Login
There has been considerable focus on the recent disclosures associated with SolarWinds, and while existing analysis on the broader campaign has resulted in detection against specific IoCs associated with the Sunburst trojan, the focus within the Advanced Threat Research (ATR) team has been to determine the possibility of additional persistence measures. Our analysis into the backdoor reveals that the level of access lends itself to the assumption that additional persistence mechanisms could have been established and some inferences regarding the intent from adversaries;
Although this analysis will focus on the premise that the backdoor supports the feasibility of establishing additional persistence methods we recognize the importance of providing assurance regarding coverage against available indicators. To that end the following resources are available:
Additional resources will become available as analysis both conducted by McAfee researchers, and the wider community becomes available.
There exists excellent analysis from many of our industry peers into the SUNBURST trojan, and the intention here is not to duplicate findings but to provide analysis we have not seen previously covered. The purpose is to enable potential victims to better understand the capabilities of the campaign in an effort to consider the possibility that there are additional persistence mechanisms.
For the purposes of this analysis our focus centered upon the file “SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll“, this particular file, as the name suggests, is associated with the SolarWinds ORION software suite and was modified with a class added containing the backdoor “SunBurst”.
A deeper dive into the backdoor reveals that the initial call is to the added class “OrionImprovementBusinessLayer” which has the following functions:
The class starts with a check to see if the module is running and, if not, it will start the service and thereafter initiate a period of dormancy.
As was detailed by FireEye, this period of sleep can range from minutes up to two weeks. The actual time period of dormancy is dependent on the checks that must be passed from the code, like hash of the Orion process, write-times of files, process running etc. A sleep period of this length of time is unusual and speaks to a very patient adversary.
The most important strings inside the backdoors are encoded with the DeflateStream Class of the .NET’s Compression library together with the base64 encoder. By examining the block-list, we discover findings that warrant further inspection. First entries are the local-IP address ranges and netmasks:
Followed by the IPv6 local addresses equivalents:
fc00::,fe00::, fec0::,ffc0::,ff00::,ff00::
Next, there is a list of IP-addresses and their associated subnetmasks. We executed a whois on those IP-addressees to get an idea of whom they might belong to. There is no indication as to the reason that the following IPs have been inserted into the blocklist, although the netmasks implemented in certain entries are ‘quite’ specific, therefore we have to assume the attackers were intentional in their desire to avoid certain targets.
Assuming that the victim is not within the block list, the sample will then proceed to create the named pipe 583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e. This is done to ensure that only one instance of the backdoor is running. We were able to verify this through replication we carried out within our own environment.
When we ran the backdoor, we were able to confirm that this value is hardcoded in the code, and once the dormancy period passed the service is started and named pipe is created. At this point, the backdoor will also create a unique UserID MD5 value for the system it is installed on as depicted within figure 5.
This particular routine will initially read the Device-info of the system but ignore the loopback interfaces (part of the code of the ReadDeviceInfo routine that mentions “Select * From Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration where IPEnabled=true” ). The Device-info will then be combined with the domain name, followed by a value from the registry key (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography). This information is then used to create an MD5 value of that string.
The module will start the ‘update’ routine. This routine is a continuous loop designed for verification against, for example, unwanted services that could potentially be used against detection of the backdoor as depicted in figure 6.
The backdoor gathers information from the system. The following information is gathered by a routine called “CollectSystemDescription”, some examples include;
There exists other subroutines to collect additional data, for example enumerating the information from the network-adaptors, the backdoor uses the GetNetworkAdapterConfiguration routine. The routine is gathering the following information:
In order to check if certain ‘unwanted’ services are running, the backdoor enumerates the services, creates a hashlist and compares them with a hard-coded set of these values. The ‘update’ routine will exit once a ‘block-listed’ process id discovered. The backdoor will attempt to stop these services by entering a value in the registry for that service that will disable that service. The update routine will check again and continue this process until all unwanted processes are disabled.
Another capability of the backdoor is to start/stop tasks:
Other functionalities we observed in the code are:
An interesting observation was the check for the presence of SolarWinds’ Improvement Client executable and it’s version “3.0.0.382”.
The ImprovementClient is a program that can collect the following information (source SolarWinds) :
Another observation of the http routine was the search for certain keywords in the http-traffic that might indicate the adversary was looking into details/access of cloud and/or wireless networks of their victims by using the SolarWinds’ modules that are installed to monitor/administer these kinds of instances. Managing the network using SolarWinds’ Orion is executed by using a browser and localhost that is hosting the webserver. Reading out the certificate values and search for these keywords in the http-traffic would have gained this information.
After all checks and routines have passed, the backdoor will use a domain generating algorithm (hereafter DGA) to generate a domain. Example of the part of the DGA code:
When the domain is successfully reached, the routine called ‘Update’ contains a part that will act on this and start a new thread firing off the routine “HttpHelper.Initialize”. In the below screenshot we can observe that flow:
The code shows that when the dnsrecord equals the domain and can be reached, the new thread will start in the background.
The ‘HttpHelper’ class/routine is responsible for all the C2 communications:
Even if a victim is using a Proxy-server with username and password, the backdoor is capable of retrieving that information and using it to build up the connection towards the C2. It then uses a routine called “IWebProxy GetWebProxy” for that:
The DGA-generated C2s are subdomains of: avsvmcloud[.]com.
An example of how these domains would look:
Inspecting the CNAME’s from the DGA-generated C2’s we observed the following domain-names:
In the forementioned HTTP handler code, we discovered paths that might be installed on the C2’s for different functions:
Once the backdoor is connected, depending on the objectives from the adversaries, multiple actions can be executed including the usage of multiple payloads that can be injected into memory. At the time of writing, details regarding the ‘killswitch’ against the above domain will prevent this particular backdoor from being operational, however for the purpose of this analysis it demonstrates the level of access afforded to attackers. While the efforts to sinkhole the domain are to be applauded, organisations that have been able to identify indicators of SUNBURST within their environment are strongly encouraged to carry out additional measures to provide themselves assurances that further persistent mechanisms have not been deployed.
The post Additional Analysis into the SUNBURST Backdoor appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
In a blog post released 13 Dec 2020, FireEye disclosed that threat actors compromised SolarWinds’s Orion IT monitoring and management software with a trojanized version of SoalrWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll delivered as part of a digitally-signed Windows Installer Patch. The trojanized file delivers a backdoor, dubbed SUNBURST by FireEye (and Solorigate by Microsoft), that communicates to third-party servers for command and control and malicious file transfer giving the attacker a foothold on the affected system with elevated privileges. From there, additional actions on the objective, such as lateral movement and data exfiltration, are possible. Since release of the initial blog from FireEye, subsequent additional analysis by McAfee and the industry as well as alerts by CISA, we have seen the attack grow in size, breadth and complexity. We will continue to update defensive recommendation blogs like this as new details emerge.
The use of a compromised software supply chain as an Initial Access technique (T1195.002) is particularly dangerous as the attack uses assumed trusted paths and as such can go undetected for a long period. This attack leveraged several techniques, such as trusted software, signed code and stealthy hiding-in-plain-sight communication, allowing the attacker to evade even strong defenses and enjoy a long dwell before detection. The sophisticated nature of the attack suggests that an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Group is likely responsible. In fact, FireEye is tracking the group as UNC2452 and has released countermeasures to identify the initial SUNBURST backdoor. McAfee has also provided an intelligence summary within MVISION Insights and mitigation controls for the initial entry vectors are published in KB93861. For additional response actions, please view Part One of this blog series here. If you are using SolarWinds software, please refer to the company guidance here to check for vulnerable versions and patch information.
However, looking beyond the initial entry and containment actions, you should think about how you are prepared for this type of attack in the future. This is a sophisticated actor(s) who may use other techniques such as Spearphishing to gain access, then move around the corporate network and potentially steal intellectual property as was the case with FireEye. They will change techniques and tools, so you need to be ready. Our Advanced Threat Research team tracks over 700 APT and Cyber Crime campaigns so the potential for another threat actor to launch a similar attack is high. In this blog, we will take a specific look at the techniques used in the SolarWinds compromise and provide some guidance on how McAfee solutions could help you respond now and prepare for this type of threat in the future with an adaptable security capability for resilience.
In our first blog in this series, we provided some initial response guidance designed to disrupt the attack early in the Execution phase or look retrospectively on the endpoints or proxy logs for indicators of compromise. But as you can see in the attack timeline below, it started much earlier with purposeful and detailed preparation and includes multiple other steps. A couple of techniques speak volumes about the sophistication and planning involved in this campaign.
First is the choice of entry vector. The attacker in this case compromised part of the software supply chain by weaponizing software by SolarWinds, a major brand of IT management software. While software supply chain compromises are not new, like the recent one affecting JavaScript, they are typically on a smaller scale or more quickly detected. More common initial access techniques involve Spearphishing or taking advantage of open remote services like RDP. While both take planning and effort, weaponizing software from a major technology company and going undetected in that process is no easy feat. Secondly, the calculated wait time before external communication and the custom Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) indicate the attacker has a lot of patience and stealth capability. For more detailed analysis of these advanced techniques, see McAfee Labs additional analysis blog on the SUNBURST backdoor.
The attack also involves numerous post-exploitation actions such as command and control communication masquerading (T1001.003) as normal update traffic, additional payload transfers (T1105), system discovery, credential harvesting and potentially then movement to other systems, even cloud-hosted infrastructure systems. The goal of course is to disrupt or detect any stage of attack before the breakout point and hopefully before any real impact to the business. The breakout point is when an attacker has gained privileges and starts to move laterally within the business. At that point, it becomes very difficult but not impossible to disrupt or detect the activity. But you must act fast. The impact of the attack can vary. In one case, it could be loss of intellectual property, but in another case, destruction of critical systems or data could be the goal. Also, what if the attacker used other initial access techniques, such as Spearphishing (T1566), to deliver a similar backdoor? Would you be able to detect that activity or any of the follow actions? Our point is don’t just update the endpoint with the latest DAT and consider yourself secure. Look for other ways to disrupt or detect an attack throughout the whole attack chain, leveraging both prevention and detection capability and keeping the end goal in mind to reduce impact to the business. Also think about how you prepare. The attackers in this case spent a lot of time in preparation creating custom malware and infrastructure. How about your organization? Do you know what attackers might be targeting your organization? Do you know their tactics and techniques?
In the first hours of a new threat campaign, if the CIO or CISO asked you, “are we exposed to SUNBURST”, how long would it take you to answer that question? One place to turn is MVISION Insights. MVISION Insights combines McAfee’s Threat Intelligence research with telemetry from your endpoint controls to reduce your attack surface against emerging threats. MVISION Insights tracks over 700 APT and Cyber Crime campaigns as researched by McAfee’s ATR team, including the most recent, FireEye Red Team tool release and SolarWinds Supply Chain Compromise campaigns.
In the beginning hours of a new threat response, you can use MVISION Insights to get a quick summary of the threat, view external resources, and a list of known indicators such as files, URLs, or IP addresses. The campaign summary saves you from some of the time-consuming task of combing multiple sites, downloading reports, and building out the broader picture. MVISION Insights provides critical pieces in one place allowing you to move quicker through the response process. The next question to answer, is this new attack a risk to my business? Insights can help you answer that question as well when you click on “Your Environment”.
Insights automatically correlates the indicators of compromise with Threat Events from McAfee ENS, allowing you to quickly asses if there is an immediate problem now. If you had a detection, you should immediately go to incident response. Insights reviews your endpoint control configuration to asses if you have the right content update deployed to potentially disrupt the threat. At this point, you are closer to answer the CIO question of “are we exposed”. I say closer because Insights provides only the endpoint protection view currently so you will need to review other controls you have in place to fully assess risk.
However, Insights also assesses your endpoint security posture against other advanced threat techniques, looking to see if you are getting the best value from ENS by leveraging signature, intelligence and behavior anomaly detection capability in the solution. This is important because the attackers will change tactics, using new entry techniques and tools, so your security posture must continuously adapt. And this is just one campaign. Insights is summarizing intelligence, surfacing detections and reducing your attack surface continuously, against 700 campaigns!
Mitigating risk from SUNBURST and similar sophisticated APT campaigns requires a security architecture that provides defense in depth and visibility throughout the entire attack chain. You should review your architecture and assess gaps either in technique visibility or protection capability. Below we have outlined where McAfee and partner solutions could be used to either disrupt or detect some of the attack techniques used in SUNBURST based on what we know today.
While the attacker is no doubt sophisticated and stealthy, the multi-stage aspect of the attack presents opportunities to detect or stop at multiple points and perhaps even before the attack gains a foothold. We cover more about how to use McAfee EDR to search for or detect some of the techniques used in SUNBURST in next section. However, there are some other key cyber defense capabilities that may be overlooked in your organizations but are critical to having a chance at detection and mitigation. We highlight those in this section below.
Normally this is beyond what most organizations have time to do. However, in this case, you need to gain any advantage. We discussed MVISION Insights above so here we will cover additional guidance. During the preparation phase of this attack, the attacker obtains infrastructure within the target geo to host their command and control server. During this phase, they also set the hostnames of their C2 servers to mimic target organization hostnames. A scan for your domain names on external IP blocks can reveal the attack formation. Open source tools such as Spiderfoot offer a number of plugins to gather and analyze such types of data. Passive DNS with combination of hosts communicating with unusual domain names also represent a window of detection whereby Advanced DNS Protection solutions such as from our SIA partner Infoblox can detect behavior-based DGA usage by malware and automatically block such DNS resolution requests.
DNS queries often provide the first layers of insights into any type of C2 communication and data exfiltration. You should enable logging ideally at an upstream resolver(s) where you can see traffic from your entire infrastructure. More information can be found here for Windows DNS Servers and Linux Bind DNS Servers. This could be forwarded to McAfee ESM/other SIEMs for analysis and correlation for detection of DGA-type activities.
Being able to detect unusual flows should also be a priority for incident responders. Along with DNS queries, NetFlow data when combined with UBA provides a great source of detection, as the attackers’ use of VPS providers can be combined with user login data to detect an “impossible rate of travel event.”
As described in the defensive architecture, MVISION EDR plays a vital role in hunting for prevalence of indicators related to the SUNBURST backdoor and ensuing post compromise activity. The role of MVISION EDR becomes even more important due to the usage of manual OPSEC by the threat actor where what follows the initial breach is driven by how the threat actor is targeting the organisation.
You can use MVISION EDR or MAR to search endpoints for SUNBURST indicators as provided by Microsoft and FireEye. If you are licensed for MVISION Insights, you can pivot directly to MVISION EDR to search for indicators. MVISION EDR supports real-time searches to hunt for presence of files on the endpoints and allows for sweeps across the estate. The following query can be used with the pre-populated malicious file hash list. The presence of the file on the system is itself does not mean it was successful and further hunting to check for execution of the actual malicious code on the system.is needed. See the search syntax below.
Begin MVEDR Query Syntax…
Files name, full_name, md5, sha256, created_at, create_user_name, create_user_domain and HostInfo hostname, ip_address, os and LoggedInUsers username, userdomain where Files sha256 equals “ac1b2b89e60707a20e9eb1ca480bc3410ead40643b386d624c5d21b47c02917c” or Files sha256 equals “c09040d35630d75dfef0f804f320f8b3d16a481071076918e9b236a321c1ea77” or Files sha256 equals “eb6fab5a2964c5817fb239a7a5079cabca0a00464fb3e07155f28b0a57a2c0ed” or Files sha256 equals “dab758bf98d9b36fa057a66cd0284737abf89857b73ca89280267ee7caf62f3b” or Files sha256 equals “32519685c0b422e4656de6e6c41878e95fd95026267daab4215ee59c107d6c77” or Files sha256 equals “d0d626deb3f9484e649294a8dfa814c5568f846d5aa02d4cdad5d041a29d5600” or Files sha256 equals “53f8dfc65169ccda021b72a62e0c22a4db7c4077f002fa742717d41b3c40f2c7” or Files sha256 equals “019085a76ba7126fff22770d71bd901c325fc68ac55aa743327984e89f4b0134” or Files sha256 equals “ce77d116a074dab7a22a0fd4f2c1ab475f16eec42e1ded3c0b0aa8211fe858d6” or Files sha256 equals “32519b85c0b422e4656de6e6c41878e95fd95026267daab4215ee59c107d6c77” or Files sha256 equals “292327e5c94afa352cc5a02ca273df543f2020d0e76368ff96c84f4e90778712” or Files sha256 equals “c15abaf51e78ca56c0376522d699c978217bf041a3bd3c71d09193efa5717c71”
…End MVEDR Query Syntax
Additionally, you can do a historical search creation and deletion of files going back up to 90 days in cloud storage.
The threat actor is known to rename system utilities/files and clean up their tracks. MVISION EDR can review historical changes to the file system, this is crucial in determining if an endpoint was a victim of this attack. The flexible search interface can be used to filter down and track the progress of the completion of the attacker’s objectives for e.g. look at changes triggered from the infected dll’s such as netsetupsvc.dll.
MVISION EDR allows for tracing of active network connections leveraging the real time search functionalities
You can also leverage the historical search function to look for historical connections related to the command and control activity for this threat actor. The filtering by process ID and source/destination IP allows analysts to track down the malicious communications.
MVISION EDR also allows analysts to review historical DNS lookups thus allowing for the ability to hunt for malicious DNS lookups. This is a very important capability in the product as many organizations do not log DNS or have a DNS hierarchy that makes it harder to log the end device making the actual request.
MVISION EDR includes custom collector creation ability that allows for execution of custom commands across the estate. In this case, it’s possible to look for the existence of the Named Pipes by executing the following Powershell command:
Powershell Command for Pipe detection [System.IO.Directory]::GetFiles(“\\.\\pipe\\”) | %{($_ -split “\\”)[6]}
HostInfo hostname, ip_address, os where _NamedPipe pipename contains “583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f2 05c72b2e”
It is known the attacker in its final stages leverages legitimate SolarWinds processes to complete their objectives:
\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
\SolarWinds\Orion\ExportToPDFCmd.Exe
\SolarWinds\Orion\APM\APMServiceControl.exe
\SolarWinds.Credentials\SolarWinds.Credentials.Orion.WebApi.exe
\SolarWinds\Orion\Topology\SolarWinds.Orion.Topology.Calculator.exe
\SolarWinds\Orion\Database-Maint.exe
ProcessHistory parentname, name, id, cmdline WHERE ProcessHistory parentname equals “WerFault.exe” or ProcessHistory parentname equals “ExportToPDFCmd.Exe” or ProcessHistory parentname equals “APMServiceControl.exe” or ProcessHistory parentname equals “SolarWinds.Credentials.Orion.WebApi.exe” or ProcessHistory parentname equals “SolarWinds.Orion.Topology.Calculator.exe” or ProcessHistory parentname equals “\SolarWinds\Orion\Database-Maint.exe”
MVISION EDR’s architecture leverages the Data Exchange Layer to stream trace data to our cloud service where we apply analytics to identify or investigate a threat. Trace data are artifacts from the endpoint, such as file hashes, processes, communications, typically needed for endpoint detection and searches. The DXL architecture allows that data to be streamed to the cloud as well to a local data store such as a SIEM or other log storage like Elastic simultaneously.
You can store the data longer than the 90-day maximum McAfee stores in our cloud. Why is this important? Recent analysis of SUNBURST suggests that the attack goes as far back as March 2020, and perhaps earlier. This local storage would provide capability to hunt for indicators further back as needed, if so configured.
How do you know what data sources are needed to detect Mitre Att&ck tactics and techniques? Carlos Diaz from MVISION EDR engineering wrote a great tool called Mitre-Assistant to simplify that process. You can download that tool here.
One of the key challenges threat hunters and security analysts face is where the attack progresses through to the second phase of the attack, where it is understood the attacker has dropped malware to execute and complete their objectives. This usage of sophisticated execution of malware from a trusted process is detected by MVISION EDR and automatically mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK Framework. As part of the detection and process tracing, EDR also captures the command executed on the endpoint. This becomes invaluable in case of tracking the manual OPSEC aspect of the second phase of the attack.
MVISION EDR provides extensive capabilities to respond to threats once they have been assessed, e.g. real-time searches once executed allows analysts to scope the affected endpoints rapidly at which point the solution offers multiple options as a method for containment and remediation of the threat across the estate through bulk operations.
MVISION EDR provides a way to easily visualize data egress by looking at topology view of the endpoints where malicious activity has been detected, by observing the network-flow map the outlier connections can be easily identified and then correlated with WHOIS, IP reputation and Passive DNS data from providers like McAfee GTI and Virustotal. Once established, the external connections can be blocked and the endpoint can be quarantined from the EDR console. EDR also shows common processes spawning across multiple endpoints to showcase lateral movement and is also tagged as part of the MITRE techniques being identified and detected.
Combining EDR with Deception technology such as that from Attivo Networks brings together a combination of offensive detection where the attacker can be effectively trapped as result of not getting hold of the real credentials required to make the lateral movement/ privilege escalation a success thus failing in their objective completion.
An integrated approach to DLP can also provide effective protection against the completion of the objectives for e.g. unified DLP policy across the endpoint and web-gateway looking for exfiltration of sensitive organizational data can also provide valuable defenses. McAfee’s UCE platform provides such unified data protection capabilities.
Our latest research indicates attacker is actively looking to establish additional footholds into customer cloud environments such as Azure AD or bypass multi-factor authentication by hijacking SAML sessions, McAfee’s MVISION Cloud Access Control and User Anomaly Detection can identify suspicious access attempts to cloud services and infrastructure.
It is recommended to increase monitoring and investigations into such activity especially with privileged accounts on sensitive infrastructure
In addition to architecture review and continuous hunting for indicators, it is recommended that customers work with their suppliers – IT, Cloud Services, Infrastructure, Hardware, etc. – to validate integrity. Secondly, review controls, detection use cases in the SOC and logs, specifically related to your intellectual property. A tabletop exercise to rehearse crisis management and breach notification procedures is also recommended.
It’s important to note that analysis of this attack is ongoing across the globe and events are still unfolding. The presence/detection of the backdoor and affected software is just the beginning for many customers. MVISION EDR or other tool detections of malicious named-pipe presence and domains help indicate to a customer if the backdoor was running, but with the gathered system information, the adversary may have valid accounts and access to AD or Cloud systems in some cases. The adversary has been wiping information/log files to erase traces. Incident Response is a critical piece of your overall business resilience and if you are affected, you will no doubt be asking yourself these types of questions.
McAfee will continue to post analysis results and defensive guidance as we learn more about the attack. Customers should follow McAfee Labs posts, check the Insights Preview Dashboard for latest threat intelligence, and continually check the Knowledge Center for latest product guidance.
The post How A Device to Cloud Architecture Defends Against the SolarWinds Supply Chain Compromise appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Die Cloud ist und bleibt ein Treiber für die digitale Transformation. Nachdem der Fokus primär auf die Erkennung von Shadow-IT
und die Absicherung von SaaS-Diensten lag, wandert nun der Blick auf längerfristige Projekte: Die Migration von ganzen Diensten
und Anwendungen in Richtung Cloud. In diesem Podcast sprechen wir daher über die Themen Infrastruktur und Container in der
Cloud, wie diese sich in die bestehende Architektur einbinden und welche weiteren wichtigen Sichtweisen für eine umfassendes
Sicherheitskonzept hilfreich sind.
The post ST25: Absicherung von Cloud-nativen Anwendungen appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
2020 has been quite the year for many, and through it all, we’re reflecting on everything we are thankful for. This includes the incredible stories and invaluable perspectives that come from our McAfee team members around the world.
As the year ends, we’re counting down the top 10 most read Life at McAfee blog stories. These are the stories from our team members that you love to read, and we love to tell!
When COVID-19 hit Germany, Heiko jumped into action and made an impact on his community with the help of THW and McAfee’s Volunteer Time Off (VTO) benefit. Read about Heiko’s experience and how he was able to help provide relief by helping to build a temporary hospital facility.
Navigating a global pandemic while balancing parenthood and adjusting to remote work is currently a challenge for many. In this blog, our team member, Paige, offers up four helpful tips for remote working parents.
In honor of International Women’s Day, we asked McAfee men around the world to share their perspectives on creating a more gender equal world. They offered candid and rich insights with takeaways to remember — inside and outside of the workplace. If you’re looking for an interesting conversation on gender equality, you won’t want to miss this blog.
Launching your career is an exciting experience that can also be a nerve-wracking feat. Our Women in Security (WISE) Community hosted a panel discussion to encourage our next generation of women in tech to pursue their passions. Whether you’re just starting your career or looking for a change, you’ll find useful insights on what it’s like to work in the tech industry and life at McAfee!
We talked to our Women in Technology (WIT) Scholarship recipients and discussed their participation in our summer internship program in Cork, Ireland. Read about their unique experiences being in the program — from building professional relationships to mentorships and training. This is a valuable read for anyone jumpstarting a new career.
Looking for a snapshot of McAfee internships? To celebrate National Intern Day, we asked ten global McAfee interns to share insights gained from their unique experiences.
To pay tribute to our veterans in honor of Veterans Day and Remembrance Day, we asked team members in our McAfee Veterans Community to share memories and photos from their service days. Check out what some of them had to say!
Meet Thomas, Advanced threat Researcher at McAfee by day, 3D–mask–printing expert by night. Read Thomas’ story and find out how he is making a significant impact and inspiring others to support healthcare workers during the pandemic.
In our Women in Sales series, McAfee’s sales professionals talked on how to break boundaries and achieve success in cybersecurity sales. If you want to dive into industry opportunities and gain advice to advance your career, this is the place to start!
Whether you’re an expert in remote work or working from home for the first time, you may be looking for helpful tips to set yourself up for success. In this blog, get advice from seasoned remote workers on navigating working from home and learn how you can incorporate practical tips.
The post 2020 In Review: The Top 10 Most Popular Life at McAfee Blogs appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
McAfee, the device-to-cloud cybersecurity company, announced the winners of its distinguished SIA Partner Awards. The 2020 awards recognize partners who demonstrated innovation, strategic value, and market leadership in their respective market segments which are a complement to the McAfee solution portfolio.
2020 has been a difficult year for everyone that has required organizations to be flexible and rethink how they deploy security to ensure their critical assets remain protected. The McAfee SIA program enables organizations to embrace the flexibility they need through certified integrated solutions from industry-leading providers to ensure they have the tools and resources needed to stay protected and ensure business keeps operating.
We are pleased to announce the winners of the 2020 McAfee Security Innovation Alliance Awards in the following three categories: Most Innovative Partners of the Year, and SIA Partner of the Year.
IBM Security is a strategic partnered with McAfee across multiple IBM teams including Resilient and QRadar. To date McAfee has certified integrations with IBM’s Incident Response platform, Resilient to include: TIE, DXL, ePO, ESM, ATD and now MVISION. McAfee has released QRadar integrations to both ePO and MVISION. All McAfee Resilient integrations are published on IBM’s AppExchange. In 2019 McAfee and IBM jointly founded the Open Cybersecurity Alliance under the auspices of Oasis. Read our solution brief for more details. IBM Security was amongst the inaugural partners announced during the recent launch of the MVISION Marketplace.
Siemplify is a great McAfee partner, previously integrating their SOAR product with McAfee ePO. Now, with McAfee’s latest announcement of the MVISION Marketplace including Siemplify as one of the inaugural development partners. Siemplify has shown themselves to be one of our most innovative partners during 2020 and now enable mutual customers to discover, try, buy, and deploy partner technologies as a Composable solution with a few clicks of the mouse.
Most Valuable Partner of the Year criteria cover the breadth and depth of the partner’s multiple integrations and close business engagement with McAfee.
ThreatQuotient, “ThreatQ” Joined the SIA program in January 2017 and quickly showed their value through their Threat Intelligence Platform. In ThreatQ fashion, they quickly, integrated with McAfee TIE, McAfee Data Exchange Layer (DXL), McAfee Advanced Threat Detection (ATD), McAfee Active Response (MAR) and Enterprise Security Manager (ESM), followed by MVISION Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR). Most recently ThreatQ was amongst the inaugural partners to launch with McAfee’s new MVISION Marketplace.
Partnership integrations and the most deal closures within the SIA programs tells the story or why ThreatQuotient was selected as the Partner of The Year.
To learn more about these partners and MVISION Marketplace visit: https://marketplace.mcafee.com
Read the MVISION Marketplace press release here: McAfee Announces MVISION Marketplace
The post McAfee Security Innovation Alliance 2020 MPOWER Awards appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
The December 2020 revelations around the SUNBURST campaigns exploiting the SolarWinds Orion platform have revealed a new attack vector – the supply chain – that will continue to be exploited.
The ever-increasing use of connected devices, apps and web services in our homes will also make us more susceptible to digital home break-ins. This threat is compounded by many individuals continuing to work from home, meaning this threat not only impacts the consumer and their families, but enterprises as well.
Attacks on cloud platforms and users will evolve into a highly polarized state where they are either “mechanized and widespread” or “sophisticated and precisely handcrafted”.
Mobile users will need to beware of phishing or smishing messages aimed at exploiting and defrauding them through mobile payment services.
The use of QR codes has notably accelerated during the pandemic, raising the specter of a new generation of social engineering techniques that seek to exploit consumers and gain access to their personal data.
Finally, the most sophisticated threat actors will increasingly use social networks to target high value individuals working in sensitive industry sectors and roles.
A new year offers hope and opportunities for consumers and enterprises, but also more cybersecurity challenges. I hope you find these helpful in planning your 2021 security strategies.
–Raj Samani, Chief Scientist and McAfee Fellow, Advanced Threat Research
Twitter @Raj_Samani
1. |
Supply Chain Backdoor Techniques to Proliferate |
On December 13, 2020, the cybersecurity industry learned nation-state threat actors had compromised SolarWinds’s Orion IT monitoring and management software and used it to distribute a malicious software backdoor called SUNBURST to dozens of that company’s customers, including several high-profile U.S. government agencies.
This SolarWinds-SUNBURST campaign is the first major supply chain attack of its kind and has been referred to by many as the “Cyber Pearl Harbor” that U.S. cybersecurity experts have been predicting for a decade and a half.
The campaign also represents a shift in tactics where nation state threat actors have employed a new weapon for cyber-espionage. Just as the use of nuclear weapons at the end of WWII changed military strategy for the next 75 years, the use of a supply chain attack has changed the way we need to consider defense against cyber-attacks.
This supply chain attack operated at the scale of a worm such as WannaCry in 2017, combined with the precision and lethality of the 2014 Sony Pictures or 2015 U.S. government Office of Personnel Management (OPM) attacks.
Within hours of its discovery, the magnitude of the campaign became frighteningly clear to organizations responsible for U.S. national security, economic competitiveness, and even consumer privacy and security.
It enables U.S. adversaries to steal all manners of information, from inter-governmental communications to national secrets. Attackers can, in turn, leverage this information to influence or impact U.S. policy through malicious leaks. Every breached agency may have different secondary cyber backdoors planted, meaning that there is no single recipe to evict the intrusion across the federal government.
While some may argue that government agencies are legitimate targets for nation-state spy craft, the campaign also impacted private companies. Unlike government networks which store classified information on isolated networks, private organizations often have critical intellectual property on networks with access to the internet. Exactly what intellectual property or private data on employees has been stolen will be difficult to determine, and the full extent of the theft may never be known.
This type of attack also poses a threat to individuals and their families given that in today’s highly interconnected homes, a breach of consumer electronics companies can result in attackers using their access to smart appliances such as TVs, virtual assistants, and smart phones to steal their information or act as a gateway to attack businesses while users are working remotely from home.
What makes this type of attack so dangerous is that it uses trusted software to bypass cyber defenses, infiltrate victim organizations with the backdoor and allow the attacker to take any number of secondary steps. This could involve stealing data, destroying data, holding critical systems for ransom, orchestrating system malfunctions that result in kinetic damage, or simply implanting additional malicious content throughout the organization to stay in control even after the initial threat appears to have passed.
McAfee believes the discovery of the SolarWinds-SUNBURST campaign will expose attack techniques that other malicious actors around the world will seek to duplicate in 2021 and beyond.
2. |
Hacking the Home to Hack the Office |
By Suhail Ansari, Dattatraya Kulkarni and Steve Povolny
While the threat to connected homes is not new, what is new is the emergence of increased functionality in both home and business devices, and the fact that these devices connect to each other more than ever before. Compounding this is the increase in remote work – meaning many of us are using these connected devices more than ever.
In 2020,the global pandemic shifted employees from the office to the home, making the home environment a work environment. In fact, since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, McAfee Secure Home Platform device monitoring shows a 22% increase in the number of connected home devices globally and a 60% increase in the U.S. Over 70% of the traffic from these devices originated from smart phones, laptops, other PCs and TVs, and over 29% originated from IoT devices such as streaming devices, gaming consoles, wearables, and smart lights.
McAfee saw cybercriminals increase their focus on the home attack surface with a surge in various phishing message schemes across communications channels. The number of malicious phishing links McAfee blocked grew over 21% from March to November, at an average of over 400 links per home.
This increase is significant and suggests a flood of phishing messages with malicious links entered home networks through devices with weaker security measures.
Millions of individual employees have become responsible for their employer’s IT security in a home office filled with “soft” targets, unprotected devices from the kitchen, to the family room, to the bedroom. Many of these home devices are “orphaned” in that their manufacturers fail to properly support them with security updates addressing new threats or vulnerabilities.
This contrasts with a corporate office environment filled with devices “hardened” by enterprise-grade security measures. We now work with consumer-grade networking equipment configured by “us” and lacking the central management, regular software updates and security monitoring of the enterprise.
Because of this, we believe cybercriminals will advance the home as an attack surface for campaigns targeting not only our families but also corporations. The hackers will take advantage of the home’s lack of regular firmware updates, lack of security mitigation features, weak privacy policies, vulnerability exploits, and user susceptibility to social engineering.
By compromising the home environment, these malicious actors will launch a variety of attacks on corporate as well as consumer devices in 2021.
3. |
Attacks on Cloud Platforms Become Highly Mechanized and Handcrafted |
By Sandeep Chandana
The COVID-19 pandemic has also hastened the pace of the corporate IT transition to the cloud, accelerating the potential for new corporate cloud-related attack schemes. With increased cloud adoption and the large number of enterprises working from home, not only is there a growing number of cloud users but also a lot more data both in motion and being transacted.
McAfee cloud usage data from more than 30 million McAfee MVISION Cloud users worldwide shows a 50% increase overall in enterprise cloud use across all industries the first four months of 2020. Our analysis showed an increase across all cloud categories, usage of collaboration services such as Microsoft O365 by 123%, increase in use of business services such as Salesforce by 61% and the largest growth in collaboration services such as Cisco Webex (600%), Zoom (+350%), Microsoft Teams (+300%), and Slack (+200%). From January to April 2020, corporate cloud traffic from unmanaged devices increased 100% across all verticals.
During the same period, McAfee witnessed a surge in attacks on cloud accounts, an estimated 630% increase overall, with variations in the sectors that were targeted. Transportation led vertical industries with a 1,350% increase in cloud attacks, followed by education (+1,114%), government (+773%), manufacturing (+679%), financial services (+571%) and energy and utilities (+472%).
The increasing proportion of unmanaged devices accessing the enterprise cloud has effectively made home networks an extension of the enterprise infrastructure. Cybercriminals will develop new, highly mechanized, widespread attacks for better efficacy against thousands of heterogenous home networks.
One example could be a widespread brute force attack against O365 users, where the attacker seeks to leverage stolen credentials and exploit users’ poor practice of re-using passwords across different platforms and applications. As many as 65% of users reuse the same password for multiple or all accounts according to a 2019 security survey conducted by Google. Where an attacker would traditionally need to manually encode first and last name combinations to find valid usernames, a learning algorithm could be used to predict O365 username patterns.
Additionally, cybercriminals could use AI and ML to bypass traditional network filtering technologies deployed to protect cloud instances. Instead of launching a classic brute force attack from compromised IPs until the IPs are blocked, resource optimization algorithms will be used to make sure the compromised IPs launch attacks against multiple services and sectors, to maximize the lifespan of compromised IPs used for the attacks. Distributed algorithms and reinforcement learning will be leveraged to identify attack plans primarily focused on avoiding account lockouts.
McAfee also predicts that, as enterprise cloud security postures mature, attackers will be forced to handcraft highly targeted exploits for specific enterprises, users and applications.
The recent Capital One breach was an example of an advanced attack of this kind. The attack was thoroughly cloud-native. It was sophisticated and intricate in that a number of vulnerabilities and misconfigurations across cloud applications (and infrastructure) were exploited and chained. It was not a matter of chance that the hackers were successful, as the attack was very well hand-crafted.
We believe attackers will start leveraging threat surfaces across devices, networks and the cloud in these ways in the months and years ahead.
4. |
New Mobile Payment Scams |
By Suhail Ansari and Dattatraya Kulkarni
Mobile payments have become more and more popular as a convenient mechanism to conduct transactions. A Worldpay Global Payments Report for 2020 estimated that 41% of payments today are on mobile devices, and this number looks to increase at the expense of traditional credit and debit cards by 2023. An October 2020 study by Allied Market Research found that the global mobile payment market size was valued at $1.48 trillion in 2019, and is projected to reach $12.06 trillion by 2027, growing at a compound annual growth rate of 30.1% from 2020 to 2027.
Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has driven the adoption of mobile payment methods higher as consumers have sought to avoid contact-based payments such as cash or physical credit cards.
But fraudsters have followed the money to mobile, pivoting from PC browsers and credit cards to mobile payments. According to research by RSA’s Fraud and Risk Intelligence team, 72% of cyber fraud activity involved the mobile channel in the fourth quarter of 2019. The researchers observed that this represented “the highest percentage of fraud involving mobile apps in nearly two years and underscores a broader shift away from fraud involving web browsers on PCs.”
McAfee predicts there will be an increase in “receive”-based mobile payment exploits, where a user receives a phishing email, direct message or smishing message telling him that he can receive a payment, transaction refund or cash prize by clicking on a malicious payment URL. Instead of receiving a payment, however, the user has been conned into sending a payment from his account.
This could take shape in schemes where fraudsters set up a fake call center using a product return and servicing scam, where the actors send a link via email or SMS, offering a refund via a mobile payment app, but the user is unaware that they are agreeing to pay versus receiving a refund. The figures below show the fraudulent schemes in action.
Mobile wallets are making efforts to make it easier for users to understand whether they are paying or receiving. Unfortunately, as the payment methods proliferate, fraudsters succeed in finding victims who either cannot distinguish credit from debit or can be prompted into quick action by smart social engineering.
Governments and banks are making painstaking efforts to educate users to understand the use of one-time passwords (OTPs) and that they should not be shared. Adoption of frameworks such as caller ID authentication (also known as STIR/SHAKEN) help in ensuring that the caller ID is not masked by fraudsters, but they do not prevent a fraudster from registering an entity that has a name close to the genuine provider of service.
In the same way that mobile apps have simplified the ability to conduct transactions, McAfee predicts the technology is making it easier to take advantage of the convenience for fraudulent purposes.
5. |
Qshing: QR Code Abuse in the Age of COVID |
By Suhail Ansari and Dattatraya Kulkarni
The global pandemic has created the need for all of us to operate and transact in all areas of our lives in a “contactless” way. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that QR codes have emerged as a convenient input mechanism to make mobile transactions more efficient.
QR code usage has proliferated into many areas, including payments, product marketing, packaging, restaurants, retail, and recreation just to name a few. QR codes are helping limit direct contact between businesses and consumers in every setting from restaurants to personal care salons, to fitness studios. They allow them to easily scan the code, shop for services or items offered, and easily purchase them.
A September 2020 survey by MobileIron found that 86% of respondents scanned a QR code over the course of the previous year and over half (54%) reported an increase in the use of such codes since the pandemic began. Respondents felt most secure using QR codes at restaurants or bars (46%) and retailers (38%). Two-thirds (67%) believe that the technology makes life easier in a touchless world and over half (58%) wish to see it used more broadly in the future.
In just the area of discount coupons, an estimated 1.7 billion coupons using QR codes were scanned globally in 2017, and that number is expected to increase by a factor of three to 5.3 billion by 2022. In just four years, from 2014 to 2018, the use of QR codes on consumer product packaging in Korea and Japan increased by 83%. The use of QR codes in such “smart” packaging is increasing at an annual rate of 8% globally.
In India, the government’s Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) uses QR codes in association with Aadhaar, India’s unique ID number, to enable readers to download citizens’ demographic information as well as their photographs.
However, the technicalities of QR codes are something of a mystery to most users, and that makes them potentially dangerous if cybercriminals seek to exploit them to target victims.
The MobileIron report found that whereas 69% of respondents believe they can distinguish a malicious URL based on its familiar text-based format, only 37% believe they can distinguish a malicious QR code using its unique dot pattern format. Given that QR codes are designed precisely to hide the text of the URL, users find it difficult to identify and even suspect malicious QR codes.
Almost two-thirds (61%) of respondents know that QR codes can open a URL and almost half (49%) know that a QR code can download an application. But fewer than one-third (31%) realize that a QR code can make a payment, cause a user to follow someone on social media (22%), or start a phone call (21%). A quarter of respondents admit scanning a QR code that did something unexpected (such as take them to a suspicious website), and 16% admitted that they were unsure if a QR code actually did what it was intended to do.
It is therefore no surprise that QR codes have been used in phishing schemes to avoid anti-phishing solutions’ attempts to identify malicious URLs within email messages. They can also be used on webpages or social media.
In such schemes, victims scan fraudulent QRs and find themselves taken to malicious websites where they are asked to provide login, personal info, usernames and passwords, and payment information, which criminals then steal. The sites could also be used to simply download malicious programs onto a user’s device.
McAfee predicts that hackers will increasingly use these QR code schemes and broaden them using social engineering techniques. For instance, knowing that business owners are looking to download QR code generator apps, bad actors will entice consumers into downloading malicious QR code generator apps that pretend to do the same. In the process of generating the QR code (or even pretending to be generating the correct QR code), the malicious apps will steal the victim’s sensitive data, which scammers could then use for a variety of fraudulent purposes.
Although the QR codes themselves are a secure and convenient mechanism, we expect them to be misused by bad actors in 2021 and beyond.
6. |
Social Networks as Workplace Attack Vectors |
By Raj Samani
Cyber adversaries have traditionally relied heavily on phishing emails as an attack vector for compromising organizations through individual employees. However, as organizations have implemented spam detection, data loss prevention (DLP) and other solutions to prevent phishing attempts on corporate email accounts, more sophisticated adversaries are pivoting to target employees through social networking platforms to which these increasingly effective defenses cannot be applied.
McAfee has observed such threat actors increasingly using the messaging features of LinkedIn, What’s App, Facebook and Twitter to engage, develop relationships with and then compromise corporate employees. Through these victims, adversaries compromise the broader enterprises that employ them. McAfee predicts that such actors will seek to broaden the use of this attack vector in 2021 and beyond for a variety of reasons.
Malicious actors have used the social network platforms in broad scoped schemes to perpetrate relatively low-level criminal scams. However, prominent actors such as APT34, Charming Kitten, and Threat Group-2889 (among others) have been identified using these platforms for higher-value, more targeted campaigns on the strength of the medium’s capacity for enabling customized content for specific types of victims.
Operation North Star demonstrates a state-of-the-art attack of this kind. Discovered and exposed by McAfee in August 2020, the campaign showed how lax social media privacy controls, ease of development and use of fake LinkedIn user accounts and job descriptions could be used to lure and attack defense sector employees.
Just as individuals and organizations engage potential consumer customers on social platforms by gathering information, developing specialized content, and conducting targeted interactions with customers, malicious actors can similarly use these platform attributes to target high value employees with a deeper level of engagement.
Additionally, individual employees engage with social networks in a capacity that straddles both their professional and personal lives. While enterprises assert security controls over corporate-issued devices and place restrictions on how consumer devices access corporate IT assets, user activity on social network platforms is not monitored or controlled in the same way. As mentioned, LinkedIn and Twitter direct messaging will not be the only vectors of concern for the corporate security operations center (SOC).
While it is unlikely that email will ever be replaced as an attack vector, McAfee foresees this social network platform vector becoming more common in 2021 and beyond, particularly among the most advanced actors.
The post 2021 Threat Predictions Report appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
As we gratefully move forward into the year 2021, we have to recognise that 2020 was as tumultuous in the digital realm as it has in the physical world. From low level fraudsters leveraging the pandemic as a vehicle to trick victims into parting with money for non-existent PPE, to more capable actors using malware that has considerably less prevalence in targeted campaigns. All of which has been played out at a time of immense personal and professional difficulties for millions of us across the world.
What started as a trickle of phishing campaigns and the occasional malicious app quickly turned to thousands of malicious URLs and more-than-capable threat actors leveraging our thirst for more information as an entry mechanism into systems across the world. There is no question that COVID was the dominant theme of threats for the year, and whilst the natural inclination will be to focus entirely on such threats it is important to recognise that there were also very capable actors operating during this time.
For the first time we made available a COVID-19 dashboard to complement our threat report to track the number of malicious files leveraging COVID as a potential lure. What this allows is real time information on the prevalence of such campaigns, but also clarity about the most targeted sectors and geographies. Looking at the statistics from the year clearly demonstrates that the overarching theme is that the volume of malicious content increased.
Whilst of course this a major concern, we must recognise that there were also more capable threat actors operating during this time.
The latter part of 2020 saw headlines about increasing ransom demands and continued successes from ransomware groups. An indication as to the reason why was provided in early 2020 in a blog published by Thomas Roccia that revealed “The number of RDP ports exposed to the Internet has grown quickly, from roughly three million in January 2020 to more than four and a half million in March.”
With RDP a common entry vector used predominantly by post intrusion ransomware gangs, there appears some explanation as to the reason why we are seeing more victims in the latter part of 2020. Indeed, in the same analysis from Thomas we find that the most common passwords deployed for RDP are hardly what we would regard as strong.
If we consider the broader landscape of RDP being more prevalent (we have to assume due to the immediate need for remote access due to the lockdowns across the globe), the use of weak credentials, then the success of ransomware groups become very evident. Indeed, later in the year we detailed our research into the Netwalker ransomware group that reveals the innovation, affiliate recruitment and ultimately financial success they were able to gain during the second quarter of 2020.
The year also provided us with the added gifts of major vulnerabilities. In August, for example, there was a series of zero-day vulnerabilities in a widely used, low-level TCP/IP software library developed by Treck, Inc. Known as Ripple 20, the affect to hundreds of millions of devices resulted in considerable concern related to the wider supply chain of devices that we depend upon. In collaboration with JSOF, the McAfee ATR team developed a Detection Logic and Signatures for organizations to detect these vulnerabilities.
Of course the big vulnerabilities did not end there; we had the pleasure of meeting BadNeighbour, Drovorub, and so many more. The almost seemingly endless stream of vulnerabilities with particularly high CVSS Scores has meant that the need to patch very high on the list of priorities.
As we closed out 2020, we were presented with details of ‘nation states’ carrying out sophisticated attacks. Whilst under normal circumstances such terminology is something that should be avoided, there is no question that the level of capability we witness from certain threat campaigns are a world away from the noisy COVID phishing scams.
In August of 2020, we released the MVISION Insights dashboard which provides a free top list of campaigns each week. This includes, most recently, tracking against the SUNBURST trojan detailed in the SolarWinds attack, or the tools stolen in the FireEye breach. What this demonstrates is that whilst prevalence is a key talking point, there exists capable threat actors targeting organizations with real precision.
For example, the Operation North Star campaign in which the threat actors deployed an Allow and Block list of targets in order to limit those they would infect with a secondary implant.
The term sophisticated is overused, and attribution is often too quickly relegated to the category of nation state. However, the revelations have demonstrated that there are those campaigns where the attack did use capabilities not altogether common and we are no doubt witnessing a level of innovation from threat groups that is making the challenge of defence harder.
What is clear is that 2020 was a challenging year, but as we try and conclude what 2021 has in store, we have to celebrate the good news stories. From initiatives such as No More Ransom continuing to tackle ransomware, to the unprecedented accessibility of tools that we can all use to protect ourselves (e.g. please check ATR GitHub repo, but recognise there are more).
Our experts share their 2021 predictions for the new year and how to protect yourself and your enterprise.
The post A Year in Review: Threat Landscape for 2020 appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Today, we celebrate the life and legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Dr. King diligently dedicated his life to dismantling systemic racism affecting marginalized groups and leading a peaceful movement to promote equality for all Americans, irrespective of color and creed. He leaves behind a legacy of courage, strength, perseverance, and a life-long dedication to pursuing a fair and just world.
At McAfee, we honor the diverse voices which make up our company and encourage every team member to bring their authentic selves to the workplace. We believe that our collective voice and action can make a difference in creating a more equal and unified world.
On this day, we commemorate MLK by honoring the man behind the message of equality. Members of the McAfee African Heritage Community share their perspectives on the impact that Martin Luther King Jr. has had on their lives and what this day means to them.
Alexus, Software Sales Engineer
When I think about what Martin Luther King Jr. Day means to me, I think of it as a time to reflect and think about the progress we have made as citizens of this country. We have made great strides, but there is much more that needs to be done for equality and justice.
I honor Martin Luther King Jr. by being of service to others around me.
I celebrate Martin Luther King Jr. Day by using my voice to uplift others.
Martin Luther King Jr. inspires me to be a man of excellence and courage.
Denise, People Operations Program ManagerFor me, Martin Luther King Jr. Day is a reminder of how far we’ve come, and how far we still have to go as a society – especially in today’s time of social unrest. Some of Dr. King’s most poignant quotes are still so applicable and impactful today.
For example – “People fail to get along because they fear each other; they fear each other because they don’t know each other; they don’t know each other because they have not communicated with each other.”
I honor Martin Luther King Jr. by doing what I can to have a positive impact on the lives of others.
I celebrate Martin Luther King Jr. Day by looking for areas to give back and serve.
Martin Luther King Jr. inspires me to do better, be better and influence the world around me accordingly.
Kristol, Global Sales Operations ManagerMLK Jr. Day is a reminder of the influence ONE person can have on people, perspectives, and shaping a platform. It means that my voice matters and that I have a right to live my dream—a dream that we continue to fight for today.
I honor Martin Luther King Jr. by never giving up on my dreams.
I celebrate Martin Luther King Jr. Day by freely bringing my authentic self to work, home and the community every day.
Martin Luther King Jr. inspires me to be a courageous, strategic and compassionate leader.
Le Var, Customer Success Manager
MLK Day always drives me to think about Dr. King’s dream and the work of the civil rights movement. I then look for ways I can make an impact in my local community to continue the work of those before me.
I honor Martin Luther King Jr. by passing the baton and sharing his dream to the next generation, molding my children to understand the past, and continuing to push Dr. King’s dream for future decades.
I celebrate Martin Luther King Jr. Day by researching African American history in an effort to broaden my own knowledge and share information I’ve learned with my peers.
Martin Luther King Jr. inspires me to make a positive impact on the community I live in. Much like Dr. King, I am one man who strives to be the dream of my ancestors. Individually, I can move boulders, but collectively, we can move mountains.
Lynne, EVP of Enterprise Global Sales and Marketing and Executive Sponsor
Martin Luther King Jr. Day means a chance to celebrate the legacy of a man who was a pivotal leader of the civil rights movement, hope and healing. Though his life was a short one, his impact was great, and there are so many lessons to learn from the words that MLK Jr. has left with us.
I honor Martin Luther King Jr. by showing up as an ally who’s ready to listen and take action.
I celebrate Martin Luther King Jr. Day by reflecting on the wise lessons shared by Martin Luther King Jr. and making it a point to have conversations about his impact.
Martin Luther King Jr. inspires me to use my voice to encourage conversation, connection and community.
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s Biography
5 of Martin Luther King Jr.’s Most Memorable Speeches
MLK Day Playlist: 10 Songs in Honor of Dr. King
Interested in joining a company that celebrates diverse voices and promotes meaningful change in our world? Explore our career opportunities. Subscribe to job alerts.
The post Honoring Martin Luther King Jr.’s Legacy with McAfee’s African Heritage Community appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Depending on your life experiences, the phrase (or country song by Eric Church) “two pink lines” may bring up a wide range of powerful emotions. I suspect, like many fathers and expecting fathers, I will never forget the moment I found out my wife was pregnant. You might recall what you were doing, or where you were and maybe even what you were thinking. As a professional ethical hacker, I have been told many times – “You just think a little differently about things.” I sure hope so, since that’s my day job and sure enough this experience wasn’t any different. My brain immediately asked the question, “How am I going to ensure my family is protected from a wide range of cyberthreats?” Having a newborn opens the door to all sorts of new technology and I would be a fool not to take advantage of all devices that makes parenting easier. So how do we do this safely?
The security industry has a well-known concept called the “principle of least privilege. “This simply means that you don’t give a piece of technology more permissions or access than it needs to perform its primary function. This can be applied well beyond just technology that helps parents; however, for me it’s of extra importance when we talk about our kids. One of the parenting classes I took preparing for our newborn suggested we use a baby tracking phone app. This was an excellent idea, since I hate keeping track of anything on paper. So I started looking at a few different apps for my phone and discovered one of them asked for permission to use “location services,” also known as GPS, along with access to my phone contacts. This caused me to pause and ask: Why does an app to track my baby’s feeding schedule need to know where I am? Why does it need to know who my friends are? These are the types of questions parents should consider before just jumping into the hottest new app. For me, I found a different, less popular app which has the same features, just with a little less access.
It’s not always as easy to just “find something else.” In my house, “if momma ain’t happy, nobody is happy.” So, when my wife decided on a specific breast pump that came with Bluetooth and is internet enabled, that’s the one she is going to use. The app backs up all the usage data to a server in the cloud. There are many ways that this can be accomplished securely, and it is not necessary a bad feature, but I didn’t feel this device benefited from being internet connected. Therefore, I simply lowered its privileges by not allowing it internet access in the settings on her phone. The device works perfectly fine, she can show the doctor the data from her phone, yet we have limited our online exposure and footprint just a little more. This simple concept of least privilege can be applied almost everywhere and goes a long way to limiting your exposure to cyber threats.
I think one of the most sought after and used products for new parents is the baby monitor or baby camera. As someone who has spent a fair amount of time hacking cameras (or cameras on wheels) this was a large area of concern for me. Most cameras these days are internet connected and if not, you often lose the ability to view the feed on your phone, which is a huge benefit to parents. So how, as parents, do we navigate this securely? While there is no silver bullet here, there are a few things to consider. For starters, there are still many baby cameras on the market that come with their own independent video screen. They generally use Wi-Fi and are only accessible from home. If this system works for you, use it. It is always more secure to have a video system which is not externally accessible. If you really want to be able to use your phone, consider the below.
Most parents, especially new ones, like to ensure that anyone that watches their children is thoroughly vetted. There are a ton of services out there to do this for babysitters and nannies, however it’s not always as easy for vetting the companies that create the devices we put in our homes. So how do we determine what is safe? My father used to tell me: “It’s how we respond to our mistakes that makes the difference.” When researching a company or device, should you find that the device has been found to have a vulnerability, often the response time and accountability from the vendor can tell you if it’s a company you should be investing in. Some things to look for include:
These answers can often be discovered on a company’s website or in release notes, which are generally attached to an update of a piece of software. Take a minute to read the notes and see if the company is making security updates. You don’t need to understand all the details, just knowing they take security seriously enough to update frequently is important. This can help tip the scales when deciding between devices or apps.
Through my preparation for becoming a new parent, I constantly read in books and was told by professionals, “Remember, you can do this!” Cybersecurity in the context of being a parent is no different. Every situation is different, and it is important to do what works with you and your family. As parents, we shouldn’t be afraid to use all the cool new gadgets that are emerging on the market, but instead educate ourselves on how to limit our risk. Which features do I need, which ones can I do without? Remember always follow a vendor’s recommendations and best practices, and of course remember to breathe!
The post Two Pink Lines appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
McAfee’s Advanced Threat Research team just completed its second annual capture the flag (CTF) contest for internal employees. Based on tremendous internal feedback, we’ve decided to open it up to the public, starting with a set of challenges we designed in 2019.
We’ve done our best to minimize guesswork and gimmicks and instead of flashy graphics and games, we’ve distilled the kind of problems we’ve encountered many times over the years during our research projects. Additionally, as this contest is educational in nature, we won’t be focused as much on the winners of the competition. The goal is for anyone and everyone to learn something new. However, we will provide a custom ATR challenge coin to the top 5 teams (one coin per team). All you need to do is score on 2 or more challenges to be eligible. When registering for the contest, make sure to use a valid email address so we can contact you.
The ATR CTF will open on Friday, February 5th at 12:01pm PST and conclude on Thursday, February 18th, at 11:59pm PST.
Click Here to Register!
If you’ve never participated in a CTF before, the concept is simple. You will:
NOTE: The format of all flags is ATR[], placing the flag, between the square brackets. For example: ATR[1a2b3c4d5e]. The flag must be submitted in full, including the ATR and square bracket parts.
The harder the challenge, the higher the points! Points range from 100 to 500. All CTF challenges are designed to practice real-world security concepts, and this year’s categories include:
The contest is set up to allow teams as groups or individuals. If you get stuck, a basic hint is available for each challenge, but be warned – it will cost you points to access the hint and should only be used as a last resort.
McAfee employees are not eligible for prizes in the public competition but are welcome to compete.
When registering, please use a valid email address, for any password resets and to be contacted for prizes. We will not store or save any email addresses or contact you for any non-contest related reasons.
Please wait until the contest ends to release any solutions publicly.
No cooperation between teams with independent accounts. Sharing of keys or providing/revealing hints to other teams is cheating, please help us keep this contest a challenge for all!
Please refrain from attacking the competition infrastructure. If you experience any difficulties with the infrastructure itself, questions can be directed to the ATR team using the email in the Contact Us section. ATR will not provide any additional hints, feedback, or clues. This email is only for issues that might arise, not related to individual challenges.
Absolutely no sabotaging of other competing teams, or in any way hindering their independent progress.
No brute forcing of challenge flag/ keys against the scoring site is accepted or required to solve the challenges. You may perform brute force attacks if necessary, on your own endpoint to determine a solution if needed. If you’re not sure what constitutes a brute force attack, please feel free to contact us.
DoSing the Capture–the–Flag (CTF) platform or any of the challenges is forbidden
Additional rules are posted within the contest following login and should be reviewed by all contestants prior to beginning.
Many of these challenges are designed with Linux end-users in mind. However, if you are a Windows user, Windows 10 has a Linux subsystem called ‘WSL’ that can be useful, or a Virtual Machine can be configured with any flavor of Linux desired and should work for most purposes.
Happy hacking!
Find a list of useful tools and techniques for CTF competitions. While it’s not exhaustive or specifically tailored to this contest, it should be a useful starting point to learn and understand tools required for various challenges.
While it may be difficult for us to respond to emails, we will do our best – please use this email address to reach us with infrastructure problems, errors with challenges/flag submissions, etc. We are likely unable to respond to general questions on solving challenges.
How much do you know about McAfee’s industry-leading research team?
ATR is a team of security researchers that deliver cutting-edge vulnerability and malware research, red teaming, operational intelligence and more! To read more about the team and some of its highlighted research, please follow this link to the ATR website.
By participating in the contest, you agree to be bound to the Official Rules and to release McAfee and its employees, and the hosting organization from any and all liability, claims or actions of any kind whatsoever for injuries, damages or losses to persons and property which may be sustained in connection with the contest. You acknowledge and agree that McAfee et al is not responsible for technical, hardware or software failures, or other errors or problems which may occur in connection with the contest. By participating you allow us to publish your name. The collection and use of personal information from participants will be governed by the McAfee Private Notice.
The post McAfee ATR Launches Education-Inspired Capture the Flag Contest! appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
The events of 2020 didn’t just set significant lifestyle changes in motion. According to a recent study, it also influenced our mindset about our online security.
McAfee’s 2021 Consumer Security Mindset Report highlights our collective shift to a Digital-First mindset and the increased risks that come with it.
This study is essential to families for several reasons. First, because it gives us a snapshot of reality, and when we understand reality, we can take steps to improve it. Second, it’s a reminder to us as parents that helping our kids build their digital skills is a process subject to cultural shifts that will require continuous recalibration.
In short, the study reveals that we’re online more and, for convenience’s sake, we’re taking more chances with our security. In step with this increase in digital activity, online scams are on the rise. And, while most of us admit to being worried about our online security and, many still don’t have the digital habits they need to protect themselves.
How do we respond to this new and seemingly ongoing reality? We can say we need better cyber safety skills, or we can implement them.
To help you do just that, here are ten easy peasy steps your family can take today to strengthen the protective circle around your digital life. Note: You don’t have to be tech savvy to do these things. They are easy, effective ways to build up your family’s digital defenses. Here we go!
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post 10 Easy Ways to Build Up Your Family’s Online Security appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
In fact, looking back at just the last 8 months of Microsoft patches, we’ve tracked at least 25 significant vulnerabilities directly related to the Windows network stack. These have ranged from DNS to NTFS, SMB to NFS and recently, several tcp/ip bugs in fragmentation and packet reassembly for IPv4 and IPv6.
That brings us to this month’s patch Tuesday, which contains several more high-profile critical vulnerabilities in tcpip.sys. We’ll focus on three of these, including 2 marked as “remote code execution” bugs, which could lead to wormability if code execution is truly possible, and a persistent denial-of-service vulnerability which could cause a permanent Blue Screen of Death on the latest versions of Windows.
There are clear similarities between all 3, indicating both Microsoft and researchers external to Microsoft are highly interested in auditing this library, and are having success in weeding out a number of interesting bugs. The following is a short summary of each bug and the progress we have made to date in analyzing them.
What is CVE-2021-24086?
The first vulnerability analyzed in this set is a Denial-of-Service (DOS) attack. Generally, these types of bugs are rather uninteresting; however, a few can have enough of an impact that although an attacker can’t get code execution, they are well worth discussing. This is one of those few. One of the things that boost this vulnerability’s impact is the fact it is internet routable and many devices using IPv6 can be directly accessible over the internet, even when behind a router. It is also worth noting that the default Windows Defender Firewall configuration does not mitigate this attack. In a worst-case scenario, an attacker could spray this attack and put it on a continuous loop to potentially cause a “permanent” or persistent DOS to a wide range of systems.
This vulnerability exists when Windows’ tcpip.sys driver attempts to reassemble fragmented IPv6 packets. As a result, this attack requires many packets to be successful. The root cause of this vulnerability is a NULL pointer dereference which occurs in Ipv6pReassembleDatagram. The crash occurs when reassembling a packet with around 0xffff bytes of extension headers. It should be impossible to send a packet with that many bytes in the extension headers according to the RFC, however this is not considered in the Ipv6pReceiveFragments function when calculating the unfragmented length. Leveraging a proof-of-concept through the Microsoft MAPP program, McAfee was easily able to reproduce this bug, demonstrating it has the potential to be seen in the wild.
What is CVE-2021-24094?
This vulnerability is classified by Remote Code Execution (RCE), though our analysis thus far, code execution comes with unique challenges. Similar to CVE-2021-24086, this issue involves IPv6 packet reassembly by the Windows tcpip.sys driver. It is different from 24086 in that it doesn’t require a large packet with extension headers, and it is not a NULL pointer dereference. Instead, it is a dangling pointer which, if the right packet data is sprayed from an attacker over IPv6, will causes the pointer to be overwritten and reference an arbitrary memory location. When the data at the pointer’s target is accessed, it causes a page fault and thus a Blue Screen of Death (BSOD). Additionally, an attacker can create persistence of the DoS by continually pointing the attack at a victim machine.
While the reproduction of this issue causes crashes on the target in all reproductions so far, it’s unclear how easy it would be to force the pointer to a location that would cause valid execution without crashing. The pointer would need to point to a paged-in memory location that had already been written with additional data that could manipulate the IPv6 reassembly code, which would likely not come from this attack alone, but may require a separate attack to do so.
What is CVE-2021-24074?
CVE-2021-24074 is a potential RCE in tcpip.sys triggered during the reassembly of fragmented IPv4 packets in conjunction with a confusion of IPv4 IP Options. During reassembly, it is possible to have two fragments with different IP Options; this is against the IPv4 standard, but Windows will proceed further, while failing to perform proper sanity checks for the respective options. This type confusion can be leveraged to trigger an Out of Bounds (OOB) read and write by “smuggling” an IP option Loose source and record route (LSRR) with invalid parameters. This option is normally meant to specify the route a packet should take. It has a variable length, starts with a pointer field, and is followed by a list of IP addresses to route the packet through.
By leveraging the type confusion, we have an invalid pointer field that will point beyond the end of the routing list provided in the packet. When the routing function Ipv4pReceiveRoutingHeader looks up the next hop for the packet, it will OOB read this address (as a DWORD) and perform a handful of checks on it. If these checks are successful, the IP stack will attempt to route the packet to its next hop by copying the original packet and then writing its own IP address in the record route. Because this write relies on the same invalid pointer value as before, this turns out to be an OOB write (beyond the end of the newly allocated packet). The content of this OOB write is the IP address of the target machine represented as a DWORD (thus, not controlled by the attacker).
Microsoft rates this bug as “Exploitation more likely”, however exploitation might not be as straightforward as it sounds. For an attack to succeed, one would have to groom the kernel heap to place a certain value to be read during the OOB read, and then make it so the OOB write would corrupt something of interest. Likely, a better exploitation primitive would need to be established first in order to successfully exploit the bug. For instance, leveraging the OOB write to corrupt another data structure that could lead to information disclosure and/or a write-what-where scenario.
From a detection standpoint, the telltale signs of an active exploitation would be fragmented packets whose IP Options vary between fragments. For instance, the first fragment would not contain an LSRR option, while the second fragment would. This would likely be accompanied by a heavy traffic meant to shape the kernel heap.
Similarities and Impact Assessment
There are obvious similarities between all three of these vulnerabilities. Each is present in the tcpip.sys library, responsible for parsing IPv4 and IPv6 traffic. Furthermore, the bugs all deal with packet reassembly and the RCE vulnerabilities leverage similar functions for IPv4 and IPv6 respectively. Given a combination of public and Microsoft-internal attribution, it’s clear that researchers and vendor alike are chasing down the same types of bugs. Whenever we see vulnerabilities in network stacks or Internet-routed protocols, we’re especially interested to determine difficulty of exploitation, wormability, and impact. For vulnerabilities such as the RCEs above, a deep dive is essential to understand the likelihood of these types of flaws being built into exploit kits or used in targeted attacks and are prime candidates for threat actors to weaponize. Despite the real potential for harm, the criticality of these bugs is somewhat lessened by a higher bar to exploitation and the upcoming patches from Microsoft. We do expect to see additional vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP stack and will continue to provide similar analysis and guidance. As it is likely to take some time for threat actors to integrate these vulnerabilities in a meaningful way, the best course of action, as always, is widespread mitigation via patching.
The post Researchers Follow the Breadcrumbs: The Latest Vulnerabilities in Windows’ Network Stack appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
The McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) team is committed to uncovering security issues in both software and hardware to help developers provide safer products for businesses and consumers. We recently investigated and published several findings on a personal robot called “temi”, which can be read about in detail here. A byproduct of our robotic research was a deeper dive into a video calling software development kit (SDK) created by Agora.io. Agora’s SDKs are used for voice and video communication in applications across multiple platforms. Several of the most popular mobile applications utilizing the vulnerable SDK included social apps such as eHarmony, Plenty of Fish, MeetMe and Skout, and healthcare apps such as Talkspace, Practo and Dr. First’s Backline. In early 2020, our research into the Agora Video SDK led to the discovery of sensitive information sent unencrypted over the network. This flaw, CVE-2020-25605, may have allowed an attacker to spy on ongoing private video and audio calls. At the time of writing, McAfee is unaware of any instances of this vulnerability being exploited in the wild. We reported this research to Agora.io on April 20, 2020 and the company, as of December 17th, 2020 released a new SDK, version 3.2.1, which mitigated the vulnerability and eliminated the corresponding threat to users.
Encryption has increasingly become the new standard for communication; often even in cases where data privacy is not explicitly sensitive. For example, all modern browsers have begun to migrate to newer standards (HTTP/2) which enforce encryption by default, a complete change from just a few years ago where a significant amount of browsing traffic was sent in clear text and could be viewed by any interested party. While the need to protect truly sensitive information such as financial data, health records, and other personally identifiable information (PII) has long been standardized, consumers are increasingly expecting privacy and encryption for all web traffic and applications. Furthermore, when encryption is an option provided by a vendor, it must be easy for developers to implement, adequately protect all session information including setup and teardown, and still meet the developers’ many use cases. These core concepts are what led us to the findings discussed in this blog.
As part of our analysis of the temi ecosystem, the team reviewed the Android application that pairs with the temi robot. During this analysis, a hardcoded key was discovered in the app.
This raised the question: What is this key and what is it used for? Thanks to the detailed logging provided by the developers, we had a place to start, https://dashboard.agora.io.
According to the website – “Agora provides the SDKs and building blocks to enable a wide range of real-time engagement possibilities” In the context of our initial robot project, it simply provides the technology required to make audio and video calls. In a broader context, Agora is used for a variety of applications including social, retail, gaming and education, among others.
Agora allows anyone to create an account and download its SDKs for testing from its website, which also provides extensive documentation. Its GitHub repositories also provide detailed sample projects on how to use the product. This is amazing for developers, but also very useful to security researchers and hackers. Using the logging comments from the above code we can look at the documentation to understand what an App ID is and what it is used for.
The last two sentences of this documentation really grabbed our attention. We had found a key which is hardcoded into an Android application that “anyone can use on any Agora SDK” and is “prudent to safeguard”.
Agora provides several different SDKs with different functionality. Since we encountered Agora through use of the video SDK, we decided to focus on only this SDK for the rest of this research. Simulating the mindset of an attacker, we began to investigate what this App ID or key could be used for. Furthermore, in the context of the video SDK, the question evolved into whether an attacker could interact with this video and audio traffic.
Since Agora provides sample projects and allows for free developer accounts, the best way to understand what potential attack vectors exists is to use these tools. Examining the GitHub example projects and the following associated documentation, we can learn exactly what is needed and how a normal user is connected to a video call.
Here we see in the example code the App ID being used to create a new “RtcEngine” object. As can be seen in the documentation, creating an RtcEngine is the foundation and first step needed to create any video call.
If we continue to examine the example code and look at the documentation’s steps for connecting to a call, we come to a function named “joinChannel”.
This function is responsible for connecting an end user to a call. In the example code, there are four parameters, three of which are hardcoded and one of which can be set to null. Without doing too much more digging, it appears that while Agora lists the App ID as important, it is not the only component needed to join a video call. An attacker would also require the values passed to the joinChannel API in order to join a call. If we assume that these values are only hardcoded for the purpose of a demo application, how would an attacker obtain the other necessary values? Code is an awesome resource, but when it comes to a network conversation the truth is in the packets. By running this example code and capturing traffic with Wireshark, we can further our understanding of how this system works.
When looking at the traffic, what immediately stands out is the values passed to joinChannel in the example code above. They are sent in plaintext across the network, in addition to the App ID needed to initiate the RtcEngine. Considering this is an example app, it is important to understand the difference between a test scenario and a production scenario. As noted in the code in Figure 5, the “token” parameter is being set to null. What is a token in this context, and would that affect the security of these parameters? We can use the Agora documentation to understand that a token is designed to be randomly generated and provide more security for a session.
With tokens being an option, it is important we see what the traffic looks like in a scenario where the token parameter is not null. The use of a token is hopefully what we find in production or at least is what is recommended in production by Agora.
Running the example application again, this time using a token and capturing traffic, we can discover that the token is also a non-issue for an attacker.
The token is sent in plaintext just like the other parameters! You may have noticed this capture does not show the App ID; in this case the App ID is still sent in plaintext, in a different packet.
Information being sent in plaintext across the network to initiate a video call is one thing, but can this actually be used by an attacker to spy on a user? Will the call support a third party? Will the user be notified of a new connection? In order to answer these questions, we can use the example applications provided by Agora to run some tests. The diagram below shows the scenario we are going to try and create for testing.
The first step for an attacker sitting on the network is to be able to identify the proper network traffic containing the sensitive information. With this information from the network packets, they can then attempt to join the call that is in progress. Using a Python framework called Scapy, we built a network layer in less than 50 lines of code to help easily identify the traffic the attacker cares about. This was done by reviewing the video call traffic and reverse engineering the protocol. Like a lot of reversing, this is done by using context clues and a lot of “guess and check”. Strings help us identify the use for certain fields and provide clues to what the fields around them might be. In some cases, fields are still unknown; however, this is normal. An attacker or researcher only needs to decipher enough of a packet to make an attack possible.
The above code identifies, parses, and displays in human readable form, only the important information in the three main packet types discovered in the Agora traffic. From here we can automate the scenario outlined in Figure 10 using Python with a few modifications to the example apps. It totally works! The demo video below shows an attacker sniffing network traffic to gather the call information and then launching their own Agora video application to join the call, completely unnoticed by normal users.
Besides using a token, were there any other security measures available to developers that might have mitigated the impact of this vulnerability? Per Agora’s documentation, the developer has the option to encrypt a video call. We also tested this, and the App ID, Channel Name, and Token are still sent in plaintext when the call is encrypted. An attacker can still get these values; however, they cannot view the video or hear the audio of the call. Despite this, the attacker can still utilize the App ID to host their own calls at the cost of the app developer. We will discuss in the next section why, even though encryption is available, it is not widely adopted, making this mitigation largely impractical.
This research started with the discovery of an App ID hardcoded into “temi”, the personal robot we were researching. Agora documents clearly on its website that this App ID should be “kept safe”, which we discovered as a vulnerability while researching temi. However, further examination shows that even if temi had kept this value safe, it is sent in cleartext over the network along with all the other values needed to join the call. So how does this impact other consumers of the Agora SDK outside of temi?
Agora’s website claims – “Agora’s interactive voice, video, and messaging SDKs are embedded into mobile, web and desktop applications across more than 1.7 billion devices globally.” To ensure our comparisons would be reasonable, we looked only at other Android applications which used the video SDK. We also focused on apps with a very large install base.
To give a quick cross-section of apps on Google Play that utilize Agora, let’s focus on MeetMe, Skout, Nimo TV, and, of course, temi. Google Play reports the number of installs at 50 million+ each for MeetMe and Skout, 10 million+ for Nimo TV and 1000+ for temi. By examining the applications’ decompiled code, we can easily determine all four of these applications have hardcoded App IDs and do not enable encryption. We see very similar code as below in all the applications:
The most important line here is the call to setEncryptionSecret which is being passed the “null” parameter. We can reference the Agora documentation to understand more about this call.
Even though the encryption functions are being called, the application developers are actually disabling the encryption based on this documentation. A developer paying close attention might ask if this is the only place the API is being called. Could it be set elsewhere? The team searched the decompiled code for all the applications reviewed and was unable to find any other instance of the API call, leading us to believe this is the only call being made. With this in mind, the cleartext traffic has a greater impact that goes well beyond a personal robot application to millions – potentially billions – of users. Without encryption enabled and the setup information passed in cleartext, an attacker can spy on a very large range of users.
Although Agora should not have been sending this sensitive information unencrypted, if it offers an encrypted traffic option, why is it not being used? This would at least protect the video and audio of the call, even though an attacker is able to join. While it is impossible to be certain, one reason might be because the Agora encryption options require a pre-shared key, which can be seen in its example applications posted on GitHub. The Agora SDK itself did not provide any secure way to generate or communicate the pre-shared key needed for the phone call, and therefore this was left up to the developers. Many calling models used in applications want to give the user the ability to call anyone without prior contact. This is difficult to implement into a video SDK post-release since a built-in mechanism for key sharing was not included. It is also worth noting that, generally, the speed and quality of a video call is harder to maintain while using encryption. These may be a few of the reasons why these application developers have chosen to not use the encryption for the video and audio. Now that the SDK properly and transparently handles encryption of call setup, developers have the opportunity to leverage a more secure method of communication for traffic. Additionally, developers still have the option to add full encryption to further protect video and audio streams.
Agora has published a list of best practices for all its developers and partners here, which does include use of encryption when possible. We generally recommend following vendors’ security best practices as they are designed to apply to the product or service directly. In this case, the vulnerability would still exist; however, its effectiveness would be extremely limited if the published best practices were followed. Although we have found Agora’s recommendations were largely not being adopted, Agora has been actively communicating with customers throughout the vulnerability disclosure process to ensure its recommended processes and procedures are widely implemented.
Privacy is always a top concern for consumers, but also remains an enticing threat vector for attackers. If we look at the two biggest apps we investigated (MeetMe and Skout), both are rated for mature audiences (17+) to “meet new people” and both advertise over 100 million users. MeetMe also mentions “flirting” on the Google Play store and its website has testimonies about people meeting the “love of their life”. Although they are not explicitly advertised as dating apps, it would be reasonable to draw the conclusion that it is at least one of their functions. In the world of online dating, a breach of security or the ability to spy on calls could lead to blackmail or harassment by an attacker. Other Agora developer applications with smaller customer bases, such as the temi robot, are used in numerous industries such as hospitals, where the ability to spy on conversations could lead to the leak of sensitive medical information.
One goal of the McAfee Advanced Threat Research team is to identify and illuminate a broad spectrum of threats in today’s complex and constantly evolving landscape. As per McAfee’s responsible disclosure policy, McAfee ATR informed Agora as soon as the vulnerability was confirmed to be exploitable. Agora was very receptive and responsive to receiving this information and further advanced its current security capabilities by providing developers with an SDK option (version 3.2.1) to encrypt the initial call setup information, mitigating this vulnerability. We have tested this new SDK and can confirm it fully mitigates CVE-2020-25605. At the time of writing, McAfee is unaware of any instances of this vulnerability being exploited in the wild, which demonstrates another powerful success story of mitigating an issue which may have affected millions of users before it is used for malicious purposes. Our partnership with Agora resulted in the release of a more secure SDK which has empowered developers across multiple companies to produce more secure video calling applications. We strongly recommend any development team which uses the Agora SDK to upgrade to the latest version, follow Agora’s outlined best practices, and implement full encryption wherever possible.
CVE: CVE-2020-25605
CVSSv3 Rating: 7.5/6.7
CVSS String: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
CVE Description: Cleartext transmission of sensitive information in Agora Video SDK prior to 3.1 allows a remote attacker to obtain access to audio and video of any ongoing Agora video call through observation of cleartext network traffic.
The post Don’t Call Us We’ll Call You: McAfee ATR Finds Vulnerability in Agora Video SDK appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
We’ve all come to a realization that we don’t go anywhere without our phone. It’s a utility that helps us navigate our daily lives: directions, schedules, shopping, discounts, banking, and so on. And as our reliance on our smartphone continues to grow, it’s no wonder that hackers have taken notice. This time, it’s another case of an app gone rogue.
With over 10 million downloads, the Barcode Scanner app provided users with a basic QR code reader and barcode generator, useful for things like making purchases and redeeming discounts. Then, most likely in a recent update, the app began to deliver ad-producing malware onto users’ phones – with the malware being traced back to the Android Barcode Scanner app. While Barcode Scanner was previously benign, it is believed that a hacker injected malicious code into the app before the latest update, pushing malware onto Android devices. Once installed, the malware hijacks your default web browsers and redirects you to random advertisements.
In a typical case of malvertising, or malicious advertising, fraudsters submit infected graphic or text ads to legitimate advertisement networks, which often can’t distinguish harmful ads from trustworthy ones. Under the guise of everyday pop-ups, these malicious ads push fake browser updates, free utilities, or antivirus programs in the hope that unsuspecting users will click. Depending on what kind of programs the malicious ads succeed in downloading, hackers might steal your data, encrypt or delete your information, or hijack your computer functions – as is the case with the Barcode Scanner’s malware.
While Google has taken down the Barcode Scanner from its store, it has not been deleted from infected devices. So, if you have the app on your phone, it’s time to uninstall it from your device manually…ASAP.
We all need to reflect on the state of our digital health, especially as hackers continue to target us through the device we use most – our phones. To help protect your data, family, and friends, check out these security tactics to keep sneaky mobile threats out:
While some malicious apps do make it through the app store screening process, most attack downloads appear to stem from social media, fake ads, and other unofficial app sources. Before downloading an app to your device, do some quick research about the origin and developer.
Reviews and rankings are still a suitable method of determining whether an app is legitimate. However, watch out for assessments that reuse repetitive or straightforward phrases, as this could be a sign of a fraudulent review.
Developers are actively working to identify and address security issues. Frequently update your operating systems and apps so that they have the latest fixes and security protections.
Holistic security solutions across all devices continues to be a strong defensive measure to protect your data and privacy from online threats like malware.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post Millions Affected by Malware Attributed to Android Barcode-Scanning App appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
I’ve had such a busy morning! I’ve hunted down my favourite foundation, bought a puzzle mat, stocked up on special dog food for our naughty new puppy, ordered the groceries, made a few appointments and chatted with several friends. And guess what? I haven’t left my study – or changed out of my pyjamas!! Ssshhh!! Because it’s all happened online…
Of course, some of us embraced the benefits of the online world long before 2020 but the Pandemic forced almost everyone to replace our in-person activities and routines with online ones. New research from McAfee in their 2021 Consumer Security Mindset Report shows that 72% of Aussies made changes in their online activities last year out of convenience which makes complete sense!
But what’s so interesting is that now we have these super handy new online routines in place – we aren’t that keen to give them up! McAfee’s report shows that 76% of Aussies are planning on continuing with online banking, 59% of us want to keep connecting with friends and family online and 55% of us remain totally committed to online shopping! Hear, hear, I say! I am absolutely staying that course too!!
There’s no doubt that there is a lot of upside to managing our lives online but unfortunately there is also a downside – increased risk! The more time spent online, the greater the chance that we will be exposed to potential risks and threats such as phishing attacks, entering details into malicious websites or even becoming a victim of fraud.
McAfee’s research shows that we are aware of the risks of being online. In fact, 66% of us are concerned about the potential dangers of living our lives online with losing control of our financial data top of the list for the majority of us. And almost 2/3 (65%) of us are also worried about having our social media accounts hacked.
But pandemic life has meant that we are now a lot more comfortable with sharing information online. Whether it’s paperless transaction records, text and email notifications, opting to stay logged in or auto-populating forms with our credit card, this level of online sharing does make life so convenient but it can be a risky business! Why, I hear you ask? Because these conveniences usually only work when you share multiple pieces of your contact details. And the more you share, the greater your chance of being hacked or compromised. But the report was very clear – if we can make our online life more seamless then we are only too happy to share our key contact information! Oh dear!!
In addition to confessing that they don’t always take the necessary security precautions, Aussie consumers in McAfee’s report also admitted that they haven’t thought about why hackers might want their data. I don’t know how many people tell me that they don’t need to really bother with a lot of online precautions because they live a pretty boring life and don’t spend that much time online.
But this is a very dangerous way to think. Your online data is like a pot of gold to hackers. Not only can they use it to possibly steal your identity and try to empty your bank accounts but they can also on-sell it for a profit. But the majority of Aussies don’t stop to consider this with the research showing that 64% of Aussies have never considered just how valuable their online data is worth.
Hackers are ALWAYS on the lookout for new ‘up-to-date’ ways to exploit others for money. Don’t forget how quick they were to conjure up scams around COVID in early 2020 – it was just a matter of weeks before Aussies received phishing emails and malicious text messages with the aim of extracting personal information from vulnerable consumers.
But, encouragingly, 85% of Aussies said they would be far more proactive about managing their data if it could be traded as a currency.
The good news is that there are ways to secure your online life and minimise the risk of being hacked. Here are my top tips:
Yes, it might take a minute or 2 more, but using multi-factor authentication is an easy way to add an additional layer of security to protect your personal data and information. Commit to using it wherever it is offered!
If you live your life out & about like I do then you’ll be very tempted to use Wi-Fi. Using public Wi-Fi to conduct transactions, particularly financial ones is a big no-no! It takes keen hackers minimal effort to set up a fraudulent wi-fi service which could easily fool a busy person into connecting. Using a Virtual Private Network (or VPN) like McAfee® Safe Connect, is the best way of ensuring everything you share over Wi-Fi is safe and secure.
Browsing the internet with a tool like the McAfee WebAdvisor is a great way of ensuring dangerous malware is blocked if you click on a malicious link in a phishing email. You’ll have real peace of mind knowing you can manage your online life while someone looks out for you!
With 4 kids, 3 pets, 2 jobs – I know I could never get to the bottom of my ‘to-do’ lists without managing the bulk of it online. I often think I should send the internet an e-card at Christmas!! Of course, I understand why corners are cut and precautions are overlooked when we all feel so stretched for time. But just think about how much more time it would take if you were hacked and had to spend hours on the phone to your bank or if you had to reconfigure all your online accounts and social media platforms!!
So, you know what you need to do! Stay safe online everyone!
The post How 2020 Has Shaped The Way We Live Our Lives appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
On February 17th, 2021, McAfee disclosed findings based on a 10-month long disclosure process with major video conferencing vendor Agora, Inc. As we disclosed the findings to Agora in April 2020, this lengthy disclosure timeline represents a nonstandard process for McAfee but was a joint agreement with the vendor to allow sufficient time for the development and release of a secure SDK. The release of the SDK mitigating the vulnerability took place on December 17th, 2020. Given the implications of snooping and spying on video and audio calls, we felt it was important to provide Agora the extended disclosure time. The affected users of Agora include popular voice and video messaging apps, with one notable application being the popular new iOS app known as Clubhouse.
Clubhouse Application Screenshot
Clubhouse has made headlines recently as one of the newest players in the social networking sphere, rising in popularity after a series of high-profile users including Elon Musk, Kanye West and influencers in various geographies posted about the platform. Released in April of 2020, Clubhouse quickly carved out a niche in Chinese social media as the platform to discuss sensitive social and political topics – perhaps aided by its invite-only approach to membership – and the spotlight shined on it by these key players further propelled it into viral status early this year. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the application was blocked for use in China on February 8th, 2021.
Last week, Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO) released research regarding the popular Clubhouse app’s use of Agora real-time engagement software and suggested that Agora could have provided the Chinese government access to Clubhouse user information and communications. While the details of Stanford’s disclosure focus on the audio SDK compared to our work on the video SDK, the functionality and flaw are similar to our recent disclosure, CVE-2020-25605. This includes the plaintext transmission of app ID, channel ID and token – credentials necessary to join either audio or video calls. We can confirm that Clubhouse updated to the most recent version of the Agora SDK on February 16th – just a day prior to our public disclosure.
Despite the recent noise surrounding Clubhouse, the reality is that this application is just one of many applications that leverage the Agora SDK. Among others, we investigated the social apps eHarmony, Skout, and MeetMe, along with several widely-used healthcare apps, some of which have a significantly larger user base. For example, MeetGroup (comprised of several apps) reported approximately 18 million monthly users compared to Clubhouse, which had approximately 600k total users as of December 2020.
We felt it was important to highlight these data points and are continuing to investigate these applications as well as monitor any potential instances of malicious actors exploiting this vulnerability. Given that Agora has released an updated SDK that fixes the call setup issues, vulnerable applications should have already switched to the secure calling SDK, thus protecting the sensitive audio and video call data as many claim to do. With that in mind, we decided to check back in with some of the Agora-based apps we previously investigated to confirm whether they had updated to the patched version. We were surprised to see many, as of February 18, 2020, still had not:
| App Name | Installs | App Version | App Version Date | Updated Agora SDK |
| MeetMe | 50,000,000+ | 14.24.4.2910 | 2/9/2021 | Yes |
| LOVOO | 50,000,000+ | 93.0 | 2/15/2021 | No |
| Plenty of Fish | 50,000,000+ | 4.36.0.1500755 | 2/5/2021 | No |
| SKOUT | 50,000,000+ | 6.32.0 | 2/3/2021 | Yes |
| Tagged | 10,000,000+ | 9.32.0 | 12/29/2020 | No |
| GROWLr | 1,000,000+ | 16.1.1 | 2/11/2021 | No |
| eharmony | 5,000,000+ | 8.16.2 | 2/5/2021 | Yes |
| Clubhouse | 2,000,000+ | 0.1.2.8 | 2/16/2021 | Yes |
| Practo | 5,000,000+ | 4.93 | 1/26/2021 | No |
With the context around censorship and basic privacy concerns, it will be interesting to see if these and many other apps using the vulnerable SDK update quickly, or even ever, and what kind of lasting effects these types of findings have on users’ trust and confidence in social media platforms.
For more on McAfee ATR’s research into the Agora SDK, please see our technical research blog.
For information on how users can protect themselves when using such apps, please see our consumer safety tips blog.
The post Beyond Clubhouse: Vulnerable Agora SDKs Still in Widespread Use appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Babuk ransomware is a new ransomware threat discovered in 2021 that has impacted at least five big enterprises, with one already paying the criminals $85,000 after negotiations. As with other variants, this ransomware is deployed in the network of enterprises that the criminals carefully target and compromise. Using MVISION Insights, McAfee was able to plot the telemetry of targets, revealing that the group is currently targeting the transportation, healthcare, plastic, electronics, and agricultural sectors across multiple geographies.
Figure 1. Infection map (source: MVISION Insights)
McAfee’s EPP solution covers Babuk ransomware with an array of prevention and detection techniques.
ENS ATP provides behavioral content focusing on proactively detecting the threat while also delivering known IoCs for both online and offline detections. For DAT based detections, the family will be reported as Ransom-Babuk!<hash>. ENS ATP adds 2 additional layers of protection thanks to JTI rules that provide attack surface reduction for generic ransomware behaviors and RealProtect (static and dynamic) with ML models targeting ransomware threats.
Updates on indicators are pushed through GTI, and customers of Insights will find a threat-profile on this ransomware family that is updated when new and relevant information becomes available.
Initially, in our research the entry vector and the complete tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by the criminals behind Babuk remained unclear.
However, when its affiliate recruitment advertisement came online, and given the specific underground meeting place where Babuk posts, defenders can expect similar TTPs with Babuk as with other Ransomware-as-a-Service families.
In its recruitment posting Babuk specifically asks for individuals with pentest skills, so defenders should be on the lookout for traces and behaviors that correlate to open source penetration testing tools like winPEAS, Bloodhound and SharpHound, or hacking frameworks such as CobaltStrike, Metasploit, Empire or Covenant. Also be on the lookout for abnormal behavior of non-malicious tools that have a dual use, such as those that can be used for things like enumeration and execution, (e.g., ADfind, PSExec, PowerShell, etc.) We advise everyone to read our blogs on evidence indicators for a targeted ransomware attack (Part1, Part2).
Looking at other similar Ransomware-as-a-Service families we have seen that certain entry vectors are quite common amongst ransomware criminals:
When it comes to the actual ransomware binary, we strongly advise updating and upgrading your endpoint protection, as well as enabling options like tamper protection and rollback. Please read our blog on how to best configure ENS 10.7 to protect against ransomware for more details.
Learn more about the inner working of Babuk, underground forum activity, Yara Rules, Indicators of Compromise & Mitre ATT&CK techniques used by reading our detailed technical analysis.
Learn more about the inner working of Babuk, underground forum activity, Yara Rules, Indicators of Compromise & Mitre ATT&CK techniques used.
View Now
The post Babuk Ransomware appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Tax season is always a high time for scams that put our money and information at risk. But this year securing your data may be more important than ever, due to a spike in unemployment fraud.
Millions of Americans have lost their jobs over the course of the pandemic, and states have seen a surge in unemployment applications, including fake claims using stolen information. In California, authorities report that between $10 billion and $30 billion was recently paid in fraudulent unemployment claims, while in New York authorities identified $5.5 billion in fake jobless claims since March of 2020.
ictims don’t even know that their information was used for a fraudulent claim until they receive an unemployment letter from their state, or a tax form from the IRS. Whether you’re concerned about your personal data, or just want to safely file your IRS return and hopefully get a tax refund, let’s take some steps to protect your private information for this tax season, and beyond.
The first thing to know is that there are a that we see evolving each year – according to the IRS, Criminal Investigation identified $2.3 billion in tax fraud schemes just last year. So, it’s always a good idea to take caution and be skeptical whenever you see something that seems too good to be true, like a free tax filing service you’ve never heard of before.
But recently, with so many people out of work, bad actors have decided to focus their attention on filing fraudulent jobless claims using stolen information from people who were actually employed.
If you’ve received a notice about unemployment benefits that you never applied for, contact your state unemployment agency and submit a claim. Then follow up with the Federal Trade Commission since they can help you by placing a fraud alert on your credit. This lets lenders know that you may be a victim of fraud, prompting them to take extra steps to verify your identity. The good news is that in the U.S. you only have to notify one of the three national credit bureaus and they will transmit your request to the other two.
My colleague Judy has shared some easy ways you can check your credit report and even freeze your credit in a blog post here. Starting 2021, you can also register for a six-digit Identity Protection PIN (IP PIN) with the IRS to add another layer of verification to protect yourself from tax-related identity theft.
Of course, tax season isn’t the only time your data can fall into the wrong hands. Keep your personal information safe by adopting these best practices and robust tools.
• Use comprehensive security software—For protection against the growing range of threats, choose holistic security software that goes beyond traditional antivirus products, by protecting your identity and privacy wherever and however you connect.
Stay Updated
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post Don’t Let Tax Fraud Ruin Your IRS Refund appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Elder scams cost seniors in the U.S. some $3 billion annually. And tax season adds a healthy sum to that appalling figure.
What makes seniors such a prime target for tax scams? The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) states several factors. For one, elders are typically trusting and polite. Additionally, many own their own home, have some manner of savings, and enjoy the benefits of good credit—all of which make for an ideal victim profile.
Also according to the FBI, elders may be less able or willing to report being scammed because they may not know the exact way in which they were scammed, or they may feel a sense of shame over it, or even some combination of the two. Moreover, being scammed may instill fear that family members will lose confidence in their ability to look after their own affairs.
If there’s one thing that we can do for our elders, it’s help them raise their critical hackles so they can spot these scams and stop them in their tracks, particularly around tax time. With that, let’s see how crooks target elders, what those scams look and feel like, along with the things we can do to keep ourselves and our loved ones from getting stung.
The phone rings, and an assertive voice admonishes an elder for non-payment of taxes. The readout on the caller ID shows “Internal Revenue Service” or “IRS,” the person cites an IRS badge number, and the victim is told to pay now via a wire transfer or prepaid gift card. The caller even knows the last four digits of their Social Security Number (SSN). This is a scam.
The caller, and the claim of non-payment, are 100 percent bogus. Even with those last four digits of the SSN attempting to add credibility, it’s still bogus. (Chances are, those last four digits were compromised elsewhere and ended up in the hands of the thieves by way of the black market or dark web so that they could use them in scams just like these.)
Some IRS imposter scams take it a step further. Fraudsters will threaten victims with arrest, deportation, or other legal action, like a lien on funds or the suspension of a driver’s license. They’ll make repeated calls as well, sometimes with additional imposters posing as law enforcement as a means of intimidating elders into payment.
The IRS will never threaten you or someone you know in such a way.
In fact, the IRS will never call you to demand payment. Nor will the IRS ever ask you to wire funds or pay with a gift card or prepaid debit card. And if the IRS claims you do owe funds, you will be notified of your rights as a taxpayer and be given the opportunity to make an appeal. If there’s any question about making payments to the IRS, the IRS has specific guidelines as to how to make a payment properly and safely on their official website.
It’s also helpful to know what the IRS will do in the event you owe taxes. In fact, they have an entire page that spells out how to know it’s really the IRS calling or knocking at your door. It’s a quick read and a worthwhile one at that.
In all, the IRS will contact you by mail or in person. Should you get one of these calls, hang up. Then, report it. I’ll include a list of ways you can file a report at the end of the article.
Whether it’s a disembodied voice generated by a computer or a scripted message that’s been recorded by a person, robocalls provide scammers with another favorite avenue of attack. The approach is often quite like the phone scam outlined above, albeit less personalized because the attack is a canned robocall. However, robocalls allow crooks to cast a much larger net in the hopes of illegally wresting money away from victims. In effect, they can spam hundreds or thousands of people with one message in the hopes of landing a bite.
While perhaps not as personalized as other imposter scams, they can still create that innate sense of unease of being contacted by the IRS and harangue a victim into dialing a phony call center where they are further pressured into paying by wire or with a prepaid card, just like in other imposter scams. As above, your course of action here is to simply hang up and report it.
Here’s another popular attack. An elder gets an unsolicited email from what appears to be the IRS, yet isn’t. The phony email asks them to update or verify their personal or financial information for a payment or refund. The email may also contain an attachment which they are instructed to click and open. Again, all of these are scams.
Going back to what we talked about earlier, that’s not how the IRS will contact you. These are phishing attacks aimed at grifting prized personal and financial information that scammers can use to commit acts of theft or embezzlement. In the case of the attachment, it very well may contain malware that can do further harm to their device, finances, or personal information.
If you receive one of these emails, don’t open it. And certainly don’t open any attachments—which holds true for any unsolicited email you receive with an attachment.
Beyond simply knowing how to spot a possible attack, you can do several things to prevent one from happening in the first place.
First let’s start with some good, old-fashioned physical security. You may also want to look into purchasing a locking mailbox. Mail and porch theft are still prevalent, and it’s not uncommon for thieves to harvest personal and financial information by simply lifting it from your mailbox.
Another cornerstone of physical security is shredding paper correspondence that contains personal or financial information, such as bills, medical documents, bank statements and so forth. I suggest investing a few dollars on an actual paper shredder, which are typically inexpensive if you look for a home model. If you have sensitive paper documents in bulk, such as old tax records that you no longer need to save, consider calling upon a professional service that can drive up to your home and do that high volume of shredding for you.
Likewise, consider the physical security of your digital devices. Make sure you lock your smartphones, tablets, and computers with a PIN or password. Losing a device is a terrible strain enough, let alone knowing that the personal and financial information on them could end up in the hands of a crook. Also see if tracking is available on your device. That way, enabling device tracking can help you locate a lost or stolen item.
There are plenty of things you can do to protect yourself on the digital front too. Step one is installing comprehensive security software on your devices. This will safeguard you in several ways, such as email filters that will protect you from phishing attacks, features that will warn you of sketchy links and downloads, plus further protection for your identity and privacy—in addition to overall protection from viruses, malware, and other cyberattacks.
Additional features in comprehensive security software that can protect you from tax scams include:
And here’s one item that certainly bears mentioning: dispose of your old technology securely. What’s on that old hard drive of yours? That old computer may contain loads of precious personal and financial info on it. Look into the e-waste disposal options in your community. There are services that will dispose of and recycle old technology while doing it in a secure manner so the data and info on your device doesn’t see the light of day again.
As said earlier, don’t let a bad deed go unreported. The IRS offers the following avenues of communication to report scams.
In all, learning to recognize the scams that crooks aim at elders and putting some strong security measures in place can help prevent these crimes from happening to you or a loved one. Take a moment to act. It’s vital, because your personal information has a hefty price tag associated with it—both at tax time and any time.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post How to Spot, and Prevent, the Tax Scams That Target Elders appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
John Lambert, a distinguished researcher specializing in threat intelligence at Microsoft, once said these words that changed perspectives: “Defenders think in lists. Attackers think in graphs.” This is true and, while it remains that way, attackers will win most of the time. However, the true power of graphs does not only reside in constructing them, but also in how we build them and what we do with them. For that, we need to reflect upon the nature of the data and how we can use graphs to make sense of it. I presented on this premise at the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour held in January 2021.
At McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR), all threat intelligence relating to current campaigns, potential threats, and past and present attacks, is collated and normalized into a single truth, namely a highly redundant, scalable relational database instance, and disseminated into different categories, including but not limited to MITRE ATT&CK techniques involved, tools used, threat actor responsible, and countries and sectors targeted. This information is a subset of the data available in McAfee MVISION Insights. Much can be learned from looking at historical attack data, but how can we piece all this information together to identify new relationships between threats and attacks? We have been collecting and processing data for many years but identifying patterns quickly and making sense of the complete dataset as a whole has proven to be a real challenge.
In our recent efforts, we have embraced the analysis of threat intelligence using graphical representations. One key takeaway is that it is not just about mapping out intelligence about campaigns and threats into graphs; the strength lies in studying our datasets and applying graph algorithms to answer questions about the data.
In this paper, we provide an extensive description of the dataset derived from the threat intelligence we collect. We establish the methodology applied to validate our dataset and build our graphical representations. We then showcase the results obtained from our research journey as defenders thinking in graphs instead of lists.
The first section explains the kind of data we have at our disposal. The second section describes the goal of our research and the kind of questions we want to answer. Sections 3 and 4 establish the methodology used to process our dataset and to validate that we can actually do something useful with it by using graphs. The fifth section describes the process of building graphs, and Section 6 shows how we use these graphs to answer the questions laid out in Section 2. Section 7 introduces an additional research element to add more granularity to our experiment, and Section 8 shares the limitations of our research and potential ways to compensate for them. Sections 9 and 10 conclude this research with some reflections and proposed future work.
Our dataset consists of threat intelligence, either collected by or shared with our team, is piped into our internal MISP instance and published to relevant stakeholders. This data concerns information about campaigns, crimeware or nation-state attacks that are currently going on in the world, from potential or reoccurring threat (groups). The data is split into multiple categories used to establish everything we know about the four basic questions of what, who, where, and how. For example, certain attacks on countries in the Middle East have been conducted by the group MuddyWater and have targeted multiple companies from the oil and gas and telecom industries, leveraging spear phishing campaigns. The dataset used for this research is a collection of the answers to these four basic questions about each event.
The quantity of data we have makes it almost impossible to make sense in one pass. Information is scattered across hundreds of events, in a database that does not necessarily enable us to connect each piece of information we have in relevant patterns. The goal of this research is to create a methodology for us to quickly connect and visualize information, identify patterns in our data that could reveal trends in, for example, actor behaviour or MITRE technique usage. In this paper, we specifically focus on actor trends and MITRE technique usage.
By providing such tooling, we can answer questions about frequency of actors or techniques, popularity of techniques across actors, and patterns of behaviour in technique usage among actors. These questions are laid out as such:
These questions are not exhaustive of everything that can be achieved using this methodology, but they reveal an example of what is possible.
As we are proposing a way to build graphs to make sense of the data we have, we first need to validate our dataset to make sure graphs will deliver something useful. For that, we need to look at expected density and connectivity of the graph. Should our dataset be too dense and overly connected, building graphs will not result in something that can be made sense of.
After establishing that our dataset is graphable, we can focus on how exactly we will graph it. We need to establish what our nodes are and what defines our edges. In this case, we propose two representations: an event-centric view and actor-centric view, respectively taking events and actors as points of reference.
Once we have built our graphs, we investigate different techniques and algorithms to answer the questions laid out in the previous section. This experiment provides us insights into our data, but also into what we are missing from our data that could give us even more information.
The tooling used for this research is an internal tool referred to as Graph Playground that provides users with the possibility to build client-side undirected graphical visualizations in their browser, based on CSV or JSON files. This software also offers a toolbox with analysis techniques and algorithms to be used on the graphs.
Before building proper graphical representations, we need to assess whether the dataset is a good fit. There are a few metrics that can indicate that the dataset is not necessarily fit for graphs, one of which being the average number of connections (edges) per node:
This average gives us an approximate indication of how many edges per node we can expect. Another useful metric is graph density, defined as the number of edges divided by the total number of possible edges for an undirected simple graph. This is normally calculated using the following formula:
It is a simple equation, but it can already give great insights as to what the graph is going to look like. A graph with high density might be a super connected graph where every node relates to one another in some way. It can be great for visualisation but will not provide us with anything useful when it comes to identifying patterns or differentiating between the different components of the graph.
Based on the data at hand, one intuitive way to build graphs is using a threat event as a central node and connected nodes that represent MITRE techniques, threat actors, tools, countries, and sectors to that event node.
Figure 1: Graph representation of the data
Figure 1 depicts the initial graphical representation using each event and associated metadata registered in MISP. Relationships between event nodes and other nodes are defined as follows: techniques and tools are used in one event that is attributed to a specific actor and involves a threat or attack on certain countries and sectors.
Based on the representation and our dataset, the number of nodes obtained is |N| = 1,359 and the total number of edges is |E| = 12,327. In our case, because only event nodes are connected to other nodes, if we want to check for the average number of edges per node, we need to look specifically at event nodes. In the obtained graph g, this average is equal to:
To calculate the density, we also need to account for the fact that only event nodes have connections. The density of the obtained graph g is then equal to:
Density always results in a number between 0 and 1. With an average of 18 edges per event node and a graph density of 0.053, we can expect the resulting graph to be relatively sparse.
Figure 2: Full representation of 705 MISP events
The full graph obtained with this representation in Figure 2, against our predictions, looks much denser than expected. It has an obvious central cluster that is busy with nodes that are highly interconnected, consisting mostly of event and technique nodes. In Figure 3, we discard MITRE technique nodes, leaving event, country, sector, and tool nodes, to demonstrate where the low-density calculation comes from.
Figure 3: Representation without MITRE technique nodes
Removing MITRE technique nodes results in a much less dense graph. This may be an indication that some event and technique nodes are highly interconnected, meaning there may be a lot of overlap between events and techniques used.
Figure 4: Representation with only event and MITRE technique nodes
Figure 4 proves this statement by showing us a large cluster of interconnected event and technique nodes. There is a set of events that all appear to be using the same technique. It would be interesting to isolate this cluster and take note of exactly which techniques these are, but this research takes us down another road.
Based on the data we have, which mostly consists of events relating to crimeware, we choose to disregard country and sector information in our graphical analyses. This is because these campaigns are most often sector and country-agnostic, based on historical observation. Therefore, we proceed without country and sector data. This allows us to perform some noise reduction, keeping events as points of reference.
We can also take this a step further and collapse event nodes to switch the focus to actor nodes with regard to tools and MITRE techniques used. This results in two different representations derived from the original graph.
Removing country and sector nodes, we are left with event nodes connected to actor, technique, and tool nodes. Figure 5 illustrates this representation.
Figure 5: Representation without country and sector nodes
This resulting representation is an event-centric view, and it can help us answer specific questions about frequency of actors involved, techniques or tools used during recorded attacks and campaigns.
Figure 6: Event-centric view
The graph in Figure 6 is very similar to the original one in Figure 2, but the noise that is not of real interest at this stage has been removed, so that we can really focus on events regarding actors, techniques, and tools.
Another possible representation, because the data we have about countries and sectors is very sparse, is to center the graph around actor nodes, connected to techniques and tools.
Figure 7: Collapsed presentation of actors, techniques, and tools
Figure 7 establishes the relationship between the three remaining nodes: actor, technique, and tools. The resulting graph is displayed in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Actor-centric view
These two ways to build graphs based on our data provide an event-centric view and an actor-centric view and can be used to answer different questions about the gathered intelligence.
Based on the two generated views for our data, we demonstrate how certain algorithms and graph-related techniques can be used to answer the questions posed in Section 2. Each view provides insights on frequency, popularity, or pattern questions.
Which techniques are observed most often?
To answer questions about the frequency of techniques used, we need to take the event-centric view, because we are directly addressing how often we have observed techniques being used. Therefore, we take this view and look at the degree of nodes in the graph. Nodes with a high degree are nodes with more connections. A MITRE technique node with a very high degree is a node that is connected to a high number of events.
Figure 9: Degree analysis on the event-centric view with a focus on techniques
Figure 9 shows us the application of degree analysis on the event-centric view, revealing techniques like Spearphishing Attachment and Obfuscated Files or Information as the most often observed techniques.
Which actors are the most active?
The same degree analysis can be used on this view to identify which actors have most often been recorded.
Figure 10: Degree analysis on the event-centric view with a focus on actors
Based on the results displayed in Figure 10, Sofacy, Lazarus Group, and COVELLITE are the most recorded actors across our data.
Which techniques are the most common across actors?
To answer questions about popularity of techniques across actors, we need to look at the actor-centric view, because it will show us how techniques and actors relate to one another. While degree analysis would also work, we can make use of centrality algorithms that measure how much control a certain node has over a network, or in other terms: how popular a certain node is.
Figure 11: Centrality algorithm used on the actor-centric view
Running centrality algorithms on the graph shows us that Obfuscated Files or Information and User Execution are two of the most popular techniques observed across actors.
Can we identify groups of actors using the same techniques?
The keyword here is groups of actors, which insinuates that we are looking for clusters. To identify groups of actors who use the same techniques, we can attempt to use clustering algorithms to isolate actors who behave the same way. We need to apply these algorithms on the actor-centric view. However, we also see that our actor-centric view in Figure 8 has quite a dense bundle of nodes, and this could make the building of clusters more difficult.
Figure 12: Clustering algorithm used on the actor-centric view
Louvain Clustering is a community detection technique that builds clusters based on edge density; Figure 12 shows us the results of running this algorithm. We see that it was possible to build some clusters, with a clear distinction between the orange cluster and the bundle of nodes, but it is not possible to verify how accurate our clusters are, because of the density of the subgraph where all the nodes seem to be interconnected.
We can draw two conclusions from this:
This takes us to the last important question:
Are actors using techniques in the same way?
With the information currently at our disposal, we cannot really assess whether a technique was used in the same way. It would be ideal to specify how an actor used a certain technique and encode that into our graphs. In the next section, we introduce an additional element to hopefully provide more granularity so we can better differentiate actors.
To provide more granularity and hopefully answer the question about actors using techniques in the same way, we embed killchain step information into our graphs. A certain attack can be used for multiple killchain steps. We believe that adding killchain step information to specify where an attack is used can help us better differentiate between actors.
Figure 13: Representation that introduces a killchain step node
This is a slight modification that occurs on our actor-centric view. The resulting graph should provide us with more granularity with regards to how a technique, that is present at multiple steps, was really used.
Figure 14: Actor-centric view with killchain information
The resulting graph displayed in Figure 14 is, for lack of a better word, disappointing. That is because killchain step information has not provided us with more granularity, which in turn is because of our dataset. Unfortunately, MISP does not let users specify when a technique is used in one specific step of the killchain, if that technique can occur in multiple steps. When recording an observed MITRE technique that can occur in multiple steps, all steps will be recorded with that technique.
MISP provides granularity in terms of MITRE sub-techniques, but there is no built-in differentiation on the killchain steps. It is not yet possible to specify exactly at which step a technique present in multiple steps is used. This removes a certain level of granularity that could be useful in the actor-centric view to differentiate even more between actors. If such differentiation existed, the actor-centric view could be collapsed into:
Additionally, based on the data at hand, it is clear that actors tend to use the same techniques overall. The question of whether using MITRE techniques to differentiate between actors is actually useful then comes to mind. Perhaps it can be used to discard some noticeably different actors, but not most?
Limitations of our research also lie in the tooling used. The Graph Playground is great for quick analyses, but more extensive manipulations and work would require a more malleable engine.
Lastly, our research focused on MISP events, threat actors, and MITRE techniques. While most questions about frequency, popularity, and pattern recognition can be answered the same way for tools, and even country and sector, the list of what is achievable with graphs is definitely not exhaustive.
Building graphs the right way helps us visualize our large dataset almost instantly, and it helps us make sense of the data we see. In our case, right means the way that is most relevant to our purpose. By having sensical and relevant representations, we can connect cyber threats, campaigns, and attacks to threat actors involved, MITRE techniques used, and more.
Graphical representations are not just about piping all our data into one visualization. We need to think of how we should build our graphs to get the most out of them, while attempting to maintain satisfactory performance when scaling those graphs. Graphs with thousands of nodes often take long to render, depending on the visualization engine. The Graph Playground generates graphs from a file on the client-side, in the browser. This makes the generation incredibly fast.
Certain aspects of our research require an event-centric view, while others may, for example, require an actor-centric view. We also need to assess whether building graphs is useful in the first place. Highly dense and connected data will result in graphs that cannot be used for anything particularly interesting for our analyses of threat intelligence.
Our research has proven fruitful in the sense that much can be gained from translating our dataset to adequate representations. However, we lack a certain granularity-level that could help us differentiate between certain aspects of our data even more.
To add to John Lambert’s quote, “Defenders think in lists. Attackers think in graphs. And Threat Intelligence analysts build proper graphs and exhaustively use them.”
As mentioned, we have encountered a granularity issue that is worth looking into for future research. It would be interesting to consider incorporating analysis results from EDR engines, to isolate where a specific MITRE ATT&CK technique was used. This would provide much deeper insights and potentially even more data we can include in our visualizations. Should we succeed and process this information into our graphs, we would be able to better differentiate between actors that otherwise seem to behave the same.
We can also shift our perspective and include country and sector information but, for that, we need to exclude all crimeware-related events that are sector or country-agnostic and include only campaigns that have specific targets. Only then will such representation be useful for further analysis.
Another point worth mentioning for future work would be to consider incorporating additional resources. The Intezer OST Map, which is open source, provides insights on tools used by threat actors for well-known campaigns. It would be interesting to merge the Intezer dataset with our own and experiment with our graph representations based on this new dataset.
The post McAfee ATR Thinks in Graphs appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
By: Smriti, People Partner
McAfee continues to recognize and celebrate hardworking mothers across our global workforce. We continue to advance in our workplace culture by offering policies and programs to better serve working parents.
Meet Smriti as she shares her incredible story as a new mother and how McAfee helped her to transition comfortably into a new role as a working parent.
My journey at McAfee began in 2017 as a People Partner. My role includes developing policies and processes for People Success.
My husband and I were delighted to welcome our first-born. In 2019, we welcomed our daughter into our family. While becoming a new parent is both rewarding and fulfilling, it can also be an overwhelming experience. The job of a parent is never-ending. There is no 9 – 5 schedule and you can’t check out. You’re always on parent duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
McAfee’s family-friendly policies and benefits helped our new family bond together. I spent quality time with my daughter during my maternity leave. From receiving baby gifts in the mail from McAfee to getting the insurance coverage and mental health support that I needed, McAfee’s benefits for working parents were a blessing for us.
Parenthood is never without its obstacles, and most times, unforeseen ones. When my family could not make it home due to travel restrictions because of COVID-19, I got the support I needed to extend my leave. I also opted for the Gradual Return to Work Program designed for new moms. This ensured that I would not be overwhelmed when reentering the workforce and that my priorities were well understood.
I received a warm welcome from everyone, including my team and my manager. I consider myself fortunate to work for a company that understands the value of a new family. Working moms often struggle with work and family. Still, with a little support, they can indeed thrive in their workplaces and have a fruitful career.
My Life’s Manta is to always look at the bigger picture in life and be thankful for what you have, rather than think about the downsides. Personally, this helps me to be happy and content.
All over the world, McAfee’s benefits continue to evolve to reflect the needs of working parents. From extended bonding leave to expanded opportunities that help parents transition with our Return to Workplace program, we work tirelessly to create a range of programs unique to each country. We continue to support those who have paused their careers to care for their families as well as new working parents.
Learn more about the ways McAfee is serving working parents and building an inclusive workplace by following Life at McAfee on Instagram and @McAfee on Twitter.
Interested in joining forces with us? Explore our job opportunities. Subscribe to job alerts.
The post How McAfee’s Inclusive Maternity Benefits Helped Me Thrive as a New Mom appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
My McAfee Chronicles is a series featuring McAfee team members who have interesting and inspiring life stories to share. Meet Shiva, a Software Development Engineer in Bangalore, India.
When a traumatic road accident changed the course of Shiva’s life, he had two options – give up on life or give life his best shot. For Shiva, there was only one obvious choice. Through his unrelenting willpower and sheer determination, he was able to overcome all odds.
Shiva shares his deeply inspirational story below:
My journey at McAfee started in 2011 when I joined the company. In 2013, my life was turned upside down. I was on a road trip with a few friends when we got in a car accident. Although I was fortunate enough to survive, unlike two of my friends, I suffered from a severe nerve injury that left me paralyzed from the neck down.
The next few months were some of the roughest of my life. Due to the extent of my injuries, I spent several months recuperating in the hospital. Soon, I hit my limit for medical insurance coverage. No one is ever prepared to face such a financial situation and I was no different. However, I was extremely fortunate that McAfee came forward and supported me in every possible way, both financially and emotionally. With McAfee’s support, I was able to receive the best treatment for my needs.
I spent close to 10 months in the hospital and doing rehab, slowly picking up the pieces of my life again. Even simple things like sitting or talking to someone took me a great deal of effort. However, giving up was never an option for me. My doctors encouraged me to engage mentally, and that’s when I slowly started to contribute at work again.
Before my accident, I led two projects for my team. Even though my mobility was restricted, I still have the ability to think. So, my team came forward and encouraged me to work again. I started at a slow pace, mostly talking on the phone and sharing my thoughts with my team. My team served as my hands and legs, coding and working on my unfinished projects. My leaders and team members turned out to be my biggest strength. They would visit me often to cheer me up and we would celebrate special occasions together. I was overwhelmed by their love and support.
Finally, it was time to get back to the office. When I started walking a little, I slowly got back to work in a phased manner. McAfee gave me the flexibility that I needed to put together the pieces of my life. Although it was wonderful to be back, returning didn’t come without its challenges. I could not drive to work anymore. For some time, my teammates helped me get to the office. On other occasions, I would hire a taxi. On the days when it rained, it was challenging to find a cab, given Bangalore’s traffic.
Around the same time, McAbility was formed in India. I became a part of it and brought my commute issue to McAfee’s knowledge. I’m glad to say that McAfee did not hesitate to arrange a special cab exclusively for me. McAfee welcomed and acted on every suggestion that I shared regarding improving mobility issues in the office.
With the support of my family, team members and McAfee, life slowly started to get back to normal. I even got a chance to visit my colleagues in the Cork office, which was a life changing moment for me. The support that I received from everyone around me was a crucial part of my recovery. Even now when I’m in the office, people stop by and ask me how I am doing and it is heartwarming.
“Any emotion, if it is sincere, is involuntary”, by Mark Twain. If you want to be a good person or be kind to someone, it will come to you naturally. You wouldn’t have to try too hard.
For more stories like Shiva’s or to learn more about our company culture, follow @LifeatMcAfee on Instagram and @McAfee on Twitter.
Interested in joining McAfee? We’re hiring! Apply now.
The post Shiva’s Tragic Accident Turns into a Story of Resilience appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
The generosity and kindness displayed by team members across McAfee is one major factor that makes up the incredible culture of the company. At McAfee, we empower our team members to initiate meaningful ways to give back to the community. It came to no surprise when a large group of team members came together in order to run a donation drive to benefit the Make-A-Wish Foundation.
The Make-A-Wish Foundation is a nonprofit corporation that helps grant wishes to thousands of children fighting life-threatening medical conditions. One way to support the foundation is by donating airline miles. Nationally, Make-A-Wish needs more than 2.8 billion miles, or 50,000 round-trip tickets, to cover every child’s travel wish each year. Every mile donated will help kids and their families travel to destinations around the world, once it is safe to resume travel. It is just one of the ways that individuals can help create a life-changing wish experience.
Some of our team members organized an air miles donation drive and encouraged others to donate their miles to the cause. The impact was astronomical, with team members raising over 585,000 miles to benefit the Make–a–Wish Foundation in the Bay Area.
We reached out to three airline mile contributors at McAfee and discussed what inspired them to contribute to this extraordinary initiative.
Derek, Product Manager, Hawaii
I was happy to see the McAfee family come together and support a terrific cause by donating airline miles to the Make-A-Wish Foundation. Giving is a key element in my faith and a core value. I knew that I could either cash in the points and do something with my family, or I could put the miles towards an even greater purpose and help a child who is truly in need of experiencing something special. The choice was an easy one to make.
I believe that helping others is one of our top callings. That is why I choose to give and do so generously with joy. I know that I’m not alone here at McAfee. There is a great culture of generosity that I’ve witnessed across the organization and I’m happy to simply be a part of that and do what I can to help others.
Laura, Senior Manager Business Operations, Santa Clara, California Years ago, my brother was a starving college student who volunteered for a local charity and drove cancer patients to their medical appointments. When I asked him about his volunteer work, he said that he didn’t have a lot of money, but he had time. Volunteering allowed him to make a difference in someone’s life and give back. It was a life–changing moment for me because it expanded how I think about giving to include time, donations and acts of kindness.
I chose to participate in the air miles donation drive because I love that this program provides time for critically ill children to spend with their loved ones while creating memorable and happy experiences.
I am incredibly grateful to our McAfee leaders who create opportunities for us to give back. Giving back is at the core of McAfee’s DNA and having closely connected teams makes it easy for team members to answer a call to action.
Pramod, Principal Engineer, Portland, Oregon
Giving is all about making small differences whenever and wherever you can, in any form. We can make a huge difference in the lives of others, especially when we are in a position where we can help those who need us the most.
When team members from the enterprise organization set up a drive for the Make-A-Wish Foundation, it connected with me on a personal level. As I went through the stories of children whose wishes were granted through the program, I was moved to learn about how a little effort can create the best moments in someone’s life.
Meaningful communication from our HR team members and leadership promoting efforts to volunteer and give back to the community are motivating. I like that McAfee has a dedicated site that team members can access for giving and that there are opportunities in which McAfee matches team member donations. Collectively, we can make a big difference to the world around us. Truly, together is power.
At McAfee, we encourage and support the efforts of our team members to make a difference in their communities. If you’re interested in joining the McAfee team, we’d love to hear from you.
Search Career Opportunities with McAfee
Interested in joining our team? We’re hiring! Apply now.
Stay Connected
For more stories like this, follow @LifeAtMcAfee on Instagram and @McAfee on Twitter to see what working at McAfee is all about.
The post How a Group of McAfee Team Members Helped Change the Lives of Critically Ill Children appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
For the March 2021 Patch Tuesday, Microsoft released a set of seven DNS vulnerabilities. Five of the vulnerabilities are remote code execution (RCE) with critical CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring Standard) scores of 9.8, while the remaining two are denial of service (DoS). Microsoft shared detection guidance and proofs of concept with MAPP members for two of the RCE vulnerabilities, CVE-2021-26877 and CVE-2021-26897, which we have confirmed to be within the DNS Dynamic Zone Update activity. Microsoft subsequently confirmed that all seven of the DNS vulnerabilities are within the Dynamic Zone Update activity.
We confirmed from our analysis of CVE-2021-26877 and CVE-2021-26897, in addition to further clarification from Microsoft, that none of the five DNS RCE vulnerabilities are wormable.
RCE vulnerabilities
CVE-2021-26877, CVE-2021-26897 (exploitation more likely)
CVE-2021-26893, CVE-2021-26894, CVE-2021-26895 (exploitation less likely)
DoS vulnerabilities
CVE-2021-26896, CVE-2021-27063 (exploitation less likely)
A critical CVSS score of 9.8 means that an attacker can remotely compromise a DNS server with no authentication or user interaction required. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities would lead to RCE on a Primary Authoritative DNS server. While CVSS is a great tool for technical scoring, it needs to be taken in context with your DNS deployment environment to understand your risk which we discuss below.
We highly recommend you urgently patch your Windows DNS servers if you are using Dynamic Updates. If you cannot patch, we recommend you prioritize evaluating your exposure. In addition, we have developed signatures for CVE-2021-26877 and CVE-2021-26897 which are rated as “exploitation more likely” by Microsoft.
Per the NIST “Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide”, DNS threats can be divided into Platform and Transaction Threats. The platform threats can be classed as either DNS Host Platform or DNS Software Threats. Per Table 1 below, Dynamic Update is one of the four DNS Transaction types. The seven DNS vulnerabilities are within the Dynamic Update DNS transaction feature of Windows DNS Software.
Table 1: DNS Transaction Threats and Security Objectives
The DNS Dynamic Zone Update feature allows a client to update its Resource Records (RRs) on a Primary DNS Authoritative Server, such as when it changes its IP address; these clients are typically Certificate Authority (CA) and DHCP servers. The Dynamic Zone Update feature can be deployed on a standalone DNS server or an Active Directory (AD) integrated DNS server. Best practice is to deploy DNS integrated with (AD) so it can avail itself of Microsoft security such as Kerberos and GSS-TSIG.
When creating a Zone on a DNS server there is an option to enable or disable DNS Dynamic Zone Updates. When DNS is deployed as a standalone server, the Dynamic Zone Update feature is disabled by default but can be enabled in secure/nonsecure mode. When DNS is deployed as AD integrated, the Dynamic Zone Update feature is enabled in secure mode by default.
Secure Dynamic Zone Update verifies that all RR updates are digitally signed using GSS-TSIG from a domain-joined machine. In addition, more granular controls can be applied on what principal can perform Dynamic Zone Updates.
Insecure Dynamic Zone Update allows any machine to update RRs without any authentication (not recommended).
From a Threat Model perspective, we must consider Threat Actor motives, capabilities, and access/opportunity, so you can understand the risk relative to your environment. We are not aware of any exploitation in the wild of these vulnerabilities so we must focus on the access capabilities, i.e., close the door on the threat actor opportunity. Table 2 summarizes DNS Dynamic Update deployment models relative to the opportunity these RCE vulnerabilities present.
Table 2: Threat Actor access relative to deployment models and system impact
The highest risk deployment would be a DNS server in Dynamic Update insecure mode exposed to the internet; this is not best security practice and based on our experience, we do not know of a use case for such deployment.
Deploying AD integrated DNS Dynamic Update in secure mode (default) mitigates the risk of an unauthenticated attacker but still has a high risk of a compromised domain computer or trusted insider being able to achieve RCE.
All the vulnerabilities are related to the processing of Dynamic Update packets in dns.exe. The goal of our vulnerability analysis, as always for critical industry vulnerabilities, is to ensure we can generate accurate signatures to protect our customers.
Figure 1: Wireshark view of exploit packet classifying the DNS packet as malformed
Figure 2: WinDbg output of crash while attached to dns.exe
FreshRSS 
File_PlaceStringInFileBuffer() function copies data from TXT_data allocated from CopyWireRead() function previously. However, the UpdateRR->TXT length value from Wireshark is not validated and used to copy from *UpdateRR->Data length. Because UpdateRR->TXT length is not validated relative to UpdateRR->Data length it results in a OOB read from heap memory.
Figure 3: Packet containing many consecutive Signature RR dynamic updates. Pay special attention to the length field of the reassembled flow.
Exploiting these vulnerabilities remotely requires both read and write primitives in addition to bypassing Control Flow Guard (CFG) for execution. The DNS protocol has significant remote unauthenticated attack surface to facilitate generating such primitives which has been researched as part of CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed). In addition, per the RR_DispatchFuncForType() function, there are read and write functions as part of its dispatch table.
Figure 4: Path of DNS RR update packet
Figure 5: Dispatch functions for reading and writing
Patching is always the first and most effective course of action. If it’s not possible to patch, the best mitigation is to audit your DNS deployment configuration to limit Dynamic Zone Updates to trusted servers only. For those McAfee customers who are unable to deploy the Windows patch, the following Network Security Platform (NSP) signatures will provide a virtual patch against attempted exploitation of both vulnerabilities, CVE-2021-26877 and CVE-2021-26897.
NSP Attack ID: 0x4030e700 – DNS: Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2021-26877)
NSP Attack ID: 0x4030e800 – DNS: Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2021-26897)
In addition, NIST “Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide” provides best practices for securing DNS deployment such as:
The post Seven Windows Wonders – Critical Vulnerabilities in DNS Dynamic Updates appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Over the last 12 months, technology has featured in our lives in a way I don’t think any of us would have predicted. Whether you were in lockdown, choosing to stay home to stay well or quite simply, out of other option – technology saved the day. It helped us work and learn from home, stay connected with friends and family, entertain ourselves, shop and essentially, live our lives.
For many parents, this was a real ‘aha’ moment. A moment when technology went from being an annoying distraction to incredibly critical to the functioning of our day to day lives. Of course, many of us had always considered technology to be useful to help us order groceries and check Facebook but to experience first-hand that technology meant life could go on during a worldwide pandemic was a real game changer.
Whether it was downloading video calling apps like Zoom or Facetime, setting up a Twitter account to get updates from the Health Department, using Google Doc to work collaboratively or experiencing what online gaming really is via a few sessions on the Xbox, 2020 means many parents had to get up to date, real fast! And you know what – that’s a good thing! I’ve had so many parents remark to me that they know finally understand why their kids are so enamoured with technology. There really is nothing like walking in someone’s shoes to experience their world!
I’m a big believer in parents taking the time to truly understand the world in which their kids exist. For years, I’ve advised parents to download and use the apps and games their kids play so they can understand the attraction and complexity of their kids’ digital life. Well, it may have taken a global pandemic, but I am delighted to report that, anecdotally at this stage, more parents are now embracing their kids’ online world.
When we first become enamoured with something, we often enter the ‘honeymoon’ phase. As a married woman of 28 years, this was many years ago for me!! The honeymoon phase is when everything is wonderful and rosy, and negatives are not always considered. And our relationship with technology can be much the same. And I’ve been there – there’s nothing quite so wonderful as discovering a new app or piece of software and almost being joyous at just how transformational it could be for your life. And this often means we gloss over or even ignore the risks because we are in love!!!
So, as Cybermum, I’m here to cheer you on and pat you on the back for embracing and using new apps and software. Yes, I’m very proud! But I also want to share with you just a few steps that you need to take to ensure you are not taking on any unnecessary risks with your new favourite app. Here are my top tips:
1. Passwords
Every app, online account or piece of software needs it own individual password. Yes, I know that it is a real pain, but it is one of the most important things you will do to protect yourself online. I’m a big fan of password managers that not only generate the most incredibly complex passwords for each of your accounts but remember them for you. McAfee’s password manager, True Key, is a free option which has completely helped me manage my 80 plus collection of passwords!! Very grateful!
2. Software Updates
The main purpose of a software update is to protect the user from security threats. Yes, you may also get some new features and possibly have a glitch or 2 removed but it is all about the user’s safety. So, if you don’t update your software, it’s a little like leaving windows open when you go out. And the longer you leave between updates – the more windows you leave open!
So, automate these updates if you can or schedule them in your diary. Why not earmark the first day of the month to check and see what you need to download to protect yourself? And don’t forget about your operating system on your phone or laptop too!
3. Be Wi-Fi Wary
Dodgy wi-fi is where so many people come unstuck. Regardless of what app or software you are using, anything you share via unsecured wi-fi could be intercepted by a hacker. So, if you find yourself using wi-fi regularly, you might want to consider a Virtual Private Network or VPN. A VPN creates an encrypted tunnel so anything you share via Wi-Fi cannot be intercepted. Genius, really! Check out McAfee’s Safe Connect for peace of mind.
So, please keep going! Keep exploring new ways technology can work for you in our new COVID world. But remember to take a break too. There is no doubt that technology has saved the day and has ensure we can all still function but there must be a balance too. So, walk the dog, play a board game or having a cuppa outside. Remember you manage the technology; it doesn’t manage you!
Till next time
Stay safe online.
Alex xx
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post How 2020 Helped Parents Understand Their Kids’ Digital Lives appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
In a recent report the McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) Strategic Intelligence team disclosed an espionage campaign, targeting telecommunication companies, named Operation Diànxùn.
The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used in the attack are like those observed in earlier campaigns publicly attributed to the threat actors RedDelta and Mustang Panda. Most probably this threat is targeting people working in the telecommunications industry and has been used for espionage purposes to access sensitive data and to spy on companies related to 5G technology.
While the initial vector for the infection is not entirely clear, the McAfee ATR team believes with a medium level of confidence that victims were lured to a domain under control of the threat actor, from which they were infected with malware which the threat actor leveraged to perform additional discovery and data collection. It is our belief that the attackers used a phishing website masquerading as the Huawei company career page.
So, how can I defend my organization as effectively as possible from an attack of this type, which involves different techniques and tactics and potential impact? To answer this question, we believe it is necessary to have a multi-layer approach and analyze the various steps, trying to understand the best way to deal with them one by one with an integrated security architecture. Below is a summary of how McAfee’s Security Architecture helps you to protect against the tactics and techniques used in Operation Dianxun.
The goal is to shift-left and block or identify a threat as soon as possible within the Kill Chain to limit any further damage. Shifting-left starts with MVISION Insights, which proactively collects intelligence on the threat and provides details on the indicators of compromise and the MITRE techniques used in the attack. MVISION Insights combines McAfee’s Threat Intelligence research with telemetry from your endpoint controls to reduce your attack surface against emerging threats. MVISION Insights tracks over 800+ Advanced Persistent Threat and Cyber Crime campaigns as researched by McAfee’s ATR team, including Operation Dianxun, sharing a quick summary of the threat, providing external resources, and a list of known indicators such as files, URLs, or IP addresses.
As a threat intelligence analyst or responder, you can drill down into the MVISION Insights interface to gather more specific information on the Operation Dianxun campaign, verify the associated severity, check for geographical prevalence and links to other sources of information. Moreover, MVISION Insights provides useful information like the McAfee products coverage with details of minimum AMCore version; this kind of information is handy to verify actual defensive capabilities within the enterprise and could raise the risk severity in case of weak coverage.
Additional information is available to further investigate on IoCs and MITRE Techniques associated to the campaign. IoCs can be also exported in STIX2 format to be ingested in other tools for automating responses or updating defenses.
The first step ahead of identification is to ensure our architecture can stop or identify the threat in the initial access vector. In this case, the initial delivery vector is a phishing attack so the web channel is therefore fundamental in the initial phase of the infection. McAfee Web Gateway and MVISION UCE provide multi-layer web vector protection with URL Reputation check, SSL decryption, and malware emulation capabilities for analyzing dangerous active Web content.
MVISION UCE also includes the capabilities of Remote Browser Isolation (RBI), the only solution that can provide 100% protection during web browsing. Remote Browser Isolation is indeed an innovative new technology that contains web browsing activity inside an isolated cloud environment in order to protect users from any malware or malicious code that may be hidden on a website. RBI technology provides the most powerful form of web threat protection available, eliminating the opportunity for malicious code to even touch the end user’s device.
The green square around the page means that the web content is isolated by RBI and provided safely through a rendered dynamic visual stream which delivers full browsing experience without risk of infection.
The second phase of exploitation and persistence results from execution on the victim endpoint of Flash-based artifacts malware and, later, DotNet payload. McAfee Endpoint Security running on the target endpoint protects against Operation Dianxun with an array of prevention and detection techniques. ENS Threat Prevention and ATP provides both signature and behavioral analysis capability which proactively detects the threat. ENS also leverages Global Threat Intelligence which is updated with known IoCs. For DAT based detections, the family will be reported as Trojan-Cobalt, Trojan-FSYW, Trojan-FSYX, Trojan-FSZC and CobaltStr-FDWE.
While the execution of the initial fake Flash installer acts mainly like a downloader, the DotNet payload contains several functions and acts as a utility to further compromise the machine. This is a tool to manage and download backdoors to the machine and configure persistence. Thus, the McAfee Endpoint Security Adaptive Threat Protection machine-learning engine triggers detection and blocks execution on its behavior-based analysis.
The last phase of the attack involves creating a backdoor for remote control of the victim via a Command and Control Server and Cobalt Strike Beacon. In this case, in addition to the detection capabilities present at the McAfee Endpoint Security level, detections and blocking features that can be activated on a Next Generation Intrusion Prevention System solution such as McAfee NSP are important. NSP includes a Callback Detection engine and is able to detect and block anomalies in communication signals with C2 Servers.
We demonstrated above how a well defended architecture can thwart and counteract such an attack in each single phase. McAfee Web Gateway and MVISON Unified Cloud Edge can stop the initial entry vector, McAfee Endpoint Protection Platform can block the dropper execution or disrupt the following malicious activities but, only by using MVISION EDR, can you get extensive visibility on the full kill chain.
On MVISION EDR we have the threat detection on the monitoring dashboard for the two different stages and processes of the attack.
Once alerted, the security analyst can dig into the Process Activity and understand behavior and indicators relative to what happened like:
The initial downloader payload flashplayer_install_cn.exe is executed directly by the user and spawned by svchost.exe.
At first it connects back to hxxp://update.flach.cn registering to the c2 and creates a new executable file, flash.exe, in the Windows/temp folder.
Then the sample checks the time and the geolocalization of the infected machine via a request to http://worldclockapi.com.
Next, it connects back to the fake Huawei website “hxxp:\\update.careerhuawei.net” used for the initial phishing attack.
Finally, to further completion, you can also use MVISION EDR to search the indicators of compromise in Real-Time or Historically (up to 90 days) across the enterprise systems.
Looking for other systems with evidence of connection to the fake Huawei website:
HostInfo hostname, ip_address and NetworkFlow src_ip, proto, time, process, md5, user where NetworkFlow dst_ip equals “8.210.186.138”
Looking for indicators of the initial downloader payload linked to this campaign.
HostInfo and Files name, full_name, create_user_name, sha1, md5, sha256 where Files sha256 equals “422e3b16e431daa07bae951eed08429a0c4ccf8e37746c733be512f1a5a160a3” or Files sha256 equals “8489ee84e810b5ed337f8496330e69d6840e7c8e228b245f6e28ac6905c19f4a ” or Files sha256 equals “c0331d4dee56ef0a8bb8e3d31bdfd3381bafc6ee80b85b338cee4001f7fb3d8c” or Files sha256 equals “89a1f947b96b39bfd1fffd8d0d670dddd2c4d96f9fdae96f435f2363a483c0e1” or Files sha256 equals “b3fd750484fca838813e814db7d6491fea36abe889787fb7cf3fb29d9d9f5429” or Files sha256 equals “9ccb4ed133be5c9c554027347ad8b722f0b4c3f14bfd947edfe75a015bf085e5” or Files sha256 equals “4e7fc846be8932a9df07f6c5c9cbbd1721620a85c6363f51fa52d8feac68ff47” or Files sha256 equals “0f2e16690fb2ef2b5b4c58b343314fc32603364a312a6b230ab7b4b963160382” or Files sha256 equals “db36ad77875bbf622d96ae8086f44924c37034dd95e9eb6d6369cc6accd2a40d” or Files sha256 equals “8bd55ecb27b94b10cb9b36ab40c7ea954cf602761202546f9b9e163de1dde8eb” or Files sha256 equals “7de56f65ee98a8cd305faefcac66d918565f596405020178aee47a3bd9abd63c” or Files sha256 equals “9d4b4c39106f8e2fd036e798fc67bbd7b98284121724c0f845bca0a6d2ae3999” or Files sha256 equals “ac88a65345b247ea3d0cfb4d2fb1e97afd88460463a4fc5ac25d3569aea42597” or Files sha256 equals “37643f752302a8a3d6bb6cc31f67b8107e6bbbb0e1a725b7cebed2b79812941f” or Files sha256 equals “d0dd9c624bb2b33de96c29b0ccb5aa5b43ce83a54e2842f1643247811487f8d9” or Files sha256 equals “260ebbf392498d00d767a5c5ba695e1a124057c1c01fff2ae76db7853fe4255b” or Files sha256 equals “e784e95fb5b0188f0c7c82add9a3c89c5bc379eaf356a4d3876d9493a986e343” or Files sha256 equals “a95909413a9a72f69d3c102448d37a17659e46630999b25e7f213ec761db9e81” or Files sha256 equals “b7f36159aec7f3512e00bfa8aa189cbb97f9cc4752a635bc272c7a5ac1710e0b” or Files sha256 equals “4332f0740b3b6c7f9b438ef3caa995a40ce53b3348033b381b4ff11b4cae23bd”
Look back historically for domain name resolution and network connection to the involved indicators.
To defeat targeted threat campaigns like Operation Dianxun, defenders must build an adaptive and integrated security architecture which will make it harder for threat actors to succeed and increase resilience in the business. This blog highlights how to use McAfee’s security solutions to prevent, detect and respond to Operation Dianxun and attackers using similar techniques.
McAfee ATR is actively monitoring this campaign and will continue to update McAfee Insights and its social networking channels with new and current information. Want to stay ahead of the adversaries? Check out McAfee Insights for more information.
The post McAfee Defender’s Blog: Operation Dianxun appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
In this report the McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) Strategic Intelligence team details an espionage campaign, targeting telecommunication companies, dubbed Operation Diànxùn.
In this attack, we discovered malware using similar tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to those observed in earlier campaigns publicly attributed to the threat actors RedDelta and Mustang Panda. While the initial vector for the infection is not entirely clear, we believe with a medium level of confidence that victims were lured to a domain under control of the threat actor, from which they were infected with malware which the threat actor leveraged to perform additional discovery and data collection. We believe with a medium level of confidence that the attackers used a phishing website masquerading as the Huawei company career page to target people working in the telecommunications industry.
We discovered malware that masqueraded as Flash applications, often connecting to the domain “hxxp://update.careerhuawei.net” that was under control of the threat actor. The malicious domain was crafted to look like the legitimate career site for Huawei, which has the domain: hxxp://career.huawei.com. In December, we also observed a new domain name used in this campaign: hxxp://update.huaweiyuncdn.com.
Moreover, the sample masquerading as the Flash application used the malicious domain name “flach.cn” which was made to look like the official web page for China to download the Flash application, flash.cn. One of the main differences from past attacks is the lack of use of the PlugX backdoor. However, we did identify the use of a Cobalt Strike backdoor.
By using McAfee’s telemetry, possible targets based in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the US were discovered in the telecommunication sector. We also identified a strong interest in German, Vietnamese and India telecommunication companies. Combined with the use of the fake Huawei site, we believe with a high level of confidence that this campaign was targeting the telecommunication sector. We believe with a moderate level of confidence that the motivation behind this specific campaign has to do with the ban of Chinese technology in the global 5G roll-out.
Activity linked to the Chinese group RedDelta, by peers in our industry, has been spotted in the wild since early May 2020. Previous attacks have been described targeting the Vatican and religious organizations.
In September 2020, the group continued its activity using decoy documents related to Catholicism, Tibet-Ladakh relations and the United Nations General Assembly Security Council, as well as other network intrusion activities targeting the Myanmar government and two Hong Kong universities. These attacks mainly used the PlugX backdoor using DLL side loading with legitimate software, such as Word or Acrobat, to compromise targets.
While external reports have given a new name to the group which attacked the religious institutions, we believe with a moderate level of confidence, based on the similarity of TTPs, that both attacks can be attributed to one known threat actor: Mustang Panda.
We believe the best way to protect yourself from this type of attack is to adopt a multi-layer approach including MVISION Insights, McAfee Web Gateway, MVISION UCE and MVISION EDR.
MVISION Insights can play a key role in risk mitigation by proactively collecting intelligence on the threat and your exposure.
McAfee Web Gateway and MVISION UCE provide multi-layer web vector protection with URL Reputation check, SSL decryption, and malware emulation capabilities for analyzing dangerous active Web content such as Flash and DotNet. MVISION UCE also includes the capabilities of Remote Browser Isolation, the only solution that can provide 100% protection during web browsing.
McAfee Endpoint Security running on the target endpoint protects against Operation Dianxun with an array of prevention and detection techniques. ENS Threat Prevention and ATP provides both signature and behavioral analysis capability which proactively detects the threat. ENS also leverages Global Threat Intelligence which is updated with known IoCs. For DAT based detections, the family will be reported as Trojan-Cobalt, Trojan-FSYW, Trojan-FSYX, Trojan-FSZC and CobaltStr-FDWE.
As the last phase of the attack involves creating a backdoor for remote control of the victim via a Command and Control Server and Cobalt Strike Beacon, the blocking features that can be activated on a Next Generation Intrusion Prevention System solution such as McAfee NSP are important, NSP includes a Callback Detection engine and is able to detect and block anomalies in communication signals with C2 Servers.
MVISION EDR can proactively identify persistence and defense evasion techniques. You can also use MVISION EDR to search the indicators of compromise in Real-Time or Historically (up to 90 days) across enterprise systems.
Learn more about Operation Diànxùn, including Yara & Mitre ATT&CK techniques, by reading our technical analysis and Defender blog.
We assess with a high level of confidence that:
We assess with a moderate level of confidence that:
PLEASE NOTE: We have no evidence that the technology company Huawei was knowingly involved in this Campaign.
McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) is actively monitoring this threat and will update as its visibility into the threat increases.
The post Operation Diànxùn: Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting Telecommunication Companies appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
The McAfee Labs Advanced Threat Research team is committed to uncovering security issues in both software and hardware to help developers provide safer products for businesses and consumers. We recently investigated software installed on computers used in K-12 school districts. The focus of this blog is on Netop Vision Pro produced by Netop. Our research into this software led to the discovery of four previously unreported critical issues, identified by CVE-2021-27192, CVE-2021-27193, CVE-2021-27194 and CVE-2021-27195. These findings allow for elevation of privileges and ultimately remote code execution, which could be used by a malicious attacker, within the same network, to gain full control over students’ computers. We reported this research to Netop on December 11, 2020 and we were thrilled that Netop was able to deliver an updated version in February of 2021, effectively patching many of the critical vulnerabilities.
Netop Vision Pro is a student monitoring system for teachers to facilitate student learning while using school computers. Netop Vision Pro allows teachers to perform tasks remotely on the students’ computers, such as locking their computers, blocking web access, remotely controlling their desktops, running applications, and sharing documents. Netop Vision Pro is mainly used to manage a classroom or a computer lab in a K-12 environment and is not primarily targeted for eLearning or personal devices. In other words, the Netop Vision Pro Software should never be accessible from the internet in the standard configuration. However, as a result of these abnormal times, computers are being loaned to students to continue distance learning, resulting in schooling software being connected to a wide array of networks increasing the attack surface.
Netop provides all software as a free trial on its website, which makes it easy for anyone to download and analyze it. Within a few minutes of downloading the software, we were able to have it configured and running without any complications.
We began by setting up the Netop software in a normal configuration and environment. We placed four virtual machines on a local network; three were set up as students and one was set up as a teacher. The three student machines were configured with non-administrator accounts in our attempt to emulate a normal installation. The teacher first creates a “classroom” which then can choose which student PCs should connect. The teacher has full control and gets to choose which “classroom” the student connects to without the student’s input. Once a classroom has been setup, the teacher can start a class which kicks off the session by pinging each student to connect to the classroom. The students have no input if they want to connect or not as it is enforced by the teacher. Once the students have connected to the classroom the teacher can perform a handful of actions to the entire class or individual students.
During this setup we also took note of the permission levels of each component. The student installation needs to be tamperproof and persistent to prevent students from disabling the service. This is achieved by installing the Netop agent as a system service that is automatically started at boot. The teacher install executes as a normal user and does not start at boot. This difference in execution context and start up behavior led us to target the student installs, as an attacker would have a higher chance of gaining elevated system permissions if it was compromised. Additionally, the ratio of students to teachers in a normal school environment would ensure any vulnerabilities found on the student machines would be wider spread.
With the initial install complete, we took a network capture on the local network and took note of the traffic between the teacher and student. An overview of the first few network packets can been seen in Figure 1 below and how the teacher, student transaction begins.
Figure 1: Captured network traffic between teacher and student
Our first observation, now classified as CVE-2021-27194, was that all network traffic was unencrypted with no option to turn encryption on during configuration. We noticed that even information normally considered sensitive, such as Windows credentials (Figure 2) and screenshots (Figure 4), were all sent in plaintext. Windows credentials were observed on the network when a teacher would issue a “Log on” command to the student. This could be used by the teacher or admin to install software or simply help a student log in.
Figure 2: Windows credentials passed in plaintext
Additionally, we observed interesting default behavior where a student connecting to a classroom immediately began to send screen captures to the classroom’s teacher. This allows the teacher to monitor all the students in real time, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Teacher viewing all student machines via screenshots
Since there is no encryption, these images were sent in the clear. Anyone on the local network could eavesdrop on these images and view the contents of the students’ screens remotely. A new screenshot was sent every few seconds, providing the teacher and any eavesdroppers a near-real time stream of each student’s computer. To capture and view these images, all we had to do was set our network card to promiscuous mode (https://www.computertechreviews.com/definition/promiscuous-mode/) and use a tool like Driftnet (https://github.com/deiv/driftnet). These two steps allowed us to capture the images passed over the network and view every student screen while they were connected to a classroom. The image in Figure 4 is showing a screenshot captured from Driftnet. This led us to file our first vulnerability disclosed as CVE-2021-27194, referencing “CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information” for this finding. As pointed out earlier, the teacher and the student clients will communicate directly over the local network. The only way an eavesdropper could access the unencrypted data would be by sniffing the traffic on the same local network as the students.
Figure 4: Image of student’s desktop captured from Driftnet over the network
With the goal of remote code execution on the students’ computers, we began to dissect the first network packet, which the teacher sends to the students, telling them to connect to the classroom. This was a UDP message sent from the teacher to all the students and can be seen in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Wireshark capture of teacher’s UDP message
The purpose of this packet is to let the student client software know where to find the teacher computer on the network. Because this UDP message is sent to all students in a broadcast style and requires no handshake or setup like TCP, this was a good place to start poking at.
We created a custom Scapy layer (https://scapy.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/scapy.layers.html) (Figure 6) from the UDP message seen in Figure 5 to begin dissecting each field and crafting our own packets. After a few days of fuzzing with UDP packets, we were able to identify two things. First, we observed a lack of length checks on strings and second, random values sent by the fuzzer were being written directly to the Windows registry. The effect of these tests can easily be seen in Figure 7.
Figure 6: UDP broadcast message from teacher
Even with these malformed entries in the registry (Figure 7) we never observed the application crashing or responding unexpectedly. This means that even though the application wasn’t handling our mutated packet properly, we never overwrote anything of importance or crossed a string buffer boundary.
Figure 7: Un-sanitized characters being written to the Registry
To go further we needed to send the next few packets that we observed from our network capture (Figure 8). After the first UDP message, all subsequent packets were TCP. The TCP messages would negotiate a connection between the student and the teacher and would keep the socket open for the duration of the classroom connection. This TCP negotiation exchange was a transfer of 11 packets, which we will call the handshake.
Figure 8: Wireshark capture of a teacher starting class
To respond appropriately to the TCP connection request, we needed to emulate how a valid teacher would respond to the handshake; otherwise, the student would drop the connection. We began reverse engineering the TCP network traffic and attempted to emulate actual “teacher” traffic. After capturing a handful of packets, the payloads started to conform to roughly the same format. Each started with the size of the packet and the string “T125”. There were three packets in the handshake that contained fields that were changing between each classroom connection. In total, four changing fields were identified.
The first field was the session_id, which we identified in IDA and is shown in the UDP packet from Figure 6. From our fuzzing exercise with the UDP packet, we learned if the same session_id was reused multiple times, the student would still respond normally, even though the actual network traffic we captured would often have a unique session_id.
This left us three remaining dynamic fields which we identified as a teacher token, student token, and a unique unknown DWORD (8 bytes). We identified two of these fields by setting up multiple classrooms with different teacher and student computers and monitoring these values. The teacher token was static and unique to each teacher. We discovered the same was true with the student token. This left us with the unique DWORD field that was dynamic in each handshake. This last field at first seemed random but was always in the same relative range. We labeled this as “Token3” for much of our research, as seen in Figure 9 below.
Figure 9: Python script output identifying “Token3”
Eventually, while using WinDbg to perform dynamic analysis, the value of Token3 started to look familiar. We noticed it matched the range of memory being allocated for the heap. This can be seen in Figure 10.
Figure 10: WinDbg address space analysis from a student PC
By combining our previous understanding of the UDP broadcast traffic with our ability to respond appropriately to the TCP packets with dynamic fields, we were able to successfully emulate a teacher’s workstation. We demonstrated this by modifying our Python script with this new information and sending a request to connect with the student. When a student connects to a teacher it displays a message indicating a successful connection has been made. Below are two images showing a teacher connecting (Figure 11) and our Python script connecting (Figure 12). Purely for demonstration purposes, we have named our attack machine “hacker”, and our classroom “hacker-room.”
Figure 11: Emulation of a teacher successful
Figure 12: Emulated teacher connection from Python script
To understand the process of reverse engineering the network traffic in more detail, McAfee researchers Douglas McKee and Ismael Valenzuela have released an in-depth talk on how to hack proprietary protocols like the one used by Netop. Their webinar goes into far more detail than this blog and can be viewed here.
Since we have successfully emulated a teacher’s connection using Python, for clarity we will refer to ourselves as the attacker and a legitimate connection made through Netop as the teacher.
Next, we began to look at some of the actions that teachers can perform and how we could take advantage of them. One of the actions that a teacher can perform is starting applications on the remote students’ PCs. In the teacher suite, the teacher is prompted with the familiar Windows Run prompt, and any applications or commands set to run are executed on the student machines (Figure 13).
Figure 13: The teacher “Run Application” prompt
Looking at the network traffic (shown in Figure 14), we were hoping to find a field in the packet that could allow us to deviate from what was possible using the teacher client. As we mentioned earlier, everything is in plaintext, making it quite easy to identify which packets were being sent to execute applications on the remote systems by searching within Wireshark.
Figure 14: Run “calc” packet
Before we started to modify the packet that runs applications on the student machines, we first wanted to see if we could replay this traffic successfully. As you can see in the video below, our Python script was able to run PowerShell followed by Windows Calculator on each of the student endpoints. This is showcasing that even valid teacher actions can still be useful to attackers.
The ability for an attacker to emulate a teacher and execute arbitrary commands on the students’ machines brings us to our second CVE. CVE-2021-27195 was filed for “CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization” since we were able to replay modified local network traffic.
When the teacher sends a command to the student, the client would drop privileges to that of the logged-in student and not keep the original System privileges. This meant that if an attacker wanted unrestricted access to the remote system, they could not simply replay normal traffic, but instead would have to modify each field in the traffic and observe the results.
In an attempt to find a way around the privilege reduction during command execution, we continued fuzzing all fields located within the “run command” packet. This proved unsuccessful as we were unable to find a packet structure that would prevent the command from lowering privileges. This required a deeper dive into the code in handling the remote command execution processed on the student endpoint. By tracing the execution path within IDA, we discovered there was in fact a path that allows remote commands to execute without dropping privileges, but it required a special case, as shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15: IDA graph view showing alternate paths of code execution
Figure 16: Zoomed in image of the ShellExecute code path
The code path that bypasses the privilege reduction and goes directly to “ShellExecute” was checking a variable that had its value set during startup. We were not able to find any other code paths that updated this value after the software started. Our theory is this value may be used during installation or uninstallation, but we were not able to legitimately force execution to the “ShellExecute” path.
This code path to “ShellExecute” made us wonder if there were other similar branches like this that could be reached. We began searching the disassembled code in IDA for calls not wrapped with code resulting in lower privileges. We found four cases where the privileges were not reduced, however none of them were accessible over the network. Regardless, they still could potentially be useful, so we investigated each. The first one was used when opening Internet Explorer (IE) with a prefilled URL. This turned out to be related to the support system. Examining the user interface on the student machine, we discovered a “Technical Support” button which was found in the Netop “about” menu.
When the user clicks on the support button, it opens IE directly into a support web form. The issue, however, is privileges are never dropped, resulting in the IE process being run as System because the Netop student client is also run as System. This can be seen in Figure 11. We filed this issue as our third CVE, CVE-2021-27192 referencing “CWE-269: Incorrect Privilege Assignment”.
Figure 17: Internet Explorer running as System
There are a handful of well-documented ways to get a local elevation of privilege (LPE) using only the mouse when the user has access to an application running with higher privileges. We used an old technique which uses the “Save as” button to navigate to the folder where cmd.exe is located and execute it. The resulting CMD process inherits the System privileges of the parent process, giving the user a System-level shell.
While this LPE was exciting, we still wanted to find something with a remote attack vector and utilize our Python script to emulate teacher traffic. We decided to take a deeper dive into the network traffic to see what we could find. Simulating an attacker, we successfully emulated the following:
During the emulation of all the above actions we performed some rudimentary fuzzing on various fields of each and discovered six crashes which caused the Netop student install to crash and restart. We were able to find two execution violations, two read violations, one write exception, and one kernel exception. After investigation, we determined these crashes were not easily exploitable and therefore a lower priority for deeper investigation. Regardless, we reported them to Netop along with all other findings.
Netop Vision Pro comes with a handful of plugins installed by default, which are used to separate different functionality from the main Netop executable. For example, to enable the ability for the teacher and student to instant message (IM) each other, the MChat.exe plugin is used. With a similar paradigm to the main executable, the students should not be able to stop these plugins, so they too run as System, making them worth exploring.
Mimicking our previous approach, we started to look for “ShellExecute” calls within the plugins and eventually discovered three more privilege escalations, each of which were conducted in a comparable way using only the mouse and bypassing restrictive file filters within the “Save as” windows. The MChat.exe, SSView.exe (Screen Shot Viewer), and the About page’s “System Information” windows all had a similar “Save as” button, each resulting in simple LPEs with no code or exploit required. We added each of these plugins under the affected versions field on our third CVE, CVE-2021-27192, mentioned above.
We were still searching for a method to achieve remote code execution and none of the “ShellExecute” calls used for the LPEs were accessible over the network. We started to narrow down the plugins that pass user supplied data over the network. This directed our attention back to the MChat plugin. As part of our initial recon for research projects, we reviewed change logs looking for any relevant security changes. During this review we noted an interesting log pertaining to the MChat client as seen in Figure 13.
Figure 18: Change log from Netop.com
The Chat function runs as System, like all the plugins, and can send text or files to the remote student computer. An attacker can always use this functionality to their advantage by either overwriting existing files or enticing a victim to click on a dropped executable. Investigating how the chat function works and specifically how files are sent, we discovered that the files are pushed to the student computers without any user interaction from the student. Any files pushed by a teacher are stored in a “work directory”, which the student can open from the IM window. Prior to the latest release it would have been opened as System; this was fixed as referenced in Figure 18. Delving deeper into the functionality of the chat application, we found that the teacher also has the ability to read files in the student’s “work directory” and delete files within it. Due to our findings demonstrated with CVE-2021-27195, we can leverage our emulation code as an attacker to write, read, and delete files within this “work directory” from a remote attack vector on the same local network. This ability to read and write files accounted for the last CVE that we filed, CVE-2021-27193 referencing “CWE-276: Incorrect Default Permissions,” with the overall highest CVSS score of 9.5.
In order to determine if the MChat plugin would potentially give us System-level access, we needed to investigate if the plugin’s file operations were restricted to the student’s permissions or if the plugin inherited the System privileges from the running context. Examining the disassembled code of the MChat plugin, as displayed in Figure 14, we learned that all file actions on the student computer are executed with System privileges. Only after the file operation finishes will the permissions be set to allow access for everyone, essentially the effect of using the Linux “chmod 777” command, to make the files universally read/writable.
Figure 19: IDA screenshot of MChat file operations changing access to everyone
To validate this, we created several test files using an admin account and restricted the permissions to disallow the student from modifying or reading the test files. We proceeded to load the teacher suite, and through an MChat session confirmed we were able to read, write, and delete these files. This was an exciting discovery; however, if the attacker is limited to the predetermined “work directory” they would be limited in the effect they could have on the remote target. To investigate if we could change the “work directory” we began digging around in the teacher suite. Hidden in a few layers of menus (Figure 20) we found that a teacher can indeed set the remote student’s “work directory” and update this remotely. Knowing we can easily emulate any teacher’s command means that we could modify the “work directory” anywhere on the student system. Based on this, an attacker leveraging this flaw could have System access to modify any file on the remote PC.
Figure 20: Changing the remote student path from a teacher’s client
Now that we knew that the teacher could overwrite any file on the system, including system executables, we wanted to automate this attack and add it to our Python script. By automating this we want to showcase how attackers can use issues like this to create tools and scripts that have real world impacts. For a chat session to begin, we had to initiate the 11-packet handshake we previously discussed. Once the student connected to our attack machine, we needed to send a request to start a chat session with the target student. This request would make the student respond using TCP, yet this time, on a separate port, initiating an MChat seven-packet handshake. This required us to reverse engineer this new handshake format in a similar approach as described earlier. Unlike the first handshake, the MChat handshake had a single unique identifier for each session, and after testing, it was determined that the ID could be hardcoded with a static value without any negative effects.
Finally, we wanted to overwrite a file that we could ensure would be executed with System privileges. With the successful MChat handshake complete we needed to send a packet that would change the “work directory” to that of our choosing. Figure 21 shows the packet as a Scapy layer used to change the work directory on the student’s PC. The Netop plugin directory was a perfect target directory to change to since anything executed from this directory would be executed as System.
Figure 21: Change working directory on the student PC
The last step in gaining System-level execution was to overwrite and execute one of the plugins with a “malicious” binary. Through testing we discovered that if the file already exists in the same directory, the chat application is smart enough to not overwrite it, but instead adds a number to the filename. This is not what we wanted since the original plugin would get executed instead of our “malicious” one. This meant that we had to also reverse engineer a packet containing commands that are used to delete files. The Scapy layer used to delete a file and save a new one is shown in Figure 22.
Figure 22: Python Scapy layers to “delete” (MChatPktDeleteFile) and “write” (MChatPkt6) files
With these Scapy layers we were able to replace the target plugin with a binary of our choosing, keeping the same name as the original plugin. We chose the “SSView.exe” plugin, which is a plugin used to show screenshots on the student’s computer. To help visualize this entire process please reference Figure 23.
Figure 23: An attack flow using the MChat plugin to overwrite an executable
Now that the SSView.exe plugin has been overwritten, triggering this plugin will execute our attacker-supplied code. This execution will inherit the Netop System privileges, and all can be conducted from an unauthenticated remote attack vector.
It is not hard to imagine a scenario where a culmination of these issues can lead to several negative outcomes. The largest impact being remote code execution of arbitrary code with System privileges from any device on the local network. This scenario has the potential to be wormable, meaning that the arbitrary binary that we run could be designed to seek out other devices and further the spread. In addition, if the “Open Enrollment” option for a classroom is configured, the Netop Vision Pro student client broadcasts its presence on the network every few seconds. This can be used to an attacker’s advantage to determine the IP addresses of all the students connected on the local network. As seen in Figure 24, our Python script sniffed for student broadcast messages for 5 seconds and found all three student computers on the same network. Because these broadcast messages are sent out to the entire local network, this could very well scale to an entire school system.
Figure 24: Finding all students on the local network.
With a list of computers running the student software, an attacker can then issue commands to each one individually to run arbitrary code with System privileges. In the context of hybrid and e-learning it is important to remember that this software on the student’s computer doesn’t get turned off. Because it is always running, even when not in use, this software assumes every network the device connects to could have a teacher on it and begins broadcasting its presence. An attacker doesn’t have to compromise the school network; all they need is to find any network where this software is accessible, such as a library, coffee shop, or home network. It doesn’t matter where one of these student’s PCs gets compromised as a well-designed malware could lay dormant and scan each network the infected PC connects to, until it finds other vulnerable instances of Netop Vision Pro to further propagate the infection.
Once these machines have been compromised the remote attacker has full control of the system since they inherit the System privileges. Nothing at this point could stop an attacker running as System from accessing any files, terminating any process, or reaping havoc on the compromised machine. To elaborate on the effects of these issues we can propose a few scenarios. An attacker could use the discoverability of these machines to deploy ransomware to all the school computers on the network, bringing the school or entire school district to a standstill. A stealthier attacker could silently install keylogging software and monitor screenshots of the students which could lead to social media or financial accounts being compromised. Lastly, an attacker could monitor webcams of the students, bridging the gap from compromised software to the physical realm. As a proof of concept, the video below will show how an attacker can put CVE-2021-27195 and CVE-2021-27193 together to find, exploit, and monitor the webcams of each computer running Netop Vision Pro.
Secure adaptation of software is much easier to achieve when security is baked in from the beginning, rather than an afterthought. It is easy to recognize when software is built for “safe” environments. While Netop Vision Pro was never intended to be internet-facing or be brought off a managed school network, it is still important to implement basic security features like encryption. While designing software one should not assume what will be commonplace in the future. For instance, when this software was originally developed the concept of remote learning or hybrid learning was a far-out idea but now seems like it will be a norm. When security decisions are integrated from inception, software can adapt to new environments while keeping users better protected from future threats.
We disclosed all these findings to Netop on December 11, 2020 and heard back from them shortly after. Our disclosure included recommendations for implementing encryption of all network traffic, adding authentication, and verification of teachers to students, and more precise packet parsing filters. In Netop Vision Pro 9.7.2, released in late February, Netop has fixed the local privilege escalations, encrypted formerly plaintext Windows credentials, and mitigated the arbitrary read/writes on the remote filesystem within the MChat client. The local privilege escalations were fixed by running all plugins as the student and no longer as System. This way, the “Save as” buttons are limited to the student’s account. The Windows credentials are now encrypted using RC4 before being sent over the network, preventing eavesdroppers from gathering account credentials. Lastly, since all the plugins are running as the student, the MChat client can no longer delete and replace system executables which successfully mitigates the attack shown in the impact section. The network traffic is still unencrypted, including the screenshots of the student computers but Netop has assured us it is working on implementing encryption on all network traffic for a future update. We’d like to recognize Netop’s outstanding response and rapid development and release of a more secure software version and encourage industry vendors to take note of this as a standard for responding to responsible disclosures from industry researchers.
The post Netop Vision Pro – Distance Learning Software is 20/20 in Hindsight appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Tax return preparation might be a little more complicated this year than usual for many Canadians with millions receiving Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) payments and about 40% of the Canadian labor force turned to self-employment options to help them financially weather the pandemic storm.
Where there’s money and uncertainty, you’re likely to find scammers. After all, scammers tend to capitalize on uncertainty and use it as the entry point for their attacks. Whether it’s through a phishing email with a phony notice of reassessment, a text message threatening arrest, or a fake phone call from the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), hackers often employ elements of fear in their attacks. McAfee’s 2021 Consumer Security Mindset study revealed that roughly 2 out of 3 Canadians (65%) plan to do their taxes online in 2021, with 12% of them doing so for the first time. With the increase in activities online, consumers are potentially exposed to more digital risks and threats, and knowing how these hackers tend to work doesn’t mean you have to live in fear. To help you identify and avoid potential threats, let’s take a look at some of the most common scams that hackers use during tax season.
Phone scams take one of two primary forms:
Some sophisticated scammers will weave stolen personal or financial data that they purchased on the dark web into their calls, such as bank or social insurance information. They intend to make their phony claims sound legitimate, hoping that an unsuspecting user will hand over their data or make a fraudulent payment.
So, what does a real call from the CRA entail? The CRA clearly outlines the reasons they’d be calling on their 2020 Tax Tips page and ways that you can follow up with the CRA to determine if a call is legitimate.
There are two instances where the CRA may contact you by email. One is during a telephone call or meeting with a legitimate CRA agent. The second is to send you a notification that you have a message or document for your review on a secure CRA site such as My Account, My Business Account, or Represent a Client. Anything else is likely a scam.
The one time where the CRA will send you an email containing links is if you have a call or meeting with an agent, as outlined above. Otherwise, you can be confident that an email with links is a scam.
This one is relatively straightforward: the CRA will never contact you via text, instant messaging, Facebook, WhatsApp, or any similar messaging service. If you receive such a message, delete it, and don’t click on any links embedded within it.
In many cases, hackers will aim to separate you from your money by demanding immediate payment in some form or other. They may request payment in pre-loaded debit cards, gift cards, e-transfer, or even bitcoin. Know that the CRA will never request payment in any of those forms.
When in doubt, ask yourself why this email or phone caller is demanding that you act immediately. Have you filed on time? Have you received written notice from the CRA already? Do you owe an installment payment? If the person contacting you leaves you unsure, you can confirm that the contact was legitimate by calling the CRA.
While recognizing the signs of tax-related fraud can help ease the burdens associated with these schemes, there are multiple steps you can take to prevent becoming a victim of tax scams in the first place. Follow these tips to stay on top of your tax return while securing your digital life:
Devices benefit from physical security. This is as simple as locking your smartphones, tablets, and computers with a PIN or password. Should one of those devices get lost or stolen, a lock provides a barrier for those who might try to access your personal and financial information on them.
Protecting your devices with comprehensive security software can help block the phishing emails and suspicious links that make up many of these tax attacks. Likewise, it can further protect you from ransomware attacks, another type of tax scam on the rise, where crooks hold your data hostage for a price. All in all, security software is always a smart move—tax time or any time.
Consider what’s on your old computer hard drive or stored away on your phone. Old devices tend to contain loads of precious personal and financial information. Look into the e-waste disposal options in your community that will recycle your old technology and do so securely.
While so many of our finances are handled electronically today (taxes included), we’d be remiss if we didn’t talk about physical security as well. Mail and porch theft still occur, which is one more way a thief can steal your personal and financial information to use in a scam. A locking mailbox is a purchase you may want to consider if you don’t have one already.
Recognizing the signs of tax-related fraud could allow you to take action and significantly suppress the repercussions. If you suspect you’ve fallen victim to fraud or believe that you’ve been tricked into giving away personal information as part of a scam, contact your local police service and make a report.
By staying proactive and vigilant, you’ll be in a better position to protect your identity and your data—and live your digital life with safety at the forefront.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post Tax Season is Here: Avoid These Common Scams Targeting Canadians appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Advancements in cloud solutions and collaboration tools in recent years, coupled with the necessity of going remote due to the pandemic, have empowered today’s workforce to choose where they want to work. While the ability to work from anywhere—home, the library, coffee shops or even the beach– gives employees increased flexibility, the shift from the traditional office setting has exposed security and logistical concerns. Remote workers often access sensitive information from unsecured devices and networks, which can result in compromised data and failed privacy compliance. It’s essential for remote workers to practice online safety to minimize the cybersecurity risks to their organizations.
It’s undeniable that the freedom to work from anywhere is an employee perk that organizations must adapt to. Here’s a breakdown of some of the risks of working remotely and what companies can do keep their sensitive information secure, even when outside the safety of their four walls:
Office closures and working-from-home mandates due to COVID-19 permanently changed the way we look at workplace connectivity. A recent Fenwick poll among HR, privacy, and security professionals across industries noted that approximately 90% of employees now handle intellectual property, confidential, and personal information on their in-home Wi-Fi as opposed to in-office networks. Additionally, many are accessing this information on personal and mobile devices that often do not have the same protections as company-owned devices. The elevated number of unprotected devices connected to unsecured networks creates weak areas in a company’s infrastructure, making it harder to protect against hackers.
One technology your organization should be especially diligent about is video conferencing software. Hackers can infiltrate video conferencing software to eavesdrop on private discussions and steal vital information. Many disrupt video calls via brute force, where they scan a list of possible meeting IDs to try and connect to a meeting. Others seek more complex infiltration methods through vulnerabilities in the actual software. Up until recently, Agora’s video conferencing software exhibited these same vulnerabilities.
Hackers will usually try to gain access to these network vulnerabilities by targeting unsuspecting employees through phishing scams which can lead to even greater consequences if they manage to insert malware or hold your data for ransom. Without proper training on how to avoid these threats, many employees wouldn’t know how to handle the impact should they become the target.
Whether you’re connecting from home or from another remote location, it’s critical to practice the same level of care as you would in the office. Here are some quick and essential security safety habits every remote employee should practice.
Phishing is one of the most common methods hackers will deploy to target unsuspecting employees to access sensitive data. In fact, over 63% of Canadian IT executives in a recent poll indicated that ransomware and phishing were the top security concerns for their organizations. Here are some ways you can spot a phishing scam:
Ensure you understand your company’s policies and confidentiality agreements when it comes to sharing files, storing documents, and other online communications. Use company-approved cloud applications that follow strict security standards to avoid inadvertently exposing sensitive company information through unsecured means. This measure can also apply when using video conferencing software. Limit the amount of sensitive information shared via video conferencing platforms and through messaging features just in case uninvited hackers are eavesdropping.
We may have brought work home with us, but nonetheless, we must strive to maintain a work/life balance and set boundaries between our personal and work life. Setting these boundaries makes it easier to separate the technology we use in our life as well. Avoid sharing your company’s devices with family members who are not aware of the best security practices, especially children. Also, keep personal accounts separate from company accounts to prevent sharing information through personal channels.
Given the flexibility to truly work from anywhere, ensure you are connected to a secure network when not connected to your home’s password-protected Wi-Fi. When connecting to an unfamiliar network, always use a VPN to encrypt data and safely share files across the internet, preferably the one your company uses, or check with your IT resource. Take preemptive measures to mitigate exposure by installing antivirus software and firewall protection to scan files and systems and protect against harmful viruses regularly.
While the COVID pandemic has sparked a remote work movement that has changed the way we look at the conventional workplace—introducing greater flexibility and the opportunity to work from anywhere—remote work is well on its way to becoming a permanent fixture in the lives of many. However, the number of employees dispersed across cities and even countries have made it more difficult to secure endpoint devices such as laptops and mobile devices. Moreover, the risk posed by unsecured networks only increases the vulnerabilities of remote workplaces. As more workplaces embrace the benefits of a fully remote workforce, we will need to give more thought to how we can facilitate a secure workplace that is collaborative yet protected. By increasing awareness of potential cyber threats and enhancing security standards for devices and home networks, we can begin to create a safer and more efficient workplace.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post How to Stay Connected and Protected in a Remote Work Environment appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
In a poll conducted by the Canadian Medical Association, nearly half of Canadians have used telehealth services since the start of the pandemic. Additionally, in a recent McAfee study, we found that 21% of Canadians have used the internet for a doctor visit in 2020, and 28% said that such online visits will become a part of their routine moving forward Telehealth, or virtual care. This includes clinical services delivered remotely via electronic communications, such as videoconferencing, mobile apps and remote patient monitoring technology. Many of us have readily accepted these medical services out of necessity, as COVID have limited in-person hospital visits.
Hackers are taking advantage of the rise in virtual health services and exploiting their vulnerabilities to steal sensitive medical records. These vulnerabilities are the result of bigger issues stemming from obscure patient health information regulations and health care system budgetary constraints.
Understanding the risks associated with telehealth is the first step to securing your online safety during your virtual doctor’s visits.
At the onset of the pandemic, the number of reported Canadian cyberattacks jumped 50% from Q4 2019 to Q1 2020. Health care is one of the most targeted industries for cyberattacks. One attack even compromised the organization that manages Ontario’s medical records. Health care is such a highly targeted industry because it holds a wealth of information that fetches a high price on the dark web. Experts say medical records are more valuable than credit card details due to the amount of vital information stored in them, such as birth dates and patient ID numbers. Hackers can then hold this information for ransom or use it to steal your identity. Further, cybercriminals see health care institutions as easy targets. Canadian health care IT departments have insufficient budgets and are ill-prepared to handle the rising threats.
Canada also does not have federal guidelines governing virtual care and patient health information. Rather, health care providers and virtual care platforms are limited to the broad guidelines outlined by the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). As these are not digital security specific purpose defined guidelines and requirements, it makes it more difficult for health care providers and telehealth companies to protect patient data.
Telehealth makes care accessible to everyone; unfortunately, if you’re not careful, telehealth also opens the door for hackers. Hackers can infiltrate the technology used for online doctor’s appointments, because video conferencing technologies have several security flaws. From there, hackers can disrupt calls, eavesdrop and steal your private health information.
The advent of telehealth services has also prompted an increase in emails. Since patients may be expecting emails from their doctor, they may let their guard down and fall victim to phishers posing as a health care organization.
Prepare for your next virtual doctor’s appointment with these best practices to secure your virtual safety.
Before heading into your next telehealth appointment, ask your health care provider the right questions to online understand what risks you may face. Ascertaining this information will help you understand what actions you need to take to mitigate the risk on your end, like staying alert for eavesdroppers or finding alternative ways to confirm personal information. Here are some questions you can ask:
Phishing is a common tactic hackers use to access private health information and trick users into downloading malware. Beware of seemingly official emails under the guise of your health care provider asking for payment information or prompting you to take immediate action. If the email logo doesn’t look right, the message is poorly written, or the URL displayed doesn’t match the one that’s linked, then it’s likely a phishing scam.
Contact your health care provider before verifying sensitive information online, such as payment details or document transfer methods, to avoid falling victim to phishing. We recommend logging into your healthcare provider’s official website or app to confirm pertinent healthcare information as well. If you accidentally reply to a phishing email, perform a full malware scan on your device to ensure your private information remains secure.
It’s important to keep telehealth applications up to date to benefit from the latest bug fixes and security patches. This includes apps belonging to your IoT devices, such as glucose monitors, blood pressure monitors or other network-enabled diagnostic devices. These devices represent more entry points that hackers can infiltrate, making it especially critical to keep them up to date and close any security loopholes.
Get creative with your telehealth portal password, or better yet, use a security solution that includes a password management system. McAfee Total Protection includes a robust password management system that creates and saves strong passwords across all your accounts in one centralized location.
Ensure you’re using a telehealth platform that leverages multi-factor authentication, so even if a hacker were to acquire your password, there’s an added layer of security they won’t be able to bypass.
It’s always best to use a virtual private network (VPN) when conducting activities online, and medical visits are no exception. Using a VPN like McAfee Safe Connect VPN will ensure your data is encrypted and your private health information stays between you and your doctors. A VPN is especially important if you’re connecting from a network other than your password-protected home Wi-Fi.
Medical services are just one of many activities that have turned virtual due to the pandemic. Keep in mind these new virtual outlets come with elevated risks. Hackers are taking advantage of software vulnerabilities and taking victims unaware through social engineering tactics to steal sensitive personal information. Remember to secure your online health by taking a proactive stance against malicious threats so you can focus on your physical health during your telehealth visits.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post Check up on Your Virtual Safety: Tips for Telehealth Protection appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
After much anticipation, you finally get a notification that you’re eligible to receive your COVID-19 vaccine. Upon getting your first dose, you may be eager to celebrate by sharing a picture of your vaccination card on social media. After all, many of your peers have been doing the same. However, these posts could actually put your online privacy and personal information at risk. While you want to share the good news, experts warn that scammers could potentially exploit the information on your card.
With more people becoming eligible to receive the COVID-19 vaccine, there has been a surge in social media posts featuring peoples’ vaccine cards. However, the Better Business Bureau stated that posting photos of your card can give criminals the data they need to create and sell fake vaccination cards. Not only do vaccine cards remind you of when your next appointment is, but they also contain important personal information such as your name, date of birth, and when and where you were vaccinated.
Currently, these cards are the only proof that people have that they’ve been vaccinated. While there is still uncertainty around the next phase of the pandemic and when life will return to “normal,” it’s possible these cards could be what gets you into a restaurant or on an airplane. If you post your vaccination card on social media, scammers could potentially forge your card and use it as their own pass into public places or use it to receive a second dose. Publicly posting medical information could also void your HIPAA protections. Furthermore, cybercriminals could significantly profit from your personal information since health care records sell for more than Social Security and credit card numbers on the dark web.
Your digital wellness is just as important as your physical wellness, so protecting your online data is crucial. It’s a good rule of thumb not to post photos with your name and other identifiable information on the internet. Although it may be tempting to post your vaccination card on social media, consider these tips to help protect your online security:
Think about who you want to share the good news with and what social media platform would be best for this. Create private groups or carefully select which followers can see your posts. Then, verify that you’ve updated your privacy settings accordingly. This will prevent scammers from lurking on your posts and extracting your personal information.
Instead of posting a photo of your vaccine card, share a picture of yourself outside the vaccination center. If your vaccination center provides “I got vaccinated” stickers, you can post a picture of that as well.
Taking steps towards protecting your digital well-being is just as important as taking steps towards protecting your physical health. By following these steps, you can help ensure that your online security will not be jeopardized by celebrating your vaccination.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post Protect Your Digital Wellness: Don’t Post Your Vaccination Card Online appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Ever since I started working in IT Security more than 10 years ago, I wondered, what helps defend against malware the best?
This simple question does not stand on its own, as there are several follow-up questions to that:
This blog will guide you through my research and thought process around these questions and how you can enable yourself to answer these for your own organization!
As mentioned above, the central question “what helps best?” has followed me throughout the years, but my methods to be able to answer this question have evolved. The first interaction I had with IT Security was more than 10 years ago, where I had to manually deploy new Anti-Virus software from a USB-key to around 100 devices. The settings were configured by a colleague in our IT-Team, and my job was to help remove infections when they came up, usually by going through the various folders or registry keys and cleaning up the remains. The most common malware was Adware, and the good-ol obnoxious hotbars which were added to the browser. I remember one colleague calling into IT saying “my internet has become so small, I can barely even read 5 lines of text” which we later translated into “I had 6 hotbars installed on my Internet Explorer so there was nearly no space left for the content to be displayed”.
Exemplary picture of the “internet” getting smaller.
Jump ahead a couple of years, I started working with McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator to manage and deploy Anti-Malware from a central place automatically, and not just for our own IT, but I was was allowed to implement McAfee ePO into our customers’ environments. This greatly expanded my view into what happens in the world of malware and I started using the central reporting tool to figure out where all these threats were coming from:
Also, I was able to understand how the different McAfee tools helped me in detecting and blocking these threats:
But this only showed the viewpoint of one customer and I had to manually overlay them to figure out what defense mechanism worked best. Additionally, I couldn’t see what was missed by the defense mechanisms, either due to configuration, missing signatures, or disabled modules. So, these reports gave me a good viewpoint into the customers I managed, but not the complete picture. I needed a different perspective, perhaps from other customers, other tools, or even other geo-locations.
Let us jump further ahead in my personal IT security timeline to about June 2020:
As you could see above, I spent quite a lot of time optimizing setups and configurations to assist customers in increasing their endpoint security. As time progressed, it became clear that solely using Endpoint Protection, especially only based on signatures, was not state of the art. Protection needs to be a combination of security controls rather than the obnoxious silver bullet that is well overplayed in cybersecurity. And still, the best product or solution set doesn’t help if you don’t know what you are looking for (Question 1&2), how to prepare (Question 4) or if you misconfigured the product including all subfolders of “C:\” as an exclusion for On-Access-Scanning (Question 5).
Then McAfee released MVISION Insights this summer and it clicked in my head:
Framework I could also link from the threat to defensive capabilitiesWith this data available it was possible to create a heatmap not just by geo-location or a very high number of new threats every day, hour or even minute, but on how specific types of campaigns are operating out in the wild. To start assessing the data, I took 60 ransomware campaigns dating between January and June 2020 and pulled out all the MITRE ATT&CK© techniques that have been used and displayed them on a heatmap:
Amber/Orange: Being used the most, green: only used in 1 or 2 campaigns
Reality Check 1: Does this mapping look accurate?
For me it does, and here is why:
Next, we need to understand what can be done to detect and ideally block ransomware in its tracks. For this I summarized key malware defense capabilities and mapped them to the tactics being used most:
| MITRE Tactic | Security Capability | Example McAfee solution features |
| Execution | Attack surface reduction | ENS Access Protection and Exploit Prevention, MVISION Insights recommendations |
| Multi-layered detection | ENS Exploit Prevention, MVISION Insights telemetry, MVISION EDR Tracing, ATD file analysis | |
| Multi-layered protection | ENS On-Access-Scanning using Signatures, GTI, Machine-Learning and more | |
| Rule & Risk-based analytics | MVISION EDR tracing | |
| Containment | ENS Dynamic Application Containment | |
| Persistence | Attack surface reduction | ENS Access Protection or Exploit Prevention, MVISION Insights recommendations |
| Multi-layered detection | ENS Exploit Prevention, MVISION Insights telemetry, MVISION EDR Tracing, ATD file analysis | |
| Sandboxing and threat analysis | ATD file analysis | |
| Rule & Risk-based analytics | MVISION EDR tracing | |
| Containment | ENS Dynamic Application Containment | |
| Defense Evasion | Attack surface reduction | ENS Access Protection and Exploit Prevention, MVISION Insights recommendations |
| Multi-layered detection | ENS Exploit Prevention, MVISION Insights telemetry, MVISION EDR Tracing, ATD file analysis | |
| Sandboxing and threat analysis | ATD file analysis | |
| Rule & Risk-based analytics | MVISION EDR tracing | |
| Containment | ENS Dynamic Application Containment | |
| Discovery | Attack surface reduction | ENS Access Protection and Exploit Prevention |
| Multi-layered detection | ENS Exploit Prevention, MVISION EDR Tracing, ATD file analysis | |
| Sandboxing and threat analysis | ATD file analysis | |
| Rule & Risk-based analytics | MVISION EDR tracing | |
| Command & Control | Attack surface reduction | MVISION Insights recommendations |
| Multi-layered detection | ENS Firewall IP Reputation, MVISION Insights telemetry, MVISION EDR Tracing, ATD file analysis | |
| Multi-layered protection | ENS Firewall | |
| Rule & Risk-based analytics | MVISION EDR tracing | |
| Containment | ENS Firewall and Dynamic Application Containment | |
| Impact | Multi-layered detection | MVISION EDR tracing, ATD file analysis |
| Rule & Risk-based analytics | MVISION EDR tracing | |
| Containment | ENS Dynamic Application Containment | |
| Advanced remediation | ENS Advanced Rollback |
A description of the McAfee Solutions is provided below.
Now this allowed me to map the solutions from the McAfee portfolio to each capability, and with that indirectly to the MITRE tactics. But I did not want to end here, as different tools might take a different role in the defensive architecture. For example, MVISION Insights can give you details around your current configuration and automatically overlays it with the current threat campaigns in the wild, giving you the ability to proactively prepare and harden your systems. Another example would be using McAfee Endpoint Security (ENS) to block all unsigned PowerShell scripts, effectively reducing the risk of being hit by a file-less malware based on this technology to nearly 0%. On the other end of the scale, solutions like MVISION EDR will give you great visibility of actions that have occurred, but this happens after the fact, so there is a high chance that you will have some cleaning up to do. This brings me to the topic of “improving protection before moving into detection” but this is for another blog post.
Coming back to the mapping shown above, let us quickly do…
Reality Check 2: Does this mapping feel accurate too?
For me it does, and here is why:
Now with all this data at hand we can come to the final step and bring it all together in one simple graph.
Before we jump into our conclusion, here is a quick summary of the actions I have taken:
So, without further ado and with a short drumroll I want to present to you the McAfee security architecture that best defends against current malware campaigns:
For reference, here is a quick breakdown of the components that make up the architecture above:
MVISION ePO is the SaaS-based version of our famous security management solution, which makes it possible to manage a heterogenous set of systems, policies, and events from a central place. Even though I have mentioned the SaaS-based version here, the same is true for our ePO on-premises software as well.
MVISION Insights is a key data source that helps organizations understand what campaigns and threats are trending. This is based on research from our Advanced Threat Research (ATR) team who use our telemetry data inside our Global Threat Intelligence (GTI) big-data platform to enhance the details that are provided.
MVISION Endpoint Detect & Response (EDR) is present in multiple boxes here, as it is a sensor on one side, which sits on the endpoint and collects data, and it is also a cloud service which receives, stores and analyses the data.
EPP is our Endpoint Protection Platform, which contains multiple items working in conjunction. First there is McAfee Endpoint Security (ENS) that is sitting on the device itself and has multiple detection and protection capabilities. For me, the McAfee Threat Intelligence Exchange (TIE) server is always a critical piece to McAfee’s Endpoint Protection Platform and has evolved from a standalone feature to an integrated building block inside ePO and is therefore not shown in the graphic above.
McAfee Advanced Threat Defense (ATD) extends the capabilities of both EPP and EDR, as it can run suspicious files in a separated environment and shares the information gathered with the other components of the McAfee architecture and even 3rd-party tools. It also goes the other way around as ATD allows other security controls to forward files for analysis in our sandbox, but this might be a topic for another blog post.
All the items listed above can be acquired by licensing our MVISION Premium suite in combination with McAfee ATD.
Based on the components and the mapping to the capabilities, I was also able to create a graph based on our most common device security bundles and their respective malware defense score:
In the graph above you can see four of our most sold bundles, ranging from the basic MVISION Standard, up to MVISION Premium in combination with McAfee Advanced Threat Defense (ATD). The line shows the ransomware detection & protection score, steadily rising as you go from left to right. Interestingly, the cost per point, i.e. how much dollar you need to spend to get one point, is much lower when buying the largest option in comparison to the smaller ones. As the absolute cost varies on too many variables, I have omitted an example here. Contact your local sales representative to gather an estimated calculation for your environment.
So, have I come to this conclusion by accident? Let us find out in the last installment of the reality check:
Reality Check 3: Is this security architecture well suited for today’s threats?
For me it does, and here is why:
While writing up my thoughts into the blog post, I was reminded of the “Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy”, as my journey in cybersecurity started out with the search for the answer to everything. But over the years it evolved into the multiple questions I prompted at the start of the article:
And certainly, the answers to these questions are a moving target. Not only do the tools and techniques by the adversaries evolve, so do all the capabilities on the defensive side.
I welcome you to take the information provided by my research and apply it to your own security architecture:
Thank you for reading this blog post and following my train of thought. I would love to hear back from you, on how you assess yourself, what could be the next focus area for my research or if you want to apply the scoring mechanism on your environment! So please find me on LinkedIn or Twitter, write me a short message or just say “Hi!”.
I also must send out a big “THANK YOU!” to all my colleagues at McAfee helping out during my research: Mo Cashman, Christian Heinrichs, John Fokker, Arnab Roy, James Halls and all the others!
The post McAfee Defenders Blog: Reality Check for your Defenses appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Over the past year, we have seen ransomware attackers change the way they have responded to organizations that have either chosen to not pay the ransom or have recovered their data via some other means. At the end of the day, fighting ransomware has resulted in the bad actors’ loss of revenue. Being the creative bunch they are, they have resorted to data dissemination if the ransom is not paid. This means that significant exposure could still exist for your organization, even if you were able to recover from the attack.
Cuba ransomware, no newcomer to the game, has recently introduced this behavior.
This blog is focused on how to build an adaptable security architecture to increase your resilience against these types of attacks and specifically, how McAfee’s portfolio delivers the capability to prevent, detect and respond against the tactics and techniques used in the Cuba Ransomware Campaign.
As always, building adaptable defensive architecture starts with intelligence. In most organizations, the Security Operations team is responsible for threat intelligence analysis, as well as threat and incident response. McAfee Insights (https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/lp/insights-dashboard1.html#) is a great tool for the threat intel analyst and threat responder. The Insights Dashboard identifies prevalence and severity of emerging threats across the globe which enables the Security Operations Center (SOC) to prioritize threat response actions and gather relevant cyber threat intelligence (CTI) associated with the threat, in this case the Cuba ransomware campaign. The CTI is provided in the form of technical indicators of compromise (IOCs) as well as MITRE ATT&CK framework tactics and techniques. As a threat intel analyst or responder you can drill down to gather more specific information on Cuba ransomware, such as prevalence and links to other sources of information. You can further drill down to gather more specific actionable intelligence such as indicators of compromise and tactics/techniques aligned to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
From the McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) blog, you can see that Cuba ransomware leverages tactics and techniques common to other APT campaigns. Currently, the Initial Access vector is not known. It could very well be spear phishing, exploited system tools and signed binaries, or a multitude of other popular methods.
Today’s digital enterprise is a hybrid environment of on-premise systems and cloud services with multiple entry points for attacks like Cuba ransomware. The work from home operating model forced by COVID-19 has only expanded the attack surface and increased risk for successful spear phishing attacks if organizations did not adapt their security posture and increase training for remote workers. Mitigating the risk of attacks like Cuba ransomware requires a security architecture with the right controls at the device, on the network and in security operations (SecOps). The Center for Internet Security (CIS) Top 20 Cyber Security Controls provides a good guide to build that architecture. As indicated earlier, the exact entry vector used by Cuba ransomware is currently unknown, so what follows, here, are more generalized recommendations for protecting your enterprise.
According to Threat Intelligence and Research, the initial access for Cuba ransomware is not currently known. As attackers can leverage many popular techniques for initial access, it is best to validate efficacy on all layers of defenses. This includes user awareness training and response procedures, intelligence and behavior-based malware defenses on email systems, web proxy and endpoint systems, and finally SecOps playbooks for early detection and response against suspicious email attachments or other phishing techniques. The following chart summarizes the controls expected to have the most effect against initial stage techniques and the McAfee solutions to implement those controls where applicable.
| MITRE Tactic | MITRE Techniques | CSC Controls | McAfee Capability |
| Initial Access | Spear Phishing Attachments (T1566.001) |
CSC 7 – Email and Web Browser Protection
CSC 8 – Malware Defenses CSC 17 – User Awareness |
Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection,
Web Gateway (MWG), Advanced Threat Defense, Web Gateway Cloud Service (WGCS) |
| Initial Access | Spear Phishing Link (T1566.002) |
CSC 7 – Email and Web Browser Protection
CSC 8 – Malware Defenses CSC 17 – User Awareness |
Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection,
Web Gateway (MWG), Advanced Threat Defense, Web Gateway Cloud Service (WGCS) |
| Initial Access | Spear Phishing (T1566.003) Service |
CSC 7 – Email and Web Browser Protection
CSC 8 – Malware Defenses CSC 17 – User Awareness |
Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection,
Web Gateway (MWG), Advanced Threat Defense, Web Gateway Cloud Service (WGCS) |
For additional information on how McAfee can protect against suspicious email attachments, review this additional blog post: https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-protects-against-suspicious-email-attachments/
The exploitation stage is where the attacker gains access to the target system. Protection against Cuba ransomware at this stage is heavily dependent on adaptable anti-malware on both end user devices and servers, restriction of application execution, and security operations tools like endpoint detection and response sensors.
McAfee Endpoint Security 10.7 provides a defense in depth capability, including signatures and threat intelligence, to cover known bad indicators or programs, as well as machine-learning and behavior-based protection to reduce the attack surface against Cuba ransomware and detect new exploitation attack techniques. If the initial entry vector is a weaponized Word document with links to external template files on a remote server, for example, McAfee Threat Prevention and Adaptive Threat Protection modules protect against these techniques.
The following chart summarizes the critical security controls expected to have the most effect against exploitation stage techniques and the McAfee solutions to implement those controls where applicable.
| MITRE Tactic | MITRE Techniques | CSC Controls | McAfee Portfolio Mitigation |
| Execution | User Execution (T1204) |
CSC 5 Secure Configuration
CSC 8 Malware Defenses CSC 17 Security Awareness |
Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Application Control (MAC), Web Gateway and Network Security Platform |
| Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059)
|
CSC 5 Secure Configuration
CSC 8 Malware Defenses |
Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Application Control (MAC), MVISION EDR |
| Execution | Shared Modules (T1129) |
CSC 5 Secure Configuration
CSC 8 Malware Defenses |
Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Application Control (MAC) |
| Persistence | Boot or Autologon Execution (T1547) |
CSC 5 Secure Configuration
CSC 8 Malware Defenses |
Endpoint Security Platform 10.7 Threat Prevention, MVISION EDR |
| Defensive Evasion | Template Injection (T1221) |
CSC 5 Secure Configuration
CSC 8 Malware Defenses |
Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, MVISION EDR |
| Defensive Evasion | Signed Binary Proxy Execution (T1218) |
CSC 4 Control Admin Privileges
CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses |
Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Application Control, MVISION EDR |
| Defensive Evasion | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1027)
|
CSC 5 Secure Configuration
CSC 8 Malware Defenses |
Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, MVISION EDR |
For more information on how McAfee Endpoint Security 10.7 can prevent some of the techniques used in the Cuba ransomware exploit stage, review this additional blog post: https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-amsi-integration-protects-against-malicious-scripts/
The impact stage is where the attacker encrypts the target system, data and perhaps moves laterally to other systems on the network. Protection at this stage is heavily dependent on adaptable anti-malware on both end user devices and servers, network controls and security operation’s capability to monitor logs for anomalies in privileged access or network traffic. The following chart summarizes the controls expected to have the most effect against impact stage techniques and the McAfee solutions to implement those controls where applicable:
The public leak site of Cuba ransomware can be found via TOR: http://cuba4mp6ximo2zlo[.]onion/
| MITRE Tactic | MITRE Techniques | CSC Controls | McAfee Portfolio Mitigation |
| Discovery | Account Discovery (T1087) |
CSC 4 Control Use of Admin Privileges
CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 6 Log Analysis |
MVISION EDR, MVISION Cloud, Cloud Workload Protection |
| Discovery | System Information Discovery (T1082) |
CSC 4 Control Use of Admin Privileges
CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 6 Log Analysis |
MVISION EDR, MVISION Cloud, Cloud Workload Protection |
| Discovery | System Owner/User Discovery (T1033) |
CSC 4 Control Use of Admin Privileges
CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 6 Log Analysis |
MVISION EDR, MVISION Cloud, Cloud Workload Protection |
| Command and Control | Encrypted Channel (T1573) |
CSC 8 Malware Defenses
CSC 12 Boundary Defenses |
Web Gateway, Network Security Platform |
As a threat intel analyst or hunter, you might want to quickly scan your systems for any indicators you received on Cuba ransomware. Of course, you can do that manually by downloading a list of indicators and searching with available tools. However, if you have MVISION EDR and Insights, you can do that right from the console, saving precious time. Hunting the attacker can be a game of inches so every second counts. Of course, if you found infected systems or systems with indicators, you can take action to contain and start an investigation for incident response immediately from the MVISION EDR console.
In addition to these IOCs, YARA rules are available in our technical analysis of Cuba ransomware.
Files:
151.bat
151.ps1
Kurva.ps1
Email addresses:
under_amur@protonmail[.]ch
helpadmin2@cock[.]li
helpadmin2@protonmail[.]com
iracomp2@protonmail[.]ch
fedelsupportagent@cock.li
admin@cuba-supp.com
cuba_support@exploit.im
Domain:
kurvalarva[.]com
Script for lateral movement and deployment:
54627975c0befee0075d6da1a53af9403f047d9e367389e48ae0d25c2a7154bc
c385ef710cbdd8ba7759e084051f5742b6fa8a6b65340a9795f48d0a425fec61
40101fb3629cdb7d53c3af19dea2b6245a8d8aa9f28febd052bb9d792cfbefa6
Cuba Ransomware: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| Tactic | Technique | Observable | IOCs |
| Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) | Cuba team is using PowerShell payload to drop Cuba ransomware | f739977004981fbe4a54bc68be18ea79
68a99624f98b8cd956108fedcc44e07c bdeb5acc7b569c783f81499f400b2745
|
| Execution | System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002) |
|
|
| Execution | Shared Modules (T1129) | Cuba ransomware links function at runtime | Functions:
“GetModuleHandle” “GetProcAddress” “GetModuleHandleEx” |
| Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) | Cuba ransomware accepts command line arguments | Functions:
“GetCommandLine” |
| Persistence | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) | Cuba ransomware can modify services | Functions:
“OpenService” “ChangeServiceConfig” |
| Privilege Escalation | Access Token Manipulation (T1134) | Cuba ransomware can adjust access privileges | Functions:
“SeDebugPrivilege” “AdjustTokenPrivileges” “LookupPrivilegeValue” |
| Defense Evasion | File and Directory Permissions Modification (T1222) | Cuba ransomware will set file attributes | Functions:
“SetFileAttributes” |
| Defense Evasion | Obfuscated files or Information (T1027) | Cuba ransomware is using xor algorithm to encode data | |
| Defense Evasion | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks | Cuba ransomware executes anti-vm instructions | |
| Discovery | File and Directory Discovery (T1083) | Cuba ransomware enumerates files | Functions:
“FindFirstFile” “FindNextFile” “FindClose” “FindFirstFileEx” “FindNextFileEx” “GetFileSizeEx” |
| Discovery | Process Discovery (T1057) | Cuba ransomware enumerates process modules | Functions:
“K32EnumProcesses” |
| Discovery | System Information Discovery (T1082) | Cuba ransomware can get keyboard layout, enumerates disks, etc | Functions:
“GetKeyboardLayoutList” “FindFirstVolume” “FindNextVolume” “GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeName” “GetDriveType” “GetLogicalDriveStrings” “GetDiskFreeSpaceEx” |
| Discovery | System Service Discovery (T1007) | Cuba ransomware can query service status | Functions:
“QueryServiceStatusEx” |
| Collection | Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) | Cuba ransomware logs keystrokes via polling | Functions:
“GetKeyState” “VkKeyScan” |
| Impact | Service Stop (T1489) | Cuba ransomware can stop services | |
| Impact | Data encrypted for Impact (T1486) | Cuba ransomware encrypts data |
Many of the exploit stage techniques in this attack could use legitimate Windows processes and applications to either exploit or avoid detection. We discussed, above, how the Endpoint Protection Platform can disrupt weaponized documents but, by using MVISION EDR, you can get more visibility. As security analysts, we want to focus on suspicious techniques used by Initial Access, as this attack’s Initial Access is unknown.
Events from McAfee Endpoint Protection and McAfee MVISION EDR play a key role in Cuba ransomware incident and threat response. McAfee ePO centralizes event collection from all managed endpoint systems. As a threat responder, you may want to create a dashboard for Cuba ransomware-related threat events to understand your current exposure.
To defeat targeted threat campaigns, defenders must collaborate internally and externally to build an adaptive security architecture which will make it harder for threat actors to succeed and build resilience in the business. This blog highlights how to use McAfee’s security solutions to prevent, detect and respond to Cuba ransomware and attackers using similar techniques.
McAfee ATR is actively monitoring this campaign and will continue to update McAfee Insights and its social networking channels with new and current information. Want to stay ahead of the adversaries? Check out McAfee Insights for more information.
The post McAfee Defender’s Blog: Cuba Ransomware Campaign appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Cuba ransomware is an older ransomware, that has recently undergone some development. The actors have incorporated the leaking of victim data to increase its impact and revenue, much like we have seen recently with other major ransomware campaigns.
In our analysis, we observed that the attackers had access to the network before the infection and were able to collect specific information in order to orchestrate the attack and have the greatest impact. The attackers operate using a set of PowerShell scripts that enables them to move laterally. The ransom note mentions that the data was exfiltrated before it was encrypted. In similar attacks we have observed the use of a Cobalt Strike payload, although we have not found clear evidence of a relationship with Cuba ransomware.
We observed Cuba ransomware targeting financial institutions, industry, technology and logistics organizations.
The following picture shows an overview of the countries that have been impacted according to our telemetry.
Defenders should be on the lookout for traces and behaviours that correlate to open source pen test tools such as winPEAS, Lazagne, Bloodhound and Sharp Hound, or hacking frameworks like Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Empire or Covenant, as well as abnormal behavior of non-malicious tools that have a dual use. These seemingly legitimate tools (e.g., ADfind, PSExec, PowerShell, etc.) can be used for things like enumeration and execution. Subsequently, be on the lookout for abnormal usage of Windows Management Instrumentation WMIC (T1047). We advise everyone to check out the following blogs on evidence indicators for a targeted ransomware attack (Part1, Part2).
Looking at other similar Ransomware-as-a-Service families we have seen that certain entry vectors are quite common among ransomware criminals:
When it comes to the actual ransomware binary, we strongly advise updating and upgrading endpoint protection, as well as enabling options like tamper protection and Rollback. Please read our blog on how to best configure ENS 10.7 to protect against ransomware for more details.
For active protection, more details can be found on our website – https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/threat-center/threat-landscape-dashboard/ransomware-details.cuba-ransomware.html – and in our detailed Defender blog.
Learn more about Cuba ransomware, Yara Rules, Indicators of Compromise & Mitre ATT&CK techniques used by reading our detailed technical analysis.
The post McAfee ATR Threat Report: A Quick Primer on Cuba Ransomware appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Recently, the McAfee Mobile Research Team uncovered several new variants of the Android malware family BRATA being distributed in Google Play, ironically posing as app security scanners.
These malicious apps urge users to update Chrome, WhatsApp, or a PDF reader, yet instead of updating the app in question, they take full control of the device by abusing accessibility services. Recent versions of BRATA were also seen serving phishing webpages targeting users of financial entities, not only in Brazil but also in Spain and the USA.
In this blog post we will provide an overview of this threat, how does this malware operates and its main upgrades compared with earlier versions. If you want to learn more about the technical details of this threat and the differences between all variants you can check the BRATA whitepaper here.
First seen in the wild at the end of 2018 and named “Brazilian Remote Access Tool Android ” (BRATA) by Kaspersky, this “RAT” initially targeted users in Brazil and then rapidly evolved into a banking trojan. It combines full device control capabilities with the ability to display phishing webpages that steal banking credentials in addition to abilities that allow it capture screen lock credentials (PIN, Password or Pattern), capture keystrokes (keylogger functionality), and record the screen of the infected device to monitor a user’s actions without their consent.
Because BRATA is distributed mainly on Google Play, it allows bad actors to lure victims into installing these malicious apps pretending that there is a security issue on the victim’s device and asking to install a malicious app to fix the problem. Given this common ruse, it is recommended to avoid clicking on links from untrusted sources that pretend to be a security software which scans and updates your system—e even if that link leads to an app in Google Play. McAfee offers protection against this threat via McAfee Mobile Security, which detects this malware as Android/Brata.
The main upgrades and changes that we have identified in the latest versions of BRATA recently found in Google Play include:
During 2020, the threat actors behind BRATA have managed to publish several apps in Google Play, most of them reaching between one thousand to five thousand installs. However, also a few variants have reached 10,000 installs including the latest one, DefenseScreen, reported to Google by McAfee in October and later removed from Google Play.
Figure 1. DefenseScreen app in Google Play.
From all BRATA apps that were in Google Play in 2020, five of them caught our attention as they have notable improvements compared with previous ones. We refer to them by the name of the developer accounts:
Figure 2. Timeline of identified apps in Google Play from May to October 2020
BRATA poses as a security app scanner that pretends to scan all the installed apps, while in the background it checks if any of the target apps provided by a remote server are installed in the user’s device. If that is the case, it will urge the user to install a fake update of a specific app selected depending on the device language. In the case of English-language apps, BRATA suggests the update of Chrome while also constantly showing a notification at the top of the screen asking the user to activate accessibility services:
Figure 3. Fake app scanning functionality
Once the user clicks on “UPDATE NOW!”, BRATA proceeds to open the main Accessibility tab in Android settings and asks the user to manually find the malicious service and grant permissions to use accessibility services. When the user attempts to do this dangerous action, Android warns of the potential risks of granting access to accessibility services to a specific app, including that the app can observe your actions, retrieve content from Windows, and perform gestures like tap, swipe, and pinch.
As soon as the user clicks on OK the persistent notification goes away, the main icon of the app is hidden and a full black screen with the word “Updating” appears, which could be used to hide automated actions that now can be performed with the abuse of accessibility services:
Figure 4. BRATA asking access to accessibility services and showing a black screen to potentially hide automated actions
At this point, the app is completely hidden from the user, running in the background in constant communication with a command and control server run by the threat actors. The only user interface that we saw when we analyzed BRATA after the access to accessibility services was granted was the following screen, created by the malware to steal the device PIN and use it to unlock it when the phone is unattended. The screen asks the user to confirm the PIN, validating it with the real one because when an incorrect PIN is entered, an error message is shown and the screen will not disappear until the correct PIN is entered:
Figure 5. BRATA attempting to steal device PIN and confirming if the correct one is provided
Once the malicious app is executed and accessibility permissions have been granted, BRATA can perform almost any action in the compromised device. Here’s the list of commands that we found in all the payloads that we have analyzed so far:
In addition to the commands above, BRATA also performs automated actions by abusing accessibility services to hide itself from the user or automatically grant privileges to itself:
Earlier BRATA versions like OutProtect and PrivacyTitan were designed to target Brazilian users only by limiting its execution to devices set to the Portuguese language in Brazil. However, in June we noticed that threat actors behind BRATA started to add support to other languages like Spanish and English. Depending on the language configured in the device, the malware suggested that one of the following three apps needed an urgent update: WhatsApp (Spanish), a non-existent PDF Reader (Portuguese) and Chrome (English):
Figure 6. Apps falsely asked to be updated depending on the device language
In addition to the localization of the user-interface strings, we also noticed that threat actors have updated the list of targeted financial apps to add some from Spain and USA. In September, the target list had around 52 apps but only 32 had phishing URLs. Also, from the 20 US banking apps present in the last target list only 5 had phishing URLs. Here’s an example of phishing websites that will be displayed to the user if specific US banking apps are present in the compromised device:
Figure 7. Examples of phishing websites pretending to be from US banks
Throughout 2020, BRATA constantly evolved, adding different obfuscation layers to impede its analysis and detection. One of the first major changes was moving its core functionality to a remote server so it can be easily updated without changing the original malicious application. The same server is used as a first point of contact to register the infected device, provide an updated list of targeted financial apps, and then deliver the IP address and port of the server that will be used by the attackers to execute commands remotely on the compromised device:
Figure 8. BRATA high level network communication
Additional protection layers include string obfuscation, country and language check, encryption of certain key strings in assets folder, and, in latest variants, the use of a commercial packer that further prevents the static and dynamic analysis of the malicious apps. The illustration below provides a summary of the different protection layers and execution stages present in the latest BRATA variants:
Figure 9. BRATA protection layers and execution stages
In order get infected with BRATA ,users must install the malicious application from Google Play so below are some recommendations to avoid being tricked by this or any other Android threats that use social engineering to convince users to install malware that looks legitimate:
The activation of accessibility services is very sensitive in Android and key to the successful execution of this banking trojan because, once the access to those services is granted, BRATA can perform all the malicious activities and take control of the device. For this reason, Android users must be very careful when granting this access to any app.
Accessibility services are so powerful that in hands of a malicious app they could be used to fully compromise your device data, your online banking and finances, and your digital life overall.
When BRATA was initially discovered in 2019 and named “Brazilian Android RAT” by Kaspersky, it was said that, theoretically, the malware can be used to target other users if the cybercriminals behind this threat wanted to do it. Based on the newest variants found in 2020, the theory has become reality, showing that this threat is currently very active, constantly adding new targets, new languages and new protection layers to make its detection and analysis more difficult.
In terms of functionality, BRATA is just another example of how powerful the (ab)use of accessibility services is and how, with just a little bit of social engineering and persistence, cybercriminals can trick users into granting this access to a malicious app and basically getting total control of the infected device. By stealing the PIN, Password or Pattern, combined with the ability to record the screen, click on any button and intercept anything that is entered in an editable field, malware authors can virtually get any data they want, including banking credentials via phishing web pages or even directly from the apps themselves, while also hiding all these actions from the user.
Judging by our findings, the number of apps found in Google Play in 2020 and the increasing number of targeted financial apps, it looks like BRATA will continue to evolve, adding new functionality, new targets, and new obfuscation techniques to target as many users as possible, while also attempting to reduce the risk of being detected and removed from the Play store.
McAfee Mobile Security detects this threat as Android/Brata. To protect yourselves from this and similar threats, employ security software on your mobile devices and think twice before granting access to accessibility services to suspicious apps, even if they are downloaded from trusted sources like Google Play.
Figure 10. MITRE ATT&CK Mobile for BRATA
<h3>Indicators of compromise
Apps:
| SHA256 | Package Name | Installs |
| 4cdbd105ab8117620731630f8f89eb2e6110dbf6341df43712a0ec9837c5a9be | com.outprotect.android | 1,000+ |
| d9bc87ab45b0c786aa09f964a8101f6df7ea76895e2e8438c13935a356d9116b | com.privacytitan.android | 1,000+ |
| f9dc40a7dd2a875344721834e7d80bf7dbfa1bf08f29b7209deb0decad77e992 | com.greatvault.mobile | 10,000+ |
| e00240f62ec68488ef9dfde705258b025c613a41760138b5d9bdb2fb59db4d5e | com.pw.secureshield | 5,000+ |
| 2846c9dda06a052049d89b1586cff21f44d1d28f153a2ff4726051ac27ca3ba7 | com.defensescreen.application | 10,000+ |
URLs:
This paper will analyze five different “Brazilian Remote Access Tool Android” (BRATA) apps found in Google Play during 2020.
The post BRATA Keeps Sneaking into Google Play, Now Targeting USA and Spain appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
The McAfee Advanced Threat Research team today published the McAfee Labs Threats Report: April 2021.
In this edition, we present new findings in our traditional threat statistical categories – as well as our usual malware, sectors, and vectors – imparted in a new, enhanced digital presentation that’s more easily consumed and interpreted.
Historically, our reports detailed the volume of key threats, such as “what is in the malware zoo.” The introduction of MVISION Insights in 2020 has since made it possible to track the prevalence of campaigns, as well as, their associated IoCs, and determine the in-field detections. This latest report incorporates not only the malware zoo but new analysis for what is being detected in the wild.
The Q3 and Q4 2020 findings include:
Additional Q3 and Q4 2020 content includes:
These new, insightful additions really make for a bumper report! We hope you find this new McAfee Labs threat report presentation and data valuable.
Don’t forget keep track of the latest campaigns and continuing threat coverage by visiting our McAfee COVID-19 Threats Dashboard and the MVISION Insights preview dashboard.
The post McAfee Labs Report Reveals Latest COVID-19 Threats and Malware Surges appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
In a year where people relied on their digital lives more than ever before and a dramatic uptick in attacks quickly followed, McAfee’s protection stood strong.
We’re proud to announce several awards from independent third-party labs, which recognized our products, protection, and the people behind them over the course of last year.
The Cybersecurity Excellence Awards is an annual competition honoring individuals and companies that demonstrate excellence, innovation, and leadership in information security. We were honored with four awards:
Further recognition came by way of three independent labs known for their testing and evaluation of security products. Once more, this garnered several honors:
As the threat landscape continues to evolve, our products do as well. We’re continually updating them with new features and enhancements, which our subscribers receive as part of automatic product updates. So, if you bought your product one or two years ago, know that you’re still getting the latest award-winning protection with your subscription.
We’d like to acknowledge your part in these awards as well. None of this is possible without the trust you place in us and our products. With the changes in our work, lifestyles, and learning that beset millions of us this past year, your protection and your feeling of security remain our top priority.
With that, as always, thank you for selecting us.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post McAfee Awarded “Cybersecurity Excellence Awards” appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
After experiencing a health scare that changed his life, VP of Technology Services, Paul, vowed to make incremental changes by incorporating four important health pledges into his daily routine.
Hear Paul’s life-changing story, how his diagnosis impacted his outlook on prioritizing his physical and mental health, and how he describes McAfee’s role in empowering him and others to follow their own wellness goals.
“To the leadership team and colleagues around me, thank you for giving me the time, space and flexibility to recover. The fact that we can 100% check out and focus on our wellbeing is paramount. At McAfee, that’s in our culture and our spirit.”
Here are Paul’s recommendations of four daily practices that every person can incorporate daily into their busy schedules.
Get up and Walk
Plan for virtual 1:1 walking meetings with your team, it allows you to stay active even on the busiest days.
Hydrate
Keep a cannister of ice, cold water at your desk so that you can stay hydrated throughout the workday.
Takes Breaks
Take mental breaks and intentionally unplug. Spend time away from your electronic devices by avoiding emails or going on chat.
Stand Up
It can be easy to sit at your desk all day. This doesn’t benefit your health. Instead, stand up and find ways to move.
At McAfee, we believe that your mental and physical wellbeing is a top priority. That’s why we encourage team members to take the time they need to reset, recharge, and care for their health. Between our paid holidays, unlimited vacation policy in the U.S., and leave policy, we enable our team to balance work with life’s responsibilities. We know that the key to living our best lives at and away from the office starts with focusing on wellbeing.
Want to work for a company that encourages team members to prioritize their health and wellbeing? Check out McAfee’s Latest Career Opportunities. Subscribe to Job Alerts.
Stay Connected
For more stories like this, follow @LifeAtMcAfee on Instagram and @McAfee on Twitter to see what working at McAfee is all about.
Search Career Opportunities with McAfee
Interested in joining our team? We’re hiring! Apply now.
The post McAfee VP Shares His Four Pledges for a Healthier Lifestyle appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
A new wave of fraudulent apps has made its way to the Google Play store, targeting Android users in Southwest Asia and the Arabian Peninsula as well—to the tune of more than 700,000 downloads before detection by McAfee Mobile Research and co-operation with Google to remove the apps.
Figure 1. Infected Apps on Google Play
Posing as photo editors, wallpapers, puzzles, keyboard skins, and other camera-related apps, the malware embedded in these fraudulent apps hijack SMS message notifications and then make unauthorized purchases. While apps go through a review process to ensure that they are legitimate, these fraudulent apps made their way into the store by submitting a clean version of the app for review and then introducing the malicious code via updates to the app later.
Figure 2. Negative reviews on Google Play
McAfee Mobile Security detects this threat as Android/Etinu and alerts mobile users if they are present. The McAfee Mobile Research team continues to monitor this threat and is likewise continuing its co-operation with Google to remove these and other malicious applications on Google Play.
In terms of details, the malware embedded in these apps takes advantage of dynamic code loading. Encrypted payloads of malware appear in the assets folder associated with the app, using names such as “cache.bin,” “settings.bin,” “data.droid,” or seemingly innocuous “.png” files, as illustrated below.
Figure 3. Encrypted resource sneaked into the assets folder
Figure 4. Decryption flow
The figure above shows the decryption flow. Firstly, the hidden malicious code in the main .apk opens “1.png” file in the assets folder, decrypts it to “loader.dex,” and then loads the dropped .dex. The “1.png” is encrypted using RC4 with the package name as the key. The first payload creates HTTP POST request to the C2 server.
Interestingly, this malware uses key management servers. It requests keys from the servers for the AES encrypted second payload, “2.png”. And the server returns the key as the “s” value of JSON. Also, this malware has self-update function. When the server responds “URL” value, the content in the URL is used instead of “2.png”. However, servers do not always respond to the request or return the secret key.
Figure 5. Updated payload response
As always, the most malicious functions reveal themselves in the final stage. The malware hijacks the Notification Listener to steal incoming SMS messages like Android Joker malware does, without the SMS read permission. Like a chain system, the malware then passes the notification object to the final stage. When the notification has arisen from the default SMS package, the message is finally sent out using WebView JavaScript Interface.
Figure 6. Notification delivery flow
As a result of our additional investigation on C2 servers, following information was found, including carrier, phone number, SMS message, IP address, country, network status, and so forth—along with auto-renewing subscriptions:
Figure 7. Leaked data
We expect that threats which take advantage of Notification Listener will continue to flourish. The McAfee Mobile Research team continues to monitor these threats and protect customers by analyzing potential malware and working with app stores to remove it. Further, using McAfee Mobile Security can detect such threats and protect you from them via its regular updates. However, it’s important to pay attention to apps that request SMS-related permissions and Notification Listener permissions. Simply put, legitimate photo and wallpaper apps simply won’t ask for those because they’re not necessary for such apps to run. If a request seems suspicious, don’t allow it.
MITRE ATT&CK Matrix
| 08C4F705D5A7C9DC7C05EDEE3FCAD12F345A6EE6832D54B758E57394292BA651 | com.studio.keypaper2021 |
| CC2DEFEF5A14F9B4B9F27CC9F5BBB0D2FC8A729A2F4EBA20010E81A362D5560C | com.pip.editor.camera |
| 007587C4A84D18592BF4EF7AD828D5AAA7D50CADBBF8B0892590DB48CCA7487E | org.my.favorites.up.keypaper |
| 08FA33BC138FE4835C15E45D1C1D5A81094E156EEF28D02EA8910D5F8E44D4B8 | com.super.color.hairdryer |
| 9E688A36F02DD1B1A9AE4A5C94C1335B14D1B0B1C8901EC8C986B4390E95E760 | com.ce1ab3.app.photo.editor |
| 018B705E8577F065AC6F0EDE5A8A1622820B6AEAC77D0284852CEAECF8D8460C | com.hit.camera.pip |
| 0E2ACCFA47B782B062CC324704C1F999796F5045D9753423CF7238FE4CABBFA8 | com.daynight.keyboard.wallpaper |
| 50D498755486D3739BE5D2292A51C7C3D0ADA6D1A37C89B669A601A324794B06 | com.super.star.ringtones |
d37i64jgpubcy4.cloudfront.net
d1ag96m0hzoks5.cloudfront.net
dospxvsfnk8s8.cloudfront.net
d45wejayb5ly8.cloudfront.net
d3u41fvcv6mjph.cloudfront.net
d3puvb2n8wcn2r.cloudfront.net
d8fkjd2z9mouq.cloudfront.net
d22g8hm4svq46j.cloudfront.net
d3i3wvt6f8lwyr.cloudfront.net
d1w5drh895wnkz.cloudfront.net
The post Clever Billing Fraud Applications on Google Play: Etinu appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Many malware attacks designed to inflict damage on a network are armed with lateral movement capabilities. Post initial infection, such malware would usually need to perform a higher privileged task or execute a privileged command on the compromised system to be able to further enumerate the infection targets and compromise more systems on the network. Consequently, at some point during its lateral movement activities, it would need to escalate its privileges using one or the other privilege escalation techniques. Once malware or an attacker successfully escalates its privileges on the compromised system, it will acquire the ability to perform stealthier lateral movement, usually executing its tasks under the context of a privileged user, as well as bypassing mitigations like User Account Control.
Process access token manipulation is one such privilege escalation technique which is widely adopted by malware authors. These set of techniques include process access token theft and impersonation, which eventually allows malware to advance its lateral movement activities across the network in the context of another logged in user or higher privileged user.
When a user authenticates to Windows via console (interactive logon), a logon session is created, and an access token is granted to the user. Windows manages the identity, security, or access rights of the user on the system with this access token, essentially determining what system resources they can access and what tasks can be performed. An access token for a user is primarily a kernel object and an identification of that user in the system, which also contains many other details like groups, access rights, integrity level of the process, privileges, etc. Fundamentally, a user’s logon session has an access token which also references their credentials to be used for Windows single sign on (SSO) authentication to access the local or remote network resources.
Once the attacker gains an initial foothold on the target by compromising the initial system, they would want to move around the network laterally to access more resource or critical assets. One of the ways for an attacker to achieve this is to use the identity or credentials of already logged-on users on the compromised machine to pivot to other systems or escalate their privileges and perform the lateral movement in the context of another logged on higher privileged user. Process access token manipulation helps the attackers to precisely accomplish this goal.
For our YARA rule, MITRE ATT&CK techniques and to learn more about the technical details of token manipulation attacks and how malware executes these attacks successfully at the code level, read our complete technical analysis here.
McAfee On-Access-Scan has a generic detection for this nature of malware as shown in the below screenshot:
Additionally, the YARA rule mentioned at the end of the technical analysis document can also be used to detect the token manipulation attacks by importing the rule in the Threat detection solutions like McAfee Advance Threat Defence, this behaviour can be detected.
Several types of malware and advanced persistent threats abuse process tokens to gain elevated privileges on the system. Malware can take multiple routes to achieve this goal. However, in all these routes, it would abuse the Windows APIs to execute the token stealing or token impersonation to gain elevated privileges and advance its lateral movement activities.
Access Token Theft and Manipulation Attacks – A Door to Local Privilege Escalation.
The post Access Token Theft and Manipulation Attacks – A Door to Local Privilege Escalation appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
McAfee is tracking an increase in the use of deceptive popups that mislead some users into taking action, while annoying many others. A significant portion is attributed to browser-based push notifications, and while there are a couple of simple steps users can take to prevent and remediate the situation, there is also some confusion about how these should be handled.
In many cases scammers use deception to trick users into Allowing push notifications to be delivered to their system.
In other cases, there is no deception involved. Users willingly opt-in uncoerced.
After Allowing notifications, messages quickly start being received. Some sites send notifications as often as every minute.
Many messages are deceptive in nature. Consider this fake alert example. Clicking the message leads to an imposter Windows Defender alert website, complete with MP3 audio and a phone number to call.
In several other examples, social engineering is crafted around the McAfee name and logo. Clicking on the messages lead to various websites informing the user their subscription has expired, that McAfee has detected threats on their system, or providing direct links to purchase a McAfee subscription. Note that “Remove Ads” and similar notification buttons typically lead to the publishers chosen destination rather than anything that would help the user in disabling the popups. Also note that many of the destination sites themselves prompt the user to Allow more notifications. This can have a cascading effect where the user is soon flooded with many messages on a regular basis.
First, it’s important to understand that the representative images provided here are not indications of a virus infection. It is not necessary to update or purchase software to resolve the matter. There is a simple fix:
1. Note the name of the site sending the notification in the popup itself. It’s located next to the browser name, for example:
Example popup with a link to a Popup remover
2. Go to your browser settings’ notification section
3. Search for the site name and click the 3 dotes next to the entry.
Chrome’s notification settings
4. Select Block
The simplest way is to carefully read such authorization prompts and only click Allow on sites that you trust. Alternatively, you can disable notification prompts altogether.
As the saying goes, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
While there are thousands of various messages and sites sending them, and messages evolve over time, these are the most common seen in April 2021:
|Click here to review your PC protection|Reminder From McAfee|Click here to review your PC protection|Download your free Windows protection now.|Bestes Antivirus–Kostenlos herunterladen
Your Mcafee has Expired |Renew now to stay protected for your PC!
Activate McAfee Antivirus Your Mcafee has Expired | Renew Norton Antivirus!The post How to Stop the Popups appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
World Password Day isn’t the most popular day on the calendar, but it’s an important reminder that good password hygiene is essential to staying safe online. This World Password Day, we’d like to talk about improving your password hygiene, how you can help your friends and family improve theirs, and what the future of authentication holds.
The SolarWinds hack in 2020 is one of the most devastating hacks in the history of the internet. Close to 20,000 company’s systems were compromised, losing billions of pieces of data in the process. If you’re one of the 37% of Americans that go long periods of time without updating passwords*, large-scale attacks like SolarWinds can be devastating. By stealing so many login credentials simultaneously, attackers can potentially access exponentially more accounts by reusing leaked credentials on different sites. Unfortunately this is not an isolated event, data breaches from websites and services we frequently use continue to happen through 2021 as well.
According to a recent survey we conducted, 34% of Americans have reused the same, or similar, password more than once. By using the same password for multiple accounts, attackers only need to find one password, creating a domino effect that makes it easier to access more accounts. If that password is weak, it becomes even easier to tip over that first domino.
Our guidance is to create strong, hard-to-guess passwords to protect your accounts. We recommend creating a unique password for every online account, using more than 16 characters, with upper and lower case letters, some numbers, and special symbols, to make a stronger than average password. How are you supposed to remember all of those strong passwords, though?
Well, password managers, especially those included in comprehensive security suites like McAfee® Total Protection, do much of the heavy lifting for you. For instance, McAfee’s integrated password manager not only helps you create stronger passwords and store them, but will also autofill your credentials and log you into websites as well. These convenient features extend beyond just your computer and can be used on other devices like your phone and tablet. Best of all, password managers that are an integrated part of a security suite can be monitored, so you’ll be alerted if your passwords get exposed in a data breach.
You’ve already taken a step towards improving your password hygiene by reading this blog post. But the next step is, have an honest look at your passwords. Do you write them down, use the same for many accounts, or use weak ones? Then it may be time for a change to better protect your accounts and the personal info in those accounts.
If you’re like a certain member of my family—that will remain nameless, Mom—who kept their passwords written down in a notepad, making the change to a password manager (McAfee’s, naturally) was a life-changing moment. Not only did it help her see just how often she was using the same login credentials, she now has an easy way to store, auto-fill, and even generate strong passwords across all her accounts and devices. An intended bonus was that she also realized how many accounts she was no longer using!
Now that you know more about what makes a strong password and how to protect them, let’s talk about why strong passwords are just the start of keeping your accounts safe. You’re probably already using Two-Factor Authentication for apps and services, but you may not have heard the term before. Two-Factor Authentication, or 2FA, is the second layer of protection to authenticate or prove you are the owner of this account. If you’ve received a text message or an email to confirm a new account signup, that’s a type of 2FA.
Text messages and email aren’t the only types of 2FA. There are USB keys, apps, and even systems built-in to your phone, like facial recognition to open phone apps, for example. Some popular 2FA options are USB keys and Google Authenticator.
The great thing about 2FA is that it helps make your strong passwords even more effective by stopping an attacker from using stolen credentials. If you fell victim to a phishing attack that looked like your bank’s website, the attacker would have your email and password combination. Without 2FA, they could log into your account and pretend they’re you. With 2FA in place, it becomes much harder for an attacker to access your account because they’re missing that last important piece of information.
Humans are almost always the weakest link when it comes to securing information. But by committing ourselves to better password practices, with help from the latest technology, we can make sure passwords are a strong link in our security chain; one that will only get stronger in the future.
For instance, using a device like a key-fob, new passwordless systems can authenticate a user without entering their login details. Not only does this make logging into your accounts lightning fast, you also never have to remember a complicated password again.
Biometric locks, like FaceID, are another example of passwordless entry. Using your face, or a fingerprint to authenticate yourself makes it much harder for attackers to break into your accounts.
We hope this Password Day post has helped answer some questions about password hygiene and how to take better care of your online accounts. Online security changes from day to day, so staying aware of new technologies and building safe new habits is essential. Perhaps one day this day will no longer need to exist on our calendars, as we look to a future where we might not need passwords at all. While we collectively make strikes towards this future, let’s celebrate this day while it lasts.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post World Password Day: Make Passwords the Strongest Link in Your Online Security appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Email is one of the primary ways of communication in the modern world. We use email to receive notifications about our online shopping, financial transaction, credit card e-statements, one-time passwords to authenticate registration processes, application for jobs, auditions, school admissions and many other purposes. Since many people around the globe depend on electronic mail to communicate, phishing emails are an attack method favored by cyber criminals.
In this type of attack, cyber criminals design emails to look convincing and send them to targeted people. The sender pretends to be someone the potential victim knows, someone who can be trusted, like a friend, or close contact, or the very bank where they save their income, or even the social media platform where they might have an account. As soon as they click on any malicious files or links embedded within these emails, they may land in a compromised situation.
In this write up, I will focus on things to look at while hunting threats in phishing emails.
Header analysis:
An email is divided into three parts: header, body, and attachment. The header part keeps the routing information of the email. It may contain other information like content type, from, to, delivery date, sender origin, mail server, and the actual email address used to send/receive the email.
Important headers
Return- Path:
The Return-path email address receives the delivery status information. To get undelivered emails, or any other bounced back messages, our emails’ server uses Return-Path. The recipient server uses this field to identify spoof emails. In this process, the recipient server retrieves all the permitted IPs related to the sender domain and matches with the sender IP. If it fails to provide any match, we can consider the email to be spam.
Received:
This field shows information related to all hops, through which the email was transferred. The last entry shows the initial address of the email sender.
Reply-To:
This field’s email address is used to receive the reply message. It can differ from the address in spoof emails.
Received-SPF:
SPF (Sender Policy Framework) helps to verify that messages appearing from a particular domain were sent from servers under control of the actual owner. If the value is Pass, then the email source is valid.
DKIM:
Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) signs the outgoing email with an encrypted signature inside the headers and the recipient email server decrypts it, using a shared public key to check whether the message was changed in transit.
X-Headers:
These headers are known as experimental or extension headers. They are usually added by the recipient mailbox providers. Fields like X-FOSE-Spam and X-Spam-Score are used to identify spam emails.
Consider the following email message:
Figure1: Raw email header information
Based on the above information the email is suspected to be spoofed. We should put the extracted email IDs in the block list.
The email bodies of phishing emails we usually receive mostly target our trust, by having something faithful and reliable in their content. It is so personalized and seemingly genuine, that victim’s often take the bait. Let us see the example below and understand what actions should be taken in such a scenario.
Figure2: Phishing email related to COVID-19
In the above email, the spammer pretends to be a medical insurance service provider and this mail is regarding a health-plan payment invoice for COVID-19 insurance the victim has supposedly purchased recently.
Figure2: Phishing email related to COVID-19 (continued)
Moreover, if we look closely at the bottom of the email, we can see the message, ‘This email has been scanned by McAfee’. This makes the email appear believable, as well as trustworthy.
Now, if we hover the mouse pointer over the |SEE DETAILS| button, one OneDrive link will pop up. Rather than clicking on the link, we must copy it for execution separately.
Figure3: Downloaded html file after clicking on the OneDrive link.
To execute the above OneDrive link separately (hxxps://1drv[.]ms/u/s!Ajmzc7fpBw5lrzwfPwIkoZRelG4D), it would be preferable to load it inside an isolated environment. If you do not have such an environment available yourself, you can use an online browser service like Browserling.
After loading the link in the browser, you will notice that it downloads an html attachment. Clicking on the html file takes us to another webpage (hxxps://selimyildiz[.]com.tr/wp-includes/fonts/greec/xls/xls/open/index.htm).
Figure4: Fake Office 365 login page
The content of the site is a lookalike of an online Microsoft Excel document where it is asking for Office 365 login details to download it. Before doing anything here we need to check a few more things.
Figure5: WordPress admin panel of selimyildiz[.]com.tr
To further validate whether the webpage is genuine or not, I have shortened the URL to its domain level to load it. The domain leads to a WordPress login page which does not belong to Microsoft, further arousing suspicion.
Figure 6: whois information of selimyildiz[.]com.tr
As per the whois information This domain has not been registered by Microsoft and it resolves to the public IP 2.56.152.159 which is also not owned by Microsoft. The information clearly indicates that it is not a genuine website.
Figure7: Attempting to login with random credentials to validate the authentication
Now to check the behavior, I came back to the login page, enter some random credentials, and try to download the invoice. As expected, I was faced with a login failed error. Here on we can assume there might be two probable reasons for the login failure. Firstly, to make the victim believe that it is a genuine login page or, secondly, to confirm whether the typed password is correct, as the victim may have made a typing error.
Figure8: Fake invoice to lure the victim
Now that we know this is fake, what is next? To validate the authentication check I entered random credentials again and bingo! This time it redirects to a pdf invoice, which looks genuine by showing it belongs to some medical company. However, the sad part is if the victim falls under this trap then, by the time they realize that this is a fake invoice, their login credentials will be phished.
In email, users commonly share two types of documents as an attachment, Microsoft office documents or PDF files. These are often used in document-based malware campaigns. To exploit the targeted systems, attackers usually infect these documents using VBA or JavaScript and distribute them via (phishing) emails.
In the first section of this part, we will analyze a malicious Word document. This type of document contains malicious Visual Basic Application (VBA) code, known as macros. Sometimes, a macro triggers the moment a document is opened, but from Microsoft Office 2007 onwards, a macro cannot execute itself until and unless the user enables the macro content. To deal with such showstoppers, attackers utilize various social engineering methods, where the primary goal is to build trust with the victim so that they click on the ‘Enable Editing’ button without any second thought.
File Name: PR_Report.bin
Hash: e992ffe746b40d97baf56098e2110ff3978f8229ca333e87e24d1539cea7415c
Tools:
Step 1: Getting started with File properties
It is always good practice to get familiar with the properties before starting any file analysis. We can get the details using the ‘file’ command in Linux.
Step 2: Apply Yara rules
Yara is a tool to identify and classify malware. This tool is used to conduct signature-based detection against any file. Let us check a couple of premade Yara rules from Didier Stevens Suites.
Step 3: Dump the document contents using oledump.py
As we know, an OLE file contains streams of data. Oledump.py will help us to analyze those streams further to extract macros or objects out of it.
You may notice in the above figure that we can see two letters ‘M‘ and ‘O’ in stream 8, 9 and 15, respectively. Here ‘M’ indicates the stream might contain macro code and ‘O’ indicates an object.
Step 4: Extract the VB script in macros
Shell cmd.exe /c ping localhost -n 100 && start Environ(“Temp”) & “\6C.pif”, vbHide
Step 5: Extract file from the ole object.
It is clear that the document has an embedded file which can be extracted using the oleobj tool.
Step 6: Getting the static information from the extracted file.
Step 7: Behavior analysis
Setup a Windows 7 32-bit VM, change the file extension to ‘.exe’ and simply run Apate DNS and Windows Network Monitoring tool before execution.
Figure9: Command and Control domain’s DNS queries captured in Apate DNS
Figure10: Captured network traffic of 5C.exe while trying to communicate with the C2
Figure11: Registry changes captured in Process Monitor
We can summarize it as the Word document first ran a VBA macro, dropped and ran an embedded executable, created a new process, communicated with the C2 servers and made unauthorized Registry changes. This is enough information to consider the document as malicious. From this point, if we want, we can do more detailed analysis like debugging the executable or analyzing the process dump to learn more about the file behavior.
A PDF document can be defined as a collection of objects that describes how the pages should be displayed inside the file.
Usually, an attack vector uses email or other social engineering skills to lure the user to click or open the pdf document. The moment a user opens the pdf file it typically executes JavaScript in the background that may exploit the existing vulnerability that persist with the Adobe pdf reader or drop an executable as a payload that might perform the rest of the objectives.
A pdf file has four components. They are header, body, reference, and trailer.
File name: Report.pdf
Sha256: a7b423202d5879d1f9e47ae85ce255e3758c5c1e5b19fcd56691dab288a47b4c
Tools –
Step 1: Scan the pdf document with PDFiD
PDFiD is a part of the Didier Stevens Suite. It scans the pdf document with a list of strings, which helps you to identify the information like JavaScript, Embedded files, actions while opening the documents and the count of the occurrences of some specific strings inside the pdf file.
Step 2: Looking inside the Objects
We have now discovered that there is JavaScript present inside the pdf file so let us start from there. We will run pdf-parser.py to search the JavaScript indirect object.
Step 3: Extract the embedded file using peepdf.
Peepdf is a tool built in Python, which provides all the necessary components in one place that are required during PDF analysis.
Syntax: peepdf –i file_name.pdf
The syntax (-i) means enabling interaction mode.
To learn more, just type help with the topic and explore the options it displays.
Step 4: Behavior analysis
Now set up a windows 7 32-bit virtual machine and execute the file.
Figure12: Process Explorer displays processes created by virus.exe
Figure13: Process Monitor captured the system changes made by virus.exe
The results in Process Monitor show the file was dropped as zedeogm.exe. Later it modified the Windows firewall rule. Then it executed WinMail.exe, following which it started cmd.exe to execute ‘tmpd849fc4d.bat’ and exited the process.
At this point, we have collected enough evidence to treat the pdf file as malicious. We can also perform additional precautionary steps like binary debugging and memory forensics on the extracted IOCs to hunt for further threats
In this write-up, we have understood the purpose of email threat hunting, how it will help to take preventive actions against un-known threats. We have discovered the areas we should investigate for hunting threats. We learned how a malicious URL can be hidden inside an email body and its analysis to further see if it is malicious or not.
To stay protected:
The post Steps to Discover Hidden Threat from Phishing Email appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
The Roaming Mantis smishing campaign has been impersonating a logistics company to steal SMS messages and contact lists from Asian Android users since 2018. In the second half of 2020, the campaign improved its effectiveness by adopting dynamic DNS services and spreading messages with phishing URLs that infected victims with the fake Chrome application MoqHao.
Since January 2021, however, the McAfee Mobile Research team has established that Roaming Mantis has been targeting Japanese users with a new malware called SmsSpy. The malicious code infects Android users using one of two variants depending on the version of OS used by the targeted devices. This ability to download malicious payloads based on OS versions enables the attackers to successfully infect a much broader potential landscape of Android devices.
The phishing SMS message used is similar to that of recent campaigns, yet the phishing URL contains the term “post” in its composition.
|
Japanese message: I brought back your luggage because you were absent. please confirm. hxxps://post[.]cioaq[.]com
|
Fig: Smishing message impersonating a notification from a logistics company. (Source: Twitter)
Another smishing message pretends to be a Bitcoin operator and then directs the victim to a phishing site where the user is asked to verify an unauthorized login.
|
Japanese message: There is a possibility of abnormal login to your [bitFlyer] account. Please verify at the following URL: hxxps://bitfiye[.]com
|
Fig: Smishing message impersonating a notification from a bitcoin operator. (Source: Twitter)
During our investigation, we observed the phishing website hxxps://bitfiye[.]com redirect to hxxps://post.hygvv[.]com. The redirected URL contains the word “post” as well and follows the same format as the first screenshot. In this way, the actors behind the attack attempt to expand the variation of the SMS phishing campaign by redirecting from a domain that resembles a target company and service.
Characteristic of the malware distribution platform, different malware is distributed depending on the Android OS version that accessed the phishing page. On Android OS 10 or later, the fake Google Play app will be downloaded. On Android 9 or earlier devices, the fake Chrome app will be downloaded.
|
|
Japanese message in the dialog: “Please update to the latest version of Chrome for better security.” |
Fig: Fake Chrome application for download (Android OS 9 or less)
|
|
Japanese message in the dialog: “[Important] Please update to the latest version of Google Play for better security!”
|
Fig: Fake Google Play app for download (Android OS 10 or above)
Because the malicious program code needs to be changed with each major Android OS upgrade, the malware author appears to cover more devices by distributing malware that detects the OS, rather than attempting to cover a smaller set with just one type of malware
The main purpose of this malware is to steal phone numbers and SMS messages from infected devices. After it runs, the malware pretends to be a Chrome or Google Play app that then requests the default messaging application to read the victim’s contacts and SMS messages. It pretends to be a security service by Google Play on the latest Android device. Additionally, it can also masquerade as a security service on the latest Android devices. Examples of both are seen below.
|
|
Japanese message: “At first startup, a dialog requesting permissions is displayed. If you do not accept it, the app may not be able to start, or its functions may be restricted.”
|
Fig: Default messaging app request by fake Chrome app
|
|
Japanese message: “Secure Internet Security. Your device is protected. Virus and Spyware protection, Anti-phishing protection and Spam mail protection are all checked.” |
Fig: Default messaging app request by fake Google Play app
After hiding its icon, the malware establishes a WebSocket connection for communication with the attacker’s command and control (C2) server in the background. The default destination address is embedded in the malware code. It further has link information to update the C2 server location in the event it is needed. Thus, if no default server is detected, or if no response is received from the default server, the C2 server location will be obtained from the update link.
The MoqHao family hides C2 server locations in the user profile page of a blog service, yet some samples of this new family use a Chinese online document service to hide C2 locations. Below is an example of new C2 server locations from an online document:
Fig: C2 server location described in online document
As part of the handshake process, the malware sends the Android OS version, phone number, device model, internet connection type (4G/Wi-Fi), and unique device ID on the infected device to the C2 server.
Then it listens for commands from the C2 server. The sample we analyzed supported the commands below with the intention of stealing phone numbers in Contacts and SMS messages.
| Command String | Description |
| 通讯录 | Send whole contact book to server |
| 收件箱 | Send all SMS messages to server |
| 拦截短信&open | Start <Delete SMS message> |
| 拦截短信&close | Stop <Delete SMS message> |
| 发短信& | Command data contains SMS message and destination number, send them via infected device |
Table: Remote commands via WebSocket
We believe that the ongoing smishing campaign targeting Asian countries is using different mobile malware such as MoqHao, SpyAgent, and FakeSpy. Based on our research, the new type of malware discovered this time uses a modified infrastructure and payloads. We believe that there could be several groups in the cyber criminals and each group is developing their attack infrastructures and malware separately. Or it could be the work of another group who took advantage of previously successful cyber-attacks.
McAfee Mobile Security detects this threat as Android/SmsSpy and alerts mobile users if it is present and further protects them from any data loss. For more information about McAfee Mobile Security, visit https://www.mcafeemobilesecurity.com.
Phishing Domains:
| Domain | Registration Date |
| post.jpostp.com | 2021-03-15 |
| manag.top | 2021-03-11 |
| post.niceng.top | 2021-03-08 |
| post.hygvv.com | 2021-03-04 |
| post.cepod.xyz | 2021-03-04 |
| post.jposc.com | 2021-02-08 |
| post.ckerr.site | 2021-02-06 |
| post.vioiff.com | 2021-02-05 |
| post.cioaq.com | 2021-02-04 |
| post.tpliv.com | 2021-02-03 |
| posk.vkiiu.com | 2021-02-01 |
| sagawae.kijjh.com | 2021-02-01 |
| post.viofrr.com | 2021-01-31 |
| posk.ficds.com | 2021-01-30 |
| sagawae.ceklf.com | 2021-01-30 |
| post.giioor.com | 2021-01-30 |
| post.rdkke.com | 2021-01-29 |
| post.japqn.com | 2021-01-29 |
| post.thocv.com | 2021-01-28 |
| post.xkdee.com | 2021-01-27 |
| post.sagvwa.com | 2021-01-25 |
| post.aiuebc.com | 2021-01-24 |
| post.postkp.com | 2021-01-23 |
| post.solomsn.com | 2021-01-22 |
| post.civrr.com | 2021-01-21 |
| post.jappnve.com | 2021-01-19 |
| sp.vvsscv.com | 2021-01-16 |
| ps.vjiir.com | 2021-01-15 |
| post.jpaeo.com | 2021-01-12 |
| t.aeomt.com | 2021-01-2 |
| Hash | Package name | Fake Application |
| EA30098FF2DD1D097093CE705D1E4324C8DF385E7B227C1A771882CABEE18362 | com.gmr.keep | Chrome |
| 29FCD54D592A67621C558A115705AD81DAFBD7B022631F25C3BAAE954DB4464B | com.gmr.keep | Google Play |
| 9BEAD1455BFA9AC0E2F9ECD7EDEBFDC82A4004FCED0D338E38F094C3CE39BCBA | com.mr.keep | Google Play |
| D33AB5EC095ED76EE984D065977893FDBCC12E9D9262FA0E5BC868BAD73ED060 | com.mrc.keep | Chrome |
| 8F8C29CC4AED04CA6AB21C3C44CCA190A6023CE3273EDB566E915FE703F9E18E | com.hhz.keeping | Chrome |
| 21B958E800DB511D2A0997C4C94E6F0113FC4A8C383C73617ABCF1F76B81E2FD | com.hhz.keeping | Google Play |
| 7728EF0D45A337427578AAB4C205386CE8EE5A604141669652169BA2FBA23B30 | com.hz.keep3 | Chrome |
| 056A2341C0051ACBF4315EC5A6EEDD1E4EAB90039A6C336CC7E8646C9873B91A | com.hz.keep3 | Google Play |
| 054FA5F5AD43B6D6966CDBF4F2547EDC364DDD3D062CD029242554240A139FDB | com.hz.keep2 | Google Play |
| DD40BC920484A9AD1EEBE52FB7CD09148AA6C1E7DBC3EB55F278763BAF308B5C | com.hz.keep2 | Chrome |
| FC0AAE153726B7E0A401BD07C91B949E8480BAA0E0CD607439ED01ABA1F4EC1A | com.hz.keep1 | Google Play |
| 711D7FA96DFFBAEECEF12E75CE671C86103B536004997572ECC71C1AEB73DEF6 | com.hz.keep1 | Chrome |
| FE916D1B94F89EC308A2D58B50C304F7E242D3A3BCD2D7CCC704F300F218295F | com.hz.keep1 | Google Play |
| 3AA764651236DFBBADB28516E1DCB5011B1D51992CB248A9BF9487B72B920D4C | com.hz.keep1 | Chrome |
| F1456B50A236E8E42CA99A41C1C87C8ED4CC27EB79374FF530BAE91565970995 | com.hz.keep | Google Play |
| 77390D07D16E6C9D179C806C83D2C196A992A9A619A773C4D49E1F1557824E00 | com.hz.keep | Chrome |
| 49634208F5FB8BCFC541DA923EBC73D7670C74C525A93B147E28D535F4A07BF8 | com.hz.keep | Chrome |
| B5C45054109152F9FE76BEE6CBBF4D8931AE79079E7246AA2141F37A6A81CBA3 | com.hz.keep | Google Play |
| 85E5DBEA695A28C3BA99DA628116157D53564EF9CE14F57477B5E3095EED5726 | com.hz.keep | Chrome |
| 53A5DD64A639BF42E174E348FEA4517282C384DD6F840EE7DC8F655B4601D245 | com.hz.keep | Google Play |
| 80B44D23B70BA3D0333E904B7DDDF7E19007EFEB98E3B158BBC33CDA6E55B7CB | com.hz.keep | Chrome |
| 797CEDF6E0C5BC1C02B4F03E109449B320830F5ECE0AA6D194AD69E0FE6F3E96 | com.hz.keep | Chrome |
| 691687CB16A64760227DCF6AECFE0477D5D983B638AFF2718F7E3A927EE2A82C | com.hz.keep | Google Play |
| C88C3682337F7380F59DBEE5A0ED3FA7D5779DFEA04903AAB835C959DA3DCD47 | com.hz.keep | Google Play |
The post Roaming Mantis Amplifies Smishing Campaign with OS-Specific Android Malware appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Social media is a great place to connect with friends and family. Unfortunately, it is also a great place for misinformation to run rampant, and it is a virtual treasure chest for cybercriminals to steal personal information. Over 25 million Canadians own a social media account, and more than 80% of the Canadian population is expected to be on social media by 2025.
Check out this roundup of common social media scams so you can network intelligently, spot misinformation, and stop its spread.
The classic saying of “Don’t believe everything you see on TV” applies neatly to “Don’t believe everything you read on social media.” There is a resurgence of false news reports circulating on social media surrounding COVID-19 and the vaccine. For example, 5G aiding the spread of the virus and the preventive properties of garlic are just two of the rumors about COVID-19.
Misinformation leads to chaos and is a major threat to public health. Before you reshare a post or article, it is great to take a few minutes to digest the message, determine if it is true, and ask yourself if friends and family would genuinely benefit if they heard the news it carries.
There are a few tell-tale signs of fake news posts. First, they often try to inspire extreme emotions, such as rage and indignation, to prompt people to share immediately. Next, fake news reports are frequently poorly written and vague about where they received their information. Always try to find the primary source for “facts.” In the case of COVID-19 news, all health tips should be sourced from a licensed medical professional.
If you are ever in doubt about the facts, especially when they deal with public health, do not share the post. Instead, leave the reporting to trained medical professionals. Consult the World Health Organization and the Public Health Agency of Canada or direct your network to #ScienceUpFirst for the latest and most accurate reports about COVID-19 and the vaccine.
There was a recent data leak at Facebook, and the contents of about half a billion accounts were posted on a hacking website, including 3.49 million Canadian accounts. Hackers can get a lot of mileage out of just one social media profile because it contains all the greatest hits of information needed to verify an identity.
Most profiles list your real full name, birthday, your relationship status, your hometown, and contact information. Also, hackers can skim a user’s posting history to find even more personal details. Many social media users have posted at one time or another a “get to know you” post, where they list many revealing facts. These posts are a pot of gold to cybercriminals. They are basically lists of possible answers to security questions: Where did you go to primary school? What was the model of your first car? What is the name of your favorite stuffed animal?
Another recent trend that can make you vulnerable in case of a data leak is posting COVID-19 vaccine cards. Social media users are excited to share the big milestone of getting their first shot. What they might not realize is that vaccine cards contain vital personal information that could be used by malicious actors. There are alternative ways to share the happy news. Instead, post a picture of the fun bandage the nurse put on your arm or take a selfie outside of the vaccination center.
It is a shame that what you share on social media can be turned against you by cybercriminals, but that does not mean you have to stop sharing details about your life. Instead of posting personal details online that could be used maliciously in the event of a data leak, think about creating an exclusive email newsletter or secure group chat for your closest friends and family.
There is a major thrill when you think you have won something; however, if you receive a notification on social media that you have won a contest, reserve your excitement until you have confirmed its legitimacy. Be especially wary if you do not remember entering a contest.
Contest scams are a type of social engineering tactic used by cybercriminals. Social engineering relies on people’s tendency to trust others. Cybercriminals often capitalize upon extreme emotions, like fear, urgency, and in this case excitement, to trick unsuspecting people into hastily giving up sensitive information.
Phishing is also common in contest scams. Social media users may receive a message that they have won a giveaway and to click on a link to claim their prize. Luckily, easy-to-spot signs of a phishing message include poor grammar, misspellings, and a sense of urgency. Always approach these types of messages with caution. Instead of clicking on any of the links, hover your cursor over them to see where they redirect. If the redirect site URL is suspicious and contains misspellings, steer clear.
If you ever receive a notification on social media that you have won a prize, remain skeptical until you have verified the authenticity. Locate the organization’s official social media page (which you can likely find on their website), and direct message them for more details.
With all of these common scams floating about and waiting to strike, check out these tips to network safely.
The joy of social media is sharing your everyday life with your friends and family. It is fun to have dozens of people wish you a happy birthday on your profile, but consider removing the year of your birthday. Also, consider removing your phone number, home address, and email address from your profile. If a friend or family member wants to get in touch with you, they can personally direct message you. Cybercriminals can take your contact information and full birthday and use it to steal your identity, so it is best not to post it online.
While you may want to share the latest news with your networks, do not share information that you are not sure is true. According to Statistics Canada, only half of Canadians investigated the accuracy of COVID-19 social media posts before they reshared. Do your due diligence and be a part of the solution, not part of the problem.
Even if you are a diligent and intelligent social media user, there is a chance that you could accidentally click on a phishing link. In case this happens, you should have a backup plan to safeguard your devices and your personal information from viruses and malware. Protect your devices with a comprehensive antivirus program, such as McAfee Total Protection. You can rest assured that if you or a member of your family accidentally opens a malicious link, your devices will be safe.
The post Beware of Social Media Scams appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
When gyms were forced to close last year, you likely looked for other ways to get some exercise and stay active during quarantine. From investing in a few pairs of dumbbells or perhaps downloading an app or two to help you track your workouts, you found alternatives to help you break a sweat. As an accessible, easy way to release endorphins, running quickly grew in popularity along with the platforms that help runners stay accountable. According to Runner’s World, there was a 34% uptick in outdoor miles logged by common fitness apps between March and September 2020 compared to the same stretch in 2019. But are these tools potentially endangering your privacy?
According to TechCrunch, running apps could potentially threaten your security if the data they collect ends up in the wrong hands. Let’s explore the functionalities of these apps and how they could pose a threat to your online safety.
Running apps are solid companions for advanced and amateur runners alike, allowing you to track the length of your run and set a pace for yourself. These apps learn a lot about you the more you use them by gathering health data like your height and weight and even your location. But similar to the threats that exist when you overshare on other online platforms, this data could pose a serious threat to your privacy. For example, location data could identify where you live or where you work – information that you definitely wouldn’t want in the hands of a stranger. If a cybercriminal is able to hack into your account, they could exploit this information to commit identity theft or craft a phishing email disguised as your employer.
Additionally, many of these apps lack basic security measures to prevent hackers from breaking into accounts or from health and fitness data from spilling out. For example, many popular running apps allow the most basic passwords like “qwerty” and “password.” Oftentimes, hackers automate their attacks by targeting accounts with easy-to-crack passwords like the ones mentioned. This allows them to exploit the most accounts with as little effort as possible. Furthermore, these apps do not have the option to set up two-factor authentication, which creates an additional barrier to prevent hackers from exploiting reused passwords.
No matter where you are in your fitness journey, it is essential to take the necessary precautions to minimize the risks of the platforms you use to hold yourself accountable – running apps included. If you are looking to hit your stride while keeping security and privacy top of mind, follow these tips:
Your password is your first line of defense, so it is important that you use one that is strong and unique to your other account credentials. If a hacker does manage to guess your password for one of your online accounts, it is likely they will check for repeat credentials across multiple sites. By using different passwords or passphrases, you can feel slightly more at ease knowing that the majority of your data is secure if one of your accounts becomes vulnerable.
You can also use a password manager to help you create strong passwords, remove the hassle of remembering numerous passwords, and log on to websites automatically.
Some running apps are configured to publicly share user data by default. After you download an app, spend some time researching how to change these settings so your data is not shared with strangers without your permission.
If your running app of choice does undergo any security updates, make sure that they are installed as soon as possible. Developers actively work to identify and address security issues. Frequently update your operating systems and apps so that they have the latest fixes and security protections. The easiest way to do this is to enable automatic software updates on your mobile device.
Next time you go for a run with your location services on, think again about what risks this poses to your virtual security and your physical safety. Enhance your security by only enabling the features that are necessary to optimize your fitness performance. This will help prevent hackers from using your location as a vehicle to invade your privacy.
Since the data collected on running apps involves sensitive health and location information, it is worth reviewing the privacy policies for all of the fitness platforms you regularly use to see how your data might be affected. To ensure that you can keep moving toward your fitness goals while protecting your online safety, stay educated on the tools you use to track your progress and implement the necessary security measure to do so with security in mind.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our email, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post How to Remain Secure While Using Running Apps appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
This year’s RSA Conference will look a little different. Instead of booking flights and hotel rooms in the busy city of San Francisco, we’ll be powering up computers in our home office with family in the next room. We’ve all had a tumultuous year and with that comes resilience, which is also this year’s conference theme.
Ahead of the RSA virtual conference, I spoke with a few of my colleagues about the major themes we should expect to see at RSA this year.
Scott Howitt, Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer – The COVID lockdown has exposed to enterprises that the ability to recover your business (Business Continuity) is important in the face of disaster, but Business Resilience means that your business will be able to adapt to Black Swan events. I’ve seen technology be the catalyst for resilience for most organizations.
Raj Samani, Chief Scientist and McAfee Fellow – For me, it would be ability to continue operations in light of disruption. Whether that disruption originated from digital factors, or indeed physical but to keep the wheels turning.
John Fokker, Principal Engineer and Head of Cyber Investigations for McAfee ATR – Just like Boxing: Isn’t as much about not being hit, because you are in the ring and punches are thrown, but resilience to me is more about how fast you can get back up on your feet once you do get hit. The same is true with security operations, attackers are going to try to hit you, but how good is your defense so you can minimize the impact of the attack and in the case you do get knocked down what controls do you have in place that you can get back up and resume operations.
Amanda House, Data Scientist – Cybersecurity is a unique industry in that new cyberthreats are always improving to avoid detection. A machine learning model made a month ago could now have weakness an adversary has learned to exploit. Machine learning model practitioners need to be resilient in always innovating and improving on past models to outpace new threats. Resilience is constantly monitoring machine learning models so that when we notice decay we can quickly improve them to stop new cyberthreats.
Sherin Mathews, Senior Research Scientist – To me, cyber-resilience implies being able to protect critical assets, maintain operations, and, most importantly, embrace new technologies in the face of evolving threats. The cybersecurity field is an arms race scenario with the threat landscape changing so much. In case of threats like deepfakes, some deepfakes will reach ultra-realism in the coming few years, many will still be more amateurish, and we need to keep advancing towards the best detection methods with newer forms of threats. I feel resiliency doesn’t mean you can survive or defend against all attacks, but it means that if you are compromised, you have a plan that lets us recover quickly after a breach and continue to function. Deepfakes and other offshoots of AI will require businesses to create a transparent, agile, and holistic detection approach to protect endpoints, data, apps, and cloud services.
Samani – I anticipate Zero Trust will play a prominent role, considering the year of remote working, and a myriad of significant threats being realised.
Fokker – Definitely Zero-Trust but also combatting threats that come with working from home, and threat intelligence so organization can better understand the actions of their adversaries even before they step into the ring.
Howitt – I am hoping to see how others have adapted to life with COVID and now that it is receding, what do they think life with look like after. As for my session, I want to highlight the importance of adaptability and stress that this paradigm shift means we will never go back to normal.
House – Cybersecurity is not a career path I ever imagined for myself. As a student I always enjoyed math and computer science and I naturally gravitated toward those topics. My love of both subjects led me to pursue data science and machine learning. My first job out of college was in the cybersecurity industry and that was my first introduction to this career. Since then, I have loved how cybersecurity requires constant innovation and creative ways of using AI to stop new threats.
Mathews – My background and Ph.D. focused on developing novel dictionary learning and deep learning algorithms for classification tasks related to remote health monitoring systems (e.g., activity recognition for wearable sensors and heartbeat classification). With a background in machine learning, deep learning with applications to computer vision areas, I entered the field of cybersecurity during my work at Intel Security/Mcafee in 2016. I contributed towards increasing the effectiveness of cybersecurity products by creating novel machine learning/deep learning models to detect advanced threats(e.g., ransomware & steganography). In my industry work experience, I also had a chance to develop leading-edge research such as eXplainable A.I. (XAI) and deepfakes. Overall, the advent of artificial intelligence can be considered a significant milestone as A.I. is steadily flooding several industries. However, A.I. platforms can also be misused if in the wrong hands, and as research professionals, we need to step up to detect attacks or mishaps before they happen. I feel deeply passionate about XAI, ethical A.I., the opportunity to combat deepfakes and digital misinformation, and topics related to ML and DL with cybersecurity applications. Overall, it is an excellent feeling as a researcher to use your knowledge to combat threats that affect humanity and safeguard humans. Also, I believe that newer A.I. research topics such as GANs, Reinforcement learning, and few-shot learning have a lot to offer to combat advanced cybersecurity threats.
House – I am fortunate to work with a lot of great women in technology at McAfee. Not only are these women on the cutting edge of innovation but they are also great mentors and leaders. We need more smart people pursuing jobs in this industry and in order to recruit new talent, especially young graduates, we need to mentor and encourage them to pursue this career. Every woman I have met in this industry wants to see new talent succeed and will go the extra mile to provide mentorship. I have also noticed women tend to have unique backgrounds in this industry. For example, some of the women I look up to have degrees in biomedical engineering or physics. These unique backgrounds allow these women to bring innovative ideas from outside cybersecurity to solve some of the toughest problems in the cybersecurity industry. We need more talent from diverse backgrounds to bring in fresh ideas.
McAfee is a proud platinum with keynote level sponsor of RSA Conference 2021. Take in the McAfee virtual booth and sessions presented by McAfee industry leaders Here are some of the best ways to catch McAfee at RSA. Can’t wait to see you there!
The post RSA Conference 2021: The Best Place to Strengthen Your Resilience appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
At McAfee, we believe no one person, product or organization can combat cybercrime alone. That is why we continue to build our device-to-cloud security platform on the premise of working together – together with customers, partners and even other cybersecurity vendors. We continue this fight against the greatest challenges of our digital age: cybercrime. As part of our ongoing effort to protect what matters, we have developed breakthrough technologies over the past several years that enable customers to proactively respond to emerging threats and adversaries despite a constantly evolving threat landscape. So, today, we are extremely proud to announce that McAfee is positioned as a “Leader” in the 2021 Gartner Magic Quadrant for Endpoint Protection Platforms (EPP).
This is a monumental development in so many ways, especially when you consider that we were not recognized in the Magic Quadrant a few years ago. This recognition speaks volumes about the innovations we are bringing to market that resonate both with our customers and industry experts. Let me review, from my perspective, why McAfee is recognized in the Leaders Quadrant.
Here are some key innovations in our Endpoint Protection Platform that contributed to our Leader recognition:
We set out with a vision, to create the most powerful endpoint protection platform and we are aggressively executing towards this vision. Over the past 12 months, we have made great strides in developing a market leading product, MVISION Insights, and our cloud delivered MVISION EDR. Looking ahead, our goal is to develop a unified and open eXtended Detection and Response (XDR) solution and strategy that further delivers on our device-to-cloud strategy.
We believe, McAfee’s position as a Leader further acknowledges some of our key differentiators, such as MVISION Insights, and our ability to eclipse the market with an innovative device-to-cloud strategy that spans the portfolio, including web gateway, cloud, and our network security offerings.
We started by redefining our endpoint security offering with the release of MVISION Insights, a game-changing product that functions as the equivalent of an early warning system – effectively delivering preventative security. It’s hard to understate the significance of this innovation; we’re breaking the old paradigm of post-attack detection and analysis and enabling customers to stay ahead of threats. In parallel, we streamlined our EDR capabilities, which now provide AI-driven, guided investigations that ease the burden on already-stretched Security Operations Centers (SOCs).
The bottom line is that we’re the only vendor taking a proactive risk management approach for safer cloud usage while reducing total cost of ownership. In addition, we have improved our licensing structure to fit customer needs and simplify consumption of our endpoint security solutions. We’ve made it easy to choose from a simplified licensing structure allowing customers to buy subscriptions for complete endpoint protection with no add-ons or extra costs. Our user-based licensing agreements provide for 5 devices, thus enabling frictionless expansion to incorporate additional device support in remote work environments.
In just under a year, our latest release of McAfee Endpoint Security (ENS) 10.7 has emerged as our highest deployed version of any McAfee product worldwide and our fastest-ever single-year ramp. More than 15,000 customers comprising tens of millions of nodes are now on ENS 10.7 and are deploying its advanced defenses against escalating threats. Customers get added protected because ENS 10.7 is backed by our Global Threat Intelligence (GTI) service to provide adaptable, defense in-depth capabilities against the techniques used in targeted attacks, such as ransomware or fileless threats. It’s also easier to use and upgrade. All of this means your SOC can be assured that customers are protected with ENS 10.7 on their devices.
Customer input guides our thinking about what to do next. Since the best critics are the people who use our products, let’s give them the last word here.
“We are now positioned to block usage of personal instances of Sanctioned services while allowing the business to move forward with numerous cloud initiatives, without getting in the way. We also now have the visibility that was lacking to ensure that we can allow our user community to work safely from their homes without introducing risks to our corporate environment.”
–Kenn Johnson, Cybersecurity Consultant
Our continued commitment to our customers is to protect what matters. We believe that McAfee’s position in the Leaders Quadrant validates that we are innovating at the pace and scale that meets the most stringent needs of our enterprise customers. We are proud of our product teams and threat researchers who continue to be driven by our singular mission, and who strive to stay ahead of adversaries with their focus on technological breakthroughs, and advancements in researching threats and vulnerabilities.
What we have accomplished over the past several years, and our position as a Leader in the 2021 Gartner Magic Quadrant for EPP, is only the tip of the iceberg for what’s ahead.
McAfee named a Leader in the 2021 Gartner Magic Quadrant for Endpoint Protection Platforms. Download the Magic Quadrant report, which evaluates the 19 vendors based on ability to execute and completeness of vision.
Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in its research publications, and does not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner research publications consist of the opinions of Gartner’s research organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this research, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
Gartner Magic Quadrant for Endpoint Protection Platforms, 5 May 2021 Paul Webber, Peter Firstbrook, Rob Smith , Mark Harris, Prateek Bhajanka
The post Gartner names McAfee a Leader in 2021 Magic Quadrant for Endpoint Protection Platforms appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Countries all over the world are racing to achieve so-called herd immunity against COVID-19 by vaccinating their populations. From the initial lockdown to the cancellation of events and the prohibition of business travel, to the reopening of restaurants, and relaxation of COVID restrictions on outdoor gatherings, the vaccine rollout has played a critical role in staving off another wave of infections and restoring some degree of normalcy. However, a new and troubling phenomenon is that consumers are buying COVID-19 vaccines on the black market due to the increased demand around the world. As a result, illegal COVID-19 vaccines and vaccination records are in high demand on darknet marketplaces.
The impact on society is that the proliferation of fraudulent test results and counterfeit COVID-19 vaccine records pose a serious threat to public health and spur the underground economy. Individuals undoubtedly long to return to their pre-pandemic routines and the freedom of travel and behavior denied them over the last year. However, the purchase of false COVID-19 test certifications or vaccination cards to board aircraft, attend an event or enter a country endangers themselves, even if they are asymptomatic. It also threatens the lives of other people in their own communities and around the world. Aside from the collective damage to global health, darknet marketplace transactions encourage the supply of illicit goods and services. The underground economy cycle continues as demand creates inventory, which in turn creates supply. In addition to selling COVID-19 vaccines, vaccination cards, and fake test results, cybercriminals can also benefit by reselling the names, dates of birth, home addresses, contact details, and other personally indefinable information of their customers.
As we commemorate the one-year anniversary of the COVID-19 pandemic, at least 184 countries and territories worldwide have started their vaccination rollouts.[1] The United States is vaccinating Americans at an unprecedented rate. As of May 2021, more than 105 million Americans had been fully vaccinated. The growing demand has made COVID-19 vaccines the new “liquid gold” in the pandemic era.
However, following vaccination success, COVID-19 related cybercrime has increased. COVID-19 vaccines are currently available on at least a dozen darknet marketplaces. Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccines (and we can only speculate as to whether they are genuine or a form of liquid “fool’s gold”) can be purchased for as little as $500 per dose from top-selling vendors. These sellers use various channels, such as Wickr, Telegram, WhatsApp and Gmail, for advertising and communications. Darknet listings associated with alleged Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccines are selling for $600 to $2,500. Prospective buyers can receive the product within 2 to 10 days. Some of these supposed COVID-19 vaccines are imported from the United States, while others are packed in the United Kingdom and shipped to every country in the world, according to the underground advertisement.
Figure 1: Dark web marketplace offering COVID-19 vaccines
Figure 2: Dark web marketplace offering COVID-19 vaccines
A vendor sells 10 doses of what they claim to be Moderna COVID-29 vaccines for $2,000. According to the advertisement, the product is available to ship to the United Kingdom and worldwide.
Figure 3: Dark web marketplace offering COVID-19 vaccines
Besides what are claimed to be COVID-19 vaccines, cybercriminals offer antibody home test kits for $152 (again, we do not know whether they are genuine or not). According to the advertisement, there are various shipping options available. It costs $41 for ‘stealth’ shipping to the United States, $10.38 to ship to the United Kingdom, and $20 to mail the vaccines internationally.
Figure 4: Dark web marketplace offering COVID-19 test kits
On the darknet marketplaces, the sales of counterfeit COVID-19 test results and vaccination certificates began to outnumber the COVID vaccine offerings in mid-April. This shift is most likely because COVID-19 vaccines are now readily available for those who want them. People can buy and show these certificates without being vaccinated. A growing number of colleges will require students to have received a COVID-19 vaccine before returning to in-person classes by this fall.[2] Soon, COVID-19 vaccination proof is likely to become a requirement of some type of “passport” to board a plane or enter major events and venues.
The growing demand for proof of vaccination is driving an illicit economy for fake vaccination and test certificates. Opportunistic cybercriminals capitalize on public interest in obtaining a COVID-19 immunity passport, particularly for those who oppose COVID-19 vaccines or test positive for COVID-19 but want to return to school or work, resume travel or attend a public event. Counterfeit negative COVID-19 test results and COVID-19 vaccination cards are available for sale at various darknet marketplaces. Fake CDC-issued vaccination cards are available for $50. One vendor offers counterfeit German COVID-19 certificates for $23.35. Vaccination cards with customized information, such as “verified” batch or lot numbers for particular dates and “valid” medical and hospital information, are also available for purchase.
One darknet marketplace vendor offers to sell a digital copy of the COVID-19 vaccination card with detailed printing instructions for $50.
Figure 5: Dark web marketplace offering COVID-19 vaccination cards
One vendor sells CDC vaccination cards for $1,200 and $1,500, as seen in the following screenshot. These cards, according to the advertisement, can be personalized with details such as the prospective buyer’s name and medical information.
Figure 6: Dark web marketplace offering COVID-19 vaccination cards
Other darknet marketplace vendors offer fake CDC-issued COVID-19 vaccination card packages for $1,200 to $2,500. The package contains a PDF file that buyers can type and print, as well as personalized vaccination cards with “real” lot numbers, according to the advertisement. Prospective buyers can pay $1,200 for blank cards or $1,500 for custom-made cards with valid batch numbers, medical and hospital details.
Figure 7: Dark web marketplace offering COVID-19 vaccination cards
One vendor offers counterfeit negative COVID-19 test results and vaccine passports to potential buyers.
Figure 8: Dark web marketplace offering negative COVID-19 test results and vaccination cards
A seller on another dark web market sells five counterfeit German COVID-19 certificates for $23.35. According to the advertisement below, the product is available for shipping to Germany and the rest of the world.
Figure 9: Dark web marketplace offering German COVID-19 vaccination certificates
The proliferation of fraudulent test results and counterfeit COVID-19 vaccine records on darknet marketplaces poses a significant threat to global health while fueling the underground economy. While an increasing number of countries begin to roll out COVID-19 vaccines and proof of vaccination, questionable COVID vaccines and fake proofs are emerging on the underground market. With the EU and other jurisdictions opening their borders to those who have received vaccinations, individuals will be tempted to obtain false vaccination documents in their drive to a return to pre-pandemic normalcy that includes summer travel and precious time with missed loved ones. Those who buy questionable COVID-19 vaccines or forged vaccination certificates risk their own lives and the lives of others. Apart from the harm to global health, making payments to darknet marketplaces promotes the growth of illegal products and services. The cycle of the underground economy continues as demand generates inventory, which generates supply. These are the unintended consequences of an effective global COVID vaccine rollout.
[1] https[:]//www.cnn.com/interactive/2021/health/global-covid-vaccinations/
[2] https[:]//www.npr.org/2021/04/11/984787779/should-colleges-require-covid-19-vaccines-for-fall-more-campuses-are-saying-yes
The post “Fool’s Gold”: Questionable Vaccines, Bogus Results, and Forged Cards appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Today, Microsoft released a highly critical vulnerability (CVE-2021-31166) in its web server http.sys. This product is a Windows-only HTTP server which can be run standalone or in conjunction with IIS (Internet Information Services) and is used to broker internet traffic via HTTP network requests. The vulnerability is very similar to CVE-2015-1635, another Microsoft vulnerability in the HTTP network stack reported in 2015.
With a CVSS score of 9.8, the vulnerability announced has the potential to be both directly impactful and is also exceptionally simple to exploit, leading to a remote and unauthenticated denial-of-service (Blue Screen of Death) for affected products.
The issue is due to Windows improperly tracking pointers while processing objects in network packets containing HTTP requests. As HTTP.SYS is implemented as a kernel driver, exploitation of this bug will result in at least a Blue Screen of Death (BSoD), and in the worst-case scenario, remote code execution, which could be wormable. While this vulnerability is exceptional in terms of potential impact and ease of exploitation, it remains to be seen whether effective code execution will be achieved. Furthermore, this vulnerability only affects the latest versions of Windows 10 and Windows Server (2004 and 20H2), meaning that the exposure for internet-facing enterprise servers is fairly limited, as many of these systems run Long Term Servicing Channel (LTSC) versions, such as Windows Server 2016 and 2019, which are not susceptible to this flaw.
At the time of this writing, we are unaware of any “in-the-wild” exploitation for CVE-2021-31166 but will continue to monitor the threat landscape and provide relevant updates. We urge Windows users to apply the patch immediately wherever possible, giving special attention to externally facing devices that could be compromised from the internet. For those who are unable to apply Microsoft’s update, we are providing a “virtual patch” in the form of a network IPS signature that can be used to detect and prevent exploitation attempts for this vulnerability.
McAfee Network Security Platform (NSP) Protection
Sigset Version: 10.8.21.2
Attack ID: 0x4528f000
Attack Name: HTTP: Microsoft HTTP Protocol Stack Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2021-31166)
McAfee Knowledge Base Article KB94510:
https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content&id=KB94510
The post Major HTTP Vulnerability in Windows Could Lead to Wormable Exploit appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Over the past week we have seen a considerable body of work focusing on DarkSide, the ransomware responsible for the recent gas pipeline shutdown. Many of the excellent technical write-ups will detail how it operates an affiliate model that supports others to be involved within the ransomware business model (in addition to the developers). While this may not be a new phenomenon, this model is actively deployed by many groups with great effect. Herein is the crux of the challenge: while the attention may be on DarkSide ransomware, the harsh reality is that equal concern should be placed at Ryuk, or REVIL, or Babuk, or Cuba, etc. These, and other groups and their affiliates, exploit common entry vectors and, in many cases, the tools we see being used to move within an environment are the same. While this technical paper covers DarkSide in more detail, we must stress the importance of implementing best practices in securing/monitoring your network. These additional publications can guide you in doing so:
As mentioned earlier, DarkSide is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that offers high returns for penetration-testers that are willing to provide access to networks and distribute/execute the ransomware. DarkSide is an example of a RaaS whereby they actively invest in development of the code, affiliates, and new features. Alongside their threat to leak data, they have a separate option for recovery companies to negotiate, are willing to engage with the media, and are willing to carry out a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against victims. Those victims who do pay a ransom receive an alert from DarkSide on companies that are on the stock exchange who are breached, in return for their payment. Potential legal issues abound, not to mention ethical concerns, but this information could certainly provide an advantage in short selling when the news breaks.
The group behind DarkSide are also particularly active. Using MVISION Insights we can identify the prevalence of targets. This map clearly illustrates that the most targeted geography is clearly the United States (at the time of writing). Further, the sectors primarily targeted are Legal Services, Wholesale, and Manufacturing, followed by the Oil, Gas and Chemical sectors.
McAfee’s market leading EPP solution covers DarkSide ransomware with an array of early prevention and detection techniques.
Customers using MVISION Insights will find a threat-profile on this ransomware family that is updated when new and relevant information becomes available.
MVISION EDR includes detections on many of the behaviors used in the attack including privilege escalation, malicious PowerShell and CobaltStrike beacons, and visibility of discovery commands, command and control, and other tactics along the attack chain. We have EDR telemetry indicating early detection before the detonation of the Ransomware payload.
ENS TP provides coverage against known indicators in the latest signature set. Updates on new indicators are pushed through GTI.
ENS ATP provides behavioral content focusing on proactively detecting the threat while also delivering known IoCs for both online and offline detections.
ENS ATP adds two (2) additional layers of protection thanks to JTI rules that provide attack surface reduction for generic ransomware behaviors and RealProtect (static and dynamic) with ML models targeting ransomware threats.
For the latest mitigation guidance, please review:
https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content&id=KB93354&locale=en_US
The RaaS platform offers the affiliate the option to build either a Windows or Unix version of the ransomware. Depending on what is needed, we observe that affiliates are using different techniques to circumvent detection, by masquerading the generated Windows binaries of DarkSide. Using several packers or signing the binary with a certificate are some of the techniques used to do so.
As peers in our industry have described, we also observed campaigns where the affiliates and their hacking crew used several ways to gain initial access to their victim’s network.
The configuration of the ransomware contains several options to enable or disable system processes, but also the above part where it states which processes should not be killed.
As mentioned before, a lot of the current Windows samples in the wild are the 1.8 version of DarkSide, others are the 2.1.2.3 version. In a chat one of the actors revealed that a V3 version will be released soon.
On March 23rd, 2021, on XSS, one of the DarkSide spokespersons announced an update of DarkSide as a PowerShell version and a major upgrade of the Linux variant:
In the current samples we observe, we do see the PowerShell component that is used to delete the Volume Shadow copies, for example.
Tools observed:
Before distributing the ransomware around the network using tools like PsExec and PowerShell, data was exfiltrated to Cloud Services that would later be used on the DarkSide Leak page for extortion purposes. Zipping the data, using Rclone or WinSCP are some of the examples observed.
While a lot of good and in-depth analyses are written by our peers, one thing worth noting is that when running DarkSide, the encryption process is fast. It is one of the areas the actors brag about on the same forum and do a comparison to convince affiliates to join their program:
DarkSide, like Babuk ransomware, has a Linux version. Both target *nix systems but in particular VMWare ESXi servers and storage/NAS. Storage/NAS is critical for many companies, but how many of you are running a virtual desktop, hosted on a ESXi server?
Darkside wrote a Linux variant that supports the encryption of ESXI server versions 5.0 – 7.1 as well as NAS technology from Synology. They state that other NAS/backup technologies will be supported soon.
In the code we clearly observe this support:
Also, the configuration of the Linux version shows it is clearly looking for Virtual Disk/memory kind of files:
Although the adversary recently claimed to vote for targets, the attacks are ongoing with packed and signed samples observed as recently as today (May 12, 2021):
Recently the Ransomware Task Force, a partnership McAfee is proud to be a part of, released a detailed paper on how ransomware attacks are occurring and how countermeasures should be taken. As many of us have published, presented on, and released research upon, it is time to act. Please follow the links included within this blog to apply the broader advice about applying available protection and detection in your environment against such attacks.
Data Encrypted for Impact – T1486
Inhibit System Recovery – T1490
Valid Accounts – T1078
PowerShell – T1059.001
Service Execution – T1569.002
Account Manipulation – T1098
Dynamic-link Library Injection – T1055.001
Account Discovery – T1087
Bypass User Access Control – T1548.002
File Permissions Modification – T1222
System Information Discovery – T1082
Process Discovery – T1057
Screen Capture – T1113
Compile After Delivery – T1027.004
Credentials in Registry – T1552.002
Obfuscated Files or Information – T1027
Shared Modules – T1129
Windows Management Instrumentation – T1047
Exploit Public-Facing Application – T1190
Phishing – T1566
External Remote Services – T1133
Multi-hop Proxy – T1090.003
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation – T1068
Application Layer Protocol – T1071
Bypass User Account Control – T1548.002
Commonly Used Port – T1043
Compile After Delivery – T1500
Credentials from Password Stores – T1555
Credentials from Web Browsers – T1555.003
Credentials in Registry – T1214
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – T1140
Disable or Modify Tools – T1562.001
Domain Account – T1087.002
Domain Groups – T1069.002
Domain Trust Discovery – T1482
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol – T1048
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage – T1567.002
File and Directory Discovery – T1083
Gather Victim Network Information – T1590
Ingress Tool Transfer – T1105
Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification – T1222.002
Masquerading – T1036
Process Injection – T1055
Remote System Discovery – T1018
Scheduled Task/Job – T1053
Service Stop – T1489
System Network Configuration Discovery – T1016
System Services – T1569
Taint Shared Content – T1080
Unix Shell – T1059.004
The post DarkSide Ransomware Victims Sold Short appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Every year CRN recognizes the women who are leading the channel and their unique strengths, vision, and achievements. This year, CRN recognized five McAfee individuals on their prestigious list of those leading the channel. Those selected demonstrate commitment to mentoring future generations and driving channel innovation and growth.
The 2021 Women of the Channel (WOTC) awards highlight over 1,000 women in all areas of the IT ecosystem, including technology vendors, distributors, solution providers and other IT organizations. We’re thrilled to see our colleagues recognized for their strategic vision and dedication to channel success. See below to learn more about each McAfee honoree.
Please join us in celebrating this recognition and congratulating these exceptional women who are at the heart of our channel business.
A channel veteran of 20+ years and 2020 WOTC recipient, Kristin Carnes joined McAfee through the acquisition of Skyhigh Networks and has lead channel growth for industry bellwethers like EMC (NYSE: EMC), Nimble Storage, (HPE Subsidiary) and Veritas Software. She was chosen to lead McAfee’s global channel programs and operations and now leads global teams supporting an extensive network of distributors. Kristin was instrumental in organizing the early 2021 expansion of McAfee and Ingram Micro’s partnership to sell in more than 20 countries leveraging the Ingram Cloud Marketplace. She has also launched new partner experience initiatives that have been adopted worldwide and driven changes in the McAfee rebate policy to improve partner profitability.
Madeline Fugate is an experienced sales and marketing leader with 23 years of experience in the channel. Madeline has a passion for mentoring and nurturing younger talent. Through coaching, she has developed a strong McAfee team for Tech Data that has delivered Tech Data’s Cyber Range with McAfee on premise and cloud solutions as well as an easy to use customer demo environment. Her work with Tech Data led to further growth in 2021 with IBM. This year, she also launched McAfee’s first social media campaign through Tech Data and played a fundamental role in improving operational efficiency to reduce quoting lead times.
With 25+ years of experience in distribution, Sheri Leach has dedicated the last 15 years to supporting and growing Ingram Micro with their McAfee business. This year, she was instrumental in launching McAfee on the Ingram Micro Cloud Marketplace soon to bring in millions of dollars in no touch business to McAfee and our partners. She’s worked closely with the team at Ingram Micro to also facilitate a creative finance program and to deliver a Business Intelligence program that helped the McAfee sales teams to create, plan and execute on business plans to drive more sales. Sheri was recognized on the 2020 WOTC list and believes that in 2021, the keys to partner success are partner enablement, frequent engagement and special finance to ensure partners are thriving amid the pandemic.
Sarah Thompson joined McAfee’s channel organization 13 years ago and has spent the last six years focused on building the Service Provider Specialization for partners delivering managed services globally. This year, Sarah managed the launch coordination, tracking progress and initiatives across product, channel, marketing and executive teams for McAfee’s partner lead managed endpoint detection and response (EDR) offerings. She’s driven innovation for McAfee’s channel by helping define a select set of partners as Global Service Provider Partners through the creation of formal requirements and curriculum.
Natalie Tomlin has been at McAfee for over 20 years, and currently drives much of McAfee’s “Channel First” global strategy through resources, tools, enablement and marketing efforts ensuring partners and customers have a good experience with McAfee. Her team is focused on helping McAfee’s strategic partners lead customer cloud adoption and deliver security from Device to Cloud. Returning to the WOTC list from 2020, Natalie’s current goal is to continue with McAfee’s “Channel First” strategy and to continue empowering, enabling, and listen to our partners.
The post CRN’s Women of the Channel 2021 Recognizes McAfee Leaders appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Browser push notifications can highly resemble Windows system notifications. As recently discussed, scammers are abusing push notifications to trick users into taking action. This recent example demonstrates the social engineering tactics used to trick users into installing a fake Windows Defender update. A toaster popup in the tray informs the user of a Windows Defender Update.
Clicking the message takes the user to a fake update website.
The site serves a signed ms-appinstaller (MSIX) package. When downloaded and run, the user is prompted to install a supposed Defender Update from “Publisher: Microsoft”
After installation, the “Defender Update” App appears in the start menu like other Windows Apps.
The shortcut points to the installed malware: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\245d1cf3-25fc-4ce1-9a58-7cd13f94923a_1.0.0.0_neutral__7afzw0tp1da5e\bloom\Eversible.exe, which is a data stealing trojan, targeting various applications and information:
The post Scammers Impersonating Windows Defender to Push Malicious Windows Apps appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
At Verisign we have a commitment to making a positive and lasting impact on the global internet community, and on the communities in which we live and work.
This commitment guided our initial efforts to help these communities respond to and recover from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, over a year ago. And at the end of 2020, our sense of partnership with our local communities helped shape our efforts to alleviate COVID-related food insecurity in the areas where we have our most substantial footprint. This same sense of community is reflected in our partnership with Virginia Ready, which aims to help individuals in our home State of Virginia access training and certification to pivot to new careers in the technology sector.
We also believe that our team is one of our most important assets. We particularly value the diverse origins of our people; we have colleagues from all over the world who, in turn, are closely connected to their own communities both in the United States and elsewhere. A significant proportion of our staff are of either Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) or South Asian origin, and today we are pleased to announce two charitable contributions, via our Verisign Cares program, directly related to these two communities.
First, Verisign is pleased to associate ourselves with the Stand with Asian Americans initiative, launched by AAPI business leaders in response to recent and upsetting episodes of aggression toward their community. Verisign supports this initiative and the pledge for which it stands, and has made a substantial contribution to the initiative’s partner, the Asian Pacific Fund, to help uplift the AAPI community.
Second, and after consultation with our staff, we have directed significant charitable contributions to organizations helping to fight the worsening wave of COVID-19 in India. Through Direct Relief we will be helping to provide oxygen and other medical equipment to hospitals, while through GiveIndia we will be supporting families in India impacted by COVID-19.
The ‘extended Verisign family’ of our employees, and their families and their communities, means a tremendous amount to us – it is only thanks to our talented and dedicated people that we are able to continue to fulfill our mission of enabling the world to connect online with reliability and confidence, anytime, anywhere.
The post Verisign Support for AAPI Communities and COVID Relief in India appeared first on Verisign Blog.
May 2021 has been an extraordinary month in the cybersecurity world, with the DoD releasing its DoD Zero Trust Reference Architecture (DoDZTRA), the Colonial Pipeline being hit with a ransomware attack, and the White House releasing its Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity (EO). Add to that several major vendors that our government depends on for its critical operations disclosing critical vulnerabilities that could potentially expose our nation’s critical infrastructure to even more risk, ranging from compromised email and cloud infrastructures to very sophisticated supply chain attacks like the SolarWinds hack, which could have started as early as 2019.
If the situation sounds ominous, it is. The words and guidance outlined in the DoDZTRA and EO must be followed up with a clear path to action and all the stakeholders, both public and private, are not held accountable for progress. This should not be another roll-up reporting exercise, time to study the situation, or end up in analysis paralysis thinking about the problem. Our adversaries move at speeds we never anticipated by leveraging automation, artificial intelligence, machine learning, social engineering, and more vectors against us. It’s time for us to catch up and just very possibly think differently to get ahead.
There is no way around it: This time our nation must invest in protecting our way of life today and for future generations.
The collective “we” observed what happened when ransomware hit a portion of the nation’s critical infrastructure at Colonial Pipeline. If the extortion wasn’t bad enough, the panic buying of gasoline and even groceries in many of Eastern U.S. states impacted thousands of people seemingly overnight, with help from social and traditional media. It’s too early to predict what the exact financial and social impacts may have been on this attack. I suspect the $4.4M ransom paid was very small in the greater scheme of the event.
May 2021 has provided a wake-up call for public-private cooperation like we’ve never seen before. Perhaps we need to rethink cybersecurity altogether. During his keynote remarks at the recent RSA Conference, McAfee CTO Steve Grobman talked about how “as humans, we are awful at perceiving risk.” Influenced by media, anecdotal data, and evolutionary biology, we let irrational fears drive decision-making, which leads humans to misperceive actual risks and sub-optimize risk reduction in both the physical and cyber world. To combat these tendencies, Steve encourages us to “be aware of our biases and embrace data and science-based approaches to assess and mitigate risk.”
Enter Zero Trust Cybersecurity, which is an architectural approach – not a single vendor product or solution. The DoDZTRA takes a broader view of Zero Trust than the very narrow access control focus, saying it is “a cybersecurity strategy and framework that embeds security throughout the architecture to prevent malicious personas from accessing our most critical assets.” And our most critical assets are data.
NSA also recently weighed in on Zero Trust, recommending that an organization invest in identifying its critical data, assets, applications, and services. The NSA guidance goes on to suggest placing additional focus on architecting from the inside out; ensuring all paths to data, assets, applications, and services are secure; determining who needs access; creating control policies; and finally, inspecting and logging all traffic before reacting.
These practices require full visibility into all activity across all layers — from endpoints to the network (which includes cloud) — to enable analytics that can detect suspicious activity. The ability to have early or advanced warnings of global and local threat campaigns, indicators of compromise, and the capability to deliver proactive countermeasures is a must-have as part of an organization’s defensive strategies.
The Zero Trust guidance from both DoD and NSA is worth following. It’s also worth reprising the concept of defense in depth – the cybersecurity strategy of leveraging multiple security mechanisms to protect an organization’s assets. Relying on a single vendor for all an organization’s IT and security needs makes it much easier for the adversary.
If you believe in a good conspiracy theory, the month of May 2021 could provide great material for a made-for-TV movie. Earlier I mentioned that the collective “we” needs to be held accountable. Part of that accountability is defining success metrics as we take on a new path to real cybersecurity.
The post Why May 2021 Represents a New Chapter in the “Book of Cybersecurity Secrets” appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Virtualization technology has been an IT cornerstone for organization for years now. It revolutionized the way organizations can scale up IT systems in a heartbeat, allowing then to be more agile as opposed to investing into dedicated “bare-metal” hardware. To the outside untrained eye, it might seem that there are different machines on the network, while in fact all the “separate” machines are controlled by a hypervisor server. Virtualization plays such a big role nowadays that it isn’t only used to spin up servers but also anything from virtual applications to virtual user desktops.
This is something cyber criminals have been noticing too and we have seen an increased interest in hypervisors. After all, why attack the single virtual machine when you can go after the hypervisor and control all the machines at once?
In recent months several high impact CVEs regarding virtualization software have been released which allowed for Remote Code Execution (RCE); initial access brokers are offering compromised VMware vCenter servers online, as well as ransomware groups developing specific ransomware binaries for encrypting ESXi servers.
On the 25th of May VMware disclosed a vulnerability impacting VMware vCenter servers allowing for Remote Code Execution on internet accessible vCenter servers, version 6.5,6.7 and 7.0. VMware vCenter is a management tool, used to manage virtual machines and ESXi servers.
CVE-2021-21985 is a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the vSphere Client via the Virtual SAN (vSAN) Health Check plugin. This plugin is enabled by default. The combination of RCE and default enablement of the plugin resulted in this being scored as a critical flaw with a CVSSv3 score of 9.8.
An attacker needs to be able to access vCenter over TCP port 443 to exploit this vulnerability. It doesn’t matter if the vCenter is remotely exposed or when the attacker has internal access.
The same exploit vector is applicable for CVE-2021-21986, which is an authentication mechanism issue in several vCenter Server Plug-ins. It would allow an attacker to run plugin functions without authentication. This leads to the CVE being scored as a ‘moderate severity’, with a CVSSv3 score of 6.5.
While writing this blog, a Proof-of-Concept was discovered that will test if the vulnerability exists; it will not execute the remote-code. The Nmap plugin can be downloaded from this location: https://github.com/alt3kx/CVE-2021-21985_PoC.
Searching with the Shodan search engine, narrowing it down to the TCP 443 port, we observe that close to 82,000 internet accessible ESXi servers are exposed. Zooming in further on the versions that are affected by these vulnerabilities, almost 55,000 publicly accessible ESXi servers are potentially vulnerable to CVE-2021-21985 and CVE-2021-21986, providing remote access to them and making them potential candidates for ransomware attacks, as we will read about in the next paragraphs.
Ransomware groups are always trying to find ways to hit their victims where it hurts. So, it is only logical that they are adapting to attacking virtualization environments and the native Unix/Linux machines running the hypervisors. In the past, ransomware groups were quick to abuse earlier CVEs affecting VMware. But aside from the disclosed CVEs, ransomware groups have also adapted their binaries specifically to encrypt virtual machines and their management environment. Below are some of the ransomware groups we have observed.
Figure 1. Screenshot from the DarkSide ransomware group, explicitly mentioning its Linux-based encryptor and support for ESXi and NAS systems
McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) analyzed the DarkSide Linux binary in our recent blog and we can confirm that a specific routine aimed at virtual machines is present in it.
Figure 2. DarkSide VMware Code routine
From the configuration file of the DarkSide Linux variant, it becomes clear that this variant is solely designed to encrypt virtual machines hosted on an ESXi server. It searches for the disk-files of the VMs, the memory files of the VMs (vmem), swap, logs, etc. – all files that are needed to start a VMware virtual machine.
Demo of Darkside encrypting an ESXi server: https://youtu.be/SMWIckvLMoE
Babuk announced on an underground forum that it was developing a cross-platform binary aimed at Linux/UNIX and ESXi or VMware systems:
Figure 3. Babuk ransomware claiming to have built a Linux-based ransomware binary capable of encrypting ESXi servers
The malware is written in the open-source programming language Golang, most likely because it allows developers to have a single codebase to be compiled into all major operating systems. This means that, thanks to static linking, code written in Golang on a Linux system can run on a Windows or Mac system. That presents a large advantage to ransomware gangs looking to encrypt a whole infrastructure comprised of different systems architecture.
After being dropped on the ESXi server, the malware encrypts all the files on the system:
The malware was designed to target ESXi environments as we guessed, and it was confirmed when the Babuk team returned the decryptor named d_esxi.out. Unfortunately, the decryptor has been developed with some errors, which cause corruption in victim’s files:
Overall, the decryptor is poor as it only checks for the extension “.babyk” which will miss any files the victim has renamed to recover them. Also, the decryptor checks if the file is more than 32 bytes in length as the last 32 bytes are the key that will be calculated later with other hardcoded values to get the final key. This is bad design as those 32 bytes could be trash, instead of the key, as the customer could make things, etc. It does not operate efficiently by checking the paths that are checked in the malware, instead it analyzes everything. Another error we noticed was that the decryptor tries to remove a ransom note name that is NOT the same that the malware creates in each folder. This does not make any sense unless, perhaps, the Babuk developers/operators are delivering a decryptor that works for a different version and/or sample.
The problems with the Babuk decryptor left victims in horrible situations with permanently damaged data. The probability of getting a faulty decryptor isn’t persuading victims to pay up and this might be one of the main reasons that Babuk announced that it will stop encrypting data and only exfiltrate and extort from now on.
It is not only ransomware groups that show an interest in virtual systems; several initial access brokers are also trading access to compromised vCenter/ESXi servers on underground cybercriminal forums. The date and time of the specific offering below overlaps with the disclosure of CVE-2021-21985, but McAfee ATR hasn’t determined if this specific CVE was used to gain access to ESXi servers.
Figure 4. Threat Actor selling access to thousands of vCenter/ESXi servers
Figure 5. Threat actor offering compromised VMware ESXi servers
VMware urges users running VMware vCenter and VMware Cloud Foundation affected by CVE-2021-21985 and CVE-2021-21986 to apply its patch immediately. According to VMware, a malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. The disclosed vulnerabilities have a critical CVSS base score of 9.8.
However, we do understand that VMware infrastructure is often installed on business-critical systems, so any type of patching activity usually has a high degree of impact on IT operations. Hence, the gap between vulnerability disclosure and patching is typically high. With the operating systems on VMware being a closed system they lack the ability to natively install workload protection/detection solutions. Therefore, the defenses should be based on standard cyber hygiene/risk mitigation practices and should be applied in the following order where possible.
Virtualization and its underlying technologies are key in today’s infrastructures. With the release of recently discovered vulnerabilities and an understanding of their criticality, threat actors are shifting focus. Proof can be seen in underground forums where affiliates recruit pentesters with knowledge of specific virtual technologies to develop custom ransomware that is designed to cripple these technologies. Remote Desktop access is the number one access vector in many ransomware cases, followed by edge-devices lacking the latest security updates, making them vulnerable to exploitation. With the latest VMware CVEs mentioned in this blog, we urge you to take the right steps to secure not only internet exposed systems, but also internal systems, to minimize the risk of your organization losing its precious VMs, or gold, to cyber criminals.
Special thanks to Thibault Seret, Mo Cashman, Roy Arnab and Christiaan Beek for their contributions.
The post Are Virtual Machines the New Gold for Cyber Criminals? appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
On May 12, the President signed the executive order (EO) on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity. As with every executive order, it establishes timelines for compliance and specific requirements of executive branch agencies to provide specific plans to meet the stated objectives.
It is clear from the EO that the Executive Office of the President is putting significant emphasis on cyber threat intelligence and how it will help government agencies make better decisions about responding to cyber threats and incidents. The EO also focuses on how federal agencies will govern resource access through Zero Trust and how to comprehensively define and protect hybrid service architectures. These are critical aspects as government agencies are moving more and more mission-critical applications and services to the cloud.
The call to action in this executive order is long overdue, as modernizing the nation’s cybersecurity approach and creating coordinated intelligence and incident response capabilities should have occurred years ago. Requiring that agencies recognize the shift in the perimeter and start tearing down silos between cloud services and physical data center services is going serve to improve visibility and understanding of how departments and sub-agencies are being targeted by adversaries.
I am sure government leaders have started to review their current capability along with their strategic initiatives to ensure they map to the new EO requirements. Where gaps are identified, agencies will need to update their plans and rethink their approach to align with the new framework and defined capabilities such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) and Zero Trust.
While the objectives outlined are critical, I do believe that agencies need to take appropriate cautions when deciding their paths to compliance. The goal of this executive order is not to add additional complexity to an already complex security organization. Rather, the goal should be to simplify and automate wherever possible. If the right approach is not decided on early, the risk is very real of adding too much complexity in pursuit of compliance, thus eroding the desired outcomes.
On the surface, it would seem that the areas of improvement outlined in the EO can be taken individually – applied threat intelligence, EDR, Zero Trust, data protection, and cloud services adoption. In reality, they should be viewed collectively. When considering solutions and architectures, agency leaders should be asking themselves some critical questions:
The executive order presents a great opportunity for government to evolve their cybersecurity approach to defend against modern threats and enable a more aggressive transition to the cloud and cloud services. There is also significant risk, as the urgency expressed in the EO could lead to hasty decisions that create more challenges than they solve. To capitalize on the opportunity presented in this executive order, federal leaders must embrace a holistic approach to cybersecurity that integrates all the solutions into a platform approach including robust threat intelligence. A standalone Zero Trust or EDR product will not accomplish an improved or modernized cybersecurity approach and could lead to more complexity. A well-thought-out platform, not individual products, will best serve public sector organizations, giving them a clear architecture that will protect and enable our government’s future.
The post The Executive Order – Improving the Nation’s Cyber Security appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
The mass migration of employees working from home in the last 14 months has accelerated the digital transformation of businesses. Cloud applications are no longer a “nice to have,” they are now essential to ensure that businesses survive. This introduces new security challenges in being able to locate and control sensitive data across all the potential exfiltration vectors regardless of whether they are in the cloud; on premise via managed or unmanaged machines. Attempting to control these vectors through multiple products results in unnecessary cost and complexity.
McAfee anticipated and responded to this trend, solving all these challenges through the launch of our MVISION Unified Cloud Edge solution in 2020. Unified Cloud Edge doesn’t simply offer data protections controls for endpoints, networks, web and the cloud; rather, Multi-Vector Data Protection provides customers with unified data classification and incident management that enables them to define data workflows once and have policies enforced consistently across each vector. Because of the unified approach and our extensive data protection heritage, we are delighted to be named a Leader in The Forrester Wave: Unstructured Data Security Platforms, Q2 2021. In our opinion, we were the top ranked dedicated cyber security vendor within the report.
We received the highest possible score in nine criteria with Forrester Research commenting on our “cloud-first data security approach” and customer recognition of our “breadth of capabilities (in particular for supporting remote work and cloud use)”.
We continue to innovate within our Unified Cloud Edge solution through the introduction of remote browser isolation to protect against risky web sites (our “heavy focus in supporting security and data protection in the cloud”), which uniquely to the market allows us to continue applying DLP controls even during isolated sessions. Delivering on increased customer value through innovation isn’t just limited to new features, for instance we continue to drive down costs through an unlimited SaaS application bundle.
Click below to read the full report.
: Unstructured Data Security Platforms, Q2 2021McAfee is delighted to be named a Leader in The Forrester Wave Unstructured Data Security Platforms, Q2 2021 report. We received the highest possible score in nine criteria with Forrester Research
The Forrester Wave: Unstructured Data Security Platforms, Q2 2021, 17 May 2021, Heidi Shey with Amy DeMartine, Shannon Fish, Peggy Dostie
The post McAfee a Leader in The Forrester Wave™ Unstructured Data Security Platforms appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
The McAfee team is very proud to announce that, for the third year in a row, McAfee was named a 2021 Gartner Peer Insights Customers’ Choice for Secure Web Gateways for its Web Solution.
In its announcement, Gartner explains, “The Gartner Peer Insights Customers’ Choice is a recognition of vendors in this market by verified end-user professionals, taking into account both the number of reviews and the overall user ratings.” To ensure fair evaluation, Gartner applies rigorous methodology for recognizing vendors with a high customer satisfaction rate.
For the distinction, a vendor needs at least 20+ Reviews from Customers with over $50M Annual Review in 18-month timeframe, above Market Average Overall Rating, and above Market Average User Interest and Adoption.
Gartner Peer Insights is a peer review and ratings platform designed for enterprise software and services decision makers. Reviews are organized by products in markets that are defined by Gartner Research in Magic Quadrant and Market Guide documents.
The “Voice of the Customer” is a document that applies a methodology to aggregated Gartner Peer Insights’ reviews in a market to provide an overall perspective for IT decision makers. This aggregated peer perspective, along with the individual detailed reviews, is complementary to expert-generated research such as Magic Quadrants and Market Guides. It can play a key role in your buying process, as it focuses on direct peer experiences of buying, implementing and operating a solution. A complimentary copy of the Peer Insights ‘Voice of the Customer’ report is available on the McAfee Web site.
“We were using an on-prem web gateway and we have been migrated to UCE recently due to the pandemic situations. It gives us the flexibility to manage our Web GW as a SaaS solution. The solution also provides us bunch of rulesets for our daily usage needs.” CIO in the Manufacturing Industry [Link here]
“McAfee Secure web gateway provides the optimum security required for the employees of the Bank surfing the Internet. It also provides the Hybrid capabilities which allows to deploy same policies regardless of the physical location of the endpoint.” [Link here]
MVISION Unified Cloud Edge was specifically designed to enable our customers to make a secure cloud transformation by bringing the capabilities of our highly successful Secure Web Gateway appliance solution to the cloud as part of a unified cloud offering. This way, users from any location or device can access the web and the cloud in a fast and secure manner.
“The McAfee Web Gateway integrated well with existing CASB and DLP solutions. It has been very effective at preventing users from going to malware sites. The professional services we purchased for implementation was the best we’ve ever had from any vendor of any IT security product.” Senior Cybersecurity Professional in the Healthcare Industry [Link here]
McAfee’s Next-Gen Secure Web Gateway technology features tight integration with our CASB and DLP solutions through a converged management interface, which provides unified policies that deliver unprecedented cloud control while reducing cost and complexity. By integrating our SWG, CASB, DLP, and RBI solutions, MVISION Unified Cloud Edge provides a complete SASE security platform that delivers unparalleled data and threat protection.
“We benchmarked against another very well known gateway and there was no comparison. The other gateway only caught a small fraction of what MWG caught when filtering for potentially harmful sites.” Information Security Officer in the Finance Industry [Link here]
As the threat landscape continues to evolve, it’s important for organizations to have a platform that is integrated and seamless. That’s why McAfee provides integrated multi-layer security including global threat intelligence, machine learning, sandboxing, UEBA, and Remote Browser Isolation to block known threats and detect the most elusive attacks.
To learn more about this distinction, or to read the reviews written about our products by the IT professionals who use them, please visit Gartner Peer Insights’ Customers’ Choice announcement for Web. To all of our customers who submitted reviews, thank you! These reviews mold our products and our customer journey, and we look forward to building on the experience that earned us this distinction!
McAfee is named a Customers’ Choice in the June 2021 Gartner Peer Insights “Voice of the Customer”: Secure Web Gateways.
The post McAfee Named a 2021 Gartner Peer Insights Customers’ Choice for SWG appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
