency said in a written statement. “However, If you have any information relating to the subjects referenced in this article, please contact the U.S. Secret Service at mostwanted@usss.dhs.gov. The Secret Service pays a reward for information leading to the arrest of cybercriminals.”
The top-level domain for the United States — .US — is home to thousands of newly-registered domains tied to a malicious link shortening service that facilitates malware and phishing scams, new research suggests. The findings come close on the heels of a report that identified .US domains as among the most prevalent in phishing attacks over the past year.
Researchers at Infoblox say they’ve been tracking what appears to be a three-year-old link shortening service that is catering to phishers and malware purveyors. Infoblox found the domains involved are typically three to seven characters long, and hosted on bulletproof hosting providers that charge a premium to ignore any abuse or legal complaints. The short domains don’t host any content themselves, but are used to obfuscate the real address of landing pages that try to phish users or install malware.
A graphic describing the operations of a malicious link shortening service that Infoblox has dubbed “Prolific Puma.”
Infoblox says it’s unclear how the phishing and malware landing pages tied to this service are being initially promoted, although they suspect it is mainly through scams targeting people on their phones via SMS. A new report says the company mapped the contours of this link shortening service thanks in part to pseudo-random patterns in the short domains, which all appear on the surface to be a meaningless jumble of letters and numbers.
“This came to our attention because we have systems that detect registrations that use domain name generation algorithms,” said Renee Burton, head of threat intelligence at Infoblox. “We have not found any legitimate content served through their shorteners.”
Infoblox determined that until May 2023, domains ending in .info accounted for the bulk of new registrations tied to the malicious link shortening service, which Infoblox has dubbed “Prolific Puma.” Since then, they found that whoever is responsible for running the service has used .US for approximately 55 percent of the total domains created, with several dozen new malicious .US domains registered daily.
.US is overseen by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an executive branch agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. But Uncle Sam has long outsourced the management of .US to various private companies, which have gradually allowed the United States’s top-level domain to devolve into a cesspool of phishing activity.
Or so concludes The Interisle Consulting Group, which gathers phishing data from multiple industry sources and publishes an annual report on the latest trends. As far back as 2018, Interisle found .US domains were the worst in the world for spam, botnet (attack infrastructure for DDOS etc.) and illicit or harmful content.
Interisle’s newest study examined six million phishing reports between May 1, 2022 and April 30, 2023, and identified approximately 30,000 .US phishing domains. Interisle found significant numbers of .US domains were registered to attack some of the United States’ most prominent companies, including Bank of America, Amazon, Apple, AT&T, Citi, Comcast, Microsoft, Meta, and Target. Others were used to impersonate or attack U.S. government agencies.
Under NTIA regulations, domain registrars processing .US domain registrations must take certain steps (PDF) to verify that those customers actually reside in the United States, or else own organizations based in the U.S. However, if one registers a .US domain through GoDaddy — the largest domain registrar and the current administrator of the .US contract — the way one “proves” their U.S. nexus is simply by choosing from one of three pre-selected affirmative responses.
In an age when most domain registrars are automatically redacting customer information from publicly accessible registration records to avoid running afoul of European privacy laws, .US has remained something of an outlier because its charter specifies that all registration records be made public. However, Infoblox said it found more than 2,000 malicious link shortener domains ending in .US registered since October 2023 through NameSilo that have somehow subverted the transparency requirements for the usTLD and converted to private registrations.
“Through our own experience with NameSilo, it is not possible to select private registration for domains in the usTLD through their interface,” Infoblox wrote. “And yet, it was done. Of the total domains with private records, over 99% were registered with NameSilo. At this time, we are not able to explain this behavior.”
NameSilo CEO Kristaps Ronka said the company actively responds to reports about abusive domains, but that it hasn’t seen any abuse reports related to Infoblox’s findings.
“We take down hundreds to thousands of domains, lots of them proactively to combat abuse,” Ronka said. “Our current abuse rate on abuseIQ for example is currently at 0%. AbuseIQ receives reports from countless sources and we are yet to see these ‘Puma’ abuse reports.”
Experts who track domains associated with malware and phishing say even phony information supplied at registration is useful in identifying potentially malicious or phishous domains before they can be used for abuse.
For example, when it was registered through NameSilo in July 2023, the domain 1ox[.]us — like thousands of others — listed its registrant as “Leila Puma” at a street address in Poland, and the email address blackpumaoct33@ukr.net. But according to DomainTools.com, on Oct. 1, 2023 those records were redacted and hidden by NameSilo.
Infoblox notes that the username portion of the email address appears to be a reference to the song October 33 by the Black Pumas, an Austin, Texas based psychedelic soul band. The Black Pumas aren’t exactly a household name, but they did recently have a popular Youtube video that featured a cover of the Kinks song “Strangers,” which included an emotional visual narrative about Ukrainians seeking refuge from the Russian invasion, titled “Ukraine Strangers.” Also, Leila Puma’s email address is at a Ukrainian email provider.
DomainTools shows that hundreds of other malicious domains tied to Prolific Puma previously were registered through NameCheap to a “Josef Bakhovsky” at a different street address in Poland. According to ancestry.com, the anglicized version of this surname — Bakovski — is the traditional name for someone from Bakowce, which is now known as Bakivtsi and is in Ukraine.
This possible Polish and/or Ukrainian connection may or may not tell us something about the “who” behind this link shortening service, but those details are useful for identifying and grouping these malicious short domains. However, even this meager visibility into .US registration data is now under threat.
The NTIA recently published a proposal that would allow registrars to redact all registrant data from WHOIS registration records for .US domains. A broad array of industry groups have filed comments opposing the proposed changes, saying they threaten to remove the last vestiges of accountability for a top-level domain that is already overrun with cybercrime activity.
Infoblox’s Burton says Prolific Puma is remarkable because they’ve been able to facilitate malicious activities for years while going largely unnoticed by the security industry.
“This exposes how persistent the criminal economy can be at a supply chain level,” Burton said. “We’re always looking at the end malware or phishing page, but what we’re finding here is that there’s this middle layer of DNS threat actors persisting for years without notice.”
Infoblox’s full report on Prolific Puma is here.
A new breach involving data from nine million AT&T customers is a fresh reminder that your mobile provider likely collects and shares a great deal of information about where you go and what you do with your mobile device — unless and until you affirmatively opt out of this data collection. Here’s a primer on why you might want to do that, and how.
Image: Shutterstock
Telecommunications giant AT&T disclosed this month that a breach at a marketing vendor exposed certain account information for nine million customers. AT&T said the data exposed did not include sensitive information, such as credit card or Social Security numbers, or account passwords, but was limited to “Customer Proprietary Network Information” (CPNI), such as the number of lines on an account.
Certain questions may be coming to mind right now, like “What the heck is CPNI?” And, ‘If it’s so ‘customer proprietary,’ why is AT&T sharing it with marketers?” Also maybe, “What can I do about it?” Read on for answers to all three questions.
AT&T’s disclosure said the information exposed included customer first name, wireless account number, wireless phone number and email address. In addition, a small percentage of customer records also exposed the rate plan name, past due amounts, monthly payment amounts and minutes used.
CPNI refers to customer-specific “metadata” about the account and account usage, and may include:
-Called phone numbers
-Time of calls
-Length of calls
-Cost and billing of calls
-Service features
-Premium services, such as directory call assistance
According to a succinct CPNI explainer at TechTarget, CPNI is private and protected information that cannot be used for advertising or marketing directly.
“An individual’s CPNI can be shared with other telecommunications providers for network operating reasons,” wrote TechTarget’s Gavin Wright. “So, when the individual first signs up for phone service, this information is automatically shared by the phone provider to partner companies.”
Is your mobile Internet usage covered by CPNI laws? That’s less clear, as the CPNI rules were established before mobile phones and wireless Internet access were common. TechTarget’s CPNI primer explains:
“Under current U.S. law, cellphone use is only protected as CPNI when it is being used as a telephone. During this time, the company is acting as a telecommunications provider requiring CPNI rules. Internet use, websites visited, search history or apps used are not protected CPNI because the company is acting as an information services provider not subject to these laws.”
Hence, the carriers can share and sell this data because they’re not explicitly prohibited from doing so. All three major carriers say they take steps to anonymize the customer data they share, but researchers have shown it is not terribly difficult to de-anonymize supposedly anonymous web-browsing data.
“Your phone, and consequently your mobile provider, know a lot about you,” wrote Jack Morse for Mashable. “The places you go, apps you use, and the websites you visit potentially reveal all kinds of private information — e.g. religious beliefs, health conditions, travel plans, income level, and specific tastes in pornography. This should bother you.”
Happily, all of the U.S. carriers are required to offer customers ways to opt out of having data about how they use their devices shared with marketers. Here’s a look at some of the carrier-specific practices and opt-out options.
AT&T’s policy says it shares device or “ad ID”, combined with demographics including age range, gender, and ZIP code information with third parties which explicitly include advertisers, programmers, and networks, social media networks, analytics firms, ad networks and other similar companies that are involved in creating and delivering advertisements.
AT&T said the data exposed on 9 million customers was several years old, and mostly related to device upgrade eligibility. This may sound like the data went to just one of its partners who experienced a breach, but in all likelihood it also went to hundreds of AT&T’s partners.
AT&T’s CPNI opt-out page says it shares CPNI data with several of its affiliates, including WarnerMedia, DirecTV and Cricket Wireless. Until recently, AT&T also shared CPNI data with Xandr, whose privacy policy in turn explains that it shares data with hundreds of other advertising firms. Microsoft bought Xandr from AT&T last year.
According to the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), T-Mobile seems to be the only company out of the big three to extend to all customers the rights conferred by the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).
EPIC says T-Mobile customer data sold to third parties uses another unique identifier called mobile advertising IDs or “MAIDs.” T-Mobile claims that MAIDs don’t directly identify consumers, but under the CCPA MAIDs are considered “personal information” that can be connected to IP addresses, mobile apps installed or used with the device, any video or content viewing information, and device activity and attributes.
T-Mobile customers can opt out by logging into their account and navigating to the profile page, then to “Privacy and Notifications.” From there, toggle off the options for “Use my data for analytics and reporting” and “Use my data to make ads more relevant to me.”
Verizon’s privacy policy says it does not sell information that personally identities customers (e.g., name, telephone number or email address), but it does allow third-party advertising companies to collect information about activity on Verizon websites and in Verizon apps, through MAIDs, pixels, web beacons and social network plugins.
According to Wired.com’s tutorial, Verizon users can opt out by logging into their Verizon account through a web browser or the My Verizon mobile app. From there, select the Account tab, then click Account Settings and Privacy Settings on the web. For the mobile app, click the gear icon in the upper right corner and then Manage Privacy Settings.
On the privacy preferences page, web users can choose “Don’t use” under the Custom Experience section. On the My Verizon app, toggle any green sliders to the left.
EPIC notes that all three major carriers say resetting the consumer’s device ID and/or clearing cookies in the browser will similarly reset any opt-out preferences (i.e., the customer will need to opt out again), and that blocking cookies by default may also block the opt-out cookie from being set.
T-Mobile says its opt out is device-specific and/or browser-specific. “In most cases, your opt-out choice will apply only to the specific device or browser on which it was made. You may need to separately opt out from your other devices and browsers.”
Both AT&T and Verizon offer opt-in programs that gather and share far more information, including device location, the phone numbers you call, and which sites you visit using your mobile and/or home Internet connection. AT&T calls this their Enhanced Relevant Advertising Program; Verizon’s is called Custom Experience Plus.
In 2021, multiple media outlets reported that some Verizon customers were being automatically enrolled in Custom Experience Plus — even after those customers had already opted out of the same program under its previous name — “Verizon Selects.”
If none of the above opt out options work for you, at a minimum you should be able to opt out of CPNI sharing by calling your carrier, or by visiting one of their stores.
Why should you opt out of sharing CPNI data? For starters, some of the nation’s largest wireless carriers don’t have a great track record in terms of protecting the sensitive information that you give them solely for the purposes of becoming a customer — let alone the information they collect about your use of their services after that point.
In January 2023, T-Mobile disclosed that someone stole data on 37 million customer accounts, including customer name, billing address, email, phone number, date of birth, T-Mobile account number and plan details. In August 2021, T-Mobile acknowledged that hackers made off with the names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers and driver’s license/ID information on more than 40 million current, former or prospective customers who applied for credit with the company.
Last summer, a cybercriminal began selling the names, email addresses, phone numbers, SSNs and dates of birth on 23 million Americans. An exhaustive analysis of the data strongly suggested it all belonged to customers of one AT&T company or another. AT&T stopped short of saying the data wasn’t theirs, but said the records did not appear to have come from its systems and may be tied to a previous data incident at another company.
However frequently the carriers may alert consumers about CPNI breaches, it’s probably nowhere near often enough. Currently, the carriers are required to report a consumer CPNI breach only in cases “when a person, without authorization or exceeding authorization, has intentionally gained access to, used or disclosed CPNI.”
But that definition of breach was crafted eons ago, back when the primary way CPNI was exposed was through “pretexting,” such when the phone company’s employees are tricked into giving away protected customer data.
In January, regulators at the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) proposed amending the definition of “breach” to include things like inadvertent disclosure — such as when companies expose CPNI data on a poorly-secured server in the cloud. The FCC is accepting public comments on the matter until March 24, 2023.
While it’s true that the leak of CPNI data does not involve sensitive information like Social Security or credit card numbers, one thing AT&T’s breach notice doesn’t mention is that CPNI data — such as balances and payments made — can be abused by fraudsters to make scam emails and text messages more believable when they’re trying to impersonate AT&T and phish AT&T customers.
The other problem with letting companies share or sell your CPNI data is that the wireless carriers can change their privacy policies at any time, and you are assumed to be okay with those changes as long as you keep using their services.
For example, location data from your wireless device is most definitely CPNI, and yet until very recently all of the major carriers sold their customers’ real-time location data to third party data brokers without customer consent.
What was their punishment? In 2020, the FCC proposed fines totaling $208 million against all of the major carriers for selling their customers’ real-time location data. If that sounds like a lot of money, consider that all of the major wireless providers reported tens of billions of dollars in revenue last year (e.g., Verizon’s consumer revenue alone was more than $100 billion last year).
If the United States had federal privacy laws that were at all consumer-friendly and relevant to today’s digital economy, this kind of data collection and sharing would always be opt-in by default. In such a world, the enormously profitable wireless industry would likely be forced to offer clear financial incentives to customers who choose to share this information.
But until that day arrives, understand that the carriers can change their data collection and sharing policies when it suits them. And regardless of whether you actually read any notices about changes to their privacy policies, you will have agreed to those changes as long as you continue using their service.
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Millions of Americans receiving food assistance benefits just earned a new right that they can’t yet enforce: The right to be reimbursed if funds on their Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards are stolen by card skimming devices secretly installed at cash machines and grocery store checkout lanes.
On December 29, 2022, President Biden signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023, which — for the first time ever — includes provisions for the replacement of stolen EBT benefits. This is a big deal because in 2022, organized crime groups began massively targeting EBT accounts — often emptying affected accounts at ATMs immediately after the states disperse funds each month.
EBT cards can be used along with a personal identification number (PIN) to pay for goods at participating stores, and to withdraw cash from an ATM. However, EBT cards differ from debit cards issued to most Americans in two important ways. First, most states do not equip EBT cards with smart chip technology, which can make the cards more difficult and expensive for skimming thieves to clone.
More critically, EBT participants traditionally have had little hope of recovering food assistance funds when their cards were copied by card-skimming devices and used for fraud. That’s because while the EBT programs are operated by individually by the states, those programs are funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which until late last year was barred from reimbursing states for stolen EBT funds.
The protections passed in the 2023 Appropriations Act allow states to use federal funds to replace stolen EBT benefits, and they permit states to seek reimbursement for any skimmed EBT funds they may have replaced from their own coffers (dating back to Oct. 1, 2022).
But first, all 50 states must each submit a plan for how they are going to protect and replace food benefits stolen via card skimming. Guidance for the states in drafting those plans was issued by the USDA on Jan. 31 (PDF), and states that don’t get them done before Feb. 27, 2023 risk losing the ability to be reimbursed for EBT fraud losses.
Deborah Harris is a staff attorney at The Massachusetts Law Reform Institute (MLRI), a nonprofit legal assistance organization that has closely tracked the EBT skimming epidemic. In November 2022, the MLRI filed a class-action lawsuit against Massachusetts on behalf of thousands of low-income families who were collectively robbed of more than $1 million in food assistance benefits by card skimming devices secretly installed at cash machines and grocery store checkout lanes across the state.
Harris said she’s pleased that the USDA guidelines were issued so promptly, and that the guidance for states was not overly prescriptive. For example, some security experts have suggested that adding contactless capability to EBT cards could help participants avoid skimming devices altogether. But Harris said contactless cards do not require a PIN, which is the only thing that stops EBT cards from being drained at the ATM when a participant’s card is lost or stolen.
Then again, nothing in the guidance even mentions chip-based cards, or any other advice for improving the physical security of EBT cards. Rather, it suggests states should seek to develop the capability to perform basic fraud detection and alerting on suspicious transactions, such as when an EBT card that is normally used only in one geographic area suddenly is used to withdraw cash at an ATM halfway across the country.
“Besides having the states move fast to approve their plans, we’d also like to see a focused effort to move states from magstripe-only cards to chip, and also assisting states to develop the algorithms that will enable them to identify likely incidents of stolen benefits,” Harris said.
Harris said Massachusetts has begun using algorithms to look for these suspicious transaction patterns throughout its EBT network, and now has the ability to alert households and verify transactions. But she said most states do not have this capability.
“We have heard that other states aren’t currently able to do that,” Harris said. “But encouraging states to more affirmatively identify instances of likely theft and assisting with the claims and verification process is critical. Most households can’t do that on their own, and in Massachusetts it’s very hard for a person to get a copy of their transaction history. Some states can do that through third-party apps, but something so basic should not be on the burden of EBT households.”
Some states aren’t waiting for direction from the federal government to beef up EBT card security. Like Maryland, which identified more than 1,400 households hit by EBT skimming attacks last year — a tenfold increase over 2021.
Advocates for EBT beneficiaries in Maryland are backing Senate Bill 401 (PDF), which would require the use of chip technology and ongoing monitoring for suspicious activity (a hearing on SB401 is scheduled in the Maryland Senate Finance Commission for Thursday, Feb. 23, at 1 p.m.).
Michelle Salomon Madaio is a director at the Homeless Persons Representation Project, a legal assistance organization based in Silver Spring, Md. Madaio said the bill would require the state Department of Human Services to replace skimmed benefits, not only after the bill goes into effect but also retroactively from January 2020 to the present.
Madaio said the bill also would require the state to monitor for patterns of suspicious activity on EBT cards, and to develop a mechanism to contact potentially affected households.
“For most of the skimming victims we’ve worked with, the fraudulent transactions would be pretty easy to spot because they mostly happened in the middle of the night or out of state, or both,” Madaio said. “To make matters worse, a lot of families whose benefits were scammed then incurred late fees on many other things as a result.”
It is not difficult to see why organized crime groups have pounced on EBT cards as easy money. In most traditional payment card transactions, there are usually several parties that have a financial interest in minimizing fraud and fraud losses, including the bank that issued the card, the card network (Visa, MasterCard, Discover, etc.), and the merchant.
But that infrastructure simply does not exist within state EBT programs, and it certainly isn’t a thing at the inter-state level. What that means is that the vast majority of EBT cards have zero fraud controls, which is exactly what continues to make them so appealing to thieves.
For now, the only fraud controls available to most EBT cardholders include being especially paranoid about where they use their cards, and frequently changing their PINs.
According to USDA guidance issued prior to the passage of the appropriations act, EBT cardholders should consider changing their card PIN at least once a month.
“By changing PINs frequently, at least monthly, and doing so before benefit issuance dates, households can minimize their risk of stolen benefits from a previously skimmed EBT card,” the USDA advised.
Identity thieves have been exploiting a glaring security weakness in the website of Experian, one of the big three consumer credit reporting bureaus. Normally, Experian requires that those seeking a copy of their credit report successfully answer several multiple choice questions about their financial history. But until the end of 2022, Experian’s website allowed anyone to bypass these questions and go straight to the consumer’s report. All that was needed was the person’s name, address, birthday and Social Security number.
The vulnerability in Experian’s website was exploitable after one applied to see their credit file via annualcreditreport.com.
In December, KrebsOnSecurity heard from Jenya Kushnir, a security researcher living in Ukraine who said he discovered the method being used by identity thieves after spending time on Telegram chat channels dedicated to the cashing out of compromised identities.
“I want to try and help to put a stop to it and make it more difficult for [ID thieves] to access, since [Experian is] not doing shit and regular people struggle,” Kushnir wrote in an email to KrebsOnSecurity explaining his motivations for reaching out. “If somehow I can make small change and help to improve this, inside myself I can feel that I did something that actually matters and helped others.”
Kushnir said the crooks learned they could trick Experian into giving them access to anyone’s credit report, just by editing the address displayed in the browser URL bar at a specific point in Experian’s identity verification process.
Following Kushnir’s instructions, I sought a copy of my credit report from Experian via annualcreditreport.com — a website that is required to provide all Americans with a free copy of their credit report from each of the three major reporting bureaus, once per year.
Annualcreditreport.com begins by asking for your name, address, SSN and birthday. After I supplied that and told Annualcreditreport.com I wanted my report from Experian, I was taken to Experian.com to complete the identity verification process.
Normally at this point, Experian’s website would present four or five multiple-guess questions, such as “Which of the following addresses have you lived at?”
Kushnir told me that when the questions page loads, you simply change the last part of the URL from “/acr/oow/” to “/acr/report,” and the site would display the consumer’s full credit report.
But when I tried to get my report from Experian via annualcreditreport.com, Experian’s website said it didn’t have enough information to validate my identity. It wouldn’t even show me the four multiple-guess questions. Experian said I had three options for a free credit report at this point: Mail a request along with identity documents, call a phone number for Experian, or upload proof of identity via the website.
But that didn’t stop Experian from showing me my full credit report after I changed the Experian URL as Kushnir had instructed — modifying the error page’s trailing URL from “/acr/OcwError” to simply “/acr/report”.
Experian’s website then immediately displayed my entire credit file.
Even though Experian said it couldn’t tell that I was actually me, it still coughed up my report. And thank goodness it did. The report contains so many errors that it’s probably going to take a good deal of effort on my part to straighten out.
Now I know why Experian has NEVER let me view my own file via their website. For example, there were four phone numbers on my Experian credit file: Only one of them was mine, and that one hasn’t been mine for ages.
I was so dumbfounded by Experian’s incompetence that I asked a close friend and trusted security source to try the method on her identity file at Experian. Sure enough, when she got to the part where Experian asked questions, changing the last part of the URL in her address bar to “/report” bypassed the questions and immediately displayed her full credit report. Her report also was replete with errors.
KrebsOnSecurity shared Kushnir’s findings with Experian on Dec. 23, 2022. On Dec. 27, 2022, Experian’s PR team acknowledged receipt of my Dec. 23 notification, but the company has so far ignored multiple requests for comment or clarification.
By the time Experian confirmed receipt of my report, the “exploit” Kushnir said he learned from the identity thieves on Telegram had been patched and no longer worked. But it remains unclear how long Experian’s website was making it so easy to access anyone’s credit report.
In response to information shared by KrebsOnSecurity, Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) said he was disappointed — but not at all surprised — to hear about yet another cybersecurity lapse at Experian.
“The credit bureaus are poorly regulated, act as if they are above the law and have thumbed their noses at Congressional oversight,” Wyden said in a written statement. “Just last year, Experian ignored repeated briefing requests from my office after you revealed another cybersecurity lapse the company.”
Sen. Wyden’s quote above references a story published here in July 2022, which broke the news that identity thieves were hijacking consumer accounts at Experian.com just by signing up as them at Experian once more, supplying the target’s static, personal information (name, DoB/SSN, address) but a different email address.
From interviews with multiple victims who contacted KrebsOnSecurity after that story, it emerged that Experian’s own customer support representatives were actually telling consumers who got locked out of their Experian accounts to recreate their accounts using their personal information and a new email address. This was Experian’s advice even for people who’d just explained that this method was what identity thieves had used to lock them in out in the first place.
Clearly, Experian found it simpler to respond this way, rather than acknowledging the problem and addressing the root causes (lazy authentication and abhorrent account recovery practices). It’s also worth mentioning that reports of hijacked Experian.com accounts persisted into late 2022. That screw-up has since prompted a class action lawsuit against Experian.
Sen. Wyden said the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) need to do much more to protect Americans from screw-ups by the credit bureaus.
“If they don’t believe they have the authority to do so, they should endorse legislation like my Mind Your Own Business Act, which gives the FTC power to set tough mandatory cybersecurity standards for companies like Experian,” Wyden said.
Sadly, none of this is terribly shocking behavior for Experian, which has shown itself a completely negligent custodian of obscene amounts of highly sensitive consumer information.
In April 2021, KrebsOnSecurity revealed how identity thieves were exploiting lax authentication on Experian’s PIN retrieval page to unfreeze consumer credit files. In those cases, Experian failed to send any notice via email when a freeze PIN was retrieved, nor did it require the PIN to be sent to an email address already associated with the consumer’s account.
A few days after that April 2021 story, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that an Experian API was exposing the credit scores of most Americans.
It’s bad enough that we can’t really opt out of companies like Experian making $2.6 billion each quarter collecting and selling gobs of our personal and financial information. But there has to be some meaningful accountability when these monopolistic companies engage in negligent and reckless behavior with the very same consumer data that feeds their quarterly profits. Or when security and privacy shortcuts are found to be intentional, like for cost-saving reasons.
And as we saw with Equifax’s consolidated class-action settlement in response to letting state-sponsored hackers from China steal data on nearly 150 million Americans back in 2017, class-actions and more laughable “free credit monitoring” services from the very same companies that created the problem aren’t going to cut it.
It is easy to adopt a defeatist attitude with the credit bureaus, who often foul things up royally even for consumers who are quite diligent about watching their consumer credit files and disputing any inaccuracies.
But there are some concrete steps that everyone can take which will dramatically lower the risk that identity thieves will ruin your financial future. And happily, most of these steps have the side benefit of costing the credit bureaus money, or at least causing the data they collect about you to become less valuable over time.
The first step is awareness. Find out what these companies are saying about you behind your back. Keep in mind that — fair or not — your credit score as collectively determined by these bureaus can affect whether you get that loan, apartment, or job. In that context, even small, unintentional errors that are unrelated to identity theft can have outsized consequences for consumers down the road.
Each bureau is required to provide a free copy of your credit report every year. The easiest way to get yours is through annualcreditreport.com.
Some consumers report that this site never works for them, and that each bureau will insist they don’t have enough information to provide a report. I am definitely in this camp. Thankfully, a financial institution that I already have a relationship with offers the ability to view your credit file through them. Your mileage on this front may vary, and you may end up having to send copies of your identity documents through the mail or website.
When you get your report, look for anything that isn’t yours, and then document and file a dispute with the corresponding credit bureau. And after you’ve reviewed your report, set a calendar reminder to recur every four months, reminding you it’s time to get another free copy of your credit file.
If you haven’t already done so, consider making 2023 the year that you freeze your credit files at the three major reporting bureaus, including Experian, Equifax and TransUnion. It is now free to people in all 50 U.S. states to place a security freeze on their credit files. It is also free to do this for your partner and/or your dependents.
Freezing your credit means no one who doesn’t already have a financial relationship with you can view your credit file, making it unlikely that potential creditors will grant new lines of credit in your name to identity thieves. Freezing your credit file also means Experian and its brethren can no longer sell peeks at your credit history to others.
Anytime you wish to apply for new credit or a new job, or open an account at a utility or communications provider, you can quickly thaw a freeze on your credit file, and set it to freeze automatically again after a specified length of time.
Please don’t confuse a credit freeze (a.k.a. “security freeze”) with the alternative that the bureaus will likely steer you towards when you ask for a freeze: “Credit lock” services.
The bureaus pitch these credit lock services as a way for consumers to easily toggle their credit file availability with push of a button on a mobile app, but they do little to prevent the bureaus from continuing to sell your information to others.
My advice: Ignore the lock services, and just freeze your credit files already.
One final note. Frequent readers here will have noticed that I’ve criticized these so-called “knowledge-based authentication” or KBA questions that Experian’s website failed to ask as part of its consumer verification process.
KrebsOnSecurity has long assailed KBA as weak authentication because the questions and answers are drawn largely from consumer records that are public and easily accessible to organized identity theft groups.
That said, given that these KBA questions appear to be the ONLY thing standing between me and my Experian credit report, it seems like maybe they should at least take care to ensure that those questions actually get asked.
Pledging to follow healthier habits is consistently the most popular new year’s resolution. That January 1st promise looks different to everyone: snacking less often, going to the gym more often, drinking more water, drinking less soda, etc. This year, instead of a juice cleanse subscription, opt for a healthier habit that’s not an unappetizing shade of green: follow this digital detox, instead! In three easy steps, you can make great strides in improving your digital wellness.
There are various aspects of your digital habits that you should consider updating for a more private and safer online life. For starters, update your passwords. Do you reuse the same password for multiple online accounts? Doing so puts your personally identifiable information (PII) at great risk. For example, if a business with which you have an online shopping account is breached by a cybercriminal, your login and password combination could make it on the dark web, through no fault of your own. Then, through a brute force attack, a criminal could use that same password and username combo to walk into your banking or tax filing accounts.
Remembering unique, complicated passwords and passphrases for your dozens of online accounts would be impossible. Luckily, there’s software that remembers them for you! It’s called a password manager, which acts as a vault for all your login information. Just remember one master password, and you can be confident in the security of your accounts and never have to deal with the hassle of forgetting passwords.
Another aspect of updating you should adopt in 2023 is making an effort to always upgrade to the latest software updates on all your devices. The easiest way to do this is to turn on automatic updates. From there, you don’t need to take any further action! Apps and operating systems (like Apple, Android, and Windows) often release updates to patch security vulnerabilities. When you run outdated software, there’s a chance a cybercriminal could take advantage of that security gap.
Finally, make sure that you keep updated on the latest security headlines. Consider setting up news alerts to notify you when a breach occurs at a company that you frequent or have an account with. Speed is often key in making sure that your information remains safe, so it’s best practice to have your finger on the pulse on the security news of the day.
A new year digital detox can be a whole family affair. Connect with your family, anyone connected to your home network, and your elderly relatives to get everyone on the same page with security best practices. Here are some common online security snags people of all ages encounter:
Everyone has an oversharer on their newsfeed. Alert your family members of the dangers of posting too much about their personal life. When someone takes those “get to know you” quizzes and posts their answers, cybercriminals can use that post to take educated guesses at your passwords. Additionally, social engineers can tailor social media scams to specific people in order to increase the chances of tricking someone into sending money or sharing valuable personal or banking details.
While spam filters catch a lot of phishing emails, phishers are getting smarter by the day and are making their attempts more and more believable. Connect with your loved ones and make sure they know how to recognize phishing emails, texts, and social media direct messages. Telltale signs of a phishing message include:
If you’re ever unsure if a message is a phishing attempt, the best course of action is to just delete it. If the “sender” is a well-known institution, follow up with a phone call using the official customer service number listed on their website. The phisher may also claim to be someone you know personally. In that case, give the loved one in question a phone call. It’s a good excuse to reconnect and have a nice conversation!
In the quest for free streams of the latest new show or movie, people often encounter unsafe sites that hide malware, spyware or other types malicious links and programs. Some types of malware can jump from one device to others connected to the same home Wi-Fi network. That’s why it’s important to make sure everyone under your roof practices excellent digital security habits. One wrong click could sink an entire household. Consider signing up your family for a safe browsing extension that can notify you when you stray onto a risky site. So, instead of putting your device at risk during movie night, connect with your friends or loved ones over one copy of a safely and officially purchased version.
As with any new health regimen, immediately zooming from zero to a hundred will likely be overwhelming and result in failure. The same goes for adopting new digital safety habits. If you try to do too much at once, all the security measures you put in place will likely get in the way of your daily online activities. The more inconvenient it is, the more likely you may be to cut corners; thus, negating all the progress you’ve made.
Being cybersafe doesn’t mean you can’t still enjoy your connected devices to the fullest. It just means that you may need to act with more intention and slow down before volunteering personal details online or clicking on links.
To supplement your digital detox, consider signing up for McAfee+ Ultimate to make 2023 the year for a safer online you. McAfee+ Ultimate includes all the tools you need to live your best online life safely and privately, including a password manager, web protection, unlimited VPN and antivirus, and $1 million in identity theft coverage and restoration for peace of mind.
Cheers to a digitally smart 2023!
The post Start the New Year Right With This 3-Step Digital Detox appeared first on McAfee Blog.
In the second part of this blog series on Unscrambling Cybersecurity Acronyms, we covered Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) and Managed Endpoint Detection and Response (MEDR) solutions, which included an overview of the evolution of endpoint security solutions. In this blog, we’ll go over Managed Detection and Response (MDR) and Extended Detection and Response (XDR) solutions in more depth.
MDR solutions are a security technology stack delivered as a managed service to customers by third-parties such as cybersecurity vendors or Managed Service Providers (MSPs). They’re similar to Managed Endpoint Detection and Response (MEDR) solutions since both solutions are managed cybersecurity services that use Security Operations Center (SOC) experts to monitor, detect, and respond to threats targeting your organization. However, the main difference between these two offerings is that MEDR solutions monitor only your endpoints while MDR solutions monitor a broader environment.
While MDR security solutions don’t have an exact definition for the types of infrastructure they monitor and the underlying security stack that powers them, they often monitor your endpoint, network, and cloud environments via a ‘follow the sun’ approach that uses multiple security teams distributed around the world to continually defend your environment. These security analysts monitor your environment 24/7 for threats, analyze and prioritize threats, investigate potential incidents, and offer guided remediation of attacks. This enables you to quickly detect advanced threats, effectively contain attacks, and rapidly respond to incidents.
More importantly, MDR security solutions allow you to augment or outsource your security to cybersecurity experts. While nearly every organization must defend their environment from cyberattacks, not every organization has the time, expertise, or personnel to run their own security solution. These organizations can benefit from outsourcing their security to MDR services, which enable them to focus on their core business while getting the security expertise they need. In addition, some organizations don’t have the budget or resources to monitor their environment 24/7 or they may have a small security team that struggles to investigate every threat. MDR security services can also help these organizations by giving them always-on security operations while enabling them to address every threat to their organization.
One drawback to deploying an MDR security service is that you become dependent on a third-party for your security needs. While many organizations don’t have any issues with this, some organizations may be hesitant to hand over control of their cybersecurity to a third-party vendor. In addition, organizations such as larger, more-risk averse companies may not desire an MDR service because they’ve already made cybersecurity investments such as developing their own SOC. Finally, MDR security solutions don’t have truly unified detection and response capabilities since they’re typically powered by heterogenous security technology stacks that lack consolidated telemetry, correlated detections, and holistic incident response. This is where XDR solutions shine.
XDR solutions unify threat monitoring, detection, and response across your entire environment by centralizing visibility, delivering contextual insights, and coordinating response. While ‘XDR’ means different things to different people because it’s a fairly nascent technology, XDR solutions usually consolidate security telemetry from multiple security products into a single solution. Moreover, XDR security solutions provide enriched context by correlating alerts from different security solutions. Finally, comprehensive XDR solutions can simplify incident response by allowing you to automate and orchestrate threat response across your environment.
These solutions speed up threat detection and response by providing a single pane of glass for gaining visibility into threats as well as detecting and responding to attacks. Furthermore, XDR security solutions reduce alert fatigue and false positives with actionable, contextual insights from higher-fidelity detections that mean you spend less time sifting through endless alerts and can focus on the most critical threats. Finally, XDR solutions enable you to streamline your security operations with improved efficiency from automated, orchestrated response across your entire security stack from one unified console.
A major downside to XDR security solutions is that you typically have to deploy and manage these solutions yourself versus having a third-party vendor run them for you. While Managed XDR (MXDR) services are growing, these solutions are still very much in their infancy. In addition, not every organization will want or need a full-fledged XDR solution. For instance, organizations with a higher risk threshold may be satisfied with using an EDR solution and/or an MDR service to defend their organization from threats.
As I mentioned in the first and second parts of this blog series, you shouldn’t take a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to cybersecurity since every organization has different needs, goals, risk appetites, staffing levels, and more. This logic holds true for MDR and XDR solutions, with these solutions working well for certain organizations and not so well for other organizations. Regardless, there are a few aspects to consider when evaluating MDR and XDR security solutions.
One factor to keep in mind is if you already have or are planning on building out your own SOC. This is important to think about because developing and operating a SOC can require large investments in cybersecurity, which includes having the right expertise on your security teams. Organizations unwilling to make these commitments usually end up choosing managed security services such as MDR solutions, which allows them to protect their organization without considerable upfront investments.
Other critical factors to consider are your existing security maturity and overall goals. For instance, organizations who have already made significant commitments to cybersecurity often think about ways to improve the operational efficiency of their security teams. These organizations frequently turn to XDR tools since these solutions reduce threat detection and response times, provide better visibility and context while decreasing alert fatigue. Moreover, organizations with substantial security investments should consider open and extensible XDR solutions that integrate with their existing tools to avoid having to ‘rip and replace’ security tools, which can be costly and cumbersome.
I hope this blog series on the different threat detection and response solutions help you make sense of the different cybersecurity acronyms while guiding you in your decision on the right security solution for your organization. For more information on MDR solutions, read about how Cisco Secure Managed Detection and Response (MDR) rapidly detects and contains threats with an elite team of security experts. For more information on XDR solutions, learn how the Cisco XDR offering finds and remediates threats faster with increased visibility and critical context to automate threat response.
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In the first part of this blog series on Unscrambling Cybersecurity Acronyms, we provided a high-level overview of the different threat detection and response solutions and went over how to find the right solution for your organization. In this blog, we’ll do a deeper dive on two of these solutions – Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) and Managed Endpoint Detection and Response (MEDR). However, first let’s take a look back at the history of endpoint security solutions and understand how we got EDR and MEDR security solutions.
The very first endpoint security solutions started out as anti-virus solutions (AV) with basic security functionality that relied heavily on signature-based detection. These solutions were effective against known threats where a signature was created, but ineffective against unknown threats such as new and emerging attacks. That meant that organizations struggled to stay ahead of attackers, who were continuously evolving their techniques to evade detection with new types of malware.
To address this problem, AV vendors added detection technologies such as heuristics, reputational analysis, behavioral protection, and even machine learning to their solutions, which became known as Endpoint Protection Platforms (EPP). These unified solutions were effective against both known and unknown threats and frequently used multiple approaches to prevent malware and other attacks from infecting endpoints.
As cyberattacks grew increasingly sophisticated though, many in the cybersecurity industry recognized that protection against threats wasn’t enough. Effective endpoint security had to include detection and response capabilities to quickly investigate and remediate the inevitable security breach. This led to the creation of EDR security solutions, which focused on post-breach efforts to contain and clean up attacks on compromised endpoints.
Today, most endpoint security vendors combine EPP and EDR solutions into a single, converged solution that provides holistic defense to customers with protection, detection, and response capabilities. Many vendors are also offering EDR as a managed service (also known as MEDR) to customers who need help in securing their endpoints or who don’t have the resources to configure and manage their own EDR solution. Now that we’ve gone over how endpoint security evolved into EDR and MEDR security solutions, let’s cover EDR and MEDR in more depth.
EDR solutions continuously monitor your endpoints for threats, alert you in case suspicious activity is detected, and allow you to investigate, respond to and contain potential attacks. Moreover, many EDR security solutions provide threat hunting functionality to help you proactively spot threats in your environment. They’re often coupled with or part of a broader endpoint security solution that also includes prevention capabilities via an EPP solution to protect against the initial incursion.
As a result, EDR security solutions enable you to protect your organization from sophisticated attacks by rapidly detecting, containing, and remediating threats on your endpoints before they gain a foothold in your environment. They give you deep visibility into your endpoints while effectively identifying both known and unknown threats. Furthermore, you can quickly contain attacks that get through your defenses with automated response capabilities and hunt for hidden threats that are difficult to detect.
While EDR provides several benefits to customers, it has some drawbacks. Chief among them is that EDR security solutions are focused on monitoring endpoints only versus monitoring a broader environment. This means that EDR solutions don’t detect threats targeting other parts of your environment such as your network, email, or cloud infrastructure. In addition, not every organization has the security staff, budget, and/or skills to deploy and run an EDR solution. This is where MEDR solutions come into play.
Managed EDR or MEDR solutions are EDR capabilities delivered as a managed service to customers by third-parties such as cybersecurity vendors or Managed Service Providers (MSPs). This includes key EDR functionality such as monitoring endpoints, detecting advanced threats, rapidly containing threats, and responding to attacks. These third-parties usually have a team of Security Operations Center (SOC) specialists who monitor, detect, and respond to threats across your endpoints around the clock via a ‘follow the sun’ approach to monitoring.
MEDR security solutions allow you to offload the work of securing your endpoints to a team of security professionals. Many organizations need to defend their endpoints from advanced threats but don’t necessarily have the desire, resources, or expertise to manage an EDR solution. In addition, a team of dedicated SOC experts with advanced security tools can typically detect and respond to threats faster than in-house security teams, all while investigating every incident and prioritizing the most critical threats. This enables you to focus on your core business while getting always-on security operations.
Similar to EDR though, one downside to MEDR security solutions is that they defend only your endpoints from advanced threats and don’t monitor other parts of your infrastructure. Moreover, while many organizations want to deploy EDR as a managed service, not everyone desires this. For example, larger and/or more risk-averse organizations who are looking to invest heavily in cybersecurity are typically satisfied with running their own EDR solution. Now, let’s discuss how to choose the right endpoint security solution when trying to defend your endpoints from threats.
As I mentioned in my previous blog, there isn’t a single correct solution for every organization. This logic applies to EDR and MEDR security solutions as well since each solution works well for different types of organizations, depending on their needs, resources, motivations, and more. Nevertheless, one major factor to consider is if you have or are willing to build out a SOC for your organization. This is important because organizations that don’t have or aren’t willing to develop a SOC usually gravitate towards MEDR solutions, which don’t require significant investments in cybersecurity.
Another factor to keep in mind is your security expertise. Even if you’re have or are willing to build a SOC, you may not have the right cybersecurity talent and skills within your organization. While you can always build out your security team, you may want to evaluate an MEDR solution because a lack of expertise makes it difficult to effectively manage an EDR solution. Finally, a common misconception is that you must choose between an EDR and a MEDR solution and that you cannot run both solutions. In reality, many organizations end up using both EDR and MEDR since MEDR solutions often complement EDR deployments.
I hope this information and key factors help you better understand EDR and MEDR solutions while acting as a guide to selecting the best endpoint security solution for your organization. For more details on the different cybersecurity acronyms and how to identify the right solution for your needs, stay tuned for the next blog in this series – Unscrambling Cybersecurity Acronyms: The ABCs of MDR and XDR Security. In the meantime, learn how Cisco Secure Endpoint stops threats with a comprehensive endpoint security solution that includes both advanced EDR and MEDR capabilities powered by an integrated security platform!
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is urging states and localities to beef up security around proprietary devices that connect to the Emergency Alert System — a national public warning system used to deliver important emergency information, such as severe weather and AMBER alerts. The DHS warning came in advance of a workshop to be held this weekend at the DEFCON security conference in Las Vegas, where a security researcher is slated to demonstrate multiple weaknesses in the nationwide alert system.
A Digital Alert Systems EAS encoder/decoder that Pyle said he acquired off eBay in 2019. It had the username and password for the system printed on the machine.
The DHS warning was prompted by security researcher Ken Pyle, a partner at security firm Cybir. Pyle said he started acquiring old EAS equipment off of eBay in 2019, and that he quickly identified a number of serious security vulnerabilities in a device that is broadly used by states and localities to encode and decode EAS alert signals.
“I found all kinds of problems back then, and reported it to the DHS, FBI and the manufacturer,” Pyle said in an interview with KrebsOnSecurity. “But nothing ever happened. I decided I wasn’t going to tell anyone about it yet because I wanted to give people time to fix it.”
Pyle said he took up the research again in earnest after an angry mob stormed the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021.
“I was sitting there thinking, ‘Holy shit, someone could start a civil war with this thing,”’ Pyle recalled. “I went back to see if this was still a problem, and it turns out it’s still a very big problem. So I decided that unless someone actually makes this public and talks about it, clearly nothing is going to be done about it.”
The EAS encoder/decoder devices Pyle acquired were made by Lyndonville, NY-based Digital Alert Systems (formerly Monroe Electronics, Inc.), which issued a security advisory this month saying it released patches in 2019 to fix the flaws reported by Pyle, but that some customers are still running outdated versions of the device’s firmware. That may be because the patches were included in version 4 of the firmware for the EAS devices, and many older models apparently do not support the new software.
“The vulnerabilities identified present a potentially serious risk, and we believe both were addressed in software updates issued beginning Oct 2019,” EAS said in a written statement. “We also provided attribution for the researcher’s responsible disclosure, allowing us to rectify the matters before making any public statements. We are aware that some users have not taken corrective actions and updated their software and should immediately take action to update the latest software version to ensure they are not at risk. Anything lower than version 4.1 should be updated immediately. On July 20, 2022, the researcher referred to other potential issues, and we trust the researcher will provide more detail. We will evaluate and work to issue any necessary mitigations as quickly as possible.”
But Pyle said a great many EAS stakeholders are still ignoring basic advice from the manufacturer, such as changing default passwords and placing the devices behind a firewall, not directly exposing them to the Internet, and restricting access only to trusted hosts and networks.
Pyle, in a selfie that is heavily redacted because the EAS device behind him had its user credentials printed on the lid.
Pyle said the biggest threat to the security of the EAS is that an attacker would only need to compromise a single EAS station to send out alerts locally that can be picked up by other EAS systems and retransmitted across the nation.
“The process for alerts is automated in most cases, hence, obtaining access to a device will allow you to pivot around,” he said. “There’s no centralized control of the EAS because these devices are designed such that someone locally can issue an alert, but there’s no central control over whether I am the one person who can send or whatever. If you are a local operator, you can send out nationwide alerts. That’s how easy it is to do this.”
One of the Digital Alert Systems devices Pyle sourced from an electronics recycler earlier this year was non-functioning, but whoever discarded it neglected to wipe the hard drive embedded in the machine. Pyle soon discovered the device contained the private cryptographic keys and other credentials needed to send alerts through Comcast, the nation’s third-largest cable company.
“I can issue and create my own alert here, which has all the valid checks or whatever for being a real alert station,” Pyle said in an interview earlier this month. “I can create a message that will start propagating through the EAS.”
Comcast told KrebsOnSecurity that “a third-party device used to deliver EAS alerts was lost in transit by a trusted shipping provider between two Comcast locations and subsequently obtained by a cybersecurity researcher.
“We’ve conducted a thorough investigation of this matter and have determined that no customer data, and no sensitive Comcast data, were compromised,” Comcast spokesperson David McGuire said.
The company said it also confirmed that the information included on the device can no longer be used to send false messages to Comcast customers or used to compromise devices within Comcast’s network, including EAS devices.
“We are taking steps to further ensure secure transfer of such devices going forward,” McGuire said. “Separately, we have conducted a thorough audit of all EAS devices on our network and confirmed that they are updated with currently available patches and are therefore not vulnerable to recently reported security issues. We’re grateful for the responsible disclosure and to the security research community for continuing to engage and share information with our teams to make our products and technologies ever more secure. Mr. Pyle informed us promptly of his research and worked with us as we took steps to validate his findings and ensure the security of our systems.”
The user interface for an EAS device.
Unauthorized EAS broadcast alerts have happened enough that there is a chronicle of EAS compromises over at fandom.com. Thankfully, most of these incidents have involved fairly obvious hoaxes.
According to the EAS wiki, in February 2013, hackers broke into the EAS networks in Great Falls, Mt. and Marquette, Mich. to broadcast an alert that zombies had risen from their graves in several counties. In Feb. 2017, an EAS station in Indiana also was hacked, with the intruders playing the same “zombies and dead bodies” audio from the 2013 incidents.
“On February 20 and February 21, 2020, Wave Broadband’s EASyCAP equipment was hacked due to the equipment’s default password not being changed,” the Wiki states. “Four alerts were broadcasted, two of which consisted of a Radiological Hazard Warning and a Required Monthly Test playing parts of the Hip Hop song Hot by artist Young Thug.”
In January 2018, Hawaii sent out an alert to cell phones, televisions and radios, warning everyone in the state that a missile was headed their way. It took 38 minutes for Hawaii to let people know the alert was a misfire, and that a draft alert was inadvertently sent. The news video clip below about the 2018 event in Hawaii does a good job of walking through how the EAS works.
Ransomware and other advanced attacks continue to evolve and threaten organizations around the world. Effectively defending your endpoints from these attacks can be a complex undertaking, and a seemingly endless number of security acronyms only compounds that complexity. There are so many acronyms – EPP, EDR, MEDR, MDR, XDR, and more – for various cybersecurity products and services that it becomes difficult to understand the differences between them and choose the right solution for your organization. Deciphering all these acronyms is a task on its own and deciding which solution works best for you is even more challenging.
We here at Cisco believe that understanding these acronyms and determining which security products or services are the best fit for your organization’s needs doesn’t have to be so hard. That’s why we developed this blog – the first in a series – to give you an overview of the different types of threat detection and response solutions.
This series will help you understand the benefits and disadvantages of each solution, the similarities and differences between these solutions, and how to identify the right solution for your organization. Now let’s go over the different types of security solutions.
There are several types of threat detection and response solutions, including:
These solutions are similar in that they all enable you to detect and respond to threats, but they differ by the environment(s) being monitored for threats, who conducts the monitoring, as well as how alerts are consolidated and correlated. For instance, certain solutions will only monitor your endpoints (EDR, MEDR) while others will monitor a broader environment (XDR, MDR). In addition, some of these solutions are actually managed services where a third-party monitors your environment (MEDR, MDR) versus solutions that you monitor and manage yourself (EDR, XDR).
When evaluating these solutions, keep in mind that there isn’t a single correct solution for every organization. This is because each organization has different needs, security maturities, resource levels, and goals. For example, deploying an EDR makes sense for an organization that currently has only a basic anti-virus solution, but this seems like table stakes to a company that already has a Security Operations Center (SOC).
That being said, there are a few questions you can ask yourself to find the cybersecurity solution that best fits your needs, including:
Of these questions, the most critical are about your security goals and current cybersecurity posture. For instance, organizations at the beginning of their security journey may want to look at an EDR or MEDR solution, while companies that are further along their journey are more likely to be interested in an XDR. Asking whether you already have or are willing to build out a SOC is another essential question. This will help you understand whether you should run your security yourself (EDR, XDR) or find a third-party to manage it for you (MEDR, MDR).
Asking whether you have or are willing to hire the right security talent is another critical question to pose. This will also help determine whether to manage your cybersecurity solution yourself or have a third-party run it for you. Finally, questions about visibility and context, alert, and security tool fatigue, as well as detection and response times will help you to decide if your current security stack is sufficient or if you need to deploy a next-generation solution such as an XDR.
These questions will help guide your decision-making process and give you the information you need to make an informed decision on your cybersecurity solution. For more details on the different endpoint security acronyms and how to determine the right solution for your organization, keep an eye out for the next blog in this series – Unscrambling Cybersecurity Acronyms: The ABCs of EDR and MEDR. Stay tuned!
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A 33-year-old Illinois man was sentenced to two years in prison today following his conviction last year for operating services that allowed paying customers to launch powerful distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against hundreds of thousands of Internet users and websites.
The user interface for Downthem[.]org.
Matthew Gatrel of St. Charles, Ill. was found guilty for violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) related to his operation of downthem[.]org and ampnode[.]com, two DDoS-for-hire services that had thousands of customers who paid to launch more than 200,000 attacks.
Despite admitting to FBI agents that he ran these so-called “booter” services (and turning over plenty of incriminating evidence in the process), Gatrel opted to take his case to trial, defended the entire time by public defenders. Gatrel’s co-defendant and partner in the business, Juan “Severon” Martinez of Pasadena, Calif., pleaded guilty just before the trial.
After a nine-day trial in the Central District of California, Gatrel was convicted on all three counts, including conspiracy to commit unauthorized impairment of a protected computer, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and unauthorized impairment of a protected computer.
Prosecutors said Downthem sold subscriptions allowing customers to launch DDoS attacks, while AmpNode provided “bulletproof” server hosting to customers — with an emphasis on “spoofing” servers that could be pre-configured with DDoS attack scripts and lists of vulnerable “attack amplifiers” used to launch simultaneous cyberattacks on victims.
Booter and stresser services let customers pick from among a variety of attack methods, but almost universally the most powerful of these methods involves what’s known as a “reflective amplification attack.” In such assaults, the perpetrators leverage unmanaged Domain Name Servers (DNS) or other devices on the Web to create huge traffic floods.
Ideally, DNS servers only provide services to machines within a trusted domain — such as translating an Internet address from a series of numbers into a domain name, like example.com. But DNS reflection attacks rely on consumer and business routers and other devices equipped with DNS servers that are (mis)configured to accept queries from anywhere on the Web.
Attackers can send spoofed DNS queries to these DNS servers, forging the request so that it appears to come from the target’s network. That way, when the DNS servers respond, they reply to the spoofed (target) address.
The bad guys also can amplify a reflective attack by crafting DNS queries so that the responses are much bigger than the requests. For example, an attacker could compose a DNS request of less than 100 bytes, prompting a response that is 60-70 times as large. This “amplification” effect is especially pronounced if the perpetrators query dozens of DNS servers with these spoofed requests simultaneously.
The government charged that Gatrel and Martinez constantly scanned the Internet for these misconfigured devices, and then sold lists of Internet addresses tied to these devices to other booter service operators.
“Gatrel ran a criminal enterprise designed around launching hundreds of thousands of cyber-attacks on behalf of hundreds of customers,” prosecutors wrote in a memorandum submitted in advance of his sentencing. “He also provided infrastructure and resources for other cybercriminals to run their own businesses launching these same kinds of attacks. These attacks victimized wide swaths of American society and compromised computers around the world.”
The U.S. and United Kingdom have been trying to impress on would-be customers of these booter services that hiring them for DDoS attacks is illegal. The U.K. has even taken out Google ads to remind U.K. residents when they search online for terms common to booter services.
The case against Gatrel and Martinez was brought as part of a widespread crackdown on booter services in 2018, when the FBI joined law enforcement partners overseas to seize 15 different booter service domains.
Those actions have prompted a flurry of prosecutions, with wildly varying sentences when the booter service owners are invariably found guilty. However, DDoS experts say booter and stresser services that remain in operation continue to account for the vast majority of DDoS attacks launched daily around the globe.
Some of more tech-savvy Democrats in the U.S. Senate are asking the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to investigate identity-proofing company ID.me for “deceptive statements” the company and its founder allegedly made over how they handle facial recognition data collected on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service, which until recently required anyone seeking a new IRS account online to provide a live video selfie to ID.me.
In a letter to FTC Chair Lina Khan, the Senators charge that ID.me’s CEO Blake Hall has offered conflicting statements about how his company uses the facial scan data it collects on behalf of the federal government and many states that use the ID proofing technology to screen applicants for unemployment insurance.
The lawmakers say that in public statements and blog posts, ID.me has frequently emphasized the difference between two types of facial recognition: One-to-one, and one-to-many. In the one-to-one approach, a live video selfie is compared to the image on a driver’s license, for example. One-to-many facial recognition involves comparing a face against a database of other faces to find any potential matches.
Americans have particular reason to be concerned about the difference between these two types of facial recognition, says the letter to the FTC, signed by Sens. Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Edward Markey (D-Mass.), Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.):
“While one-to-one recognition involves a one-time comparison of two images in order to confirm an applicant’s identity, the use of one-to-many recognition means that millions of innocent people will have their photographs endlessly queried as part of a digital ‘line up.’ Not only does this violate individuals’ privacy, but the inevitable false matches associated with one-to-many recognition can result in applicants being wrongly denied desperately-needed services for weeks or even months as they try to get their case reviewed.”
“This risk is especially acute for people of color: NIST’s Facial Recognition Vendor Test found that many facial recognition algorithms have rates of false matches that are as much as 100 times higher for individuals from countries in West Africa, East Africa and East Asia than for individuals from Eastern European countries. This means Black and Asian Americans could be disproportionately likely to be denied benefits due to a false match in a one-to-many facial recognition system.”
The lawmakers say that throughout the latter half of 2021, ID.me published statements and blog posts stating it did not use one-to-many facial recognition and that the approach was “problematic” and “tied to surveillance operations.” But several days after a Jan. 16, 2022 post here about the IRS’s new facial ID requirement went viral and prompted a public backlash, Hall acknowledged in a LinkedIn posting that ID.me does use one-to-many facial recognition.
“Within days, the company edited the numerous blog posts and white papers on its website that previously stated the company did not use one-to-many to reflect the truth,” the letter alleges. “According to media reports, the company’s decision to correct its prior misleading statements came after mounting internal pressure from its employees.”
Cyberscoop’s Tonya Riley published excerpts from internal ID.me employee Slack messages wherein some expressed dread and unease with the company’s equivocation on its use of one-to-many facial recognition.
In February, the IRS announced it would no longer require facial scans or other biometric data from taxpayers seeking to create an account at the agency’s website. The agency also pledged that any biometric data shared with ID.me would be permanently deleted.
But the IRS still requires new account applicants to sign up with either ID.me or Login.gov, a single sign-on solution already used to access 200 websites run by 28 federal agencies. It also still offers the option of providing a live selfie for verification purposes, although the IRS says this data will be deleted automatically.
Asked to respond to concerns raised in the letter from Senate lawmakers, ID.me instead touted its successes in stopping fraud.
“Five state workforce agencies have publicly credited ID.me with helping to prevent $238 billion dollars in fraud,” the statement reads. “Conditions were so bad during the pandemic that the deputy assistant director of the FBI called the fraud ‘an economic attack on the United States.’ ID.me played a critical role in stopping that attack in more than 20 states where the service was rapidly adopted for its equally important ability to increase equity and verify individuals left behind by traditional options. We look forward to cooperating with all relevant government bodies to clear up any misunderstandings.”
As Cyberscoop reported on Apr. 14, the House Oversight and Reform Committee last month began an investigation into ID.me’s practices, with committee chairwoman Carolyn Maloney (D-N.Y.) saying the committee’s questions to the company would help shape policy on how the government wields facial recognition technology.
A copy of the letter the senators sent to the FTC is here (PDF).
If you pick up your teen’s phone on any given day, chances are the next stop you make will be Google. That’s because, if you’re like most parents, you’re beyond baffled by texting language kids use.
It’s okay, you are not alone if you feel out of the loop. As parents, we’re not invited to the party—and that’s okay. Slag belongs to the generation that coined it. And few of us are aching to use words like “sus” and “simp,” right? The goal of these updates isn’t to decode or invade. It’s digital parenting 101. The more we know about what’s going on in our child’s world, the better we can parent. It’s our job to know.
So once a year we do our best to decipher some of the more common terms you may hear or see your kids use. Keep in mind: Slang isn’t universal. It changes from city to city and culture to culture. Terms and meanings may vary. Many of the words are fun and harmless, while others are specifically meant to mask risky behavior. Remember, McAfee frees you to live your connected life safe from threats like viruses, malware, phishing, and more. Download award-winning antivirus that protects your data and devices today.
A real one. A person who is being authentic, genuine, trusted.
And I oop. A phrase used after a funny mistake or accident.
Awks. Short for awkward.
Baddie. Name for an independent female who is tough and beautiful.
Bands. Refers to bands around cash or a wealthy person. No doubt, the dude’s got bands.
Bet. A willingness to do something; means “yes” or “okay.”
Big yikes. When you see something, that is a huge embarrassment.
Booed up. To be in a romantic relationship.
Bop. A really good song. That song is such a bop!
Bread or Cheddar. Terms that refer to money.
Breadcrumbing. Sending flirtatious text messages to another person to get their attention but remain non-committal.
Bussin. Something is awesome. Her new hair color is bussin’.
Cake. When someone’s body looks good. The girl in my science class has cake.
Cancel. Reject or stop supporting a group or idea.
Cap. A term that means “lie” or “false.” He said we were a couple. Cap!
No cap. A phrase that means “no lie” or “for real” emphasizes telling the truth. I just saw him eat a bug. No cap!
CEO. A term used to describe something that you’re very good at, making you the CEO of it. I’m the CEO of being late to class.
Cheug. This term describes a person, idea, or situation that is outdated or inauthentic.
Clout. A term that relates to a person’s follower count, fame, or influencer status. Sometimes an expression for an extravagant way of living.
Chasing Clout. A term that describes a person who does and says things for the sole purpose of becoming more popular.
Curve. To reject someone romantically.
Cuffing. Wanting to date or cuff yourself to someone temporarily—at least until summer break.
Do it for the gram. A phrase that describes someone doing something for the sole purpose of posting online.
Drip. A term that describes someone’s style as sexy or cool. Zayne has some serious drip.
Facts. When you agree with someone.
Finsta. A second Instagram account used for sharing with a smaller circle of friends and followers.
Fish. Fishing for compliments.
Fit. Short for outfit.
Flex. To show off or show something off.
Get after it. Start with something with intensity.
Ghost. Suddenly stop all contact with someone online and in person.
Hundo P. Being 100% certain.
Hypebeast. A term that describes someone who cares too much about popular things rather than being self-aware and genuine.
I’m dead. Describes how you feel when something is hilarious.
I’m weak. Like, dead, describes how you feel when something is hilarious.
I can’t even. An expression used when you’ve had enough of someone or a situation.
Keep it 100. Stay true to yourself and stick to your values.
Lewk. Look.
Left on read. When someone does not respond to your text. He left me on read!
Lit. Cool or awesome.
Mood. A term used to express a relatable feeling or experience. Seeing that kid by himself kicking a can is such a mood.
Mutuals. People who follow and support one another on social media.
Oof. An expression used when something bad happens, and you don’t know how to respond.
Periodt. A term used to emphasize what you just said.
Purr. Expressing approval. I’ve got nothing but purr for my friends.
Receipts. Evidence to prove someone is either lying. Often in the form of screenshots, videos, or images.
Savage. A cool person or someone overly direct or candid.
Sketch. A sketchy or ominous situation, place, or person.
Skrrt. To leave quickly or get away from someone (the sound a car makes).
Ship. Short for relationship.
Simp. Used to describe a guy who is seen as being too attentive and submissive to a girl.
Sheesh. A term used to compliment someone when they look good or do something good.
Suh. A combination of “sup” and “huh” used as a greeting.
Sus. Short for suspect describing a situation, a person, or a claim. That guy is sus. Let’s get out of here.
Shawty. An attractive female. Sometimes a short, attractive female.
Sheee. An expression of disappointment, annoyance, or surprise.
Slaps. A term used when something is awesome. The DJ slaps.
Snatched. Describing a person or a thing that looks great. I’m jealous her makeup is so snatched.
Stan. A combination of “stalker” and “fan” refers to an overly obsessed fan of a celebrity.
Straight Fire or Fire. Describes something amazing. His new truck is straight fire.
Thumpin’. Word to describe someone going very. I didn’t even see him leave. He was thumpin’.
Vaguebooking. The act of posting vague Facebook or other social status updates for attention or as a cry for help. Wondering what the point of it all is anyway.
Whip. A word that means car. Have you seen his new whip?
Wig. When something has you so excited, your wig might come off; mind-blowing. The new Adele song!! WIIIIGGG!
Yeet. Throwing something out of rage. Also used as an exclamation for being excited.
NGL. Not Gonna Lie.
NMH. Nodding My Head; an expression of agreement.
NSA. No Strings Attached.
HWU. Hey, what’s up?
IYKWIM. If You Know What I Mean.
RLY. Really?
OG.Short for Original Gangster;a compliment for someone who is exceptional or authentic.
ORLY. Oh really?
SMH. Shaking My Head.
TFW. That Feeling When
TT2T. Too Tired to Talk.
L. Short for loose or loss.
V. Short for very.
W. Short for win. Their loss is our w.
WYA. Where are you at?
WYD. What are you doing?
YK. You’re Kidding.
YKTS. You Know the Score.
YKTV. You know the vibe.
Addy/Study Buddy. Terms used in place of the medication Adderal.
Break Green. A term that means to share marijuana with others.
Crashy. Combo of “crazy” and “trashy.”
Daddy. An attractive man, usually older, who conveys a sense of power and dominance.
Faded/Cooked. Terms used to describe being high on drugs.
Lit/Turnt Up. It can mean party or get drunk.
MOS/POS. Mom Over Shoulder; Parent Over Shoulder.
Kush/Flower/Gas. Terms used in place of marijuana.
Smash. To hook up for casual sex. Is he a smash or a pass?
Thirsty. Adjective for a person desperate for attention or sex.
Xan/Xans. Terms short for Xanax, a sedative used to treat anxiety. Also called xanny, beans, bars, and footballs.
ASL. Age/sex/location.
CD9. Can’t talk parents are here.
CU46. See You For Sex.
GALMA. Go Away Leave Me Alone.
GOMB. Get Off My Back.
GSW. Get Some Weed.
LMIRL. Let’s meet in Real Life.
KMS/KYS. Kill myself, Kill Yourself.
ONG. On God; a term that implies a person is serious enough to swear “on god.”
ONS. One Night Stand.
Spice or K2. Code for synthetic marijuana, which can be more harmful than actual cannabis.
URAL. You’re A Loser.
WWTP. Want to Trade Pics?
X or E. Letters that stand for ecstasy, otherwise known as “molly” or MDMA.
Zaddy. A well-dressed, attractive man of any age.
Zerg. A term that originated in the gaming community for gamers using the many against one strategy to win a game. A Zerg is a person who employs the same bullying tactics in real life. Stay away from him. He’s such a Zerg! Or Stay off that site. There’s too much zerging.
Protect your connected life today with McAfee Total Protection
*Content collected from various sources, including NetLingo.com, slangit.com, cyberdefinitions.com, UrbanDictionary.com, webopedia.com, and conversations on TikTok, Reddit, and YouTube.
The post Teen Slang and Texting Acronyms Parents Should Know appeared first on McAfee Blog.
There used to be a time when one roommate split the cost of rent with another by writing a check. Who still owns a checkbook these days? Of course, those days are nearly long gone, in large part thanks to “peer to peer” (P2P) mobile payment apps, like Venmo, Zelle, or Cash App. Now with a simple click on an app, you can transfer your friend money for brunch before you even leave the table. Yet for all their convenience, P2P mobile payment apps could cost you a couple of bucks or more if you’re not on the lookout for things like fraud. The good news is that there are some straightforward ways to protect yourself.
You likely have one of these apps on your phone already. If so, you’re among the many. It’s estimated that 70% of adults in the U.S. use mobile payment apps like these. And chances are that you have more than just the one. Only 25% of adults in the U.S. use just a single payment app.
Yet with all those different apps come different policies and protections associated with them. So, if you ever get stuck with a bum charge, it may not always be so easy to get your money back.
With that, here are seven quick tips for using your P2P mobile payment apps safely.
In addition to securing your account with a strong password, go into your settings and set up your app to use a PIN code, facial ID, or fingerprint ID. (And make sure you’re locking your phone the same way too.) This provides an additional layer of protection in the event your phone is stolen or lost and someone, other than you, tries to make a payment with it.
What’s worse than sending money to the wrong person? When paying a friend for the first time, have them make a payment request for you. This way, you can be sure that you’re sending money to the right person. With the freedom to create account names however one likes, a small typo can end up as a donation to a complete stranger. To top it off, that money could be gone for good!
Another option is to make a test payment. Sending a small amount to that new account lets both of you know that the routing is right and that a full payment can be made with confidence.
Bye, bye, bye! Unlike some other payment methods, new mobile payment apps don’t have a way to dispute a charge, cancel a payment, or otherwise use some sort of recall or retrieval feature. If anything, this reinforces the thought above—be sure that you’re absolutely making the payment to the right person.
Credit cards offer a couple of clear advantages over debit cards when using them in association with mobile payment apps (and online shopping for that matter too). Essentially, they can protect you better from fraud:
Report any activity like this immediately to your financial institution. Timing can be of the essence in terms of limiting your liabilities and losses. For additional info, check out this article from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that outlines what to do if your debit or credit card is stolen and what your liabilities are.
Also, note the following guidance from the FTC on payment apps:
“New mobile apps and forms of payment may not provide these same protections. That means it might not always be easy to get your money back if something goes wrong. Make sure you understand the protections and assurances your payment services provider offers with their service.”
It’s sad but true. Crooks are setting up all kinds of scams that use mobile payment apps. A popular one involves creating fake charities or posing as legitimate ones and then asking for funds by mobile payment. To avoid getting scammed, check and see if the charity is legit. The FTC suggests researching resources like Better Business Bureau’s Wise Giving Alliance, Charity Navigator, Charity Watch or, GuideStar.
Overall, the FTC further recommends the following to keep yourself from getting scammed:
With so much of your life on your phone, getting security software installed on your it can protect you and the things you keep on your phone. Whether you’re an Android owner or iOS owner, mobile security software can keep your data, shopping, and payments secure.
The post Avoid Making Costly Mistakes with Your Mobile Payment Apps appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
World Password Day isn’t the most popular day on the calendar, but it’s an important reminder that good password hygiene is essential to staying safe online. This World Password Day, we’d like to talk about improving your password hygiene, how you can help your friends and family improve theirs, and what the future of authentication holds.
The SolarWinds hack in 2020 is one of the most devastating hacks in the history of the internet. Close to 20,000 company’s systems were compromised, losing billions of pieces of data in the process. If you’re one of the 37% of Americans that go long periods of time without updating passwords*, large-scale attacks like SolarWinds can be devastating. By stealing so many login credentials simultaneously, attackers can potentially access exponentially more accounts by reusing leaked credentials on different sites. Unfortunately this is not an isolated event, data breaches from websites and services we frequently use continue to happen through 2021 as well.
According to a recent survey we conducted, 34% of Americans have reused the same, or similar, password more than once. By using the same password for multiple accounts, attackers only need to find one password, creating a domino effect that makes it easier to access more accounts. If that password is weak, it becomes even easier to tip over that first domino.
Our guidance is to create strong, hard-to-guess passwords to protect your accounts. We recommend creating a unique password for every online account, using more than 16 characters, with upper and lower case letters, some numbers, and special symbols, to make a stronger than average password. How are you supposed to remember all of those strong passwords, though?
Well, password managers, especially those included in comprehensive security suites like McAfee® Total Protection, do much of the heavy lifting for you. For instance, McAfee’s integrated password manager not only helps you create stronger passwords and store them, but will also autofill your credentials and log you into websites as well. These convenient features extend beyond just your computer and can be used on other devices like your phone and tablet. Best of all, password managers that are an integrated part of a security suite can be monitored, so you’ll be alerted if your passwords get exposed in a data breach.
You’ve already taken a step towards improving your password hygiene by reading this blog post. But the next step is, have an honest look at your passwords. Do you write them down, use the same for many accounts, or use weak ones? Then it may be time for a change to better protect your accounts and the personal info in those accounts.
If you’re like a certain member of my family—that will remain nameless, Mom—who kept their passwords written down in a notepad, making the change to a password manager (McAfee’s, naturally) was a life-changing moment. Not only did it help her see just how often she was using the same login credentials, she now has an easy way to store, auto-fill, and even generate strong passwords across all her accounts and devices. An intended bonus was that she also realized how many accounts she was no longer using!
Now that you know more about what makes a strong password and how to protect them, let’s talk about why strong passwords are just the start of keeping your accounts safe. You’re probably already using Two-Factor Authentication for apps and services, but you may not have heard the term before. Two-Factor Authentication, or 2FA, is the second layer of protection to authenticate or prove you are the owner of this account. If you’ve received a text message or an email to confirm a new account signup, that’s a type of 2FA.
Text messages and email aren’t the only types of 2FA. There are USB keys, apps, and even systems built-in to your phone, like facial recognition to open phone apps, for example. Some popular 2FA options are USB keys and Google Authenticator.
The great thing about 2FA is that it helps make your strong passwords even more effective by stopping an attacker from using stolen credentials. If you fell victim to a phishing attack that looked like your bank’s website, the attacker would have your email and password combination. Without 2FA, they could log into your account and pretend they’re you. With 2FA in place, it becomes much harder for an attacker to access your account because they’re missing that last important piece of information.
Humans are almost always the weakest link when it comes to securing information. But by committing ourselves to better password practices, with help from the latest technology, we can make sure passwords are a strong link in our security chain; one that will only get stronger in the future.
For instance, using a device like a key-fob, new passwordless systems can authenticate a user without entering their login details. Not only does this make logging into your accounts lightning fast, you also never have to remember a complicated password again.
Biometric locks, like FaceID, are another example of passwordless entry. Using your face, or a fingerprint to authenticate yourself makes it much harder for attackers to break into your accounts.
We hope this Password Day post has helped answer some questions about password hygiene and how to take better care of your online accounts. Online security changes from day to day, so staying aware of new technologies and building safe new habits is essential. Perhaps one day this day will no longer need to exist on our calendars, as we look to a future where we might not need passwords at all. While we collectively make strikes towards this future, let’s celebrate this day while it lasts.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post World Password Day: Make Passwords the Strongest Link in Your Online Security appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Video conferencing has really taken off this year. With more people working and learning from home than ever before, video calling has rapidly become the mainstream method for remote communication, allowing users to stay connected. But very few may realize that they might be giving away their passwords on video calls through their body language. According to Tom’s Guide, call participants can guess a user’s passwords through the arm and shoulder movements they make while they type.
Let’s unpack how this threat works so you can continue to connect via video calls worry-free.
Keyboard snooping, or a keyboard interference threat, occurs when an attacker is present on a video call and observes the target’s body and physiological features to infer what they are typing. To pull off this attack, the hacker would need to record the meeting or video stream and feed it through a computer program. This program eliminates the visual background and measures the user’s arm and shoulder movements relative to their face. From there, the program analyzes the user’s actions to guess which keys they are hitting on the keyboard – including passwords and other sensitive information.
So, how accurate is this program, anyway? While this shows that the program was only correct 20% of the time when subjects were on their own devices in an uncontrolled environment, the program’s accuracy increased to 75% if their password was one of the one million most commonly used passwords. And suppose the program already knew their email address or name. In that case, it could decipher when the target was typing this information during the video call (and when their password would immediately follow) 90% of the time. The less complex the target makes their password, the easier it is for the program to guess what they’re typing.
Keystroke inference attacks can have potentially dangerous effects, since the text typed can often contain sensitive or private information even beyond passwords, like credit card numbers, authentication codes, and physical addresses. It’s also important to note that any video conferencing tool or videos obtained from public video sharing/streaming platforms are susceptible to this attack.
Therefore, to prevent your meeting attendees from snooping on what you’re typing, follow these tips for greater peace-of-mind:
Avoid giving keyboard snoopers the upper hand by making your password or passphrase as unique as the information it’s protecting. If a hacker does manage to guess your password for one of your online accounts, they will likely check for repeat credentials across multiple sites. By using different passwords or passphrases for your online accounts, you can remain calm and collected knowing that the majority of your data is secure if one of your accounts becomes vulnerable.
Two or multi-factor authentication provides an extra layer of security, as it requires multiple forms of verification like texting or emailing a secure code to verify your identity. Most popular online sites like Gmail, Dropbox, LinkedIn, Facebook, etc. offer multi-factor authentication, and it takes just a few minutes to set it up. This reduces the risk of successful impersonation by criminals who may have uncovered your information by keyboard snooping.
Take your security to the next level with a password manager, like the one included in McAfee Total Protection. A password manager can help you create strong passwords, remove the hassle of remembering numerous passwords, and log you on to websites automatically.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post How to Prevent Keyboard Snooping Attacks on Video Calls appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
It’s hard to believe, right, parents? In just a blink or two, you went from being the teenager dropping cool phrases like “rad” and “gnarly” to monitoring a teenager texting words like “lowkey,” “IRL” and “CD9” into her smartphone non-stop.*
For generations, teens have been crafting terms to differentiate themselves from other age groups. The difference today is that smartphone texting has multiplied the scope of that code to include words, emojis, numbers, and hashtags.
The times have changed, fo’ sho.’
You don’t have to speak your child’s language (please don’t). However, with new terms and risks emerging online each day, it’s a good idea to at least understand what they are saying.
Since kids have been spending more time online due to the pandemic, we thought we might discover a few new and interesting terms. We were right. We found stories of teens referring to the Coronavirus as “Miss Rona” and “Rona,” and abbreviating quarantine to “Quar.” A “Corona Bae” is the person you would only plan to date during a lockdown.
Much of the coded language kids use is meant to be funny, sarcastic, or a quick abbreviation. However, there are times when a text exchange can slip into risky territory. Seemingly harmless, text exchanges can spark consequences such as bullying, sextortion, privacy violations, and emotional or physical harm.
To help kids avoid dangerous digital situations, we recommend three things: 1) Talk early and often with your kids about digital risk and behavior expectations, 2) Explore and use parental monitoring software, and 3) Know your child’s friends and communities online and in real life.
Note: Context is everything. Many of these terms are used in jest or as casual banter. Be sure to understand the context in which a word is used.
Flex. This term means showing off. For example, “Look at her trying to flex with her new car.”
Crashy. Description of a person who is thought to be both crazy and trashy.
Clap back. A comeback filled with attitude.
Cringey. Another word for embarrassing.
Hop off. Mind your own business.
Spill tea or Kiki. Dishing gossip.
Sip tea. Listening to gossip.
Salty. Mad, angry, jealous, bitter, upset, or irritated.
“She gave me a salty look in class.”
Extra. Over the top or unnecessarily dramatic.
Left on read. Not replying to someone’s message.
Ghosting. Ending a friendship or relationship online with no explanation.
Neglext. Abandon someone in the middle of a text conversation.
Ok, Boomer. Dismissing someone who is not up to date enough.
(Throw) shade. Insult or trash talk discreetly.
Receipts. Getting digital proof, usually in the form of screenshots.
THOT. Acronym for That H__ Over There.
Thirsty. A term describing a person as desperate or needy. “Look at her staring at him — she’s so thirsty.”
Thirst trap. A sexy photograph or message posted on social media.
Dis. Short for showing blatant disrespect.
Preeing. A word that describes stalking or being stalked on Facebook.
Basic. Referring to a person as mainstream, nothing special. Usually used in a negative connotation.
Chasing Clout. A negative term describing someone trying too hard to get followers on social media.
9, CD9, or Code9, PAW, POS. Parents are around, over the shoulder.
99. All clear, the parents are gone. Safe to resume texting or planning.
KPC. Keeping parents clueless.
Cheddar, Cheese, or Bread. These are all terms that mean money.
Cap. Means to lie as in “she’s capping.” Sending the baseball cap emoji expresses the same feeling. No capping means “I’m not lying.”
Hundo P. Term that is short for “hundred percent;” absolutely, for sure.
Woke. Aware of and outspoken on current on political and social issues.
And I oop. Lighthearted term to describe a silly mistake.
Big oof. A slightly bigger mistake.
Yeet. An expression of excitement. For example, “He kissed me. Yeeeet!”
Retweet. Instead of saying, “yes, I agree,” you say, “retweet.”
Canceled. Absurd or foolish behavior is “canceled.” For example, “He was too negative on our date, so I canceled him.”
Slap or Snatched. Terms that mean fashionable or on point. For instance, “Those shoes are slap” or “You look snatched.”
And just for fun, here’s a laugh out loud video from comedian Seth Meyer’s on teen Coronavirus slang you’ll enjoy on YouTube.
* lowkey (a feeling you want to keep secret), IRL (In Real Life), CD9 also Code9 (Adult Alert used to hide secretive activity). ** Terms collected from various sources, including NetLingo.com, UrbanDictionary.com, webopedia.com, and from tweets and posts from teens online.
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Welcome to the new normal. We’re all now living in a post-COVID-19 world characterized by uncertainty, mass home working and remote learning. The lines demarcating normal life have shifted abruptly – perhaps never to return. That’s not the worst that can happen, as we all know, but it does mean we all need to get used to new ways of living, working and studying from home. This has major implications for the online safety, security and privacy of our families.
To help you adapt to these new conditions while protecting what matters most, Trend Micro has developed a two-part blog series on “The New Normal.” Part 1 identifies the scope and specific cyber-threats of the new normal. Part 2 provides security tips and products to help address those threats.
In April, nearly 300 million Americans were estimated to be in government-mandated lockdown. Even as some businesses, municipalities and states begin to relax these rules, experts have warned of subsequent waves of the virus, which could result in new localized lockdowns. In short, a lot of people will continue to work from home, while their children, also at home, attempt to study remotely from their mobile devices.
This has considerable implications for how we spend our time. Without that morning commute to work or school, more of it than ever will involve sitting in front of a desktop, laptop, tablet or smartphone screen. Even the smart TV is enlisted. Dangers include
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Unfortunately, the increase in working from home (WFH), especially for those not used to it, may lead to an increase in risky behavior, such as: using non-approved apps for work; visiting non work-related sites on work devices; and using personal devices to access work resources. Recent global Trend Micro research found that:
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This is not about restricting your freedom to visit the sites you want to visit while at home. It’s about reducing the risk of exposing corporate data and systems to possible malware.
Unsurprisingly, there has also been a major uptick in the volume of cyber-threats targeting home users. With a captive audience to aim at, it’s a huge opportunity for cyber-criminals to steal your log-ins and personal data to sell to fraudsters, or even to steal corporate passwords and information for a potentially bigger pay-off. They are helped by the fact that many home workers may be more distracted than they usually would be at the office, especially if they have young children. Your kids may even share the same laptops or PCs as you, potentially visiting risky sites and/or downloading unapproved apps.
There’s also a chance that, unless you have a corporate machine at home, your personal computing equipment is less secure than the kit you had in the office. Add to that the fact that support from the IT department may be less forthcoming than usual, given that stretched teams are overwhelmed with requests, while themselves struggling to WFH. One recent report claimed that nearly half (47%) of IT security pros have been taken off some or all of their typical security tasks to support other IT-related jobs. In another, only 59% of respondents said they believe their cybersecurity team has the right tools and resources at home to perform their job effectively.
It’s time to step up and take security into your own hands. Stay on the lookout for the following threats.
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So what’s a remote worker/concerned parent to do to protect themselves and the family in the midst of the “new normal?”
Read Part 2 in this mini-series, which we’re publishing simultaneously with Part 1, where we share some best practice advice on how to keep your digital lives and work systems safe from online threats during lockdown—and where we provide tools to help you do just that.
The post Top Tips For Home Cybersecurity And Privacy In A Coronavirus-Impacted World (Part 1) appeared first on .
The past few months have seen radical changes to our work and home life under the Coronavirus threat, upending norms and confining millions of American families within just four walls. In this context, it’s not surprising that more of us are spending an increasing portion of our lives online. But this brings with it some familiar cyber-risks. In Part 1 of this mini-series, we explained how cyber-criminals are looking to capitalize on these sweeping changes to society to further their own ends.
Now let’s take a look at what you can do to protect your family, your data, and access to your corporate accounts.
The bad guys are laser-focused on stealing your personal data and log-ins and increasingly see the remote worker as an easy target for leapfrogging into corporate networks. That’s not to mention the potential internet safety risks inherent in bored kids spending more time in front of their screens. To respond, you’ll need to create an equally focused “home security plan” governed by sensible policies and best practices. Here are some of the key areas to consider.
Protect your smart home and router
Increasingly, unprotected smart home devices are being targeted by cyber-criminals to turn into botnets to attack others. They might also provide sophisticated attackers with a stepping-stone into your corporate systems, via the home network. The home router, with its known flaws, is (after the modem) the digital front door to the smart home and the basis for your networking, so it should be first in any security strategy. Consider the following when tackling home network security:
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Secure your home office
Cyber-criminals are primed to take advantage of distracted home workers and potentially less secure PCs/devices. Secure this environment by doing the following:
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Stay safe from phishing
Phishing is the number one tactic used by attackers to trick you into installing malware or handing over your log-ins. Emails, text messages, social media messages and more are spoofed to appear as if sent by a legitimate company or contact. In response:
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Use video conferencing safely
New videoconferencing platforms can introduce risk, especially if you’re not familiar with the default settings. Here’s how to stay safe when video conferencing:
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Stay safe shopping and banking
Next, protect your financial information and stay safe from e-commerce fraud by doing the following:
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Think about online safety for kids
They may be under your roof for more hours of the day than usual, but your children are also likely to be spending more time online. That means you need to have a measured conversation with them about internet safety, backed up with parental controls. Consider the following:
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Mobile security best practices
Finally, sheltering at home has limits, particularly for restless kids. When they go to the store or out to the park, facemasks notwithstanding, they’re likely going to use their mobile devices, just as they’ll continue to do at home. Of course, you’re not exempt either from mobile threats. Ensure mobile security by
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When it comes to protecting the home from security and privacy threats during lockdown, leave no stone unturned. Cyber-criminals will always look for the weak link in the chain and focus their efforts there. Network security is important, but it doesn’t replace the need for protection on each individual device. You’ll need to cover your router, network, smart devices, and all endpoints (PCs, laptops, mobiles and other devices). Here’s how Trend Micro can help:
Trend Micro Home Network Security
Trend Micro Home Network Security provides industry-leading protection against any threats to internet-connected devices in the home. The solution
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Trend Micro Security (PC and Mac)
Trend Micro Security, available in various editions (led by Trend Micro Maximum Security), is Trend’s flagship endpoint security product for consumers. Available for both PCs and Macs, it features AI learning to stop advanced threats. Among a wide range of protections, it includes:
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Trend Micro Mobile Security:
Trend Micro Mobile Security provides endpoint security for all your mobile devices, whether Android or iOS-based.
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Additional Trend Micro Tools:
Network and endpoint security should be supplemented with tools that accomplish specific tasks, such as protecting your internet connections, your passwords, and your identity data. Trend Micro provides
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Maintaining your family’s security and privacy on all their devices during the coronavirus lockdown above all means changing your mindset, to take into account the mix of work and play in the household during the “new normal.” Use these tips and tools during lockdown and you’ll be well on your way to ensuring you and your family’s safety from malicious viruses—both digital and natural.
The post Top Tips For Home Cybersecurity And Privacy In A Coronavirus-Impacted World (Part 2) appeared first on .
Few national emergencies have the ability to strike panic into the populace quite like a virus pandemic. It’s fortunately something most of us have never had to experience, until now. At the time of writing, the number of global confirmed cases of Coronavirus infection, or COVID-19, has reached nearly 174,000 worldwide. Although the official US total currently remains a fraction of that (around 4,000), problems with testing mean many cases are likely to be going unreported here.
This is a difficult time for many Americans, as it is for citizens all over the world. But unfortunately it’s extraordinary global events like this that cyber-criminals look for in order to make their schemes more successful. True to form, they’re using mass awareness of the outbreak and a popular desire for more information on the virus, to trick users into giving away personal information and log-ins, or to unwittingly install malware on their devices.
As organizations enforce remote working to reduce the impact of the virus, many of you will be logging-on from home or your mobile computing devices, which may have fewer built-in protections from such threats. This makes it more important than ever to know how the bad guys are trying to cash in on COVID-19 and what you can do to stay safe.
Here’s a quick guide to the key online threats and security tips:
Phishing for trouble
Decades before COVID-19 burst onto the scene, a different kind of pandemic was spreading across the globe. Phishing messages have been one of the most popular tools in the hackers’ arsenal for years. In fact, Trend Micro blocked nearly 48 billion email-borne threats in 2019, 91% of the total we detected. Phishing is designed to trick the user into handing over their log-ins or personal and financial details, or persuading them to unwittingly download malware. Cyber-criminals typically achieve this by spoofing an email to make it appear as if sent from a legitimate and trustworthy source.
Once a user has been hooked, they are enticed into clicking on a malicious link or opening a malware-laden attachment. This could be anything from a banking trojan designed to steal online banking log-ins, to a piece of ransomware which will lock the user out of their PC until they pay a fee. It could even be cryptojacking malware which sits on the infected machine, quietly mining for Bitcoin while running up large energy bills and slowing down your PC.
The bad news is that phishing messages — whether sent by email, social media, text or messaging app — are getting harder to spot. Many now feature perfect English, and official logos and sender domains. They also often use current newsworthy events to trick the user into clicking. And they don’t get more high-profile than the COVID-19 pandemic.
Depending on how well protected your computing devices are, you may be more likely to receive one of these scam messages than be exposed to the virus itself. So, it pays to know what’s out there.
Watch out for these scams
The phishing landscape is evolving all the time. But here is a selection of some of the most common scams doing the rounds at the moment:
‘Official’ updates
Many of these emails purport to come from official organizations such as the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), or the World Health Organization (WHO). They claim to contain key updates on the spread of the virus and must-read recommendations on how to avoid infection. Booby-trapped links and attachments carry malware and/or could redirect users to phishing sites.
Coronavirus map
Sometimes legitimate tools can be hijacked to spread malware. Researchers have spotted a version of the interactive Coronavirus dashboard created by Johns Hopkins University which was altered to contain information-stealing malware known as AZORult. If emails arrive with links to such sites, users should exercise extreme caution.
Corporate updates
Many big brands are proactively contacting their customer base to reassure them of the steps they are taking to keep staff and customers safe from the virus. But here too, the hackers are jumping in with spoof messages of their own purporting to come from the companies you may do business with. FedEx is one such global brand that has been spoofed in this way.
Donations
Another trick is to send phishing emails calling for donations to help fund research into the virus. One, claiming to come from the “Department of Health” has a subject line, “URGENT: Coronavirus, Can we count on your support today?” A key tactic in phishing emails is to create a sense of urgency like this to rush the reader into making hasty decisions.
Click here for a cure
One scam email claims to come from a medical professional and contains details about a vaccine for COVID-19 which has been “hushed up” by global governments. Of course, clicking through to find the non-existent ‘cure’ will bring the recipient nothing but trouble.
Tax refunds
In the UK, users have received emails spoofed to appear as if sent from the government, and promising a tax refund to help citizens cope with the financial shock of the pandemic. As governments in the US and elsewhere start to take more interventionist measures to prop up their economies, we can expect more of these types of phishing email.
How to stay safe
The good news is that there’s plenty you can do to protect you and your family from phishing emails like these. A blend of the following technical and human fixes will go a long way to minimizing the threat:
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How Trend Micro can help
Fortunately, Trend Micro Security can also help. Among its anti-phishing features are the following:
Antispam for Outlook: includes checks on email sender reputation, employs web threat protection to block malicious URLs in messages, and scans for threats in files attached to email messages.
Fraud Buster: uses leading-edge AI technology to detect fake emails in Gmail and Outlook webmail that don’t contain malicious URLs or attachments, but still pose a risk to the user.
To find out more about how Trend Micro can help keep your family safe from online threats and phishing, go to our Trend Micro Security homepage, or watch our video series: How to Prevent Phishing, Part 1 and Part 2.
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