I recently re-tested an old Binance API finding I had reported through Bugcrowd.
The original issue was about Binance API IP whitelisting and derived listenKey stream credentials.
At the time, a listenKey could be created from a whitelisted IP and then used from a non-whitelisted IP to consume private user data streams.
That did not allow trading, withdrawals, or account takeover.
But it did allow real-time access to sensitive private stream data such as balances, orders, executions, positions, timing, and strategy behavior.
The core security argument was:
A derived credential should not be more portable than the credential that created it.
The report was rejected as “Social Engineering” / “Not Applicable”.
I disagreed, because the relevant threat model was not “convince the user to send a token”.
The realistic threat model was supply-chain compromise: malicious code running inside a trusted bot server, CI job, dependency, IDE workspace, or trading environment where API keys already exist.
I re-tested the behavior on May 5, 2026.
Result:
The old behavior appears to be gone.
Spot and Margin no longer use the old listenKey model. Futures still uses listenKey, but now appears to enforce the API key IP whitelist correctly. From a whitelisted IP the calls worked; from non-whitelisted Mullvad exits they failed with the expected IP restriction error.
That is good for users.
But it raises an uncomfortable disclosure-process question:
If a finding is “not applicable” enough to reject, not acknowledge, and not reward — but technical enough to later fix — what should a healthy disclosure process do?
Full technical write-up, timeline, re-test setup, and raw outputs:
I am mainly interested in the process question here:
When a rejected report later disappears from production, should the program re-open it, acknowledge it, partially reward it, or leave it closed unless the researcher can prove direct causality?
Researchers at Rapid7 say that they have spotted what they believe was an Iranian intelligence cyber unit masquerading as the Chaos ransomware gang to hide a state-sponsored espionage operation. The intrusion was spotted earlier this year, and investigators say breadcrumbs left behind give them "medium confidence" in saying it was the work of MuddyWater, which has been linked to intrusions affecting Western government and banking networks in recent months. Attackers began with a Microsoft Teams phishing campaign, which is not uncommon. They also encouraged targets to share their screens. Again, it was nothing too out of the ordinary. However, what must have required some expert persuasion work was that they convinced these individuals to enter their credentials into local text files, and even modify MFA settings to allow attacker-controlled devices to complete authentication. Rapid7 researchers Alexandra Blia and Ivan Feigl wrote: "While connected, the [threat actor (TA)] executed basic discovery commands, accessed files related to the victim's VPN configuration, and instructed users to enter their credentials into locally-created text files. "In at least one instance, the TA also deployed a remote management tool (AnyDesk) to further facilitate access." From there, browser artifacts suggested that attackers lifted credentials through phishing pages. At least one mimicked a Microsoft Quick Assist page. Armed with valid credentials, the attackers then executed various commands via RDP, which downloaded payloads using curl. These payloads included a backdoor malware dubbed Darkcomp, a malicious Microsoft WebView2 loader to disguise traffic, and an encrypted configuration file that sent instructions to Darkcomp. Then it was a case of performing lateral movement by using additional compromised accounts and scooping up sensitive data along the way. The attackers used the same accounts to send emails internally notifying organization leaders about the intrusion and data theft, and included an onion link leading to Chaos ransomware’s data leak site (DLS), where a corresponding entry appeared with all data redacted and hidden behind a countdown timer. Follow-up emails aimed to build the illusion of a genuine ransomware attack, although the illusion was short-lived. The attackers instructed recipients to look for a file containing "access credentials" they could use to begin ransom negotiations. Unlike the plaintext credential files the attackers had socially engineered the original targets into creating, this file did not actually exist. There was no way to contact the attackers, whereas in a typical scenario the intruders would be looking for a payout. There was also no file encryption, which is inconsistent with Chaos affiliates' typical way of working. "Despite these inconsistencies in the initial proof-of-compromise, the TA later published the stolen data on its DLS in line with modern extortion tactics," Blia and Feigl wrote. "The leaked data was assessed to be legitimate." If not for financial gain, then what? MuddyWater – if that is indeed the group behind this – did not extort the organizations in question, nor did they deploy a ransomware payload, but they did pose as an established ransomware group. Rapid7 believes the group did this as an extension of its false-flag operations to provide a plausible front for cyberespionage activity, or preposition work to underpin potential destructive cyberattacks. It wouldn't be the first time MuddyWater or Iranian intelligence (MOIS) was found LARPing as a ransomware crew. Both have previously been linked to an attack on an Israeli hospital, allegedly carried out by a Qilin affiliate. "Following the subsequent public attribution of that incident to the MOIS, it is plausible that the group adopted alternative ransomware branding, in this case Chaos, in an effort to reduce attribution risk and maintain a degree of plausible deniability," said the researchers. The unique benefits of masquerading as ransomware crooks include muddying attribution for attacks by leaving behind ransomware breadcrumbs, as well as redirecting defensive efforts toward locating signs of ransomware deployment instead of the backdoors that underpin espionage activity. ®
It's not just you. Scammers, hackers, and other cybercriminals are complaining about “AI shit” flooding platforms where they discuss cyberattacks and other illegal activity.
Privacy groups, VPN providers, and civil liberties outfits have lined up to warn the UK government that its latest plan to slap age gates across swathes of the internet risks breaking the web while doing little to keep kids safe. In a joint statement, signatories including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Mozilla, the Open Rights Group, Proton, and the Tor Project took aim at proposals now moving forward after the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill cleared Parliament, with access to some platforms, services, and specific features potentially restricted by age checks. "The open internet is a global public resource that has long since become foundational to the flourishing of individuals, businesses, and societies," the letter states, warning that "this openness and the opportunities it affords are coming under threat in the UK." Ministers are now consulting on measures that could include curfews for younger users and restrictions across services ranging from games and VPNs to static websites. The signatories say that will quickly turn into a system where everyone, not just children, has to prove their age to get full access. "Implementing such access restrictions hinges on all users having to verify their ages, not just young people," the letter warns, adding that the approach "focuses on restricting young people's access, rather than ensuring services are designed to uphold their rights and interests by default." Early results are not exactly inspiring. It's been months since tougher checks under the Online Safety Act began rolling out, and some systems have already been fooled by little more than a drawn-on mustache, raising questions about how effective the tech really is at keeping minors out. This hasn't gone unnoticed. "Existing age assurance technologies are either insufficiently accurate, undermine privacy and data security, or are not widely available across populations," the letter says, warning that rolling them out broadly "creates serious new security threats." It is not just a privacy headache either: the groups argue the policy could tilt the market further toward Big Tech. Mandating checks across more services risks "cementing the dominance of gatekeeper app stores, operating systems, and platforms' walled gardens," while turning the web into "a patchwork of age-gated jurisdictions." Instead of doubling down on access controls, the groups argue policymakers are targeting the wrong problem. "These risks are real and require thoughtful policy interventions that address the root of the issue, not just simplistic policies like access bans," the letter says, pointing to business models built on "massive collection of user data" as a bigger driver of harm. The closing line does not leave much room for interpretation: "Now is the time to hold tech to account, not undermine the open internet." ®
The Iranian state-sponsored hacking group known as MuddyWater (aka Mango Sandstorm, Seedworm, and Static Kitten) has been attributed to a ransomware attack in what has been described as a "false flag" operation.
The attack, observed by Rapid7 in early 2026, has been found to leverage social engineering techniques via Microsoft Teams to initiate the infection sequence. Although the incident
For nearly 20 years, we at The Hacker News have mostly told scary stories about cyberspace — big hacks, broken systems, and new threats.
But behind every headline, there’s a quieter, better story.
It’s the story of leaders making tough calls under pressure, teams building smarter defenses, and security products that keep hunting threats 24/7 — even when it’s hard.
Most of the time, this work is
Analysts recently confirmed what identity security teams have quietly feared: AI agents are being deployed faster than enterprises can govern them. In their inaugural Market Guide for Guardian Agents, Gartner states that “enterprise adoption of AI agents is accelerating, outpacing maturity of governance policy controls.” Enterprise leaders can request access to the Gartner Market Guide for
Google has announced expanded Binary Transparency for Android as a way to safeguard the ecosystem from supply chain attacks.
"This new public ledger ensures the Google apps on your device are exactly what we intended to build and distribute," Google's product and security teams said.
The initiative builds upon the foundation of Pixel Binary Transparency, which Google introduced in October 2021
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of an intrusion that involved the use of a CloudZ remote access tool (RAT) and a previous undocumented plugin dubbed Pheno with the aim of facilitating credential theft.
"According to the functionalities of the CloudZ RAT and Pheno plugin, this was with the intention of stealing victims' credentials and potentially one-time passwords (OTPs),"
Palo Alto Networks has released an advisory warning that a critical buffer overflow vulnerability in its PAN-OS software has been exploited in the wild.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-0300, has been described as a case of unauthenticated remote code execution. It carries a CVSS score of 9.3 if the User-ID Authentication Portal is configured to enable access from the internet or any
India’s Securities and Exchange Board has advised participants in the nation’s equities industry to immediately revisit their information security systems and practices, in case Anthropic’s Mythos bug-finding AI sparks a cyberattack spree. The Board is India’s equivalent of the USA’s Securities and Exchange Commission, or the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority. On Tuesday, the Indian regulator issued an advisory that opens with the following observation: In response to those threats, the Board has established a taskforce that will examine the risks posed by models like Mythos, share threat intelligence, report incidents, and initiate a review of cybersecurity at third-party software vendors who supply the regulator and the entities it oversees. The advisory then offers some basic infosec advice: ensure patches are up to date, conduct audits of potential vulnerabilities, conduct inventories of APIs and secure them, run a serious SOC and take its advice, and harden systems by adopting principles such as zero-trust networking and running only essential services. The regulator also told participants in India’s equities markets to have their IT committees issue guidance on how to mitigate risks created by AI-led vulnerability detection models, then develop a plan to use AI as part of their infosec armoury. “Also, undertake other measures including recalibration of risks for AI accelerated threats, AI-augmented SOC transformation, and continuous vulnerability management using AI tools,” the advisory states. The Board directed the above advice at 19 different classes of company, ranging from venture capitalists to merchant bankers, mutual funds, stock exchanges, and even niche suppliers such as agencies that store know your customer information. Other regulators around the world have also acknowledged the risks Mythos poses. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent convened an emergency meeting with the nation’s banks a few weeks back. Singaporean regulators did likewise, yesterday. Australian regulators sent local banks a strongly worded reminder that they must develop AI strategies that consider risks the technology creates. Hong Kong’s Monetary Authority is working on new infosec guidance for the age of Mythos. India’s approach stands out for effectively putting entities it regulates on alert to an imminent threat and ordering them to take action to prevent problems. ®
It's a fascinating display of leverage: the ShinyHunters folks, with very limited resources and experience (their demographic will be teenagers to their early 20s), consistently gaining access to the data of massive brands. Not through technical ingenuity alone (although I'm sure there's a portion of that), but primarily through good ol' social engineering. That's coming through in the disclosure notices from the impacted companies, and Mandiant has a good write-up of it too:
These operations primarily leverage sophisticated voice phishing (vishing) and victim-branded credential harvesting sites to gain initial access to corporate environments by obtaining single sign-on (SSO) credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes
Question now is how long their run will go for. There's a very predictable ending if things keep going in this direction but right now, they show little sign of abating.
In this blog post I introduced several novel techniques:
1.How to get all routes - no need to authenticate.
How to get methods to fuzz from pages and not just the bootstrap JS files - the vast majority of methods are in those pages and not the JS files that existing tools and guides point to.
How to parse "LWC" components and not just legacy components.
ServiceNow announced an expansion of its AI Control Tower, transforming what began last year as a governance dashboard into what the company now describes as a command center for managing AI assets across an entire enterprise, including those running outside ServiceNow's own platform. The updated AI Control Tower, shipping as part of ServiceNow's Australia platform release, now operates across five areas: discovery, observation, governance, security, and measurement. The company said that this is its answer to AI agent sprawl, as enterprises have deployed more AI than they can account for and the tools to govern it have not kept pace. “What we launched last year gave customers a governance layer, but what we're shipping this year goes significantly deeper, evolving from visibility and management into a full enterprise AI command center,” Nenshad Bardoliwalla, group vice president of AI products at ServiceNow told reporters during a media briefing ahead of the company’s annual product show, Knowledge 26. “Our AI control tower ensures every AI system asset and identity is compliant, secure, and aligned with your strategy.” The AI Control Tower now reaches beyond ServiceNow's own platform with 30 new enterprise connectors that span all three major hyperscalers, Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Azure, along with enterprise applications such as SAP, Oracle, and Workday. The system can now discover AI assets, models, agents, prompts, and datasets running across an organization's full technology estate, not just those deployed on ServiceNow. “With our Veza integration, we're bringing patented access graph technology into the AI control tower, extending identity access governance to hyperscaler AI environments and every connected device, every agent, every model, every action has scope permissions, least privilege enforcement and auditable identity chains,” Bardoliwalla said. Bardoliwalla walked through a demo in which the AI Control Tower detected a prompt injection attack on a pricing agent. The system identified malicious instructions hidden inside order payloads, mapped the blast radius of affected systems using access graph technology from Veza, and presented a kill switch to disable the compromised agent, without human intervention. "You need a system that senses, decides and acts on its own, that can scale with your AI portfolio, not your head count," said Bardoliwalla. Two recent acquisitions underpin the security architecture. ServiceNow announced in December it would acquire Veza, which contributes an access graph that maps every identity and access path across systems whether it belongs to humans, machines, or AI agents. It also knows which entities have create, read, update, and delete-level permissions. ServiceNow said the access graph currently maps over 30 billion fine-grained permissions. When a vendor pushes a new version of a model or agent, the platform detects permission changes and automatically triggers a re-scoping workflow. Traceloop, which ServiceNow acquired in March, provides deep AI observability inside the Control Tower by tracking every LLM call that is running in the system. The integration delivers continuous runtime monitoring with live alerts, replacing what ServiceNow described as the periodic manual audits most enterprises still rely on. Teams can watch how agents reason, where they make decisions, and when to course-correct. ServiceNow also addressed the cost side of the AI equation. Control Tower now includes cost tracking and ROI dashboards to give finance teams visibility into model spend. The measurements track token consumption across providers such as OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google so customers can predict costs and tie spending to business outcomes. ServiceNow said it uses the AI Control Tower internally to manage over 1,600 AI assets and tracked half a billion dollars in cumulative AI value from internal use cases in 2025. "The number one question every CFO is asking is, where's the value?" said Bardoliwalla during the briefing. He added that runaway model spend ranks among the biggest pain points enterprises currently face as they scale AI deployments. Alongside the Control Tower expansion, ServiceNow announced Action Fabric, a mechanism that opens the company's full workflow engine to external AI agents. Through a generally available MCP server, agents built on Claude, Copilot, or custom platforms can now trigger governed enterprise actions — not just read and write data, but execute the flows, playbooks, approval chains, and catalog requests that ServiceNow customers have built over years. Anthropic is the first design partner for Action Fabric. The integration connects Claude directly to ServiceNow's governed system of action. "The gap between knowing what needs to happen and making it happen is where productivity dies," said Boris Cherny, head of Claude Code at Anthropic said in a statement. "Connecting Claude Cowork to ServiceNow's system of action closes that gap with enterprise execution, directly in the flow of work." Every action routed through Action Fabric runs through the AI Control Tower, so it carries identity verification, permission scoping, and a full audit trail. The MCP server is included in every Now Assist and AI Native SKU, with additional features planned for the second half of 2026.
CISA is warning that a newly-disclosed Linux kernel bug dubbed "CopyFail" is already being exploited, just days after researchers dropped a working root-level exploit. Tracked as CVE-2026-31431, the bug sits in the Linux kernel and gives low-level users a way to take full control of a system by modifying data they should only be able to read, effectively turning limited access into full root privileges on unpatched machines. The issue was disclosed by cybersecurity consultancy Theori, which said the flaw was discovered by its AI-powered penetration testing platform, Xint, and reported to the Linux kernel security team on March 23. Major Linux distributions pushed out patches ahead of public disclosure, which Theori published alongside a proof-of-concept exploit. The Python-based code works against Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, Amazon Linux 2023, RHEL 10.1, and SUSE 16, but the researchers warned that every mainstream Linux kernel built since 2017 is in scope of potential exploitation. "Same script, four distributions, four root shells — in one take. The same exploit binary works unmodified on every Linux distribution," Theori says. That level of reliability has not gone unnoticed. The CISA, the US government's cybersecurity agency, has added the bug to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and ordered Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies to patch within two weeks, setting a May 15 deadline. Microsoft backed CISA's findings and said it is already seeing signs of activity following the PoC's release. "Given the availability of a fully working exploit proof-of-concept (PoC) and the race to patch systems, Microsoft Defender is seeing preliminary testing activity that might result most likely in increased threat actor exploitation over the next few days," the company warned. The mechanics help explain the urgency. The attack is local and requires little access, with no user interaction, so anyone who already has a foothold on a vulnerable box can try their luck. It is the kind of bug that turns a small break-in into full control pretty quickly. As The Register reported last week, the flaw stems from how the kernel handles certain cryptographic operations, opening a path to tamper with cached data in ways that were never meant to be user-controlled. With a reliable exploit now in the wild, that design quirk has effectively turned into a universal privilege-escalation trick. ®
Real estate giant Cushman & Wakefield has confirmed a data breach after two cybercrime groups, ShinyHunters and Qilin, separately claimed responsibility for attacks on the company. A spokesperson told The Register the attack was "limited" in scope and stemmed from vishing (voice phishing), suggesting an employee was socially engineered. The representative said: "Cushman & Wakefield recently became aware of a limited data security incident due to vishing. We have activated our response protocols, including taking steps to contain the unauthorized activity and engaging third-party expert advisors to support a comprehensive response. "Our systems and operations continue to run normally, and we are working diligently to investigate the incident. We recognize the trust placed in us to protect sensitive data and we take this responsibility very seriously." Cushman & Wakefield (C&W) did not address the apparent dual targeting by both ShinyHunters, which operates a pay-or-leak model, and Qilin, currently viewed as the world's most prolific ransomware group. There is no previously established coalition between ShinyHunters and Qilin, which suggests the two alleged attacks are separate but coincidentally timed. In a message sent to The Register, ShinyHunters claimed they attacked the company on May 1, while Qilin listed C&W on its data leak site on May 4. Qilin's website listing did not detail how it allegedly attacked C&W, although ShinyHunters claimed it stole "over 500,000 Salesforce records containing PII and other internal corporate data." ShinyHunters set a May 6 deadline for C&W to make contact to prevent the data from being leaked, but the cybercriminals claimed this had yet to happen. ShinyHunters has been on something of a tear recently. Known for its large-scale, high-impact attacks, the group's latest wave of activity began in March when it laid claim to an expansive supply chain attack after breaching Salesforce customers via the CRM giant itself. At the time, it said it had stolen data belonging to Salesforce and more than 100 of its high-profile customers. Since then, big-name brands like ADT, Carnival Cruise Line, Rockstar Games, Vimeo, and others have all confirmed ShinyHunters-linked cyberattacks, although not all were explicitly linked to its earlier Salesforce compromise. ®