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[This is Part III in a series on research conducted for a recent Hulu documentary on the 2015 hack of marital infidelity website AshleyMadison.com.]
In 2019, a Canadian company called Defiant Tech Inc. pleaded guilty to running LeakedSource[.]com, a service that sold access to billions of passwords and other data exposed in countless data breaches. KrebsOnSecurity has learned that the owner of Defiant Tech, a 32-year-old Ontario man named Jordan Evan Bloom, was hired in late 2014 as a developer for the marital infidelity site AshleyMadison.com. Bloom resigned from AshleyMadison citing health reasons in June 2015 — less than one month before unidentified hackers stole data on 37 million users — and launched LeakedSource three months later.
Jordan Evan Bloom, posing in front of his Lamborghini.
On Jan. 15, 2018, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) charged then 27-year-old Bloom, of Thornhill, Ontario, with selling stolen personal identities online through the website LeakedSource[.]com.
LeakedSource was advertised on a number of popular cybercrime forums as a service that could help hackers break into valuable or high-profile accounts. LeakedSource also tried to pass itself off as a legal, legitimate business that was marketing to security firms and professionals.
The RCMP arrested Bloom in December 2017, and said he made approximately $250,000 selling hacked data, which included information on 37 million user accounts leaked in the 2015 Ashley Madison breach.
Subsequent press releases from the RCMP about the LeakedSource investigation omitted any mention of Bloom, and referred to the defendant only as Defiant Tech. In a legal settlement that is quintessentially Canadian, the matter was resolved in 2019 after Defiant Tech agreed to plead guilty. The RCMP declined to comment for this story.
The Impact Team, the hacker group that claimed responsibility for stealing and leaking the AshleyMadison user data, also leaked several years worth of email from then-CEO Noel Biderman. A review of those messages shows that Ashley Madison hired Jordan Evan Bloom as a PHP developer in December 2014 — even though the company understood that Bloom’s success as a programmer and businessman was tied to shady and legally murky enterprises.
Bloom’s recommendation came to Biderman via Trevor Sykes, then chief technology officer for Ashley Madison parent firm Avid Life Media (ALM). The following is an email from Sykes to Biderman dated Nov. 14, 2014:
“Greetings Noel,
“We’d like to offer Jordan Bloom the position of PHP developer reporting to Mike Morris for 75k CAD/Year. He did well on the test, but he also has a great understanding of the business side of things having run small businesses himself. This was an internal referral.”
When Biderman responded that he needed more information about the candidate, Sykes replied that Bloom was independently wealthy as a result of his forays into the shadowy world of “gold farming” — the semi-automated use of large numbers of player accounts to win some advantage that is usually related to cashing out game accounts or inventory. Gold farming is particularly prevalent in massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs), such as RuneScape and World of Warcraft.
“In his previous experience he had been doing RMT (Real Money Trading),” Sykes wrote. “This is the practice of selling virtual goods in games for real world money. This is a grey market, which is usually against the terms and services of the game companies.” Here’s the rest of his message to Biderman:
“RMT sellers traditionally have a lot of problems with chargebacks, and payment processor compliance. During my interview with him, I spent some time focusing in on this. He had to demonstrate to the processor, Paypal, at the time he had a business and technical strategy to address his charge back rate.”
“He ran this company himself, and did all the coding, including the integration with the processors,” Sykes continued in his assessment of Bloom. “Eventually he was squeezed out by Chinese gold farmers, and their ability to market with much more investment than he could. In addition the cost of ‘farming’ the virtual goods was cheaper in China to do than in North America.”
The gold farming reference is fascinating because in 2017 KrebsOnSecurity published Who Ran LeakedSource?, which examined clues suggesting that one of the administrators of LeakedSource also was the admin of abusewith[.]us, a site unabashedly dedicated to helping people hack email and online gaming accounts.
An administrator account Xerx3s on Abusewithus.
Abusewith[.]us began in September 2013 as a forum for learning and teaching how to hack accounts at Runescape, an MMORPG set in a medieval fantasy realm where players battle for kingdoms and riches.
The currency with which Runescape players buy and sell weapons, potions and other in-game items are virtual gold coins, and many of Abusewith[dot]us’s early members traded in a handful of commodities: Phishing kits and exploits that could be used to steal Runescape usernames and passwords from fellow players; virtual gold plundered from hacked accounts; and databases from hacked forums and websites related to Runescape and other online games.
That 2017 report here interviewed a Michigan man who acknowledged being administrator of Abusewith[.]us, but denied being the operator of LeakedSource. Still, the story noted that LeakedSource likely had more than one operator, and breached records show Bloom was a prolific member of Abusewith[.]us.
In an email to all employees on Dec. 1, 2014, Ashley Madison’s director of HR said Bloom graduated from York University in Toronto with a degree in theoretical physics, and that he has been an active programmer since high school.
“He’s a proprietor of a high traffic multiplayer game and developer/publisher of utilities such as PicTrace,” the HR director enthused. “He will be a great addition to the team.”
PicTrace appears to have been a service that allowed users to glean information about anyone who viewed an image hosted on the platform, such as their Internet address, browser type and version number. A copy of pictrace[.]com from Archive.org in 2012 redirects to the domain qksnap.com, which DomainTools.com says was registered to a Jordan Bloom from Thornhill, ON that same year.
The street address listed in the registration records for qksnap.com — 204 Beverley Glen Blvd — also shows up in the registration records for leakadvisor[.]com, a domain registered in 2017 just months after Canadian authorities seized the servers running LeakedSource.
Pictrace, one of Jordan Bloom’s early IT successes.
A review of passive DNS records from DomainTools indicates that in 2013 pictrace[.]com shared a server with just a handful of other domains, including Near-Reality[.]com — a popular RuneScape Private Server (RSPS) game based on the RuneScape MMORPG.
Copies of near-reality[.]com from 2013 via Archive.org show the top of the community’s homepage was retrofitted with a message saying Near Reality was no longer available due to a copyright dispute. Although the site doesn’t specify the other party to the copyright dispute, it appears Near-Reality got sued by Jagex, the owner of RuneScape.
The message goes on to say the website will no longer “encourage, facilitate, enable or condone (i) any infringement of copyright in RuneScape or any other Jagex product; nor (ii) any breach of the terms and conditions of RuneScape or any other Jagex product.”
A scene from the MMORPG RuneScape.
Near Reality also has a Facebook page that was last updated in 2019, when its owner posted a link to a news story about Defiant Tech’s guilty plea in the LeakedSource investigation. That Facebook page indicates Bloom also went by the nickname “Agentjags.”
“Just a quick PSA,” reads a post to the Near Reality Facebook page dated Jan. 21, 2018, which linked to a story about the charges against Bloom and a photo of Bloom standing in front of his lime-green Lamborghini. “Agentjags has got involved in some shady shit that may have compromised your personal details. I advise anyone who is using an old NR [Near Reality] password for anything remotely important should change it ASAP.”
By the beginning of 2016, Bloom was nowhere to be found, and was suspected of having fled his country for the Caribbean, according to the people commenting on the Near Reality Facebook page:
“Jordan aka Agentjags has gone missing,” wrote a presumed co-owner of the Facebook page. “He is supposedly hiding in St. Lucia, doing what he loved, scuba-diving. Any information to his whereabouts will be appreciated.”
KrebsOnSecurity ran the unusual nickname “AgentJags” through a search at Constella Intelligence, a commercial service that tracks breached data sets. That search returned just a few dozen results — and virtually all were accounts at various RuneScape-themed sites, including a half-dozen accounts at Abusewith[.]us.
Constella found other “AgentJags” accounts tied to the email address ownagegaming1@gmail.com. The marketing firm Apollo.io experienced a data breach several years back, and according to Apollo the email address ownagegaming1@gmail.com belongs to Jordan Bloom in Ontario.
Constella also revealed that the password frequently used by ownagegaming1@gmail.com across many sites was some variation on “niggapls,” which my 2017 report found was also the password used by the administrator of LeakedSource.
Constella discovered that the email eric.malek@rogers.com comes up when one searches for “AgentJags.” This is curious because emails leaked from Ashley Madison’s then-CEO Biderman show that Eric Malek from Toronto was the Ashley Madison employee who initially recommended Bloom for the PHP developer job.
According to DomainTools.com, Eric.Malek@rogers.com was used to register the domain devjobs.ca, which previously advertised “the most exciting developer jobs in Canada, delivered to you weekly.” Constella says eric.malek@rogers.com also had an account at Abusewith[.]us — under the nickname “Jags.”
Biderman’s email records show Eric Malek was also a PHP developer for Ashley Madison, and that he was hired into this position just a few months before Bloom — on Sept. 2, 2014. The CEO’s leaked emails show Eric Malek resigned from his developer position at Ashley Madison on June 19, 2015.
“Please note that Eric Malek has resigned from this position with Avid and his last day will be June 19th,” read a June 5, 2015 email from ALM’s HR director. “He is resigning to deal with some personal issues which include health issues. Because he is not sure how much time it will take to resolve, he is not requesting a leave of absence (his time off will be indefinite). Overall, he likes the company and plans to reach out to Trevor or I when the issues are resolved to see what is available at that time.”
A follow-up email from Biderman demanded, “want to know where he’s truly going….,” and it’s unclear whether there was friction with Malek’s departure. But ALM General Counsel Avi Weisman replied indicating that Malek probably would not sign an “Exit Acknowledgment Form” prior to leaving, and that the company had unanswered questions for Malek.
“Aneka should dig during exit interview,” Weisman wrote. “Let’s see if he balks at signing the Acknowledgment.”
Bloom’s departure notice from Ashley Madison’s HR person, dated June 23, 2015, read:
“Please note that Jordan Bloom has resigned from his position as PHP Developer with Avid. He is leaving for personal reasons. He has a neck issue that will require surgery in the upcoming months and because of his medical appointment schedule and the pain he is experiencing he can no longer commit to a full-time schedule. He may pick up contract work until he is back to 100%.”
A follow-up note to Biderman about this announcement read:
“Note that he has disclosed that he is independently wealthy so he can get by without FT work until he is on the mend. He has signed the Exit Acknowledgement Form already without issue. He also says he would consider reapplying to Avid in the future if we have opportunities available at that time.”
Perhaps Mr. Bloom hurt his neck from craning it around blind spots in his Lamborghini. Maybe it was from a bad scuba outing. Whatever the pain in Bloom’s neck was, it didn’t stop him from launching himself fully into LeakedSource[.]com, which was registered roughly one month after the Impact Team leaked data on 37 million Ashley Madison accounts.
Mr. Malek declined a request for comment. A now-deleted LinkedIn profile for Malek from December 2018 listed him as a “technical recruiter” from Toronto who also attended Mr. Bloom’s alma mater — York University. That resume did not mention Mr. Malek’s brief stint as a PHP developer at Ashley Madison.
“Developer, entrepreneur, and now technical recruiter of the most uncommon variety!” Mr. Malek’s LinkedIn profile enthused. “Are you a developer, or other technical specialist, interested in working with a recruiter who can properly understand your concerns and aspirations, technical, environmental and financial? Don’t settle for a ‘hack’; this is your career, let’s do it right! Connect with me on LinkedIn. Note: If you are not a resident of Canada/Toronto, I cannot help you.”
Mr. Bloom told KrebsOnSecurity he had no role in harming or hacking Ashley Madison. Bloom validated his identity by responding at one of the email addresses mentioned above, and agreed to field questions so long as KrebsOnSecurity agreed to publish our email conversation in full (PDF).
Bloom said Mr. Malek did recommend him for the Ashley Madison job, but that Mr. Malek also received a $5,000 referral bonus for doing so. Given Mr. Malek’s stated role as a technical recruiter, it seems likely he also recommended several other employees to Ashley Madison.
Bloom was asked whether anyone at the RCMP, Ashley Madison or any authority anywhere ever questioned him in connection with the July 2015 hack of Ashley Madison. He replied that he was called once by someone claiming to be from the Toronto Police Service asking if he knew anything about the Ashley Madison hack.
“The AM situation was not something they pursued according to the RCMP disclosure,” Bloom wrote. “Learning about the RCMP’s most advanced cyber investigative techniques and capabilities was very interesting though. I was eventually told information by a third party which included knowledge that law enforcement effectively knew who the hacker was, but didn’t have enough evidence to proceed with a case. That is the extent of my involvement with any authorities.”
As to his company’s guilty plea for operating LeakedSource, Bloom maintains that the judge at his preliminary inquiry found that even if everything the Canadian government alleged was true it would not constitute a violation of any law in Canada with respect the charges the RCMP leveled against him, which included unauthorized use of a computer and “mischief to data.”
“In Canada at the lower court level we are allowed to possess stolen information and manipulate our copies of them as we please,” Bloom said. “The judge however decided that a trial was required to determine whether any activities of mine were reckless, as the other qualifier of intentionally criminal didn’t apply. I will note here that nothing I was accused of doing would have been illegal if done in the United States of America according to their District Attorney. +1 for free speech in America vs freedom of expression in Canada.”
“Shortly after their having most of their case thrown out, the Government proposed an offer during a closed door meeting where they would drop all charges against me, provide full and complete personal immunity, and in exchange the Corporation which has since been dissolved would plead guilty,” Bloom continued. “The Corporation would also pay a modest fine.”
Bloom said he left Ashley Madison because he was bored, but he acknowledged starting LeakedSource partly in response to the Ashley Madison hack.
“I intended to leverage my gaming connections to get into security work including for other private servers such as Minecraft communities and others,” Bloom said. “After months of asking management for more interesting tasks, I became bored. Some days I had virtually nothing to do except spin in my chair so I would browse the source code for security holes to fix because I found it enjoyable.”
“I believe the decision to start LS [LeakedSource] was partly inspired by the AM hack itself, and the large number of people from a former friend group messaging me asking if XYZ person was in the leak after I revealed to them that I downloaded a copy and had the ability to browse it,” Bloom continued. “LS was never my idea – I was just a builder, and the only Canadian. In other countries it was never thought to be illegal on closer examination of their laws.”
Bloom said he still considers himself independently wealthy, and that still has the lime green Lambo. But he said he’s currently unemployed and can’t seem to land a job in what he views as his most promising career path: Information security.
“As I’m sure you’re aware, having negative media attention associated with alleged (key word) criminal activity can have a detrimental effect on employment, banking and relationships,” Bloom wrote. “I have no current interest in being a business owner, nor do I have any useful business ideas to be honest. I was and am interested in interesting Information Security/programming work but it’s too large of a risk for any business to hire someone who was formerly accused of a crime.”
If you liked this story, please consider reading the first two pieces in this series:
SEO Expert Hired and Fired by Ashley Madison Turned on Company, Promising Revenge
Top Suspect in 2015 Ashley Madison Hack Committed Suicide in 2014
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) recently revised its policy on charging violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), a 1986 law that remains the primary statute by which federal prosecutors pursue cybercrime cases. The new guidelines state that prosecutors should avoid charging security researchers who operate in “good faith” when finding and reporting vulnerabilities. But legal experts continue to advise researchers to proceed with caution, noting the new guidelines can’t be used as a defense in court, nor are they any kind of shield against civil prosecution.
In a statement about the changes, Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco said the DOJ “has never been interested in prosecuting good-faith computer security research as a crime,” and that the new guidelines “promote cybersecurity by providing clarity for good-faith security researchers who root out vulnerabilities for the common good.”
What constitutes “good faith security research?” The DOJ’s new policy (PDF) borrows language from a Library of Congress rulemaking (PDF) on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), a similarly controversial law that criminalizes production and dissemination of technologies or services designed to circumvent measures that control access to copyrighted works. According to the government, good faith security research means:
“…accessing a computer solely for purposes of good-faith testing, investigation, and/or correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where such activity is carried out in a manner designed to avoid any harm to individuals or the public, and where the information derived from the activity is used primarily to promote the security or safety of the class of devices, machines, or online services to which the accessed computer belongs, or those who use such devices, machines, or online services.”
“Security research not conducted in good faith — for example, for the purpose of discovering security holes in devices, machines, or services in order to extort the owners of such devices, machines, or services — might be called ‘research,’ but is not in good faith.”
The new DOJ policy comes in response to a Supreme Court ruling last year in Van Buren v. United States (PDF), a case involving a former police sergeant in Florida who was convicted of CFAA violations after a friend paid him to use police resources to look up information on a private citizen.
But in an opinion authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the Supreme Court held that the CFAA does not apply to a person who obtains electronic information that they are otherwise authorized to access and then misuses that information.
Orin Kerr, a law professor at University of California, Berkeley, said the DOJ’s updated policy was expected given the Supreme Court ruling in the Van Buren case. Kerr noted that while the new policy says one measure of “good faith” involves researchers taking steps to prevent harm to third parties, what exactly those steps might constitute is another matter.
“The DOJ is making clear they’re not going to prosecute good faith security researchers, but be really careful before you rely on that,” Kerr said. “First, because you could still get sued [civilly, by the party to whom the vulnerability is being reported], but also the line as to what is legitimate security research and what isn’t is still murky.”
Kerr said the new policy also gives CFAA defendants no additional cause for action.
“A lawyer for the defendant can make the pitch that something is good faith security research, but it’s not enforceable,” Kerr said. “Meaning, if the DOJ does bring a CFAA charge, the defendant can’t move to dismiss it on the grounds that it’s good faith security research.”
Kerr added that he can’t think of a CFAA case where this policy would have made a substantive difference.
“I don’t think the DOJ is giving up much, but there’s a lot of hacking that could be covered under good faith security research that they’re saying they won’t prosecute, and it will be interesting to see what happens there,” he said.
The new policy also clarifies other types of potential CFAA violations that are not to be charged. Most of these include violations of a technology provider’s terms of service, and here the DOJ says “violating an access restriction contained in a term of service are not themselves sufficient to warrant federal criminal charges.” Some examples include:
-Embellishing an online dating profile contrary to the terms of service of the dating website;
-Creating fictional accounts on hiring, housing, or rental websites;
-Using a pseudonym on a social networking site that prohibits them;
-Checking sports scores or paying bills at work.
Kerr’s warning about the dangers that security researchers face from civil prosecution is well-founded. KrebsOnSecurity regularly hears from security researchers seeking advice on how to handle reporting a security vulnerability or data exposure. In most of these cases, the researcher isn’t worried that the government is going to come after them: It’s that they’re going to get sued by the company responsible for the security vulnerability or data leak.
Often these conversations center around the researcher’s desire to weigh the rewards of gaining recognition for their discoveries with the risk of being targeted with costly civil lawsuits. And almost just as often, the source of the researcher’s unease is that they recognize they might have taken their discovery just a tad too far.
Here’s a common example: A researcher finds a vulnerability in a website that allows them to individually retrieve every customer record in a database. But instead of simply polling a few records that could be used as a proof-of-concept and shared with the vulnerable website, the researcher decides to download every single file on the server.
Not infrequently, there is also concern because at some point the researcher suspected that their automated activities might have actually caused stability or uptime issues with certain services they were testing. Here, the researcher is usually concerned about approaching the vulnerable website or vendor because they worry their activities may already have been identified internally as some sort of external cyberattack.
What do I take away from these conversations? Some of the most trusted and feared security researchers in the industry today gained that esteem not by constantly taking things to extremes and skirting the law, but rather by publicly exercising restraint in the use of their powers and knowledge — and by being effective at communicating their findings in a way that maximizes the help and minimizes the potential harm.
If you believe you’ve discovered a security vulnerability or data exposure, try to consider first how you might defend your actions to the vulnerable website or vendor before embarking on any automated or semi-automated activity that the organization might reasonably misconstrue as a cyberattack. In other words, try as best you can to minimize the potential harm to the vulnerable site or vendor in question, and don’t go further than you need to prove your point.
For over a decade, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and its multi-stakeholder community have engaged in an extended dialogue on the topic of DNS abuse, and the need to define, measure and mitigate DNS-related security threats. With increasing global reliance on the internet and DNS for communication, connectivity and commerce, the members of this community have important parts to play in identifying, reporting and mitigating illegal or harmful behavior, within their respective roles and capabilities.
As we consider the path forward on necessary and appropriate steps to improve mitigation of DNS abuse, it’s helpful to reflect briefly on the origins of this issue within ICANN, and to recognize the various and relevant community inputs to our ongoing work.
As a starting point, it’s important to understand ICANN’s central role in preserving the security, stability, resiliency and global interoperability of the internet’s unique identifier system, and also the limitations established within ICANN’s bylaws. ICANN’s primary mission is to ensure the stable and secure operation of the internet’s unique identifier systems, but as expressly stated in its bylaws, ICANN “shall not regulate (i.e., impose rules and restrictions on) services that use the internet’s unique identifiers or the content that such services carry or provide, outside the express scope of Section 1.1(a).” As such, ICANN’s role is important, but limited, when considering the full range of possible definitions of “DNS Abuse,” and developing a comprehensive understanding of security threat categories and the roles and responsibilities of various players in the internet infrastructure ecosystem is required.
In support of this important work, ICANN’s generic top-level domain (gTLD) contracted parties (registries and registrars) continue to engage with ICANN, and with other stakeholders and community interest groups, to address key factors related to effective and appropriate DNS security threat mitigation, including:
To better understand the various roles, responsibilities and processes, it’s important to first define illegal and abusive online activity. While perspectives may vary across our wide range of interest groups, the emerging consensus on definitions and terminology is that these activities can be categorized as DNS Security Threats, Infrastructure Abuse, Illegal Content, or Abusive Content, with ICANN’s remit generally limited to the first two categories.
Behavior within each of these categories constitutes abuse, and it is incumbent on members of the community to actively work to combat and mitigate these behaviors where they have the capability, expertise and responsibility to do so. We recognize the benefit of coordination with other entities, including ICANN within its bylaw-mandated remit, across their respective areas of responsibility.
The ICANN Organization has been actively involved in advancing work on DNS abuse, including the 2017 initiation of the Domain Abuse Activity Reporting (DAAR) system by the Office of the Chief Technology Officer. DAAR is a system for studying and reporting on domain name registration and security threats across top-level domain (TLD) registries, with an overarching purpose to develop a robust, reliable, and reproducible methodology for analyzing security threat activity, which the ICANN community may use to make informed policy decisions. The first DAAR reports were issued in January 2018 and they are updated monthly. Also in 2017, ICANN published its “Framework for Registry Operators to Address Security Threats,” which provides helpful guidance to registries seeking to improve their own DNS security posture.
The ICANN Organization also plays an important role in enforcing gTLD contract compliance and implementing policies developed by the community via its bottom-up, multi-stakeholder processes. For example, over the last several years, it has conducted registry and registrar audits of the anti-abuse provisions in the relevant agreements.
The ICANN Organization has also been a catalyst for increased community attention and action on DNS abuse, including initiating the DNS Security Facilitation Initiative Technical Study Group, which was formed to investigate mechanisms to strengthen collaboration and communication on security and stability issues related to the DNS. Over the last two years, there have also been multiple ICANN cross-community meeting sessions dedicated to the topic, including the most recent session hosted by the ICANN Board during its Annual General Meeting in October 2021. Also, in 2021, ICANN formalized its work on DNS abuse into a dedicated program within the ICANN Organization. These enforcement and compliance responsibilities are very important to ensure that all of ICANN’s contracted parties are living up to their obligations, and that any so-called “bad actors” are identified and remediated or de-accredited and removed from serving the gTLD registry or registrar markets.
The ICANN Organization continues to develop new initiatives to help mitigate DNS security threats, including: (1) expanding DAAR to integrate some country code TLDs, and to eventually include registrar-level reporting; (2) work on COVID domain names; (3) contributions to the development of a Domain Generating Algorithms Framework and facilitating waivers to allow registries and registrars to act on imminent security threats, including botnets at scale; and (4) plans for the ICANN Board to establish a DNS abuse caucus.
As early as 2009, the ICANN community began to identify the need for additional safeguards to help address DNS abuse and security threats, and those community inputs increased over time and have reached a crescendo over the last two years. In the early stages of this community dialogue, the ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee, via its Public Safety Working Group, identified the need for additional mechanisms to address “criminal activity in the registration of domain names.” In the context of renegotiation of the Registrar Accreditation Agreement between ICANN and accredited registrars, and the development of the New gTLD Base Registry Agreement, the GAC played an important and influential role in highlighting this need, providing formal advice to the ICANN Board, which resulted in new requirements for gTLD registry and registrar operators, and new contractual compliance requirements for ICANN.
Following the launch of the 2012 round of new gTLDs, and the finalization of the 2013 amendments to the RAA, several ICANN bylaw-mandated review teams engaged further on the issue of DNS Abuse. These included the Competition, Consumer Trust and Consumer Choice Review Team (CCT-RT), and the second Security, Stability and Resiliency Review Team (SSR2-RT). Both final reports identified and reinforced the need for additional tools to help measure and combat DNS abuse. Also, during this timeframe, the GAC, along with the At-Large Advisory Committee and the Security and Stability Advisory Committee, issued their own respective communiques and formal advice to the ICANN Board reiterating or reinforcing past statements, and providing support for recommendations in the various Review Team reports. Most recently, the SSAC issued SAC 115 titled “SSAC Report on an Interoperable Approach to Addressing Abuse Handling in the DNS.” These ICANN community group inputs have been instrumental in bringing additional focus and/or clarity to the topic of DNS abuse, and have encouraged ICANN and its gTLD registries and registrars to look for improved mechanisms to address the types of abuse within our respective remits.
During 2020 and 2021, ICANN’s gTLD contracted parties have been constructively engaged with other parts of the ICANN community, and with ICANN Org, to advance improved understanding on the topic of DNS security threats, and to identify new and improved mechanisms to enhance the security, stability and resiliency of the domain name registration and resolution systems. Collectively, the registries and registrars have engaged with nearly all groups represented in the ICANN community, and we have produced important documents related to DNS abuse definitions, registry actions, registrar abuse reporting, domain generating algorithms, and trusted notifiers. These all represent significant steps forward in framing the context of the roles, responsibilities and capabilities of ICANN’s gTLD contracted parties, and, consistent with our Letter of Intent commitments, Verisign has been an important contributor, along with our partners, in these Contracted Party House initiatives.
In addition, the gTLD contracted parties and ICANN Organization continue to engage constructively on a number of fronts, including upcoming work on standardized registry reporting, which will help result in better data on abuse mitigation practices that will help to inform community work, future reviews, and provide better visibility into the DNS security landscape.
It is important to note that groups outside of ICANN’s immediate multi-stakeholder community have contributed significantly to the topic of DNS abuse mitigation:
Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network
The Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network is a multi-stakeholder organization addressing the tension between the cross-border internet and national jurisdictions. Its secretariat facilitates a global policy process engaging over 400 key entities from governments, the world’s largest internet companies, technical operators, civil society groups, academia and international organizations from over 70 countries. The I&JP has been instrumental in developing multi-stakeholder inputs on issues such as trusted notifier, and Verisign has been a long-time contributor to that work since the I&JP’s founding in 2012.
DNS Abuse Institute
The DNS Abuse Institute was formed in 2021 to develop “outcomes-based initiatives that will create recommended practices, foster collaboration and develop industry-shared solutions to combat the five areas of DNS Abuse: malware, botnets, phishing, pharming, and related spam.” The Institute was created by Public Interest Registry, the registry operator for the .org TLD.
Global Cyber Alliance
The Global Cyber Alliance is a nonprofit organization dedicated to making the internet a safer place by reducing cyber risk. The GCA builds programs, tools and partnerships to sustain a trustworthy internet to enable social and economic progress for all.
ECO “topDNS” DNS Abuse Initiative
Eco is the largest association of the internet industry in Europe. Eco is a long-standing advocate of an “Internet with Responsibility” and of self-regulatory approaches, such as the DNS Abuse Framework. The eco “topDNS” initiative will help bring together stakeholders with an interest in combating and mitigating DNS security threats, and Verisign is a supporter of this new effort.
Other Community Groups
Verisign contributes to the anti-abuse, technical and policy communities: We continuously engage with ICANN and an array of other industry partners to help ensure the continued safe and secure operation of the DNS. For example, Verisign is actively engaged in anti-abuse, technical and policy communities such as the Anti-Phishing and Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Groups, FIRST and the Internet Engineering Task Force.
As a leader in the domain name industry and DNS ecosystem, Verisign supports and has contributed to the cross-community efforts enumerated above. In addition, Verisign also engages directly by:
An important concept and approach for mitigating illegal and abusive activity online is the ability to engage with and rely upon third-party “trusted notifiers” to identify and report such incidents at the appropriate level in the DNS ecosystem. Verisign has supported and been engaged in the good work of the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network since its inception, and we’re encouraged by its recent progress on trusted notifier framing. As mentioned earlier, there are some key questions to be addressed as we consider the viability of engaging trusted notifiers or building trusting notifier entities, to help mitigate illegal and abusive online activity.
Verisign’s recent experience with the U.S. government (NTIA and FDA) in combating illegal online opioid sales has been very helpful in illuminating a possible approach for third-party trusted notifier engagement. As noted, we have also benefited from direct engagement with the Internet Watch Foundation and law enforcement in combating CSAM. These recent examples of third-party engagement have underscored the value of a well-formed and executed notification regime, supported by clear expectations, due diligence and due process.
Discussions around trusted notifiers and an appropriate framework for engagement are under way, and Verisign recently engaged with other registries and registrars to lead the development of such a framework for further discussion within the ICANN community. We have significant expertise and experience as an infrastructure provider within our areas of technical, legal and contractual responsibility, and we are aggressive in protecting our operations from bad actors. But in matters related to illegal or abusive content, we need and value contributions from third parties to appropriately identify such behavior when supported by necessary evidence and due diligence. Precisely how such third-party notifications can be formalized and supported at scale is an open question, but one that requires further exploration and work. Verisign is committed to continuing to contribute to these ongoing discussions as we work to mitigate illegal and abusive threats to the security, stability and resiliency of the internet.
Over the last several years, DNS abuse and DNS-related security threat mitigation has been a very important topic of discussion in and around the ICANN community. In cooperation with ICANN, contracted parties, and other groups within the ICANN community, the DNS ecosystem including Verisign has been constructively engaged in developing a common understanding and practical work to advance these efforts, with a goal of meaningfully reducing the level and impact of malicious activity in the DNS. In addition to its contractual compliance functions, ICANN’s contributions have been important in helping to advance this important work and it continues to have a critical coordination and facilitation function that brings the ICANN community together on this important topic. The ICANN community’s recent focus on DNS abuse has been helpful, significant progress has been made, and more work is needed to ensure continued progress in mitigating DNS security threats. As we look ahead to 2022, we are committed to collaborating constructively with ICANN and the ICANN community to deliver on these important goals.
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