Written by James Schmidt
Editor’s Note: We often speak of online scams in our blogs, ones that cost victims hundreds if not thousands of dollars. This account puts a face on one of those scams—along with the personal, financial, and emotional pain that they can leave in their wake. This is the story of “Meredith,” whose aunt “Leslie” fell victim to an emerging form on online elder fraud. Our thanks to James for bringing it forward and to “Meredith’s” family for sharing it, all so others can prevent such scams from happening to them.
“Embarrassing. Simply embarrassing.” She shook her head. “It’s too raw. I can’t talk about it right now. I need time.”
Her aunt had been scammed. To the tune of $100,000 dollars. My colleague—we both work in the security industry—felt a peculiar sense of loss.
“I work in this industry. I thought I’d done everything right. I’ve passed on enough warnings to my family and friends to ensure they’d avoid the fate of the scammed. Simply because I’m in this industry does not imply my circle is always aware of all the threats to them, even if I do my best to teach them.”
“My mental state, recently, borders on shame; this feeling, you know? How could someone working in my industry have something like this happen to a family member?”
I told her many people working in other industries cannot control what happens to people in their families even if people in that industry had knowledge that could have helped them or otherwise avoided a problem altogether.
“I know, but this simply should never have happened! My aunt is one of the smartest, most conscientious people I know, and she fell for this. It’s crazy and I can’t wrap my head around it.”
My colleague, let’s call her Meredith (not her real name as she’s a bit ashamed to know this happened to a family member), told me the beginnings.
Let’s call her aunt Leslie.
Her story unfolds, the overall picture a pastiche of millions of people in the United States today. Her aunt is retired, bored, lonely, and isolated. She feels adrift without something to occupy her time; she was looking for companionship, connections, someone (anyone) to talk to. Her feelings intensified during the pandemic. She morphed into perfect prey for scammers of what is now known as the “Pig Butchering Scam.”
The term “Pig Butchering” has a visceral and raw feel to it, which falls right in line with how brutal this scam can be. It’s a long con game, where the scammer befriends the victim and encourages them to make small investments through the scammer, which get bigger and bigger over time. The scammer builds trust early with what appear to be small investment wins. None of it is legit. The money goes right into the scammer’s pocket, even as the scammer shows the victim phony financial statements and dashboards to show off the bogus returns. Confidence grows. The scammer wrings even larger sums out of the victim. And then disappears.
It was a targeted attack that started innocuously enough with a “fake wrong number”. An SMS arrives. A text conversation starts. The scammer then apologizes but tells Leslie someone gave them the number to initiate the text.
The scammer then uses emotional and psychological techniques to keep Leslie hooked. “How are you, are you having a nice day?” Leslie, being bored and interested, engages willingly.
The scammer asks to talk directly, not via text: and a phone conversation ensues. The scammer proceeds to describe—in very soothing detail—what they are doing, helping people, like Leslie, invest their “hard-earned money” into something that will make them more money, to help them out in retirement.
Of course, it is too good to be true.
“The craziest part of all of this is my aunt refuses—to this day—to believe she’s been scammed!”
She still thinks this scammer is a “friend” even though the entire family is up in arms over this, all of whom beg her aunt to “open her eyes.”
“My aunt still thinks she’d going to see that money again, or even make some money, which is crazy. The scammers are so good at emotional intelligence; really leveraging heartstrings and psychological makeup of the forlorn in society. My aunt finally agreed to stop sending more money to the scammers, but only after the entire family threatened to cut her off from the rest of the family. It took a lot to get her to stop trusting the scammers.”
Meredith feels this is doubly sad as the aunt in question is not someone they’d ever imagine would in this predicament. She was always the upright one, always the diligent and hardworking and the best with money. She is smart and savvy and we could never imagine her to be taken by these people and taken so easily. It boggles the mind.”
She did start to change in the last few years. And the pandemic created a weird situation. Retirement, loneliness from loss of a partner, and the added burden of the pandemic created a perfect storm for her to open herself up to someone willingly, simply for the sake of connection.
“No one deserves this. It has rocked my family to the core. It is not only about the money, but we’ve found family bonds stretched. She believes these random people, these scammers, more than she believes her own family. Have we been neglectful of our aunt? Does she no longer put her faith in people she knows, rather gives money to complete strangers?”
Being a security professional does not provide magical protection. We are more aware of scams and scammers, and how they work, and what to look for, and we try to do all we can to keep our family aware of scams out there in the big wide world, but we are human. We fall short.
Diligence is action. Awareness is action. Education is action.
We need to be better, all of us, at socializing risky things. We need to consistently educate our family and friends to protect themselves, not only via security software (which everyone should have as default) but by providing tips and tricks and warnings for things we all need to be on the lookout. This is not a one-time thing. The cliché holds true: “If you see something say something.” Repetition helps.
In today’s world, the need for protecting people’s security, identity, and privacy is critical to keeping them safe. Scammers long stopped focusing on attacking only your computer. Now focus more than ever on YOU: your identity, your privacy, your trust. If they get you there, they soon get your money.
As for contributing factors to scammers success with their victims, such as loneliness, isolation, and boredom, they all have remedies. Make connections with your loved ones, especially those easily tagged as vulnerable, those you feel might be at risk. Reach out. It may be hard sometimes due to distance and other factors but make it a point to connect. There is a reason these scammers are succeeding. They are stepping into roles of companions to people who are desperate for connection.
Most people are greatly saddened at seeing other people being “taken.” Let’s work together to help stop the scammers.
Look out for each other, and get your people protected!
Editor’s Closing Note:
If you or someone you know suspects elder fraud, the following resources can help:
For further reading on scams and scam prevention, check out the guides in our McAfee Safety Series, which provide in-depth advice on protecting your identity and privacy—and your family from scams. They’re ready to download and share.
The post A Scam in the Family—How a Close Relative Lost $100,000 to an Elder Scam appeared first on McAfee Blog.
As the majority of the global Covid fog finally started lifting in 2022, other events – and their associated risks – started to fill the headspace of C-level execs the world over. In my role, I regularly engage with CISOs in all kinds of sectors, representatives at industry bodies, and experts at analyst houses. This gives me an invaluable macroview not only of how the last 12 months have affected organizations and what CISOs are thinking about, but also how the upcoming year is shaping up.
Using this information, last year I wrote a blog summing up the nine top of mind issues I believed will most impact CISOs as we headed into 2022. Many of them still ring true now and will continue to do so, but some new concerns have risen up the agenda. Here are the topics that I think will be top of mind in 2023, and what CISOs can do to prepare.
One aspect that has come to the fore this year is the CISO’s position as ‘guardian of customers’ private data’ in the event of a breach, and their responsibilities over the level of disclosure they later provide. And here, we are not only talking about the legal duty to inform regulators, but the implicit moral duty to inform third parties, customers, etc. From my conversations this year, this whole area is getting CISOs thinking about their own personal liability more.
As a result of this, next year we could see CISOs tightening up the disclosure decision making process, focusing on quicker and greater clarity on breach impact, and even looking to include personal liability cover in cyber insurance contracts. CISOs will also likely be pushing more tabletop exercises with the executive leadership team to ask and answer questions around what is showed, to whom, and by whom.
Cyber insurance has become a newsworthy topic over the last 24 months, mainly due to the hardening of the market, as insurance products have become less profitable for underwriters and insurers’ costs have risen. But the topic will continue to be in focus as we move into 2023, with insurers demanding greater attribution – aka the science of identifying the perpetrator of a cybercrime by comparing the evidence gathered from an attack with evidence gathered from earlier attacks that have been attributed to known perpetrators to find similarities.
The need for greater attribution stems from the news that some insurers are announcing that they are not covering nation state attacks, including major marketplace for insurance and reinsurance, Lloyd’s – a topic I covered with colleague and co-author Martin Lee, in this blog earlier in the year.
Greater preparation and crystal-clear clarity of the extent to which attribution has taken place when negotiating contracts will be an essential element for CISOs going forward. For more practical advice on this topic, I also wrote a blog on some of the challenges and opportunities within the cyber liability insurance market back in June which you can read here.
Being a CISO has never been more complex. With more sophisticated attacks, scarcity of resources, the challenges of communicating effectively with the board, and more demanding regulatory drivers like the recently approved NIS2 in the EU, which includes a requirement to flag incidents that cause a significant financial implication or operational disruption to the service or to others within 24 hours.
With so much to consider, it is vital that CISOs have a clear understanding of the core elements of what they protect. Questions like ‘where is the data?’, ‘who is accessing it?’, ‘what applications is the organization using?’, ‘where and what is in the cloud?’ will continue to be asked, with an overarching need to make management of the security function more flexible and simpler for the user. This visibility will also inevitably help ease quicker decision making and less of an operational overhead when it comes to regulatory compliance, so the benefits of asking these questions are clear.
According to Forrester, the term Zero Trust was born in 2009. Since then, it has been used liberally by different cybersecurity vendors – with various degrees of accuracy. Zero Trust implementations, while being the most secure approach a firm can take, are long journeys that take multiple years for major enterprises to carry out, so it is vital that they start as they mean to go on. But it is clear from the interactions we have had that many CISOs still don’t know where to start, as we touched on in point #3.
However, that can be easier said than done in many cases, as the principles within Zero trust fundamentally turn traditional security methods on their head, from protecting from the outside in (guarding your company’s parameter from external threats) to protecting from in the inside out (guarding individual assets from all threats, both internal and external). This is particularly challenging for large enterprises with a multitude of different silos, stakeholders and business divisions to consider.
The key to success on a zero-trust journey is to set up the right governance mode with the relevant stakeholders and communicate all changes. It is also worth taking the opportunity to update their solutions via a tech refresh which has a multitude of benefits, as explained in our most recent Security Outcomes Study (volume 2).
For more on where to start check out our eBook which explores the five phases to achieving zero trust, and if you have already embarked on the journey, read our recently published Guide to Zero Trust Maturity to help you find quick wins along the way.
As with last year, ransomware continues to be the main tactical issue and concern facing CISOs. More specifically, the uncertainty around when and how an attack could be launched against the organization is a constant threat.
Increased regulation on the payment of ransomware and declaring payments is predicted, on top of the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA), the Ransom Disclosure Act, but that doesn’t help alleviate ransomware worries, especially as this will again put the CISO in the firing line.
CISOs will continue to keep a focus on the core basics to prevent or limit the impact of an attack, and again have a closer look at how any ransomware payment may or may not be paid and who will authorize payment. For more on how executives can prepare for ransomware attacks, read this blog from Cisco Talos.
Traditionally CISOs have talked about the importance of improving security awareness which has resulted in the growth of those test phishing emails we all know and love so much. Joking aside, there is increased discussion now about the limited impact of this approach, including this in depth study from the computer science department of ETH Zurich.
The study, which was the largest both in terms of scale and length at time of publishing, revealed that ‘embedded training during simulated phishing exercises, as commonly deployed in the industry today, does not make employees more resilient to phishing, but instead it can have unexpected side effects that can make employees even more susceptible to phishing’.
For the most effective security awareness, culture is key. This means that everyone should see themselves as part of the security team, like the approach that has been taken when approaching the issue of safety in many high-risk industries. In 2023, CISOs will now be keen to bring about a change to a security culture by making security inclusive, looking to create security champions within the business unit, and finding new methods to communicate the security message.
Last year, we talked about preparing for the ‘great resignation’ and how to prevent staff leaving as WFH became a norm rather than an exception. In the past year, the conversations I have had have altered to focus on how to ensure recruitment and retention of key staff within the business by ensuring they work in an environment that supports their role.
Overly restrictive security practices, burdensome security with too many friction points, and limitations around what resources and tools can be used may deter the best talent from joining – or indeed staying – with an organization. And CISOs don’t need that extra worry of being the reason behind that kind of ‘brain drain’. So, security will need to focus on supporting the introduction of flexibility and the ease of user experience, such as passwordless or risk-based authentication.
Just when we thought it was safe to go back into the organization with MFA protecting us, along came methods of attack that rely on push-based authentication vulnerabilities including:
There has been a lot written about this kind of technique and how it works (including guidance from Duo) due to some recent high-profile cases. So, in the forthcoming year CISOs will look to update their solutions and introduce new ways to authenticate, along with increased communications to users on the topic.
This issue was highlighted again this year driven by regulations in different sectors such as the UK Telecoms (Security) Act which went live in the UK in November 2022 and the new EU regulation on digital operational resilience for financial services firms (DORA), which the European Parliament voted to adopt, also in November 2022. Both prompt greater focus on compliance, more reporting and understanding the dependency and interaction organizations have with the supply chain and other third parties.
CISOs will focus on obtaining reassurance from third parties as to their posture and will receive a lot of requests from others about where their organization stands, so it is crucial more robust insight into third parties is gained, documented, and communicated.
When writing this blog, and comparing it to last year’s, the 2023 top nine topics fit into three categories. Some themes make a reappearance, seem to repeat themselves such as the need to improve security’s interaction with users and the need to keep up to date with digital change. Others appear as almost incremental changes to current capabilities such as an adjusted approach to MFA to cope with push fatigue. But, perhaps one of the most striking differences to previous years is the new focus on the role of the CISO in the firing line and the personal impact that may have. We will of course continue to monitor all changes over the year and lend our viewpoint to give guidance. We wish you a secure and prosperous new year!
We’d love to hear what you think. Ask a Question, Comment Below, and Stay Connected with Cisco Secure on social!
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Ransomware. Even the name sounds scary.
When you get down to it, ransomware is one of the nastiest attacks a hacker can wage. They target some of our most important and precious things—our files, our photos, and the information stored on our devices. Think about suddenly losing access to all of them and being forced to pay a ransom to get access back. Worse yet, paying the ransom is no guarantee the hacker will return them.
That’s what a ransomware attack does. Broadly speaking, it’s a type of malware that infects a network or a device and then typically encrypts the files, data, and apps stored on it, digitally scrambling them so the proper owners can’t access them. Only a digital key can unlock them—one that the hacker holds.
Nasty for sure, yet you can take several steps that can greatly reduce the risk of it happening to you. Our recently published Ransomware Security Guide breaks them down for you, and in this blog we’ll look at a few reasons why ransomware protection is so vital.
The short answer is pretty bad—to the tune of billions of dollars stolen from victims each year. Ransomware targets people and their families just as explained above. Yet it also targets large organizations, governments, and even companies that run critical stretches of energy infrastructure and the food supply chain. Accordingly, the ransom amounts for these victims climb into millions of dollars.
A few recent cases of large-scale ransomware attacks include:
Who’s behind such attacks? Given the scope and scale of them, it’s often organized hacking groups. Put simply, these are big heists. It demands expertise to pull them off, not to mention further expertise to transfer large sums of cryptocurrency in ways that cover the hackers’ tracks.
As for ransomware attacks on people and their families, the individual dollar amounts of an attack are far lower, typically in the hundreds of dollars. Again, the culprits behind them may be large hacking groups that cast a wider net for individual victims, where hundreds of successful attacks at hundreds of dollars each quickly add up. One example: a hacker group that posed as a government agency and as a major retailer, which mailed out thousands of USB drives infected with malware.
Other ransomware hackers who target people and families are far less sophisticated. Small-time hackers and hacking groups can find the tools they need to conduct such attacks by shopping on the dark web, where ransomware is available for sale or for lease as a service (Ransomware as a Service, or RaaS). In effect, near-amateur hackers can grab a ready-to-deploy attack right off the shelf.
Taken together, hackers will level a ransomware attack at practically anyone or any organization—making it everyone’s concern.
Hackers have several ways of getting ransomware onto one of your devices. Like any other type of malware, it can infect your device via a phishing link or a bogus attachment. It can also end up there by downloading apps from questionable app stores, with a stolen or hacked password, or through an outdated device or network router with poor security measures in place. And as mentioned above, infected storage devices provide another avenue.
Social engineering attacks enter the mix as well, where the hacker poses as someone the victim knows and gets the victim to either download malware or provide the hacker access to an otherwise password-protected device, app, or network.
And yes, ransomware can end up on smartphones as well.
While not a prevalent as other types of malware attacks, smartphone ransomware can encrypt files, photos, and the like on a smartphone, just as it can on computers and networks. Yet other forms of mobile ransomware don’t have to encrypt data to make the phone unusable. The “Lockerpin” ransomware that has struck some Android devices in the past would change the PIN number that locked the phone. Other forms of mobile ransomware paste a window over the phone’s apps, making them unusable without decrypting the ransomware.
Part of avoiding ransomware involves reducing human error—keeping a watchful eye open for those spammy links, malicious downloads, bogus emails, and basically keeping your apps and devices up to date so that they have the latest security measures in place. The remainder relies on a good dose of prevention.
Our Ransomware Security Guide provides a checklist for both.
It gets into the details of what ransomware looks like and how it works, followed by the straightforward things you can do to prevent it, along with the steps to take if the unfortunate ends up happening to you or someone you know.
Ransomware is one of the nastiest attacks going because it targets our files, photos, and information, things we don’t know where we’d be without. Yet it’s good to know you can indeed lower your risk with a few relatively simple steps. Once you have them in place, chances are a good feeling will come over you, the one that comes with knowing you’ve protected what’s precious and important to you.
The post Your Guide to Ransomware—and Preventing It Too appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Ransomware groups are constantly devising new methods for infecting victims and convincing them to pay up, but a couple of strategies tested recently seem especially devious. The first centers on targeting healthcare organizations that offer consultations over the Internet and sending them booby-trapped medical records for the “patient.” The other involves carefully editing email inboxes of public company executives to make it appear that some were involved in insider trading.
Alex Holden is founder of Hold Security, a Milwaukee-based cybersecurity firm. Holden’s team gained visibility into discussions among members of two different ransom groups: CLOP (a.k.a. “Cl0p” a.k.a. “TA505“), and a newer ransom group known as Venus.
Last month, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) warned that Venus ransomware attacks were targeting a number of U.S. healthcare organizations. First spotted in mid-August 2022, Venus is known for hacking into victims’ publicly-exposed Remote Desktop services to encrypt Windows devices.
Holden said the internal discussions among the Venus group members indicate this gang has no problem gaining access to victim organizations.
“The Venus group has problems getting paid,” Holden said. “They are targeting a lot of U.S. companies, but nobody wants to pay them.”
Which might explain why their latest scheme centers on trying to frame executives at public companies for insider trading charges. Venus indicated it recently had success with a method that involves carefully editing one or more email inbox files at a victim firm — to insert messages discussing plans to trade large volumes of the company’s stock based on non-public information.
“We imitate correspondence of the [CEO] with a certain insider who shares financial reports of his companies through which your victim allegedly trades in the stock market, which naturally is a criminal offense and — according to US federal laws [includes the possibility of up to] 20 years in prison,” one Venus member wrote to an underling.
“You need to create this file and inject into the machine(s) like this so that metadata would say that they were created on his computer,” they continued. “One of my clients did it, I don’t know how. In addition to pst, you need to decompose several files into different places, so that metadata says the files are native from a certain date and time rather than created yesterday on an unknown machine.”
Holden said it’s not easy to plant emails into an inbox, but it can be done with Microsoft Outlook .pst files, which the attackers may also have access to if they’d already compromised a victim network.
“It’s not going to be forensically solid, but that’s not what they care about,” he said. “It still has the potential to be a huge scandal — at least for a while — when a victim is being threatened with the publication or release of these records.”
The Venus ransom group’s extortion note. Image: Tripwire.com
Holden said the CLOP ransomware gang has a different problem of late: Not enough victims. The intercepted CLOP communication seen by KrebsOnSecurity shows the group bragged about twice having success infiltrating new victims in the healthcare industry by sending them infected files disguised as ultrasound images or other medical documents for a patient seeking a remote consultation.
The CLOP members said one tried-and-true method of infecting healthcare providers involved gathering healthcare insurance and payment data to use in submitting requests for a remote consultation on a patient who has cirrhosis of the liver.
“Basically, they’re counting on doctors or nurses reviewing the patient’s chart and scans just before the appointment,” Holden said. “They initially discussed going in with cardiovascular issues, but decided cirrhosis or fibrosis of the liver would be more likely to be diagnosable remotely from existing test results and scans.”
While CLOP as a money making collective is a fairly young organization, security experts say CLOP members hail from a group of Threat Actors (TA) known as “TA505,” which MITRE’s ATT&CK database says is a financially motivated cybercrime group that has been active since at least 2014. “This group is known for frequently changing malware and driving global trends in criminal malware distribution,” MITRE assessed.
In April, 2021, KrebsOnSecurity detailed how CLOP helped pioneer another innovation aimed at pushing more victims into paying an extortion demand: Emailing the ransomware victim’s customers and partners directly and warning that their data would be leaked to the dark web unless they can convince the victim firm to pay up.
Security firm Tripwire points out that the HHS advisory on Venus says multiple threat actor groups are likely distributing the Venus ransomware. Tripwire’s tips for all organizations on avoiding ransomware attacks include:
While the above tips are important and useful, one critical area of ransomware preparedness overlooked by too many organizations is the need to develop — and then periodically rehearse — a plan for how everyone in the organization should respond in the event of a ransomware or data ransom incident. Drilling this breach response plan is key because it helps expose weaknesses in those plans that could be exploited by the intruders.
As noted in last year’s story Don’t Wanna Pay Ransom Gangs? Test Your Backups, experts say the biggest reason ransomware targets and/or their insurance providers still pay when they already have reliable backups of their systems and data is that nobody at the victim organization bothered to test in advance how long this data restoration process might take.
“Suddenly the victim notices they have a couple of petabytes of data to restore over the Internet, and they realize that even with their fast connections it’s going to take three months to download all these backup files,” said Fabian Wosar, chief technology officer at Emsisoft. “A lot of IT teams never actually make even a back-of-the-napkin calculation of how long it would take them to restore from a data rate perspective.”
Authored by Dennis Pang
What is antivirus? That’s a good question. What does it really protect? That’s an even better question.
Over the years, I’ve come to recognize that different people define antivirus differently. Some see it as way to keep hackers from crashing their computers. Others see it as a comprehensive set of protections. Neither definition is entirely on the money.
With this blog, I hope to give everyone a clear definition of what antivirus does well, along with what it doesn’t do at all. The fact is that antivirus is just one form of online protection. There are other forms of protection as well, and understanding antivirus’ role in your overall mix of online protection is an important part of staying safer online.
Antivirus software protects your devices against malware and viruses through a combination of prevention, detection, and removal.
For years, people have installed antivirus software on their computers. Today, it can also protect your smartphones and tablets as well. In fact, we recommend installing it on those devices as well because they’re connected, just like a computer—and any device that connects to the internet is a potential target for malware and viruses.
In short, if it’s connected, it must get protected.
One important distinction about antivirus is its name, a name that first came into use decades ago when viruses first appeared on the scene. (More on that in a bit.) However, antivirus protects you from more than viruses. It protects against malware too.
Malware is an umbrella term that covers all types of malicious software regardless of its design, intent, or how its delivered. Viruses are a subset of malicious software that infects devices and then replicates itself so that it can infect yet more devices.
So while we popularly refer to protection software as antivirus, it protects against far more than just viruses. It protects against malware overall.
Now here’s where some confusion may come in. Some antivirus apps are standalone. They offer malware protection and that’s it. Other antivirus apps are part of comprehensive online protection software, which can include several additional far-reaching features that can protect your privacy and your identity.
The reason why antivirus gets paired up with other apps for your privacy and identity is because antivirus alone doesn’t offer these kinds of protections. Yet when paired with things like a password manager, credit monitoring, identity theft coverage, and a VPN, to name a few, you can protect your devices—along with your privacy and identity. All the things you need to stay safer online.
In short, antivirus doesn’t cut it alone.
With that, let’s take a closer look at what malware and viruses really are—how they evolved, and what they look like today, along with how antivirus protects you against them.
Viruses have a long history. And depending on how you define what a virus is, the first one arguably took root in 1971—more than 50 years ago.
It was known as Creeper, and rather than being malicious in nature, it was designed to show how a self-replicating program could identify other connected devices on a network, transfer itself to them, and find yet more devices to repeat the process. Later, the same programmer who created a follow-on version of Creeper developed Reaper, a program that could remove the Creeper program. In a way, Reaper could be considered the first piece of antivirus software.
From there, it wasn’t until the 1980’s that malware started affecting the broader population, a time when computers became more commonplace in businesses and people’s homes.
At first, malware typically spread by infected floppy disks, much like the “Brain” virus in 1986. While recognized today as the first large-scale computer virus, its authors say they never intended it to work that way. Rather they say they created Brain as an anti-piracy measure to protect their proprietary software from theft. However, Brain got loose. It went beyond their software and affected computers worldwide. Although not malicious or destructive in nature, Brain most certainly put the industry, businesses, and consumers on notice.
Computer viruses became a thing.
Another piece of malware that got passed along via floppy disks was the “PC Cyborg” attack that targeted the medical research community in and around 1989. There the malware would lie in wait until the user rebooted their computer for the 90th time. And on that 90th boot, the user was presented with a digital ransom note like the one here:
Along with that note, PC Cyborg encrypted the computer’s files, which would only get unencrypted if the victim paid a fee—making PC Cyborg the first widely recognized form of ransomware.
Shortly thereafter, the internet started connecting computers, which opened millions of doors for hackers as people went online. Among the most noteworthy was 1999’s “Melissa” virus, which spread by way of infected email attachments and overloaded hundreds of corporate and governmental email servers worldwide.
It was quickly followed in 2000 by what’s considered the among the most damaging malware to date—ILOVEYOU, which also spread by way of an attachment, this one posing as a love letter. Specifically, it was a self-replicating worm that installed itself on the victim’s computer where it destroyed some information and stole other information, then spread to other computers. One estimate puts the global cost of ILOVEYOU at $10 billion and further speculated that it infected 10% of the world’s internet-connected computers at the time.
With the advent of the internet, malware quickly established itself as a sad fact of connected life. Today, McAfee registers an average of 1.1 million new malicious programs and potentially unwanted apps (PUA) each day, which contributes to the millions and millions of malicious programs already in existence.
Apart from the sheer volume of malware out there today, another thing that distinguishes today’s malware from early malware attacks—they’re created largely for profit.
We can think of it this way:
Today’s malware is far more than an annoyance or headache. It can lead to follow-on attacks that target your finances, your identity, your privacy, or a mix of all three.
So with a million or so new threats coming online each day, and millions more out there already, how does antivirus protect you from malware? It blocks, detects, and removes malware. And it does so in a couple of ways:
However, as mentioned earlier, antivirus provides only one aspect of online protection today. While it protects your devices and the data that’s on them, your privacy and identity can come under attack as well. So while antivirus alone can protect you from malware, it can’t prevent other forms of online crime like identity theft, phishing attacks designed to steal personal information, or attacks on your accounts, to name a few of the many other types of threats out there.
Yet comprehensive online protection can.
Comprehensive online protection software like ours offers antivirus, along with specific services and features that protect your privacy and identity online as well. It gives you dozens of other features like identity theft coverage & restoration, personal data cleanup, security freezes, and an online protection score that shows you just how safe you are, along with suggestions that can make you safer still.
So while protecting your devices with antivirus is a great start, it’s only one part of staying safer online. Including privacy and identity protection rounds out your protection overall.
The post What is Antivirus and What Does It Really Protect? appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Peter is an IT manager for a technology manufacturer that got hit with a Russian ransomware strain called “Zeppelin” in May 2020. He’d been on the job less than six months, and because of the way his predecessor architected things, the company’s data backups also were encrypted by Zeppelin. After two weeks of stalling their extortionists, Peter’s bosses were ready to capitulate and pay the ransom demand. Then came the unlikely call from an FBI agent. “Don’t pay,” the agent said. “We’ve found someone who can crack the encryption.”
Peter, who spoke candidly about the attack on condition of anonymity, said the FBI told him to contact a cybersecurity consulting firm in New Jersey called Unit 221B, and specifically its founder — Lance James. Zeppelin sprang onto the crimeware scene in December 2019, but it wasn’t long before James discovered multiple vulnerabilities in the malware’s encryption routines that allowed him to brute-force the decryption keys in a matter of hours, using nearly 100 cloud computer servers.
In an interview with KrebsOnSecurity, James said Unit 221B was wary of advertising its ability to crack Zeppelin ransomware keys because it didn’t want to tip its hand to Zeppelin’s creators, who were likely to modify their file encryption approach if they detected it was somehow being bypassed.
This is not an idle concern. There are multiple examples of ransomware groups doing just that after security researchers crowed about finding vulnerabilities in their ransomware code.
“The minute you announce you’ve got a decryptor for some ransomware, they change up the code,” James said.
But he said the Zeppelin group appears to have stopped spreading their ransomware code gradually over the past year, possibly because Unit 221B’s referrals from the FBI let them quietly help nearly two dozen victim organizations recover without paying their extortionists.
In a blog post published today to coincide with a Black Hat talk on their discoveries, James and co-author Joel Lathrop said they were motivated to crack Zeppelin after the ransomware gang started attacking nonprofit and charity organizations.
“What motivated us the most during the leadup to our action was the targeting of homeless shelters, nonprofits and charity organizations,” the two wrote. “These senseless acts of targeting those who are unable to respond are the motivation for this research, analysis, tools, and blog post. A general Unit 221B rule of thumb around our offices is: Don’t [REDACTED] with the homeless or sick! It will simply trigger our ADHD and we will get into that hyper-focus mode that is good if you’re a good guy, but not so great if you are an ***hole.”
The researchers said their break came when they understood that while Zeppelin used three different types of encryption keys to encrypt files, they could undo the whole scheme by factoring or computing just one of them: An ephemeral RSA-512 public key that is randomly generated on each machine it infects.
“If we can recover the RSA-512 Public Key from the registry, we can crack it and get the 256-bit AES Key that encrypts the files!” they wrote. “The challenge was that they delete the [public key] once the files are fully encrypted. Memory analysis gave us about a 5-minute window after files were encrypted to retrieve this public key.”
Unit 221B ultimately built a “Live CD” version of Linux that victims could run on infected systems to extract that RSA-512 key. From there, they would load the keys into a cluster of 800 CPUs donated by hosting giant Digital Ocean that would then start cracking them. The company also used that same donated infrastructure to help victims decrypt their data using the recovered keys.
A typical Zeppelin ransomware note.
Jon is another grateful Zeppelin ransomware victim who was aided by Unit 221B’s decryption efforts. Like Peter, Jon asked that his last name and that of his employer be omitted from the story, but he’s in charge of IT for a mid-sized managed service provider that got hit with Zeppelin in July 2020.
The attackers that savaged Jon’s company managed to phish credentials and a multi-factor authentication token for some tools the company used to support customers, and in short order they’d seized control over the servers and backups for a healthcare provider customer.
Jon said his company was reluctant to pay a ransom in part because it wasn’t clear from the hackers’ demands whether the ransom amount they demanded would provide a key to unlock all systems, and that it would do so safely.
“They want you to unlock your data with their software, but you can’t trust that,” Jon said. “You want to use your own software or someone else who’s trusted to do it.”
In August 2022, the FBI and the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a joint warning on Zeppelin, saying the FBI had “observed instances where Zeppelin actors executed their malware multiple times within a victim’s network, resulting in the creation of different IDs or file extensions, for each instance of an attack; this results in the victim needing several unique decryption keys.”
The advisory says Zeppelin has attacked “a range of businesses and critical infrastructure organizations, including defense contractors, educational institutions, manufacturers, technology companies, and especially organizations in the healthcare and medical industries. Zeppelin actors have been known to request ransom payments in Bitcoin, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand dollars to over a million dollars.”
The FBI and CISA say the Zeppelin actors gain access to victim networks by exploiting weak Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials, exploiting SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities, and phishing campaigns. Prior to deploying Zeppelin ransomware, actors spend one to two weeks mapping or enumerating the victim network to identify data enclaves, including cloud storage and network backups, the alert notes.
Jon said he felt so lucky after connecting with James and hearing about their decryption work, that he toyed with the idea of buying a lottery ticket that day.
“This just doesn’t usually happen,” Jon said. “It’s 100 percent like winning the lottery.”
By the time Jon’s company got around to decrypting their data, they were forced by regulators to prove that no patient data had been exfiltrated from their systems. All told, it took his employer two months to fully recover from the attack.
“I definitely feel like I was ill-prepared for this attack,” Jon said. “One of the things I’ve learned from this is the importance of forming your core team and having those people who know what their roles and responsibilities are ahead of time. Also, trying to vet new vendors you’ve never met before and build trust relationships with them is very difficult to do when you have customers down hard now and they’re waiting on you to help them get back up.”
A more technical writeup on Unit 221B’s discoveries (cheekily titled “0XDEAD ZEPPELIN”) is available here.
A 25-year-old Finnish man has been charged with extorting a once popular and now-bankrupt online psychotherapy company and its patients. Finnish authorities rarely name suspects in an investigation, but they were willing to make an exception for Julius “Zeekill” Kivimaki, a notorious hacker who — at the tender age of 17 — had been convicted of more than 50,000 cybercrimes, including data breaches, payment fraud, operating botnets, and calling in bomb threats.
In late October 2022, Kivimaki was charged (and arrested in absentia, according to the Finns) with attempting to extort money from the Vastaamo Psychotherapy Center. On October 21, 2020, Vastaamo became the target of blackmail when a tormentor identified as “ransom_man” demanded payment of 40 bitcoins (~450,000 euros at the time) in return for a promise not to publish highly sensitive therapy session notes Vastaamo had exposed online.
In a series of posts over the ensuing days on a Finnish-language dark net discussion board, ransom_man said Vastaamo appeared unwilling to negotiate a payment, and that he would start publishing 100 patient profiles every 24 hours “to provide further incentive for the company to continue communicating with us.”
“We’re not asking for much, approximately 450,000 euros which is less than 10 euros per patient and only a small fraction of the around 20 million yearly revenues of this company,” ransom_man wrote.
When Vastaamo declined to pay, ransom_man shifted to extorting individual patients. According to Finnish police, some 22,000 victims reported extortion attempts targeting them personally, targeted emails that threatened to publish their therapy notes online unless paid a 500 euro ransom.
The extortion message targeted Vastaamo patients.
On Oct. 23, 2020, ransom_man uploaded to the dark web a large compressed file that included all of the stolen Vastaamo patient records. But investigators found the file also contained an entire copy of ransom_man’s home folder, a likely mistake that exposed a number of clues that they say point to Kivimaki.
Ransom_man quickly deleted the large file (accompanied by a “whoops” notation), but not before it had been downloaded a number of times. The entire archive has since been made into a searchable website on the Dark Web.
Among those who grabbed a copy of the database was Antti Kurittu, a team lead at Nixu Corporation and a former criminal investigator. In 2013, Kurittu worked on investigation involving Kivimaki’s use of the Zbot botnet, among other activities Kivimaki engaged in as a member of the hacker group Hack the Planet.
“It was a huge opsec [operational security] fail, because they had a lot of stuff in there — including the user’s private SSH folder, and a lot of known hosts that we could take a very good look at,” Kurittu told KrebsOnSecurity, declining to discuss specifics of the evidence investigators seized. “There were also other projects and databases.”
Kurittu said he and others he and others who were familiar with illegal activities attributed to Kivimäki couldn’t shake suspicion that the infamous cybercriminal was also behind the Vastaamo extortion.
“I couldn’t find anything that would link that data directly to one individual, but there were enough indicators in there that put the name in my head and I couldn’t shake it,” Kurittu said. “When they named him as the prime suspect I was not surprised.”
A handful of individually extorted victims paid a ransom, but when news broke that the entire Vastaamo database had been leaked online, the extortion threats no longer held their sting. However, someone would soon set up a site on the dark web where anyone could search this sensitive data.
Kivimaki stopped using his middle name Julius in favor of his given first name Aleksanteri when he moved abroad several years ago. A Twitter account by that name was verified by Kivimaki’s attorney as his, and through that account he denied being involved in the Vastaamo extortion.
“I believe [the Finnish authorities] brought this to the public in order to influence the decision-making of my old case from my teenage years, which was just processed in the Court of Appeal, both cases are investigated by the same persons,” Kivimaki tweeted on Oct. 28.
Kivimaki is appealing a 2020 district court decision sentencing him to “one year of conditional imprisonment for two counts of fraud committed as a young person, and one of gross fraud, interference with telecommunications as a young person, aggravated data breach as a young person and incitement to fraud as a young person,” according to the Finnish tabloid Ilta-Sanomat.
“Now in the Court of Appeal, the prosecutor is demanding a harsher punishment for the man, i.e. unconditional imprisonment,” reads the Ilta-Sanomat story. “The prosecutor notes in his complaint that the young man has been committing cybercrimes from Espoo since he was 15 years old, and the actions have had to be painstakingly investigated through international legal aid.”
As described in this Wired story last year, Vastaamo filled an urgent demand for psychological counseling, and it won accolades from Finnish health authorities and others for its services.
“Vastaamo was a private company, but it seemed to operate in the same spirit of tech-enabled ease and accessibility: You booked a therapist with a few clicks, wait times were tolerable, and Finland’s Social Insurance Institution reimbursed a big chunk of the session fee (provided you had a diagnosed mental disorder),” William Ralston wrote for Wired. “The company was run by Ville Tapio, a 39-year-old coder and entrepreneur with sharp eyebrows, slicked-back brown hair, and a heavy jawline. He’d cofounded the company with his parents. They pitched Vastaamo as a humble family-run enterprise committed to improving the mental health of all Finns.”
But for all the good it brought, the healthcare records management system that Vastaamo used relied on little more than a MySQL database that was left dangerously exposed to the web for 16 months, guarded by nothing more than an administrator account with a blank password.
The Finnish daily Iltalehti said Tapio was relieved of his duties as CEO of Vastaamo in October 2020, and that in September, prosecutors brought charges against Tapio for a data protection offense in connection with Vastaamo’s information leak.
“According to Vastaamo, the data breach in Vastaamo’s customer databases took place in November 2018,” Iltalehti reported last month. “According to Vastaamo, Tapio concealed information about the data breach for more than a year and a half.”
Just a few years ago when the topic of supporting offsite workers arose, some of the key conversation topics were related to purchase, logistics, deployment, maintenance and similar issues. The discussions back then were more like “special cases” vs. today’s environment where supporting workers offsite (now known as the hybrid workforce) has become a critical mainstream topic.
Now with the bulk of many organization’s workers off-premise, the topic of security and the ability of a security vendor to help support an organization’s hybrid workers has risen to the top of the selection criteria. In a soon to be released Cisco endpoint survey, it’s not surprising that the ability of a security vendor to make supporting the hybrid workforce easier and more efficient was the key motivating factor when organizations choose security solutions.
Today, when prospects and existing customers look at Cisco’s ability to support hybrid workers with our advanced security solution set and open platform, it’s quite clear that we can deliver on that promise. But, yes, good tools make it easier and more efficient, but the reality is that running a SOC or any security group, large or small, still takes a lot of work. Most organizations not only rely on advanced security tools but utilize a set of best practices to provide clarity of roles, efficiency of operation, and for the more prepared, have tested these best practices to prove to themselves that they are prepared for what’s next.
Knowing that not all organizations have this degree of security maturity and preparedness, we gathered a couple of subject matter experts together to discuss 5 areas of time-tested best practices that, besides the advanced tools offered by Cisco and others, can help your SOC (or small security team) yield actionable insights and guide you faster, and with more confidence, toward the outcomes you want.
In this webinar you will hear practical advice from Cisco technical marketing and a representative from our award winning Talos Threat Intelligence group, the same group who have created and are maintaining breach defense in partnership with Fortune 500 Security Operating Centers (SOC) around the globe.
You can expect to hear our 5 Best Practices recommendations on the following topics;
Check out our webinar to find out how you can become more security resilient and be better prepared for what’s next.
We’d love to hear what you think. Ask a Question, Comment Below, and Stay Connected with Cisco Secure on social!
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Today we’re examining some of the revelations in the Q3 Cisco Talos Incident Response Trends Report. This document is an anonymized look at of all the engagements that the Cisco Talos Incident Response team have been involved in over the previous three months. It also features threat intelligence from our team of researchers and analysts.
To start, take a watch of this episode of ThreatWise TV which explores how these trends have evolved since the previous quarter. Our guests also talk about incidents and cyber-attacks that they themselves have consulted on recently, including a particularly interesting insider threat case.
Ransomware returned as the top threat this quarter, after commodity trojans narrowly surpassed ransomware last quarter. Ransomware made up nearly 18 percent of all threats observed, up from 15 percent last quarter. Cisco Talos Incident Response (CTIR) observed high-profile families, such as Vice Society and Hive, as well as the newer family Blast Basta, which first emerged in April of this year.
Also noteworthy is the fact that CTIR saw an equal number in ransomware and pre- ransomware engagements this quarter, totalling nearly 40 percent of threats observed. Pre-ransomware is when we have observed a ransomware attack is about to happen, but the encryption of files has not yet taken place.
Pre-ransomware comprised 18 percent of threats this quarter, up from less than 5 percent previously. While it’s difficult to determine an adversary’s motivations if encryption does not take place, several behavioral characteristics bolster Talos’ confidence that ransomware may likely be the final objective. In these engagements adversaries were observed deploying frameworks such as Cobalt Strike and Mimikatz, alongside numerous enumeration and discovery techniques.
Commodity malware, such as the Qakbot banking trojan, was observed in multiple engagements this quarter. In one engagement, several compromised endpoints were seen communicating with IP addresses associated with Qakbot C2 traffic. This activity coincides with a general resurgence of Qakbot and its delivery of emerging ransomware families and offensive security frameworks that we have not previously observed Qakbot deploy. This comes at a time where competing email-based botnets like Emotet and Trickbot have suffered continued setbacks from law enforcement and tech companies.
Other threats this quarter include infostealers like Redline Stealer and Raccoon Stealer. Redline Stealer was observed across three engagements this quarter, two of which involved ransomware. The malware operators behind Raccoon introduced new functionality to the malware at the end of June, which likely contributed to its increased presence in engagements this quarter.
As infostealers have continued to rank highly in CTIR engagements, let’s explore them in a bit more detail.
Throughout the incidents discussed over the last few quarters, and CTIR engagements in general, information stealing plays a big part of the attackers’ TTPs.
From a high level, infostealers can be used to gain access a variety of sensitive information, such as contact information, financial details, and even intellectual property. The adversaries involved often proceed to exfiltrate this information and may then attempt to sell it in dark web forums, threaten to release it if a ransom isn’t paid, among other things.
While these instances can and do crop up in CTIR engagements, many of the infostealers seen in this space are used for accessing and collecting user credentials. Once an attacker has gained an initial foothold on a system, there are many places within an operating system that they can look for and collect credentials through the practice of credential dumping.
These stolen credentials may be offered up for sale on the dark web, alongside the stolen information mentioned above, but they can also prove to be a key weapon in an attacker’s arsenal. Their usefulness lies in one simple concept—why force your way into a system when you can just log in?
There are several advantages for bad actors that use this approach. Probably the most oblivious of these is that using pre-existing credentials is far more likely to go unnoticed than other more flagrant tactics an attacker can use. If part of the goal of an attack is to remain under the radar, activities carried out by “known users” are less likely to trigger security alerts when compared to tactics such as exploiting vulnerabilities or downloading malware binaries.
Adversaries tend to seek credentials with higher privileges, allowing them further control over the systems they compromise, with those including administrative access being the crown jewels.
User credentials can not only provide an attacker with means to elevate privileges and establish persistence on a system, but also to move laterally through a network. Some credentials, especially those with administrative privileges, can offer access to multiple systems throughout a network. By obtaining them, many more options become available to further an attack.
There are several threats involved in information stealing that appear repeatedly in CTIR engagements over the last few quarters.
Perhaps the most notorious is Mimikatz—a tool used to pull credentials from operating systems. Mimikatz is not malware per-se and can be useful for penetration testing and red team activities. But bad actors leverage it as well, and over the last few quarters CTIR has observed it being used in ransomware-as-a-service attacks, as well as pre-ransomware incidents.
CTIR has also observed Redline Stealer being utilized by adversaries in CTIR engagements across quarters. This infostealer has grown in popularity as a supplementary tool used alongside other malware. On more than one occasion, CTIR has identified stolen credentials on the dark web that claimed to have been obtained via Redline Stealer.
Other information stealers seen across the last few quarters include the Vidar information stealer, Raccoon Stealer, and SolarMaker, all of which have been used to further an adversary’s attacks.
Over the last several months, Talos has seen an increasing number of engagements involving insider threats. In one engagement this quarter, passwords were reset through a management console of a perimeter firewall that a disgruntled employee had access to.
The organization’s team changed all associated passwords but overlooked one administrative account. On the following day, someone logged in using that account, deleted all other accounts and firewall rules, and created one local account, likely to provide persistence.
You’ll hear Alexis Merritt, Incident Response Consultant for Cisco Talos, talk about this more in the ThreatWise TV episode.
To help protect against this threat when an individual leaves an organization, steps like disabling accounts and ensuring that connections to the enterprise remotely through VPN has been removed can be very valuable. Implementing a mechanism to wipe systems, especially for remote employees, is important as well.
For more on this topic, Cisco Secure recently put together a white paper on the Insider Threat Maturity FrameWork.
In several incidents over the last few quarters that involved information stealers, multi-factor authentication (MFA) was not properly implemented by the organizations impacted, providing adversaries an opportunity to infiltrate the networks. MFA tools like Cisco Secure Access by Duo can prevent attackers from successfully gaining access.
And finally, Cisco Advisory CISO Wolfgang Goerlich has created this storytelling video, to help people think about incident response in a new way:
Join the Cisco Talos Incident Response team for a live debrief of the Q3 report on 27th October.
We’d love to hear what you think. Ask a Question, Comment Below, and Stay Connected with Cisco Secure on social!
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A new ransomware threat is currently sweeping its way across home computers. And what’s making it extra tricky is that it’s disguised as an operating system update.
Be on the lookout for this new ransomware scheme and protect yourself from ransomware with a few of these tips.
Magniber is a new type of ransomware that is disguised at almost every touchpoint until it seemingly pops out of nowhere demanding money. The attack begins when someone visits a fake Windows 10 update website owned by the Magniber cybercriminal group. Once someone clicks on a malicious link on that site, file-encrypting malware downloads onto the device.
Another stealth maneuver of Magniber is that the encryption malware downloads as a JavaScript file straight to the memory of the device, which can often slide under an antivirus’ radar. This malware allows the criminal to view, delete, and encrypt files and gain administrator access of the device. Usually, before the person even knows their device is in danger, Magniber reveals itself and demands a ransom payment in exchange for releasing the documents and giving back control of the computer. If the device owner refuses to pay, the criminal threatens to delete the files forever.1
For the last several years, large companies fell left and right to breaches. Hacker groups infiltrated complex cybersecurity defenses, got ahold of sensitive company or customer information, and threatened to release their findings on the dark web if not paid a hefty ransom. The reasons cybercriminals targeted corporate databases versus personal devices wasn’t just because they could demand multiple millions, but because companies were better equipped to make ransom transactions anonymously. Often, cryptocurrency transactions are untraceable, which allows criminals to remain at large.
Now that more everyday people are proficient in cryptocurrency, ransomware may shift to targeting personal devices. Though the ransom payments won’t be as lucrative, there also won’t be corporate cybersecurity experts hot on the cybercriminal’s tail.
To avoid ransomware schemes similar to Magniber, adopt these three habits to better protect your device and digital privacy:
If a cybercriminal gets in touch with you and demands a ransom, immediately contact your local FBI field office and file a report with the FBI’s Internet Criminal Complaint Center. From there, the authorities will advise you on how to proceed.
Something you can start with now to defend against ransomware is to invest in McAfee+ Ultimate. It provides the most thorough device, privacy, and identity protection, including $25,000 in ransomware coverage.
1ZDNET, “This unusual ransomware attack targets home PCs, so beware”
The post Ransomware Masquerading as Microsoft Update Targets Home Computers appeared first on McAfee Blog.