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Cyber security implies protecting the confidentiality, availability and integrity of computer systems and networks. Often security researchers and security teams focus on threats to software and the risks associated with authenticating and managing users. However, computing systems are built upon a tall stack of computing resources.
Each layer within the stack is exposed to specific threats which need to be considered as part of a cyber security strategy. As the threat landscape evolves and exposure to risk changes, organizations need to review their threat exposure and consider if current mitigations are sufficient for their needs.
The recent disruption of the Nord Stream submarine gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea by an apparent act of sabotage highlights the risks to infrastructure located beneath the waves. The telecommunications infrastructure that carries internet traffic between countries and continents is often provided by submarine cables. These cables are relatively few in number but carry vast amounts of internet and enterprise traffic, potentially from many different service providers.
The seabed is a challenging environment for infrastructure. Sea water is corrosive, the pressure on the ocean floor can be extreme, while earthquakes, ship’s anchors and dredging provide additional risks to may result in the severing of a cable. Submarine cables are only expected to achieve a lifespan in the region of 25 years before failure.
Repairing or replacing a submarine cable is expensive and time consuming. It may be many months before a failed cable can be repaired or replaced. In the absence of a functioning cable, internet connections must be rerouted to avoid disruption. However, this risks saturating the remaining infrastructure and adversely affecting the quality of connections.
Organizations that require high availability international or intercontinental network connections should review their exposure to the risk of submarine cables failure. The nature of this risk will depend on how services are currently delivered.
At the time of writing there is no specific threat to undersea infrastructure. Other than attacks against terrestrial cables, no cable damage has been shown to be due to sabotage. Nevertheless, the Secretary General of NATO has stressed the importance of undersea cables to civilian society and military capability [1]. The British Chief of Defense Staff has warned how seriously intentional damage to telecommunications cables would be taken [2].
Physical infrastructure can not be taken for granted. Organizations would do well to review the impact of one or more submarine cables being taken out of service. Preparing response plans and contingencies in advance ensures that disruption is kept to a minimum in the event that such a scenario occurs.
[1]. Press Conference (22 Oct 2020), NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_178946.htm?selectedLocale=en
[2]. “Chief of Defence Staff: Russia cutting underwater cables could be ‘an act of war’” (8 Jan 2022), Forces.net.
https://www.forces.net/news/chief-defence-staff-russia-cutting-underwater-cables-could-be-act-war
We’d love to hear what you think. Ask a Question, Comment Below, and Stay Connected with Cisco Secure on social!
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Two Russian nationals accused of operating Z-Library – one of the largest online book piracy websites – have been charged with criminal copyright infringement, wire fraud and money laundering.…
Israeli fortifications in the West Bank are becoming a bit more faceless, as the military has reportedly deployed robotic turrets capable of firing stun grenades, less-than-lethal bullets, and tear gas at Palestinians protesting their presence.…
Peter is an IT manager for a technology manufacturer that got hit with a Russian ransomware strain called “Zeppelin” in May 2020. He’d been on the job less than six months, and because of the way his predecessor architected things, the company’s data backups also were encrypted by Zeppelin. After two weeks of stalling their extortionists, Peter’s bosses were ready to capitulate and pay the ransom demand. Then came the unlikely call from an FBI agent. “Don’t pay,” the agent said. “We’ve found someone who can crack the encryption.”
Peter, who spoke candidly about the attack on condition of anonymity, said the FBI told him to contact a cybersecurity consulting firm in New Jersey called Unit 221B, and specifically its founder — Lance James. Zeppelin sprang onto the crimeware scene in December 2019, but it wasn’t long before James discovered multiple vulnerabilities in the malware’s encryption routines that allowed him to brute-force the decryption keys in a matter of hours, using nearly 100 cloud computer servers.
In an interview with KrebsOnSecurity, James said Unit 221B was wary of advertising its ability to crack Zeppelin ransomware keys because it didn’t want to tip its hand to Zeppelin’s creators, who were likely to modify their file encryption approach if they detected it was somehow being bypassed.
This is not an idle concern. There are multiple examples of ransomware groups doing just that after security researchers crowed about finding vulnerabilities in their ransomware code.
“The minute you announce you’ve got a decryptor for some ransomware, they change up the code,” James said.
But he said the Zeppelin group appears to have stopped spreading their ransomware code gradually over the past year, possibly because Unit 221B’s referrals from the FBI let them quietly help nearly two dozen victim organizations recover without paying their extortionists.
In a blog post published today to coincide with a Black Hat talk on their discoveries, James and co-author Joel Lathrop said they were motivated to crack Zeppelin after the ransomware gang started attacking nonprofit and charity organizations.
“What motivated us the most during the leadup to our action was the targeting of homeless shelters, nonprofits and charity organizations,” the two wrote. “These senseless acts of targeting those who are unable to respond are the motivation for this research, analysis, tools, and blog post. A general Unit 221B rule of thumb around our offices is: Don’t [REDACTED] with the homeless or sick! It will simply trigger our ADHD and we will get into that hyper-focus mode that is good if you’re a good guy, but not so great if you are an ***hole.”
The researchers said their break came when they understood that while Zeppelin used three different types of encryption keys to encrypt files, they could undo the whole scheme by factoring or computing just one of them: An ephemeral RSA-512 public key that is randomly generated on each machine it infects.
“If we can recover the RSA-512 Public Key from the registry, we can crack it and get the 256-bit AES Key that encrypts the files!” they wrote. “The challenge was that they delete the [public key] once the files are fully encrypted. Memory analysis gave us about a 5-minute window after files were encrypted to retrieve this public key.”
Unit 221B ultimately built a “Live CD” version of Linux that victims could run on infected systems to extract that RSA-512 key. From there, they would load the keys into a cluster of 800 CPUs donated by hosting giant Digital Ocean that would then start cracking them. The company also used that same donated infrastructure to help victims decrypt their data using the recovered keys.
A typical Zeppelin ransomware note.
Jon is another grateful Zeppelin ransomware victim who was aided by Unit 221B’s decryption efforts. Like Peter, Jon asked that his last name and that of his employer be omitted from the story, but he’s in charge of IT for a mid-sized managed service provider that got hit with Zeppelin in July 2020.
The attackers that savaged Jon’s company managed to phish credentials and a multi-factor authentication token for some tools the company used to support customers, and in short order they’d seized control over the servers and backups for a healthcare provider customer.
Jon said his company was reluctant to pay a ransom in part because it wasn’t clear from the hackers’ demands whether the ransom amount they demanded would provide a key to unlock all systems, and that it would do so safely.
“They want you to unlock your data with their software, but you can’t trust that,” Jon said. “You want to use your own software or someone else who’s trusted to do it.”
In August 2022, the FBI and the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a joint warning on Zeppelin, saying the FBI had “observed instances where Zeppelin actors executed their malware multiple times within a victim’s network, resulting in the creation of different IDs or file extensions, for each instance of an attack; this results in the victim needing several unique decryption keys.”
The advisory says Zeppelin has attacked “a range of businesses and critical infrastructure organizations, including defense contractors, educational institutions, manufacturers, technology companies, and especially organizations in the healthcare and medical industries. Zeppelin actors have been known to request ransom payments in Bitcoin, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand dollars to over a million dollars.”
The FBI and CISA say the Zeppelin actors gain access to victim networks by exploiting weak Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials, exploiting SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities, and phishing campaigns. Prior to deploying Zeppelin ransomware, actors spend one to two weeks mapping or enumerating the victim network to identify data enclaves, including cloud storage and network backups, the alert notes.
Jon said he felt so lucky after connecting with James and hearing about their decryption work, that he toyed with the idea of buying a lottery ticket that day.
“This just doesn’t usually happen,” Jon said. “It’s 100 percent like winning the lottery.”
By the time Jon’s company got around to decrypting their data, they were forced by regulators to prove that no patient data had been exfiltrated from their systems. All told, it took his employer two months to fully recover from the attack.
“I definitely feel like I was ill-prepared for this attack,” Jon said. “One of the things I’ve learned from this is the importance of forming your core team and having those people who know what their roles and responsibilities are ahead of time. Also, trying to vet new vendors you’ve never met before and build trust relationships with them is very difficult to do when you have customers down hard now and they’re waiting on you to help them get back up.”
A more technical writeup on Unit 221B’s discoveries (cheekily titled “0XDEAD ZEPPELIN”) is available here.
Private security firms in New York City have co-opted public resources – specifically trees – to track their guards as they make their rounds.…
A New York judge has issued a default judgment against two Russian nationals who are alleged to have helped create the "Glupteba" botnet, sold fraudulent credit card information, and generated cryptocurrency using the network.…
Since releasing SecureX orchestration, we’ve regularly published two types of content for our customers to import and use: atomic actions and workflows. Atomic actions are small, re-usable functions that allow you to do simple things like isolating an endpoint in Cisco Secure Endpoint. Workflows are more complex combinations of activities, often made up of multiple atomic actions, that accomplish a broader objective. One of our most popular workflows fetches blog posts from Talos and then conducts an investigation into each post using a customer’s SecureX-integrated products. As of this blog post’s publishing, we’ve released 75 workflows. So, let’s talk about what’s new…
In the past, when you wanted to communicate with SecureX APIs, you had to go through a multi-step process to generate an API client, use that API client to get a token, and then refresh the token every 10 minutes. This process wasn’t exactly simple, so in April we released the new SecureX Token account key. This special type of account key allows you to integrate with SecureX APIs without creating an API client, generating a token, or worrying about when the token expires. Simply use a SecureX target in conjunction with a SecureX Token account key and the platform takes care of the tokens. For more information about this update and how to take advantage of this new functionality, check out our documentation. Keep in mind that if your orchestration tenant was created prior to April 2022, you may need to create a SecureX Token.
Now that we have SecureX Token account keys and customers have been using them for a few months, we decided it was time to update all of our previously published workflows to be fully compatible with the new account key type. All 24 workflows using SecureX APIs have now been updated to leverage SecureX Tokens. For more information about Cisco-published workflows, check out our workflow list.
Since Cisco Secure Firewall is almost always deployed on-premises and behind a firewall, integrating it with SecureX orchestration in the cloud has required the use of a SecureX orchestration remote. Not all of our customers are interested in deploying an on-premises virtual machine or they lack a VMware ESXi deployment within which to run the VM. Now, with the release of the SecureX Security Services Exchange (SSE) API proxy, you can integrate your SSE-registered FMC devices with orchestration workflows without the need for additional remotes or virtual machines. To show how this works and highlight how easy this integration is, we re-released five of our existing FMC workflows with support for the SSE API proxy:
To stay updated on what’s new with SecureX, check out the following resources:
We’d love to hear what you think. Ask a Question, Comment Below, and Stay Connected with Cisco Secure on social!
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The Emotet malware-delivery botnet is back after a short hiatus, quickly ramping up the number of malicious emails it's sending and sporting additional capabilities, including changes to its binary and delivering a new version of the IcedID malware dropper.…
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The post Test delete article – 17-11-2022 appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Iranian state-sponsored cyber criminals used an unpatched Log4j flaw to break into a US government network, illegally mine for cryptocurrency, steal credentials and change passwords, and then snoop around undetected for several months, according to CISA.…
World Cup apps from the Qatari government collect more personal information than they need to, according to Germany's data protection agency, which this week warned football fans to only install the two apps "if it is absolutely necessary." Also: consider using a burner phone.…
Monkey in the middle, the beloved playground staple, extends beyond schoolyards into corporate networks, home desktops, and personal mobile devices in a not-so-fun way. Known as a monkey-in-the-middle or man-in-the-middle attack (MiTM), it’s a type of cybercrime that can happen to anyone.
Here’s everything you need to know about mobile MiTM schemes specifically, how to identify when your mobile device is experiencing one, and how to protect your personally identifiable information (PII) and your device from cybercriminals.
A man-in-the-middle attack, or MiTM attack, is a scheme where a cybercriminal intercepts someone’s online activity and impersonates a trusted person or organization. From there, the criminal may ask personal questions or attempt to get financial information; however, since the mobile device owner thinks they’re communicating with someone with good intentions, they give up these details freely.
MiTM is an umbrella term that includes several cybercrime tactics, such as:
Cybercriminals gain access to mobile devices to carry out MiTM mobile attacks through three main methods: Wi-Fi eavesdropping, malware, or phishing.
The most common giveaway of a MiTM attack is a spotty internet connection. If a cybercriminal has a hold on your device, they may disconnect you from the internet so they can take your place in sessions or steal your username and password combination.
If your device is overheating or the battery life is much shorter than normal, it could indicate that it is running malware in the background.
If you can identify the signs of a MiTM attack, that’s a great first step in protecting your device. Awareness of your digital surroundings is another way to keep your device and PII safe. Steer clear of websites that look sloppy, and do not stream or download content from unofficial sites. Malware is often hidden in links on dubious sites.
To safeguard your Wi-Fi connection, protect your home router with a strong password or passphrase. When connecting to public Wi-Fi, confirm with the hotel or café’s staff their official Wi-Fi network name. Then, make sure to connect to a virtual private network (VPN). A VPN encrypts your online activity, which makes it impossible for someone to digitally eavesdrop.
Finally, a comprehensive antivirus software can clean up your device of malicious programs it might have contracted.
McAfee+ Ultimate includes unlimited VPN and antivirus, plus a whole lot more to keep all your devices safe. It also includes web protection that alerts you to suspicious websites, identity monitoring, and daily credit reports to help you browse safely and keep on top of any threats to your identity or credit.
A cybercriminal’s prize for winning a mobile scheme of monkey in the middle is your personal information. With preparation and excellent digital protection tools on your team, you can make sure you emerge victorious and safe.
The post Everything You Need to Know to Avoid a Man-in-the-Middle Mobile Attack appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Malware dubbed WASP is using steganography and polymorphism to evade detection, with its malicious Python packages designed to steal credentials, personal information, and cryptocurrency.…
Since 1996, United Nations members have commemorated Nov. 16 as International Day of Tolerance. As a word, tolerance can mean different things to different people and cultures. The UN defines tolerance as: “respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human.” I define it slightly differently. To me, tolerance is acceptance. Tolerance is inclusion. Tolerance is humanity. Tolerance is letting people be and live authentically as they choose.
Being able to live authentically is key. It’s about creating an environment for everyone to fit in and feel a sense of belonging. In a way, this means obfuscating the “standard” and stop paying attention to the degrees of variation from it. Tolerance is a step one in that process and a critical step toward a more diverse and tolerant world.
But if this is the goal, I say we have lots of work left in promoting this within our workforce, especially in the cybersecurity industry. I wrote extensively about this in a blog last year on why diversity matters so much to create stronger cybersecurity organizations. I pointed out that cybersecurity as a technology is multi-faceted and constantly changing. So, it would make sense that a highly diverse organization would provide different perspectives and more creative solutions to these challenges.
Even in the face of this logical goal of creating more diverse workforces, legacy recruiting, education, and even hiring practices are holding us back as an industry. I’ll look at one workforce populations specifically, women in cybersecurity. Currently, women constitute less than 25 percent of the workforce in cybersecurity. Of course, this is inclusive of all roles in cybersecurity meaning that I think it’s fair to say that the percentage of women in technical cybersecurity roles (e.g., software and hardware engineering) would be much lower. That’s discouraging, especially when there are still more than 700,000 cybersecurity positions that remain unfilled, many of them being high-paying roles.
Perhaps the more important question is “why?” The International Information System Security Certification Consortium (ISC2) commissioned a study to examine this issue closely and came up with some important conclusions that I’ll summarize.
In promoting the International Day of Tolerance, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon listed three ways we as a global society can be more tolerant: education, inclusion, and opportunities. As it happens, those are also exactly the approaches required to create more diverse workforces.
Of the three, I believe education (the earlier the better) is key as it’s foundational to being able to take advantage of inclusion and opportunities. Yes, we must continue to invest in STEM education and encourage more girls and minorities to take part. But the harder challenge is to somehow overcome the perception issue among large parts of these populations that the STEM field is not for them.
I believe that will require an investment in time and interaction in the form of mentoring and community outreach. For example, the Cisco Women in Technology employee resource organization that I’m proud to be the executive sponsor for, started a coding bootcamp targeting underrepresented populations. There will be many more bootcamps next year including weeklong camps in the summer. We need more of this, much more and I know there are many companies in cybersecurity who have similar aspirations and programs.
So, on this International Day of Tolerance, I ask my fellow cybersecurity professionals to at least think of ways they can influence someone in an underrepresented population to explore a career in the STEM field including cybersecurity. Take part in local volunteer activities at a school, especially in an inner-city one, like the kind that the Cisco Networking Academy is renowned for. Join and be an active participant in one of many cybersecurity organizations and affinity groups. Become a sponsor and a mentor to a girl or a minority and help encourage them to get ready to join this exciting and lucrative industry.
But whatever you do, get started. Author and activist Rachel Cargle spoke to us earlier this year as part of our Black History Month celebration about what it means to show up with purpose toward addressing many injustices that still exist today. “There’s an incredible disconnect here between humanity and dignity and all of this stuff in the country, and that should hopefully push you to action,” she said. Indeed, as these are issues that have existed for decades, and we will not solve them in a day, a month, or even a year. But if we don’t start, I’m afraid that the diversity issues that I’ve highlighted will be much the same in the International Day of Tolerance for years to come.
We’d love to hear what you think. Ask a Question, Comment Below, and Stay Connected with Cisco Secure on social!
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A financial cybercrime group calling itself the Disneyland Team has been making liberal use of visually confusing phishing domains that spoof popular bank brands using Punycode, an Internet standard that allows web browsers to render domain names with non-Latin alphabets like Cyrillic.
The Disneyland Team’s Web interface, which allows them to interact with malware victims in real time to phish their login credentials using phony bank websites.
The Disneyland Team uses common misspellings for top bank brands in its domains. For example, one domain the gang has used since March 2022 is ushank[.]com — which was created to phish U.S. Bank customers.
But this group also usually makes use of Punycode to make their phony bank domains look more legit. The U.S. financial services firm Ameriprise uses the domain ameriprise.com; the Disneyland Team’s domain for Ameriprise customers is https://www.xn--meripris-mx0doj[.]com [brackets added to defang the domain], which displays in the browser URL bar as ạmeriprisẹ[.]com.
Look carefully, and you’ll notice small dots beneath the “a” and the second “e”. You could be forgiven if you mistook one or both of those dots for a spec of dust on your computer screen or mobile device.
This candid view inside the Disneyland Team comes from Alex Holden, founder of the Milwaukee-based cybersecurity consulting firm Hold Security. Holden’s analysts gained access to a Web-based control panel the crime group has been using to keep track of victim credentials (see screenshot above). The panel reveals the gang has been operating dozens of Punycode-based phishing domains for the better part of 2022.
Have a look at the Punycode in this Disneyland Team phishing domain: https://login2.xn--mirtesnbd-276drj[.]com, which shows up in the browser URL bar as login2.ẹmirạtesnbd[.]com, a domain targeting users of Emirates NBD Bank in Dubai.
Here’s another domain registered this year by the Disneyland Team: https://xn--clientchwb-zxd5678f[.]com, which spoofs the login page of financial advisor Charles Schwab with the landing page of cliẹntșchwab[.]com. Again, notice the dots under the letters “e” and “s”. Another Punycode domain of theirs sends would-be victims to cliẹrtschwạb[.]com, which combines a brand misspelling with Punycode.
We see the same dynamic with the Disneyland Team Punycode domain https://singlepoint.xn--bamk-pxb5435b[.]com, which translates to singlepoint.ụșbamk[.]com — again phishing U.S. Bank customers.
What’s going on here? Holden says the Disneyland Team is Russian-speaking — if not also based in Russia — but it is not a phishing gang per se. Rather, this group uses the phony bank domains in conjunction with malicious software that is already secretly installed on a victim’s computer.
Holden said the Disneyland Team domains were made to help the group steal money from victims infected with a powerful strain of Microsoft Windows-based banking malware known as Gozi 2.0/Ursnif. Gozi specializes in collecting credentials, and is mainly used for attacks on client-side online banking to facilitate fraudulent bank transfers. Gozi also allows the attackers to connect to a bank’s website using the victim’s computer.
In years past, crooks like these would use custom-made “web injects” to manipulate what Gozi victims see in their Web browser when they visit their bank’s site. These web injects allowed malware to rewrite the bank’s HTML code on the fly, and copy and/or intercept any data users would enter into a web-based form, such as a username and password.
Most Web browser makers, however, have spent years adding security protections to block such nefarious activity. As a result, the Disneyland Team simply tries to make their domains look as much like the real thing as possible, and then funnel victims toward interacting with those imposter sites.
“The reason that it is infeasible for them to use in-browser injects include browser and OS protection measures, and difficulties manipulating dynamic pages for banks that require multi-factor authentication,” Holden said.
In reality, the fake bank website overlaid by the Disneyland Team’s malware relays the victim’s browser activity through to the real bank website, while allowing the attackers to forward any secondary login requests from the bank, such as secret questions or multi-factor authentication challenges.
The Disneyland Team included instructions for its users, noting that when the victim enters their login credentials, he sees a 10-second spinning wheel, and then the message, “Awaiting back office approval for your request. Please don’t close this window.”
A fake PNC website overlay or “web inject” displaying a message intended to temporarily prevent the user from accessing their account.
The “SKIP” button in the screenshot above sends the user to the real bank login page, “in case the account is not interesting to us,” the manual explains. “Also, this redirect works if none of our operators are working at the time.”
The “TAKE” button in the Disneyland Team control panel allows users or affiliates to claim ownership over a specific infected machine or bot, which then excludes other users from interacting with that victim.
In the event that it somehow takes a long time to get the victim (bot) connected to the Disneyland Team control panel, or if it is necessary to delay a transaction, users can push a button that prompts the following message to appear on the victim’s screen:
“Your case ID number is 875472. An online banking support representative will get in touch shortly. Please provide your case ID number, and DO NOT close this page.”
The Disneyland user manual explains that the panel can be used to force the victim to log in again if they transmit invalid credentials. It also has other options for stalling victims whilst their accounts are drained. Another fake prompt the panel can produce shows the victim a message saying, “We are currently working on updating our security system. You should be able to log in once the countdown timer expires.”
The user manual says this option blocks the user from accessing their account for two hours. “It is possible to block for an hour with this button, in this case they get less frustrated, within the hours ddos will kill their network.”
Cybercrime groups will sometimes launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on the servers of the companies they’re trying to rob — which is usually intended to distract victims from their fleecing, although Holden said it’s unclear if the Disneyland Team employs this tactic as well.
For many years, KrebsOnSecurity tracked the day-to-day activities of a similar malware crew that used web injects and bots to steal tens of millions of dollars from small- to mid-sized businesses across the United States.
At the end of each story, I would close with a recommendation that anyone concerned about malware snarfing their banking information should strongly consider doing their online banking from a dedicated, security-hardened system which is only used for that purpose. Of course, the dedicated system approach works only if you always use that dedicated system for managing your account online.
Those stories also observed that since the vast majority of the malicious software used in cyberheists is designed to run only on Microsoft Windows computers, it made sense to pick a non-Windows computer for that dedicated banking system, such as a Mac or even a version of Linux. I still stand by this advice.
In case anyone is interested, here (PDF) is a list of all phishing domains currently and previously used by the Disneyland Team.
Canalys Forums APAC Canalys CEO Steve Brazier has proposed that cloud vendors should have similar accountability to credit card companies when accounts are hacked and used to mine cryptocurrency.…
The convenience with which you manage all your financial wants and needs may come at a cost
The post Open banking: Tell me what you buy, and I’ll tell you who you are appeared first on WeLiveSecurity
Somewhere between 73 and 81 percent of retail Bitcoin buyers are likely to be into the negative on their investment, according to research published Monday by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS).…
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The post Test article delete – 16-11-2022 appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Sponsored Feature The widespread, global deployment of 5G telecommunications equipment and systems is already well underway. The GSMA forecasts that by 2025, 29 percent of the mobile connections in Europe – including those linking mission-critical infrastructure such as remotely operated power grids – will be made through 5G.…
A vulnerability in network technology widely used in space and aircraft could, if successfully exploited, have disastrous effects on those critical systems, according to academics.…
If you've noticed car charging stations showing up in your area, congratulations! You're part of a growing network of systems so poorly secured they could one day be used to destabilize entire electrical grids, and which contain enough security issues to be problematic today. …
Authored by Oliver Devane
It hasn’t taken malicious actors long to take advantage of the recent bankruptcy filing of FTX, McAfee has discovered several phishing sites targeting FTX users.
One of the sites discovered was registered on the 15th of November and asks users to submit their crypto wallet phrase to receive a refund. After entering this phrase, the creators of the site would gain access to the victim’s crypto wallet and they would likely transfer all the funds out of it.
Upon analyzing the website code used to create the phishing sites, we noticed that they were extremely similar to previous sites targeting WalletConnect customers, so it appears that they likely just modified a previous phishing kit to target FTX users.
The image below shows a code comparison between a website from June 2022, and it shows that the FTX phishing site shares most of its code with it.
McAfee urges anyone who was using FTX to be weary of any unsolicited emails or social media messages they receive and to double-check the authenticity before accessing them. If you are unsure of the signs to look for, please check out the McAfee Scam education portal (https://www.mcafee.com/consumer/en-us/landing-page/retention/scammer-education.html)
McAfee customers are protected against the sites mentioned in this blog
| Type | Value | Product | Detected |
| URL | ftx-users-refund[.]com | McAfee WebAdvisor | Blocked |
| URL | ftx-refund[.]com | McAfee WebAdvisor | Blocked |
The post Threat Actors Taking Advantage of FTX Bankruptcy appeared first on McAfee Blog.
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