A US surveillance program that lets the FBI view Americans’ communications without a warrant is up for renewal. A new bill aims to address mounting lawmaker concerns—with smoke and mirrors.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has revealed how a Chinese national posed as a U.S. researcher as part of a spear-phishing campaign to obtain sensitive information from the space agency, as well as from government entities, universities, and private companies, in violation of export control laws.
"For years, NASA employees
The AI Agent Authority Gap - From Ungoverned to Delegation
As discussed in our previous article, AI agents are exposing a structural gap in enterprise security, but the problem is often framed too narrowly.
The issue is not simply that agents are new actors. It is that agents are delegated actors. They do not emerge with independent authority. They are triggered, invoked, provisioned, or
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a set of malicious apps on the Apple App Store that impersonate popular cryptocurrency wallets in an attempt to steal recovery phrases and private keys since at least fall 2025.
"Once launched, these apps redirect users to browser pages designed to look similar to the App Store and distribute trojanized versions of legitimate wallets," Kaspersky
Full disclosure: I work on community at Always Further, the team behind this. Not the author. Posting because Luke's approach to tackling this challenge is unique and of an interest to the netsec community.
The core idea: if an AI agent is compromised, any log the agent itself writes becomes part of the attack surface. The post walks through how they split auditing into a supervisor process the sandboxed child can't reach, then uses the same Merkle tree + hash-chain construction RFC 6962 (Certificate Transparency) uses to make edits, truncation, and reordering all detectable.
There's a concrete threat-model table near the end that lists what each attack looks like and what structurally stops it. Worth skipping to if you don't want the crypto primer.
Chinese-speaking individuals are the target of a new campaign that uses a trojanized version of SumatraPDF reader to deploy the AdaptixC2 Beacon post-exploitation agent and ultimately facilitate the abuse of Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnels for remote access.
Zscaler ThreatLabz, which discovered the campaign last month, has attributed it with high confidence to Tropic Trooper (aka
A high-severity security flaw in LMDeploy, an open-source toolkit for compressing, deploying, and serving large language models (LLMs), has come under active exploitation in the wild less than 13 hours after its public disclosure.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-33626 (CVSS score: 7.5), relates to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that could be exploited to access
Researchers have finally cracked Fast16, mysterious code capable of silently tampering with calculation and simulation software. It was created in 2005—and likely deployed by the US or an ally.
A previously undocumented threat activity cluster known as UNC6692 has been observed leveraging social engineering tactics via Microsoft Teams to deploy a custom malware suite on compromised hosts.
"As with many other intrusions in recent years, UNC6692 relied heavily on impersonating IT help desk employees, convincing their victim to accept a Microsoft Teams chat invitation from an account
Standard advice for refresh tokens: rotate on every use, store hashed, set a short expiry. Done, right?
Not quite.
Rotation alone does nothing against token theft. If malware or XSS lifts a refresh token from a legit client, the attacker and the client race to rotate it next. Whoever loses the race gets a "token revoked" error — and the winner keeps the session.
From the server’s point of view, it just sees two valid requests seconds apart. No alarm, no signal, nothing.
The missing piece is what OAuth 2.0 Security BCP §4.14 calls refresh token reuse detection: if a token that was already rotated is presented again, treat it as evidence of compromise and invalidate the entire session.
The core idea
Every token belongs to a family (FamilyId), shared across all rotations of a single login.
If a rotated token shows up again (outside a small grace window), you revoke the entire family:
the attacker is locked out
the legit user is forced to re-authenticate
the session is no longer silently compromised
if (stored.ReplacedByTokenHash is not null && stored.RevokedAtUtc.HasValue) { var withinGrace = stored.RevokedAtUtc.Value.AddSeconds(graceSeconds) > DateTime.UtcNow; if (withinGrace) return Fail("token_recently_rotated"); // benign race (SPA tabs, retries) await RevokeFamilyAsync(stored.FamilyId, ip, reason: "reuse_detected"); return Fail("token_reuse_detected"); }
Client-side it’s just one extra branch:
if (error.code === "token_reuse_detected") { // "You've been signed out for security reasons. Please log in again." router.push("/login?reason=compromised"); }
You can also hook into it for observability (alerts, SIEM, etc.):
Race vs theft look identical. Two requests with the same token arrive. One is legit, one might not be. Only timing differs. Grace window too small → false positives on flaky networks. Too large → real attack window. ~30 seconds worked well in practice.
Revoking the whole chain. On reuse you must invalidate all still-active tokens from that session. A simple FamilyId + index makes this a single bulk update.
Concurrency is common. Multi-tab SPAs, retries, mobile reconnects — without a grace window, I was logging myself out constantly during tests.
Bitwarden CLI, the command-line interface for the password manager Bitwarden, has reportedly been compromised as part of a newly discovered and ongoing Checkmarx supply chain campaign, according to findings from JFrog and Socket.
"The affected package version appears to be @bitwarden/cli@2026.4.0, and the malicious code was published in 'bw1.js,' a file included in the package contents," the
You scroll past one incident and see another that feels familiar, like it should have been fixed years ago, but it still works with small changes. Same bugs. Same mistakes.
The supply chain is messy. Packages you did not check are stealing data, adding backdoors, and spreading. Attacking the systems behind apps is easier than breaking the apps themselves. The exploits are simple but still work
Login
