I told ya so. Right from the beginning, it was pretty obvious what "MOAB" was probably going to be and sure enough, this tweet came true:
Interesting find by @MayhemDayOne, wonder if it was from a shady breach search service (weβve seen a bunch shut down over the years)? Either way, collecting and storing this data is now trivial so not a big surprise to see someone screw up their permissions and (re)leak it all. https://t.co/DM7udeUcRk
β Troy Hunt (@troyhunt) January 22, 2024
What I didn't know at the time was the hilarity of how similar this service would be to those that had come before it... and been shut down by law enforcement agencies. I mean seriously, when you're literally copying and pasting clauses from LeakedSource, what do you think is going to happen?! I sense another "I told ya so" coming...
Three Americans were charged this week with stealing more than $400 million in a November 2022 SIM-swapping attack. The U.S. government did not name the victim organization, but there is every indication that the money was stolen from the now-defunct cryptocurrency exchange FTX, which had just filed for bankruptcy on that same day.
A graphic illustrating the flow of more than $400 million in cryptocurrencies stolen from FTX on Nov. 11-12, 2022. Image: Elliptic.co.
An indictment unsealed this week and first reported on by Ars Technica alleges that Chicago man Robert Powell, a.k.a. βR,β βR$β and βElSwapo1,β was the ringleader of a SIM-swapping group called the βPowell SIM Swapping Crew.β Colorado resident Emily βEmβ Hernandez allegedly helped the group gain access to victim devices in service of SIM-swapping attacks between March 2021 and April 2023. Indiana resident Carter Rohn, a.k.a. βCarti,β and βPunslayer,β allegedly assisted in compromising devices.
In a SIM-swapping attack, the crooks transfer the targetβs phone number to a device they control, allowing them to intercept any text messages or phone calls sent to the victim, including one-time passcodes for authentication or password reset links sent via SMS.
The indictment states that the perpetrators in this heist stole the $400 million in cryptocurrencies on Nov. 11, 2022 after they SIM-swapped an AT&T customer by impersonating them at a retail store using a fake ID. However, the document refers to the victim in this case only by the name βVictim 1.β
Wiredβs Andy Greenberg recently wrote about FTXβs all-night race to stop a $1 billion crypto heist that occurred on the evening of November 11:
βFTXβs staff had already endured one of the worst days in the companyβs short life. What had recently been one of the worldβs top cryptocurrency exchanges, valued at $32 billion only 10 months earlier, had just declared bankruptcy. Executives had, after an extended struggle, persuaded the companyβs CEO, Sam Bankman-Fried, to hand over the reins to John Ray III, a new chief executive now tasked with shepherding the company through a nightmarish thicket of debts, many of which it seemed to have no means to pay.β
βFTX had, it seemed, hit rock bottom. Until someoneβa thief or thieves who have yet to be identifiedβchose that particular moment to make things far worse. That Friday evening, exhausted FTX staffers began to see mysterious outflows of the companyβs cryptocurrency, publicly captured on the Etherscan website that tracks the Ethereum blockchain, representing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of crypto being stolen in real time.β
The indictment says the $400 million was stolen over several hours between November 11 and 12, 2022. Tom Robinson, co-founder of the blockchain intelligence firm Elliptic, said the attackers in the FTX heist began to drain FTX wallets on the evening of Nov. 11, 2022 local time, and continuing until the 12th of November.
Robinson said Elliptic is not aware of any other crypto heists of that magnitude occurring on that date.
βWe put the value of the cryptoassets stolen at $477 million,β Robinson said. βThe FTX administrators have reported overall losses due to βunauthorized third-party transfersβ of $413 million β the discrepancy is likely due to subsequent seizure and return of some of the stolen assets. Either way, itβs certainly over $400 million, and we are not aware of any other thefts from crypto exchanges on this scale, on this date.β
The SIM-swappers allegedly responsible for the $400 million crypto theft are all U.S. residents. But there are some indications they had help from organized cybercriminals based in Russia. In October 2023, Elliptic released a report that found the money stolen from FTX had been laundered through exchanges with ties to criminal groups based in Russia.
βA Russia-linked actor seems a stronger possibility,β Elliptic wrote. βOf the stolen assets that can be traced through ChipMixer, significant amounts are combined with funds from Russia-linked criminal groups, including ransomware gangs and darknet markets, before being sent to exchanges. This points to the involvement of a broker or other intermediary with a nexus in Russia.β
Nick Bax, director of analytics at the cryptocurrency wallet recovery firm Unciphered, said the flow of stolen FTX funds looks more like what his team has seen from groups based in Eastern Europe and Russian than anything theyβve witnessed from US-based SIM-swappers.
βI was a bit surprised by this development but it seems to be consistent with reports from CISA [the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] and others that βScattered Spiderβ has worked with [ransomware] groups like ALPHV/BlackCat,β Bax said.
CISAβs alert on Scattered Spider says they are a cybercriminal group that targets large companies and their contracted information technology (IT) help desks.
βScattered Spider threat actors, per trusted third parties, have typically engaged in data theft for extortion and have also been known to utilize BlackCat/ALPHV ransomware alongside their usual TTPs,β CISA said, referring to the groupβs signature βTactics, Techniques an Procedures.β
Nick Bax, posting on Twitter/X in Nov 2022 about his research on the $400 million FTX heist.
Earlier this week, KrebsOnSecurity published a story noting that a Florida man recently charged with being part of a SIM-swapping conspiracy is thought to be a key member of Scattered Spider, a hacking group also known as 0ktapus. That group has been blamed for a string of cyber intrusions at major U.S. technology companies during the summer of 2022.
Financial claims involving FTXβs bankruptcy proceedings are being handled by the financial and risk consulting giant Kroll. In August 2023, Kroll suffered its own breach after a Kroll employee was SIM-swapped. According to Kroll, the thieves stole user information for multiple cryptocurrency platforms that rely on Kroll services to handle bankruptcy proceedings.
KrebsOnSecurity sought comment for this story from Kroll, the FBI, the prosecuting attorneys, and Sullivan & Cromwell, the law firm handling the FTX bankruptcy. This story will be updated in the event any of them respond.
Attorneys for Mr. Powell said they do not know who Victim 1 is in the indictment, as the government hasnβt shared that information yet. Powellβs next court date is a detention hearing on Feb. 2, 2024.
Update, Feb. 3, 12:19 p.m. ET: The FBI declined a request to comment.
On Jan. 9, 2024, U.S. authorities arrested a 19-year-old Florida man charged with wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiring with others to use SIM-swapping to steal cryptocurrency. Sources close to the investigation tell KrebsOnSecurity the accused was a key member of a criminal hacking group blamed for a string of cyber intrusions at major U.S. technology companies during the summer of 2022.
A graphic depicting how 0ktapus leveraged one victim to attack another. Image credit: Amitai Cohen of Wiz.
Prosecutors say Noah Michael Urban of Palm Coast, Fla., stole at least $800,000 from at least five victims between August 2022 and March 2023. In each attack, the victims saw their email and financial accounts compromised after suffering an unauthorized SIM-swap, wherein attackers transferred each victimβs mobile phone number to a new device that they controlled.
The government says Urban went by the aliases βSosaβ and βKing Bob,β among others. Multiple trusted sources told KrebsOnSecurity that Sosa/King Bob was a core member of a hacking group behind the 2022 breach at Twilio, a company that provides services for making and receiving text messages and phone calls. Twilio disclosed in Aug. 2022 that an intrusion had exposed a βlimited numberβ of Twilio customer accounts through a sophisticated social engineering attack designed to steal employee credentials.
Shortly after that disclosure, the security firm Group-IB published a report linking the attackers behind the Twilio intrusion to separate breaches at more than 130 organizations, including LastPass, DoorDash, Mailchimp, and Plex. Multiple security firms soon assigned the hacking group the nickname βScattered Spider.β
Group-IB dubbed the gang by a different name β 0ktapus β which was a nod to how the criminal group phished employees for credentials. The missives asked users to click a link and log in at a phishing page that mimicked their employerβs Okta authentication page. Those who submitted credentials were then prompted to provide the one-time password needed for multi-factor authentication.
A booking photo of Noah Michael Urban released by the Volusia County Sheriff.
0ktapus used newly-registered domains that often included the name of the targeted company, and sent text messages urging employees to click on links to these domains to view information about a pending change in their work schedule. The phishing sites used a Telegram instant message bot to forward any submitted credentials in real-time, allowing the attackers to use the phished username, password and one-time code to log in as that employee at the real employer website.
0ktapus often leveraged information or access gained in one breach to perpetrate another. As documented by Group-IB, the group pivoted from its access to Twilio to attack at least 163 of its customers. Among those was the encrypted messaging app Signal, which said the breach could have let attackers re-register the phone number on another device for about 1,900 users.
Also in August 2022, several employees at email delivery firm Mailchimp provided their remote access credentials to this phishing group. According to an Aug. 12 blog post, the attackers used their access to Mailchimp employee accounts to steal data from 214 customers involved in cryptocurrency and finance.
On August 25, 2022, the password manager service LastPass disclosed a breach in which attackers stole some source code and proprietary LastPass technical information, and weeks later LastPass said an investigation revealed no customer data or password vaults were accessed.
However, on November 30, 2022 LastPass disclosed a far more serious breach that the company said leveraged data stolen in the August breach. LastPass said criminal hackers had stolen encrypted copies of some password vaults, as well as other personal information.
In February 2023, LastPass disclosed that the intrusion involved a highly complex, targeted attack against a DevOps engineer who was one of only four LastPass employees with access to the corporate vault. In that incident, the attackers exploited a security vulnerability in a Plex media server that the employee was running on his home network, and succeeded in installing malicious software that stole passwords and other authentication credentials. The vulnerability exploited by the intruders was patched back in 2020, but the employee never updated his Plex software.
As it happens, Plex announced its own data breach one day before LastPass disclosed its initial August intrusion. On August 24, 2022, Plexβs security team urged users to reset their passwords, saying an intruder had accessed customer emails, usernames and encrypted passwords.
A review of thousands of messages that Sosa and King Bob posted to several public forums and Discord servers over the past two years shows that the person behind these identities was mainly focused on two things: Sim-swapping, and trading in stolen, unreleased rap music recordings from popular artists.
Indeed, those messages show Sosa/King Bob was obsessed with finding new βgrails,β the slang term used in some cybercrime discussion channels to describe recordings from popular artists that have never been officially released. It stands to reason that King Bob was SIM-swapping important people in the music industry to obtain these files, although there is little to support this conclusion from the public chat records available.
βI got the most music in the com,β King Bob bragged in a Discord server in November 2022. βI got thousands of grails.β
King Bobβs chats show he was particularly enamored of stealing the unreleased works of his favorite artists β Lil Uzi Vert, Playboi Carti, and Juice Wrld. When another Discord user asked if he has Eminem grails, King Bob said he was unsure.
βI have two folders,β King Bob explained. βOne with Uzi, Carti, Juicewrld. And then I have βevery other artist.β Every other artist is unorganized as fuck and has thousands of random shit.β
King Bobβs posts on Discord show he quickly became a celebrity on Leaked[.]cx, one of most active forums for trading, buying and selling unreleased music from popular artists. The more grails that users share with the Leaked[.]cx community, the more their status and access on the forum grows.
The last cache of Leaked dot cx indexed by the archive.org on Jan. 11, 2024.
And King Bob shared a large number of his purloined tunes with this community. Still others he tried to sell. Itβs unclear how many of those sales were ever consummated, but it is not unusual for a prized grail to sell for anywhere from $5,000 to $20,000.
In mid-January 2024, several Leaked[.]cx regulars began complaining that they hadnβt seen King Bob in a while and were really missing his grails. On or around Jan. 11, the same day the Justice Department unsealed the indictment against Urban, Leaked[.]cx started blocking people who were trying to visit the site from the United States.
Days later, frustrated Leaked[.]cx users speculated about what could be the cause of the blockage.
βProbs blocked as part of king bob investigation i think?,β wrote the user βPlsdontarrest.β βDoubt he only hacked US artists/ppl which is why itβs happening in multiple countries.β
On Sept. 21, 2022, KrebsOnSecurity told the story of a βForeshadow,β the nickname chosen by a Florida teenager who was working for a SIM-swapping crew when he was abducted, beaten and held for a $200,000 ransom. A rival SIM-swapping group claimed that Foreshadow and his associates had robbed them of their fair share of the profits from a recent SIM-swap.
In a video released by his abductors on Telegram, a bloodied, battered Foreshadow was made to say they would kill him unless the ransom was paid.
As I wrote in that story, Foreshadow appears to have served as a βholderβ β a term used to describe a low-level member of any SIM-swapping group who agrees to carry out the riskiest and least rewarding role of the crime: Physically keeping and managing the various mobile devices and SIM cards that are used in SIM-swapping scams.
KrebsOnSecurity has since learned that Foreshadow was a holder for a particularly active SIM-swapper who went by βElijah,β which was another nickname that prosecutors say Urban used.
Shortly after Foreshadowβs hostage video began circulating on Telegram and Discord, multiple known actors in the SIM-swapping space told everyone in the channels to delete any previous messages with Foreshadow, claiming he was fully cooperating with the FBI.
This was not the first time Sosa and his crew were hit with violent attacks from rival SIM-swapping groups. In early 2022, a video surfaced on a popular cybercrime channel purporting to show attackers hurling a brick through a window at an address that matches the spacious and upscale home of Urbanβs parents in Sanford, Fl.
βBrickingsβ are among the βviolence-as-a-serviceβ offerings broadly available on many cybercrime channels. SIM-swapping and adjacent cybercrime channels are replete withΒ job offers for in-person assignments and tasks that can be found if one searches for posts titled, βIf you live near,β or βIRL jobβ β short for βin real lifeβ job.
A number of these classified ads are in service of performing brickings, where someone is hired to visit a specific address and toss a brick through the targetβs window. Other typical IRL job offers involve tire slashings and even drive-by shootings.
Sosa was known to be a top member of the broader cybercriminal community online known as βThe Com,β wherein hackers boast loudly about high-profile exploits and hacks that almost invariably begin with social engineering β tricking people over the phone, email or SMS into giving away credentials that allow remote access to corporate internal networks.
Sosa also was active in a particularly destructive group of accomplished criminal SIM-swappers known as βStar Fraud.β Cyberscoopβs AJ Vicens reported last year that individuals within Star Fraud were likely involved in the high-profile Caesars Entertainment an MGM Resorts extortion attacks.
βALPHV, an established ransomware-as-a-service operation thought to be based in Russia and linked to attacks on dozens of entities, claimed responsibility for Caesars and MGM attacks in a note posted to its website earlier this month,β Vicens wrote. βExperts had said the attacks were the work of a group tracked variously as UNC 3944 or Scattered Spider, which has been described as an affiliate working with ALPHV made up of people in the United States and Britain who excel at social engineering.β
In February 2023, KrebsOnSecurity published data taken from the Telegram channels for Star Fraud and two other SIM-swapping groups showing these crooks focused on SIM-swapping T-Mobile customers, and that they collectively claimed access to T-Mobile on 100 separate occasions over a 7-month period in 2022.
The SIM-swapping groups were able to switch targeted phone numbers to another device on demand because they constantly phished T-Mobile employees into giving up credentials to employee-only tools. In each of those cases the goal was the same: Phish T-Mobile employees for access to internal company tools, and then convert that access into a cybercrime service that could be hired to divertΒ anyΒ T-Mobile userβs text messages and phone calls to another device.
Allison Nixon, chief research officer at the New York cybersecurity consultancy Unit 221B, said the increasing brazenness of many Com members is a function of how long it has taken federal authorities to go after guys like Sosa.
βThese incidents show what happens when it takes too long for cybercriminals to get arrested,β Nixon said. βIf governments fail to prioritize this source of threat, violence originating from the Internet will affect regular people.β
The Daytona Beach News-Journal reports that Urban was arrested Jan. 9 and his trial is scheduled to begin in the trial term starting March 4 in Jacksonville. The publication said the judge overseeing Urbanβs case denied bail because the defendant was a strong flight risk.
At Urbanβs arraignment, it emerged that he had no fixed address and had been using an alias to stay at an Airbnb. The judge reportedly said that when a search warrant was executed at Urbanβs residence, the defendant was downloading programs to delete computer files.
Whatβs more, the judge explained, despite telling authorities in May that he would not have any more contact with his co-conspirators and would not engage in cryptocurrency transactions, he did so anyway.
Urban entered a plea of not guilty. Urbanβs court-appointed attorney said her client would have no comment at this time.
Prosecutors charged Urban with eight counts of wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and five counts of aggravated identity theft. According to the government, if convicted Urban faces up to 20 years in federal prison on each wire fraud charge. He also faces a minimum mandatory penalty of two years in prison for the aggravated identity offenses, which will run consecutive to any other prison sentence imposed.
I've always thought of it a bit like baseball cards; a kid has a card of this one player that another kid is keen on, and that kid has a card the first one wants so they make a trade. They both have a bunch of cards they've collected over time and by virtue of existing in the same social circles, trades are frequent, and cards flow back and forth on a regular basis. That's the analogy I often use to describe the data breach "personal stash" ecosystem, but with one key difference: if you trade a baseball card then you no longer have the original card, but if you trade a data breach which is merely a digital file, it replicates.
There are personal stashes of data breaches all over the place and they're usually presented like this one:
You'll recognise many of those names because they're noteworthy incidents that received a bunch of press. My Space. Adobe. LinkedIn. Ashley Madison.
The same incidents appear here:
And so on and so forth. Stashes of breaches like this are all over the place and they fuel an exchange ecosystem that replicates billions of records of personal data over and over again. Your data. My data. The data of a significant portion of the global internet-using population, just freely flowing backwards and forwards not just in the shady corners of "the dark web" but traded out there in the clear on mainstream websites. Until inevitably:
Diogo Santos Coelho was 14 when he started RaidForums, and was 21 by the time he was arrested for running the service 2 years ago. A kid, exchanging data without the maturity to understand the consequences of his actions. RaidForums left a void that was quickly filled by BreachForums:
Conor Fitzpatrick was 20 years old when he was finally picked up for running the service last year. Still just a kid, at least in the colloquial fashion in which we refer to youngsters as when we get a bit older, but surely still legally a minor when he chose to begin collecting data breaches.
Websites like these are taken down for a simple reason:
The ecosystem of personal stashes exchanged with other parties fuels crime.
For example, data breaches seed services set up with the express intent of monetising a broad range of personal attributes to the detriment of people who are already victims of a breach. Call them shady versions of Have I Been Pwned if you will, and this talk I gave at AusCERT a couple of years ago is a great explainer (deep-linked to the start of that segment):
The first service I spoke about in that segment was We Leak Info and it was run by two 22 year old guys. The website first appeared 3 years earlier - only a year after the creators had left childhood - and it allowed anyone with the money to access anyone else's personal data including:
names, email addresses, usernames, phone numbers, and passwords
One of the duo was later sentenced to 2 years in prison for his role, and when you read the sorts of conversations they were having, you can't help but think they behaved exactly like you'd expect a couple of young guys who thought they were anonymous would:
In the video, I mentioned Jordan Bloom in relation to LeakedSource, a veritable older gentleman of this class of crime being 24 when the site first appeared.
The company operating LeakedSource, Defiant Tech Inc, which was founded by Jordan Bloom, eventually entered a guilty plea to charges that included trafficking in identity information and when you read what that involved, you can see why this would attract the ire of law enforcement agencies:
However, unlike other breach notification services, such as Have I Been Pwned, LeakedSource also gave subscribers access to usernames, passwords (including in clear text), email addresses and IP addresses. LeakedSource services were often advertised on hacking forums and there was suspicion that its operators were actively looking to hack organizations whose data they could add to their database.
In 2016, a well-wisher purchased my own data from LeakedSource and sent over a dozen different records similar to this one:
Not mentioned in my talk but running in the same era was Leakbase, yet another service that collated huge volumes of sensitive data and sold it to absolutely anyone:
And just like all the other ones, the same data appeared over and over again:
It went dark at the end of 2017 amidst speculation the disappearance was tied to the takedown of the Hansa dark web market. If that was the case, why did we never hear of charges being laid as we did with We Leak Info and LeakedSource? Could it be that the operator of Leakbase was only ever so slightly younger than the other guys mentioned above and not having yet reached adulthood, managed to dodge charges? It would certainly be consistent with the demographic pattern of those with personal stashes of data breaches.
Speaking of patterns: We Leak Info, LeakedSource, Leakbase - it's like there's a theme of shady services attached to the word. As I say in the video, there's also a theme of attempting to remain anonymous (which clearly hasn't worked very well!), and a theme of attempting to eschew legal responsibility for how the data is used by merely putting words in the terms of service. For example, here's Jordan's go at deflecting his role in the ecosystem and yes, this was the entire terms of service:
I particularly like this clause:
You may only use this tool for your own personal security and data research. You may only search information about yourself, or those you are authorized in writing to do so.
That's not going to keep you out of trouble! Time and time again, I see this sort of wording on services used as if it's going to make a difference when the law comes asking hard questions; "Hey we literally told people to play nice with the data!"
We Leak Info used similar entertaining wording with some of the highlights including:
That last one in particular is an absolute zinger! But again, remember, we're talking about guys who stood this service up as teenagers and literally worked on the assumption of "as [l]ong as we cooperate they [the FBI] won't fuck with us" π€¦ββοΈ The ignorance of that attitude whilst advertising services on criminal forums is just mind-blowing, even for kids.
All of which brings me to the inspiration for this blog post:
Interesting find by @MayhemDayOne, wonder if it was from a shady breach search service (weβve seen a bunch shut down over the years)? Either way, collecting and storing this data is now trivial so not a big surprise to see someone screw up their permissions and (re)leak it all. https://t.co/DM7udeUcRk
β Troy Hunt (@troyhunt) January 22, 2024
It's like I've seen it all before! No, really, because only a couple of days later someone running a service popped up and claimed responsibility for having exposed the data due to "a firewall misconfiguration". I'm not going to name or link the service, but I will describe a few key features:
I could write predictions about the future of this service but if you've read this far and paid attention to the precedents, you can reliably form your own conclusion. The outcome is easily predictable and indeed it was the predictability of the whole situation when I started getting bombarded with queries about the "Mother of all Breaches" that frustrated me; of course it was someone's personal stash, because we've seen it all before and we live in an era where it's dead easy to build services like this. Cloud is ubiquitous and storage is cheap, you can stand up great looking websites in next to no time courtesy of freely available templates, and the whole data breach trading ecosystem I referred to earlier can easily seed services like this.
Maybe the young guy running this service (assuming the previously observed patterns apply) will learn from history and quietly exit while the getting is good, I don't know, time will tell. At the very least, if he reads this and takes nothing else away, don't go driving around in a bright green Lamborghini!
Edit: In the original version of this blog post, it was incorrectly implied that Jordan Bloom may have been the person who pled guilty to charges when in fact it was the company that ran LeakedSource, Defiant Tech Inc, that the plea was entered under. To the extent that the blog contained words to the effect of, or otherwise implied or contained innuendo that Mr Bloom engaged in criminal or otherwise illegal conduct, or pled guilty to trafficking identify information, I apologise and unreservedly retract such statements and this blog has been edited to ensure that the facts involved in this matter are accurately portrayed.