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Prosecutors in Finland this week commenced their criminal trial against Julius Kivimäki, a 26-year-old Finnish man charged with extorting a once popular and now-bankrupt online psychotherapy practice and thousands of its patients. In a 2,200-page report, Finnish authorities laid out how they connected the extortion spree to Kivimäki, a notorious hacker who was convicted in 2015 of perpetrating tens of thousands of cybercrimes, including data breaches, payment fraud, operating a botnet and calling in bomb threats.
In November 2022, Kivimäki was charged with attempting to extort money from the Vastaamo Psychotherapy Center. In that breach, which occurred in October 2020, a hacker using the handle “Ransom Man” threatened to publish patient psychotherapy notes if Vastaamo did not pay a six-figure ransom demand.
Vastaamo refused, so Ransom Man shifted to extorting individual patients — sending them targeted emails threatening to publish their therapy notes unless paid a 500-euro ransom. When Ransom Man found little success extorting patients directly, they uploaded to the dark web a large compressed file containing all of the stolen Vastaamo patient records.
Security experts soon discovered Ransom Man had mistakenly included an entire copy of their home folder, where investigators found many clues pointing to Kivimäki’s involvement. By that time, Kivimäki was no longer in Finland, but the Finnish government nevertheless charged Kivimäki in absentia with the Vastaamo hack. The 2,200-page evidence document against Kivimäki suggests he enjoyed a lavish lifestyle while on the lam, frequenting luxury resorts and renting fabulously expensive cars and living quarters.
But in February 2023, Kivimäki was arrested in France after authorities there responded to a domestic disturbance call and found the defendant sleeping off a hangover on the couch of a woman he’d met the night before. The French police grew suspicious when the 6′ 3″ blonde, green-eyed man presented an ID that stated he was of Romanian nationality.
A redacted copy of an ID Kivimaki gave to French authorities claiming he was from Romania.
Finnish prosecutors showed that Kivimäki’s credit card had been used to pay for the virtual server that hosted the stolen Vastaamo patient notes. What’s more, the home folder included in the Vastaamo patient data archive also allowed investigators to peer into other cybercrime projects of the accused, including domains that Ransom Man had access to as well as a lengthy history of commands he’d executed on the rented virtual server.
Some of those domains allegedly administered by Kivimäki were set up to smear the reputations of different companies and individuals. One of those was a website that claimed to have been authored by a person who headed up IT infrastructure for a major bank in Norway which discussed the idea of legalizing child sexual abuse.
Another domain hosted a fake blog that besmirched the reputation of a Tulsa, Okla. man whose name was attached to blog posts about supporting the “white pride” movement and calling for a pardon of the Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh.
Kivimäki appears to have sought to sully the name of this reporter as well. The 2,200-page document shows that Kivimäki owned and operated the domain krebsonsecurity[.]org, which hosted various hacking tools that Kivimäki allegedly used, including programs for mass-scanning the Internet for systems vulnerable to known security flaws, as well as scripts for cracking database server usernames and passwords, and downloading databases.
Ransom Man inadvertently included a copy of his home directory in the leaked Vastaamo patient data. A lengthy history of the commands run by that user show they used krebsonsecurity-dot-org to host hacking and scanning tools.
Mikko Hyppönen, chief research officer at WithSecure (formerly F-Secure), said the Finnish authorities have done “amazing work,” and that “it’s rare to have this much evidence for a cybercrime case.”
Petteri Järvinen is a respected IT expert and author who has been following the trial, and he said the prosecution’s case so far has been strong.
“The National Bureau of Investigation has done a good job and Mr Kivimäki for his part some elementary mistakes,” Järvinen wrote on LinkedIn. “This sends an important message: online crime does not pay. Traces are left in the digital world too, even if it is very tedious for the police to collect them from servers all around the world.”
Antti Kurittu is an information security specialist and a former criminal investigator. In 2013, Kurittu worked on an investigation involving Kivimäki’s use of the Zbot botnet, among other activities Kivimäki engaged in as a member of the hacker group Hack the Planet (HTP). Kurittu said it remains to be seen if the prosecution can make their case, and if the defense has any answers to all of the evidence presented.
“Based on the public pretrial investigation report, it looks like the case has a lot of details that seem very improbable to be coincidental,” Kurittu told KrebsOnSecurity. “For example, a full copy of the Vastaamo patient database was found on a server that belonged to Scanifi, a company with no reasonable business that Kivimäki was affiliated with. The leaked home folder contents were also connected to Kivimäki and were found on servers that were under his control.”
The Finnish daily yle.fi reports that Kivimäki’s lawyers sought to have their client released from confinement for the remainder of his trial, noting that the defendant has already been detained for eight months.
The court denied that request, saying the defendant was still a flight risk. Kivimäki’s trial is expected to continue until February 2024, in part to accommodate testimony from a large number of victims. Prosecutors are seeking a seven-year sentence for Kivimäki.
[This is Part III in a series on research conducted for a recent Hulu documentary on the 2015 hack of marital infidelity website AshleyMadison.com.]
In 2019, a Canadian company called Defiant Tech Inc. pleaded guilty to running LeakedSource[.]com, a service that sold access to billions of passwords and other data exposed in countless data breaches. KrebsOnSecurity has learned that the owner of Defiant Tech, a 32-year-old Ontario man named Jordan Evan Bloom, was hired in late 2014 as a developer for the marital infidelity site AshleyMadison.com. Bloom resigned from AshleyMadison citing health reasons in June 2015 — less than one month before unidentified hackers stole data on 37 million users — and launched LeakedSource three months later.
Jordan Evan Bloom, posing in front of his Lamborghini.
On Jan. 15, 2018, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) charged then 27-year-old Bloom, of Thornhill, Ontario, with selling stolen personal identities online through the website LeakedSource[.]com.
LeakedSource was advertised on a number of popular cybercrime forums as a service that could help hackers break into valuable or high-profile accounts. LeakedSource also tried to pass itself off as a legal, legitimate business that was marketing to security firms and professionals.
The RCMP arrested Bloom in December 2017, and said he made approximately $250,000 selling hacked data, which included information on 37 million user accounts leaked in the 2015 Ashley Madison breach.
Subsequent press releases from the RCMP about the LeakedSource investigation omitted any mention of Bloom, and referred to the defendant only as Defiant Tech. In a legal settlement that is quintessentially Canadian, the matter was resolved in 2019 after Defiant Tech agreed to plead guilty. The RCMP declined to comment for this story.
The Impact Team, the hacker group that claimed responsibility for stealing and leaking the AshleyMadison user data, also leaked several years worth of email from then-CEO Noel Biderman. A review of those messages shows that Ashley Madison hired Jordan Evan Bloom as a PHP developer in December 2014 — even though the company understood that Bloom’s success as a programmer and businessman was tied to shady and legally murky enterprises.
Bloom’s recommendation came to Biderman via Trevor Sykes, then chief technology officer for Ashley Madison parent firm Avid Life Media (ALM). The following is an email from Sykes to Biderman dated Nov. 14, 2014:
“Greetings Noel,
“We’d like to offer Jordan Bloom the position of PHP developer reporting to Mike Morris for 75k CAD/Year. He did well on the test, but he also has a great understanding of the business side of things having run small businesses himself. This was an internal referral.”
When Biderman responded that he needed more information about the candidate, Sykes replied that Bloom was independently wealthy as a result of his forays into the shadowy world of “gold farming” — the semi-automated use of large numbers of player accounts to win some advantage that is usually related to cashing out game accounts or inventory. Gold farming is particularly prevalent in massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs), such as RuneScape and World of Warcraft.
“In his previous experience he had been doing RMT (Real Money Trading),” Sykes wrote. “This is the practice of selling virtual goods in games for real world money. This is a grey market, which is usually against the terms and services of the game companies.” Here’s the rest of his message to Biderman:
“RMT sellers traditionally have a lot of problems with chargebacks, and payment processor compliance. During my interview with him, I spent some time focusing in on this. He had to demonstrate to the processor, Paypal, at the time he had a business and technical strategy to address his charge back rate.”
“He ran this company himself, and did all the coding, including the integration with the processors,” Sykes continued in his assessment of Bloom. “Eventually he was squeezed out by Chinese gold farmers, and their ability to market with much more investment than he could. In addition the cost of ‘farming’ the virtual goods was cheaper in China to do than in North America.”
The gold farming reference is fascinating because in 2017 KrebsOnSecurity published Who Ran LeakedSource?, which examined clues suggesting that one of the administrators of LeakedSource also was the admin of abusewith[.]us, a site unabashedly dedicated to helping people hack email and online gaming accounts.
An administrator account Xerx3s on Abusewithus.
Abusewith[.]us began in September 2013 as a forum for learning and teaching how to hack accounts at Runescape, an MMORPG set in a medieval fantasy realm where players battle for kingdoms and riches.
The currency with which Runescape players buy and sell weapons, potions and other in-game items are virtual gold coins, and many of Abusewith[dot]us’s early members traded in a handful of commodities: Phishing kits and exploits that could be used to steal Runescape usernames and passwords from fellow players; virtual gold plundered from hacked accounts; and databases from hacked forums and websites related to Runescape and other online games.
That 2017 report here interviewed a Michigan man who acknowledged being administrator of Abusewith[.]us, but denied being the operator of LeakedSource. Still, the story noted that LeakedSource likely had more than one operator, and breached records show Bloom was a prolific member of Abusewith[.]us.
In an email to all employees on Dec. 1, 2014, Ashley Madison’s director of HR said Bloom graduated from York University in Toronto with a degree in theoretical physics, and that he has been an active programmer since high school.
“He’s a proprietor of a high traffic multiplayer game and developer/publisher of utilities such as PicTrace,” the HR director enthused. “He will be a great addition to the team.”
PicTrace appears to have been a service that allowed users to glean information about anyone who viewed an image hosted on the platform, such as their Internet address, browser type and version number. A copy of pictrace[.]com from Archive.org in 2012 redirects to the domain qksnap.com, which DomainTools.com says was registered to a Jordan Bloom from Thornhill, ON that same year.
The street address listed in the registration records for qksnap.com — 204 Beverley Glen Blvd — also shows up in the registration records for leakadvisor[.]com, a domain registered in 2017 just months after Canadian authorities seized the servers running LeakedSource.
Pictrace, one of Jordan Bloom’s early IT successes.
A review of passive DNS records from DomainTools indicates that in 2013 pictrace[.]com shared a server with just a handful of other domains, including Near-Reality[.]com — a popular RuneScape Private Server (RSPS) game based on the RuneScape MMORPG.
Copies of near-reality[.]com from 2013 via Archive.org show the top of the community’s homepage was retrofitted with a message saying Near Reality was no longer available due to a copyright dispute. Although the site doesn’t specify the other party to the copyright dispute, it appears Near-Reality got sued by Jagex, the owner of RuneScape.
The message goes on to say the website will no longer “encourage, facilitate, enable or condone (i) any infringement of copyright in RuneScape or any other Jagex product; nor (ii) any breach of the terms and conditions of RuneScape or any other Jagex product.”
A scene from the MMORPG RuneScape.
Near Reality also has a Facebook page that was last updated in 2019, when its owner posted a link to a news story about Defiant Tech’s guilty plea in the LeakedSource investigation. That Facebook page indicates Bloom also went by the nickname “Agentjags.”
“Just a quick PSA,” reads a post to the Near Reality Facebook page dated Jan. 21, 2018, which linked to a story about the charges against Bloom and a photo of Bloom standing in front of his lime-green Lamborghini. “Agentjags has got involved in some shady shit that may have compromised your personal details. I advise anyone who is using an old NR [Near Reality] password for anything remotely important should change it ASAP.”
By the beginning of 2016, Bloom was nowhere to be found, and was suspected of having fled his country for the Caribbean, according to the people commenting on the Near Reality Facebook page:
“Jordan aka Agentjags has gone missing,” wrote a presumed co-owner of the Facebook page. “He is supposedly hiding in St. Lucia, doing what he loved, scuba-diving. Any information to his whereabouts will be appreciated.”
KrebsOnSecurity ran the unusual nickname “AgentJags” through a search at Constella Intelligence, a commercial service that tracks breached data sets. That search returned just a few dozen results — and virtually all were accounts at various RuneScape-themed sites, including a half-dozen accounts at Abusewith[.]us.
Constella found other “AgentJags” accounts tied to the email address ownagegaming1@gmail.com. The marketing firm Apollo.io experienced a data breach several years back, and according to Apollo the email address ownagegaming1@gmail.com belongs to Jordan Bloom in Ontario.
Constella also revealed that the password frequently used by ownagegaming1@gmail.com across many sites was some variation on “niggapls,” which my 2017 report found was also the password used by the administrator of LeakedSource.
Constella discovered that the email eric.malek@rogers.com comes up when one searches for “AgentJags.” This is curious because emails leaked from Ashley Madison’s then-CEO Biderman show that Eric Malek from Toronto was the Ashley Madison employee who initially recommended Bloom for the PHP developer job.
According to DomainTools.com, Eric.Malek@rogers.com was used to register the domain devjobs.ca, which previously advertised “the most exciting developer jobs in Canada, delivered to you weekly.” Constella says eric.malek@rogers.com also had an account at Abusewith[.]us — under the nickname “Jags.”
Biderman’s email records show Eric Malek was also a PHP developer for Ashley Madison, and that he was hired into this position just a few months before Bloom — on Sept. 2, 2014. The CEO’s leaked emails show Eric Malek resigned from his developer position at Ashley Madison on June 19, 2015.
“Please note that Eric Malek has resigned from this position with Avid and his last day will be June 19th,” read a June 5, 2015 email from ALM’s HR director. “He is resigning to deal with some personal issues which include health issues. Because he is not sure how much time it will take to resolve, he is not requesting a leave of absence (his time off will be indefinite). Overall, he likes the company and plans to reach out to Trevor or I when the issues are resolved to see what is available at that time.”
A follow-up email from Biderman demanded, “want to know where he’s truly going….,” and it’s unclear whether there was friction with Malek’s departure. But ALM General Counsel Avi Weisman replied indicating that Malek probably would not sign an “Exit Acknowledgment Form” prior to leaving, and that the company had unanswered questions for Malek.
“Aneka should dig during exit interview,” Weisman wrote. “Let’s see if he balks at signing the Acknowledgment.”
Bloom’s departure notice from Ashley Madison’s HR person, dated June 23, 2015, read:
“Please note that Jordan Bloom has resigned from his position as PHP Developer with Avid. He is leaving for personal reasons. He has a neck issue that will require surgery in the upcoming months and because of his medical appointment schedule and the pain he is experiencing he can no longer commit to a full-time schedule. He may pick up contract work until he is back to 100%.”
A follow-up note to Biderman about this announcement read:
“Note that he has disclosed that he is independently wealthy so he can get by without FT work until he is on the mend. He has signed the Exit Acknowledgement Form already without issue. He also says he would consider reapplying to Avid in the future if we have opportunities available at that time.”
Perhaps Mr. Bloom hurt his neck from craning it around blind spots in his Lamborghini. Maybe it was from a bad scuba outing. Whatever the pain in Bloom’s neck was, it didn’t stop him from launching himself fully into LeakedSource[.]com, which was registered roughly one month after the Impact Team leaked data on 37 million Ashley Madison accounts.
Mr. Malek declined a request for comment. A now-deleted LinkedIn profile for Malek from December 2018 listed him as a “technical recruiter” from Toronto who also attended Mr. Bloom’s alma mater — York University. That resume did not mention Mr. Malek’s brief stint as a PHP developer at Ashley Madison.
“Developer, entrepreneur, and now technical recruiter of the most uncommon variety!” Mr. Malek’s LinkedIn profile enthused. “Are you a developer, or other technical specialist, interested in working with a recruiter who can properly understand your concerns and aspirations, technical, environmental and financial? Don’t settle for a ‘hack’; this is your career, let’s do it right! Connect with me on LinkedIn. Note: If you are not a resident of Canada/Toronto, I cannot help you.”
Mr. Bloom told KrebsOnSecurity he had no role in harming or hacking Ashley Madison. Bloom validated his identity by responding at one of the email addresses mentioned above, and agreed to field questions so long as KrebsOnSecurity agreed to publish our email conversation in full (PDF).
Bloom said Mr. Malek did recommend him for the Ashley Madison job, but that Mr. Malek also received a $5,000 referral bonus for doing so. Given Mr. Malek’s stated role as a technical recruiter, it seems likely he also recommended several other employees to Ashley Madison.
Bloom was asked whether anyone at the RCMP, Ashley Madison or any authority anywhere ever questioned him in connection with the July 2015 hack of Ashley Madison. He replied that he was called once by someone claiming to be from the Toronto Police Service asking if he knew anything about the Ashley Madison hack.
“The AM situation was not something they pursued according to the RCMP disclosure,” Bloom wrote. “Learning about the RCMP’s most advanced cyber investigative techniques and capabilities was very interesting though. I was eventually told information by a third party which included knowledge that law enforcement effectively knew who the hacker was, but didn’t have enough evidence to proceed with a case. That is the extent of my involvement with any authorities.”
As to his company’s guilty plea for operating LeakedSource, Bloom maintains that the judge at his preliminary inquiry found that even if everything the Canadian government alleged was true it would not constitute a violation of any law in Canada with respect the charges the RCMP leveled against him, which included unauthorized use of a computer and “mischief to data.”
“In Canada at the lower court level we are allowed to possess stolen information and manipulate our copies of them as we please,” Bloom said. “The judge however decided that a trial was required to determine whether any activities of mine were reckless, as the other qualifier of intentionally criminal didn’t apply. I will note here that nothing I was accused of doing would have been illegal if done in the United States of America according to their District Attorney. +1 for free speech in America vs freedom of expression in Canada.”
“Shortly after their having most of their case thrown out, the Government proposed an offer during a closed door meeting where they would drop all charges against me, provide full and complete personal immunity, and in exchange the Corporation which has since been dissolved would plead guilty,” Bloom continued. “The Corporation would also pay a modest fine.”
Bloom said he left Ashley Madison because he was bored, but he acknowledged starting LeakedSource partly in response to the Ashley Madison hack.
“I intended to leverage my gaming connections to get into security work including for other private servers such as Minecraft communities and others,” Bloom said. “After months of asking management for more interesting tasks, I became bored. Some days I had virtually nothing to do except spin in my chair so I would browse the source code for security holes to fix because I found it enjoyable.”
“I believe the decision to start LS [LeakedSource] was partly inspired by the AM hack itself, and the large number of people from a former friend group messaging me asking if XYZ person was in the leak after I revealed to them that I downloaded a copy and had the ability to browse it,” Bloom continued. “LS was never my idea – I was just a builder, and the only Canadian. In other countries it was never thought to be illegal on closer examination of their laws.”
Bloom said he still considers himself independently wealthy, and that still has the lime green Lambo. But he said he’s currently unemployed and can’t seem to land a job in what he views as his most promising career path: Information security.
“As I’m sure you’re aware, having negative media attention associated with alleged (key word) criminal activity can have a detrimental effect on employment, banking and relationships,” Bloom wrote. “I have no current interest in being a business owner, nor do I have any useful business ideas to be honest. I was and am interested in interesting Information Security/programming work but it’s too large of a risk for any business to hire someone who was formerly accused of a crime.”
If you liked this story, please consider reading the first two pieces in this series:
SEO Expert Hired and Fired by Ashley Madison Turned on Company, Promising Revenge
Top Suspect in 2015 Ashley Madison Hack Committed Suicide in 2014
This article is part of a series in which we will explore several features, principles, and the building blocks of a security detection engine within an extended detection and response (XDR) solution.
In this second installment, we will look at ways of structuring the presentation of machine-generated alerts, so that each alert offers a cohesive and compelling narrative, as if written by a human analyst, at scale and in realtime.
In cyber security, we are used to two types of stories.
The first story is common for reports written by humans. It contains sections such as “impact,” “reproduction,” and “remediation” to help us understand what is at stake and what we need to fix. For example:
IMPACT: An SSH server which supports password authentication is susceptible to brute-forcing attacks.
REPRODUCTION: Use the `ssh` command in verbose mode (`ssh -v`) to determine supported authentication methods. Look for “keyboard-interactive” and “password” methods.
REMEDIATION: Disable unneeded authentication methods.
The second story comes from machine detections. It is much terser in content and sometimes leaves us scratching our heads. “Malware,” the machine says with little explanation, followed by a horde of gibberish-looking data of network flows, executable traces, and so on.
The challenge is now to get the best of both worlds: to enhance machine-generated alerts with the richness of human-written reports. The following sections explain how this can be approached.
In our example of a report written by a human, the “reproduction” section would help us understand, from a factual perspective, how exactly the conclusions were derived.
On the other hand, the machine-generated horde of data provides evidence in a very nondescript way. We would need to be smart enough to spot or reverse-engineer what algorithm the machine was following on said data. Most security analysts do not wish to do this. Instead, they attempt to seek the first story type. “Surely, someone must have written a blog or something more descriptive about this already,” they would say. Then, they would copy-paste anything that looks like a searchable term – an IP address, domain, SHA checksum – and start searching it, either on a threat intelligence search site or even a general-purpose search engine.
Having such cryptic machine-generated alerts is leading us to our first two issues: first, when the story is incomplete or misunderstood, it may lead the analyst astray. For example, the security event might involve requests to communicate with an IP address, and the analyst would say, “This IP address belongs to my DNS server, so the traffic is legitimate.” However, the detection engine was really saying, “I suspect there is DNS tunnelling activity happening through your DNS server—just look at the volume.”
Second, when an analyst seeks explanations from elsewhere, the main function of an advanced detection engine — finding novel, localized, and targeted attacks — cannot work. Information on attacks is generally available only after they have been discovered and analyzed, not when they happen initially.
A common approach to remedy this situation is to include a short description of the algorithm. “This detector works by maintaining a baseline of when during the day a user is active and then reports any deviations,” a help dialog would say. “Okay, that’s clever,” an analyst would reply. But this is not enough. “Wait, what is the baseline, and how was it violated in this particular security event?” To find the answer, we need to go back to the horde of data.
To mimic the “reproduction” section of the human-written report, our security events are enriched with an annotation—a short summary of the behavior described by the event. Here are a few examples of such annotated events:
In the first and second cases, the story is relatively straightforward: in the horde of data, successful communication with said hostnames was observed. An inference through threat intelligence associates these hostnames to the Sality malware.
The third line informs us that, on a factual basis, only a communication with an IP address was observed. Further chain of inferences is that this IP address was associated by a passive DNS mechanism to a hostname which is in turn associated to the Sality malware.
In the fourth event, we have an observation of full HTTP URL requests, and inference through a pattern matcher associates this URL to the Sality malware. In this case, neither the hostname nor the IP address is important to the detector.
In all these annotated events, an analyst can easily grasp the factual circumstances and what the detection engine infers and thinks about the observations. Note that whether these events describe benign, malicious, relevant, or irrelevant behavior, or whether they lead to true or false positives, is not necessarily the concern. The concern is to be specific about the circumstances of the observed behavior and to be transparent about the inferences.
When we eventually succeed in explaining the security events, we might not be finished with the storytelling yet. The analyst would face another dilemma. They would ask: “What relevance does this event have in my environment? Is it part of an attack, an attack technique perhaps? What should I look for next?”
In the human-written report, the “impact” section provides a translation between the fact-based technical language of “how” and the business language of “what.” In this business language, we talk about threats, risks, attacker objectives, their progress, and so on.
This translation is an important part of the story. In our previous example about DNS tunnelling, we might want to express that “an anomaly in DNS traffic is a sign of an attacker communicating with their command-and-control infrastructure,” or that “it is a sign of exfiltration,” or perhaps both. The connotation is that both techniques are post-infection, and that there is probably already a foothold that the attacker has established. Perhaps other security events point to this, or perhaps it needs to be sought after by the analyst.
When it is not explicit, the analyst needs to mentally perform the translation. Again, an analyst might look up some intelligence in external sources and incorrectly interpret the detection engine’s message. Instead, they might conclude that “an anomaly in DNS traffic is a policy violation, user error, or reconnaissance activity,” leading them astray from pivoting and searching for the endpoint foothold that performs the command-and-control activity.
We take special attention not to mix these two different dictionaries. Rather, we express separately the factual observations versus the conclusions in the form of threats and risks. Inbetween, there are the various chains of inferences. Based on the complexity, the depth of the story varies, but the beginning and the end will always be there: facts versus conclusions.
This is very similar to how an analyst would set up their investigation board to organize what they know about the case. Here is an elaborate example:
In this case, from top to bottom:
In all points, the “what” and “how” languages are distinguished from each other. Finally, the whole story is stitched together into one alert by using the alert fusion algorithm described in the Intelligent alert management blog post.
Have we bridged the storytelling gap between machine-generated and human-generated reports?
Threat detections need to be narrated in sufficient detail, so that our users can understand them. Previously, we relied on the human aspect—we would need to document, provide support, and even reverse-engineer what the detection algorithms said.
The two solutions, distinguishing the “what/how” languages and the annotated events, provide the bandwidth to transmit the details and the expert knowledge directly from the detection algorithms. Our stories are now rich with detail and are built automatically in real time.
The result allows for quick orientation in complex detections and lowers the time to triage. It also helps to correctly convey the message, from our team, through the detection engine, and towards the analyst, lowering the possibility of misinterpretation.
This capability is part of Cisco Global Threat Alerts, currently available within Cisco Secure Network Analytics and Cisco Secure Endpoint, and has been continually improved based on customer feedback. In the future, it will also be available in Cisco SecureX XDR.
We’d love to hear what you think. Ask a Question, Comment Below, and Stay Connected with Cisco Secure on social!
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Can thieves steal identities with only a name and address?
In short, the answer is “no.” Which is a good thing, as your name and address are in fact part of the public record. Anyone can get a hold of them. However, because they are public information, they are still tools that identity thieves can use.
If you think of your identity as a jigsaw puzzle, your name and address are the first two pieces that they can use to build a bigger picture and ultimately put your identity at risk.
With that, let’s look at some other key pieces of your identity that are associated with your name and address—and what you can do to protect them.
For starters, this information is so general that it is of little value in of itself to an identity thief. Yet a determined identity thief can do a bit of legwork and take a few extra steps to use them as a springboard for other scams.
For example, with your name and address a thief could:
There are volumes of public information that are readily available should someone want to add some more pieces to your identity jigsaw puzzle, such as:
In the U.S., the availability of such information will vary from state-to-state and different levels of government may have different regulations about what information gets filed—in addition to whether and how those reports are made public. Globally, different nations and regions will collect varying amounts of public information and have their own regulations in place as well. More broadly, though, many of these public databases are now online. Consequently, accessing them is easier than the days when getting a hold of that information required an in-person visit a library or public office.
Thieves can gain additional information about you from other online sources, such as data brokers. And data brokerage is a big business, a global economy estimated at $200 billion U.S. dollars a year. What fuels it? Personal information, representing thousands of data points on billions of people scraped from public records, social media, smartphone apps, shopper loyalty cards, third-party sources, and sometimes other data broker sites as well.
The above-the-board legal intent of data broker sites is to sell that information to advertisers so that they can create highly targeted campaigns based on people’s behaviors, travels, interests, and even political leanings. Others such as law enforcement officials, journalists, and others who are conducting background checks will use them too.
On the dark side, hackers, scammers, and thieves will buy this information as well, which they can use to commit identity theft and fraud. The thing is, data brokers will sell to anyone. They don’t discriminate.
Phishing attacks aren’t just for email, texts, and direct messages. In fact, thieves are turning to old tricks via old-fashioned physical mail. That includes sending phony offers or by impersonating officials of government institutions, all designed to trick you into giving up your personally identifiable information (PII).
What might that look like in your mailbox? They can take the form of bogus lottery prizes that request bank information for routing (non-existent) winnings. Another favorite of scammers are bogus tax notifications that demand immediate payment. In all, many can look quite convincing at first blush, yet there are ready ways you can spot them. In fact, many of the tips for avoiding these physical mail phishing attacks are the same for avoiding phishing attacks online, which we outline in detail here.
Recently, I’ve seen a few news stories like this where thieves reportedly abuse the change-of-address system with the U.S. Postal Service. Thieves will simply forward your mail to an address of their choosing, which can drop sensitive information like bank and credit card statements in their mailbox. From there, they could potentially have new checks sent to them or perhaps an additional credit card—both of which they can use to drain your accounts and run up your bills.
The Postal Service has mechanisms in place to prevent this, however. Among which, the Postal Service will send you a physical piece of mail to confirm the forwarding. So, if you ever receive mail from the Postal Service, open it and give it a close look. If you get such a notice and didn’t order the forwarding, visit your local post office to get things straightened out. Likewise, if it seems like you’re missing bills in the mail, that’s another good reason to follow up with your post office and the business in question to see if there have been any changes made in your mail forwarding.
So while your name and address are out there for practically all to see, they’re largely of little value to an identity thief on their own. But as mentioned above, they are key puzzle pieces to your overall identity. With enough of those other pieces in hand, that’s where an identity thief can cause trouble.
Other crucial pieces of your identity include:
Let’s start with the biggest one. This is the master key to your identity, as it is one of the most unique identifiers you have. As I covered in my earlier blog on Social Security fraud, a thief can unlock everything from credit history and credit line to tax refunds and medical care with your Social Security or tax ID number. In extreme cases, they can use it to impersonate you for employment, healthcare, and even in the event of an arrest.
You can protect your Social Security Number by keeping it locked in a safe place (rather than in your wallet) and by providing your number only when absolutely necessary. For more tips on keeping your number safe, drop by that blog on Social Security fraud I mentioned.
Thieves have figured out ways of getting around the fact that IDs like these include a photo. They may be able to modify or emulate these documents “well enough” to pull off certain types of fraud, particularly if the people requesting their bogus documents don’t review them with a critical eye.
Protecting yourself in this case means knowing where these documents are at any time. (With passports, you may want to store those securely like your Social Security or tax ID number.) Also be careful when you share this information, as the identifiers on these documents are highly unique. If you’re uncomfortable with sharing this information, you can ask if other forms of ID might work—or if this information is really needed at all. Also, take a moment to make copies of these documents and store them in a secure place. This can help you provide important info to the proper authorities if they’re lost or stolen.
With data breaches large and small making the news (and many more that do not), keeping a sharp eye on your accounts is a major part of identity theft prevention. We talk about this topic quite often, and it’s worth another mention because protecting these means protecting yourself from thieves who’re after direct access to your finances and more.
Secure your digital accounts for banking, credit cards, financials, and shopping by using strong, unique passwords for each of your accounts that you change every 60 days. Sound like a lot of work? Let a password manager do it for you, which you can find in comprehensive online protection software. By changing your strong passwords and keeping them unique can help prevent you from becoming a victim if your account information is part of a breach—by the time a crook attempts to use it, you may have changed it and made it out of date.
In addition to protecting the core forms of identity mentioned above, a few other good habits go a long way toward keeping your identity secure.
By protecting your devices, you protect what’s on them, like your personal information. Comprehensive online protection software can protect your identity in several ways, like creating and managing the strong, unique passwords we talked about and providing further services that monitor and protect your identity—in addition to digital shredders that can permanently remove sensitive documents (simply deleting them won’t do that alone.) Further, it can monitor your identity and monitor your credit, further protecting you from theft and fraud.
Identity theft where thieves dig through trash or go “dumpster diving” for literal scraps of personal info in bills and statements, has been an issue for some time. You can prevent it by shredding up any paper medical bills, tax documents, and checks once you’re through with them. Paper shredders are inexpensive, and let’s face it, kind of fun too. Also, if you’re traveling, have a trusted someone collects your mail or have the post office put a temporary hold on your mail. Thieves still poach mail from mailboxes too.
Getting statements online cuts the paper out of the equation and thus removes another thing that a thief can physically steal and possibly use against you. Whether you use electronic statements through your bank, credit card company, medical provider, or insurance company, use a secure password and a secure connection provided by a VPN. Both will make theft of your personal info far tougher on identity thieves.
A VPN is a Virtual Private Network, a service that protects your data and privacy online. It creates an encrypted tunnel to keep you more anonymous online by masking your IP address, device information, and the data you’re passing along that connection. In this way, it makes if far more difficult for advertisers, data brokers, and bad actors to skim your private information—in addition to shielding your information from crooks and snoops while you’re banking, shopping, or handling any kind of sensitive information online.
Give your statements a close look each time they come around. While many companies and institutions have fraud detection mechanisms in place, they don’t always catch every instance of fraud. Look out for strange purchases or charges and follow up with your bank or credit card company if you suspect fraud. Even the smallest charge could be a sign that something shady is afoot.
This is a powerful tool for spotting identity theft. And in many cases, it’s free to do so. In the U.S., the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) requires the major credit agencies to provide you with a free credit check at least once every 12 months. Canada provides this service, and the UK has options to receive free reports as well, along with several other nations. It’s a great idea to check your credit report, even if you don’t suspect a problem.
If the thought of your personal info being bought and sold puts you off, there’s something you can do about it. Our Personal Data Cleanup service can scan some of the riskiest data broker sites and show you which ones are selling your personal info. It also provides guidance on how you can remove your data from those sites, and with select products, it can even manage the removal for you.
While thieves need more than just your name and address to commit the overwhelming majority of fraud, your name and address are centerpieces of the larger jigsaw puzzle that is your overall identity.
And the interesting thing is your puzzle gets larger and larger as time goes on. With each new account you create and service that you sign into, that’s one more piece added to the puzzle. Thieves love getting their hands on any pieces they can because with enough of them in place they can try and pull a fast one in your name. By looking after each piece and knowing what your larger jigsaw puzzle looks like, you can help keep identity thieves out of your business and your life.
The post Can Thieves Steal Identities With Only a Name and Address? appeared first on McAfee Blog.
A good time to check if someone is using your identity is before it even happens.
One of identity theft’s several downsides is how people discover they’ve become a victim in the first place—by surprise. They go to rent an apartment, open a line of credit, or apply for financing, only to discover that their finances or reputation has taken a hit because of identity thief.
And those hits add up, particularly when you look at the dollars involved. In 2020, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported $3.3 billion in financial losses from 4.7 million reported cases of fraud, a 45% increase over the year prior. Of those reports, identity theft was the leading fraud category, accounting for 29% of fraud incidents.
Plenty. Depending on the type and amount of information an identity thief gets their hands on, they can harm your finances and reputation in several ways, including:
Rather than ending up with a rude and potentially costly surprise of your own, you can get ahead of thieves by checking to see if someone is using your identity before it’s a problem or before it really takes root.
Major data breaches that expose personal information seem to hit the headlines with some regularity, not to mention the many, many more that don’t get national or international press coverage. Most recently we have the Neiman Marcus breach, where this major retailer alerted 4.6 million customers that “an unauthorized party obtained personal information associated with certain Neiman Marcus customers’ online accounts.”
And as it is with many such breaches, it took quite some time before the theft of information was discovered. Per Neiman Marcus, it’s believed that the breach occurred in May 2020 and only discovered in September of 2021. Potentially compromised information included:
Whether or not you have reason to suspect that your information got caught up in this recent large-scale breach, it serves as a good reminder that any time is the right time to check up on your identity. Acting now can save headaches, potentially big headaches, later.
Quite a bit of identity theft prevention begins with taking stock of the accounts and services you have in your name. This ranges anywhere from bank accounts to public utilities and from credit cards to loans, all of which contain varying degrees of personal information about you. With a sense of where your personal identity is being used, you can better look for instances where it’s being misused.
Ways you can spot for possible identity theft include:
If you stop receiving a bill that normally comes to you, such as a utility bill or for a department store credit card, that could be a sign that a thief has changed the mailing address and has potentially hijacked your identity.
This is rather straightforward, yet it reminds us how important it is to look at our statements closely. Charges that you didn’t ring up or that seem slightly higher than normal are a surefire sign that you should follow up with the bank or company involved and let them know of possible fraud.
In the U.S., you have annual access to free credit reports from the major credit reporting agencies. Not only will this give you a sense of your credit score, but it will also show the credit that’s open in your name, along with addresses associated with your identity. Spotting an account that you haven’t signed up for or seeing an address of a residence that you’re not renting are other common signs that your identity may have been compromised.
With the number of accounts many of us have these days, a credit monitoring service can help you stay on top of what’s happening in your name. Often offered through banks, credit unions, and even insurance providers, credit monitoring can alert you in several instances, including:
Overall, credit monitoring can act as another set of eyes for you and spot potential identity issues. Different services provide different levels of monitoring, so consider reviewing a few options to find the one that works best for you.
One like our own Identity Protection Service will monitor several types of personally identifiable information, alert you of potentially stolen personal info, and offer guided help to neutralize the threat—in addition to offering several preventative steps to help keep theft from happening in the first place. With this set up on your computers and smartphone you can stay in the know and address issues immediately.
Along with keeping an eye on what’s happening with your identity online and elsewhere, there are a few more things you can do to make it tougher for thieves to steal your identity.
Given all the banking and shopping we do on our computers and phones, installing and using comprehensive online protection software is a must these days. It puts several layers of security in place, such as creating complex passwords automatically, shielding credit card info from prying eyes, and protecting your privacy and data online by connecting with a VPN. In short, online protection software acts as a solid first line of defense.
As mentioned above, comprehensive online protection software often includes a password manager that can generate strong, unique passwords for each of your accounts and remember them for you. It’s extra protection that makes life a lot easier for you by managing all the accounts you’re juggling. Also, use MFA (multi-factor authentication) on the accounts that give you the option, which makes it harder for a thief to crack your accounts with a password alone.
Sensitive documents come in all forms. Top-of-the-line examples include things like tax returns, bank statements, and financial records. Yet there are also things like your phone and utility bills, statements from your doctor’s office, and offers that come to you via mail. Together, these things can contain personal information such as account numbers, your full Social Security Number, the last four digits of your Social Security Number (which can still be useful to thieves), and other information that may uniquely identify you. You’ll want to dispose of sensitive documents like these so that they can’t be harvested by hackers.
For physical documents, consider the low-cost investment of a paper shredder to help ensure they don’t fall into the wrong hands when you are done with them. (And let’s face it, they’re fun to use!) For digital documents, simply deleting a file is not enough – online protection software is a great resource that often includes a digital document shredder, designed to render the data practically unusable when you’re ready to trash the file.
Your Social Security Number is one of the most prized possessions a thief can run away with because it is so closely associated with you and things like your tax returns, employment, and so on. Keep it stored in a safe location rather than on your person or in your wallet. Likewise, be careful about giving out your SSN. While organizations like the IRS, your bank, and employer require it, there are other organizations who do not—but may ask for it anyway. (Doctor’s offices are a prime example.) If you get such a request, ask them what they intend to use it for and then ask if another form of identification will work instead.
Phishing attacks are one of the primary ways identity thieves steal personal information. Whether they come via a direct message, on social media, or through email, text, or phone calls, thieves use them to harvest your personal info by posing as a legitimate organization—such as in this recent IRS phishing scam. Phishing is a topic all unto itself, and you can check out this quick read to see how you can spot phishing scams and protect yourself from them.
Like any criminal, identity thieves do their dirtiest work in the shadows—quietly stealing money under your nose, or worse, as we outlined above. By shining a light on your identity and keeping regular track of what’s happening with it, you can spot unusual activity right away. Even the small stuff is important. A co-worker of mine once saw an incorrect address listed on his credit report. Turned out, that address was used to rack up several large charges at a retailer, which he was able to fix with the aid of the credit reporting agency and the retailer in question.
No doubt about it. Identity theft is indeed on the rise, and your best bet to avoid such a nasty surprise is to keep an eye on your digital identity the same way you keep an eye on your actual wallet.
The post How to Check if Someone is Using Your Identity appeared first on McAfee Blog.
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