10 years later... 🤯 Seriously, how did this thing turn into this?! It was the humblest of beginning with absolutely no expectations of anything, and now it's, well, massive! I'm a bit lost for words if I'm honest, I hope the chat with Charlotte adds some candour to this week's update, she's seen this thing grow since before its first birthday, through the hardest times and the best times and now lives and breathes HIBP day in day out with me. I hope you enjoy this video, and we'd both love to hear those swag ideas from you too 😊
I'm irrationally excited about the new Prusa 3D printer on order, and I think that's mostly to do with planning for the NDC Oslo talk I plan to do with Elle, my 11-year old daughter. I'm all for getting the kids exposure not just to tech, but also to being able to talk to others about tech and involving them in conference talks since a young age has been a big part of that. But what I'm especially excited about is that this won't just be an "aw, isn't it cute seeing kids talk at a conference" kinda thing; she genuinely knows enough about this technology that together, we can make a talk that adults will learn something from. That's cool 😎
For a weekly update with no real agenda, we sure did spend a lot of time talking about the ridiculous approach Harvey Norman took to dealing with heavy traffic on Black Friday. It was just... unfathomable. A bunch of people chimed into the tweet thread and suggested it may have been by design, but they certainly wouldn't have set out to achieve the sorts of headlines that adorned the news afterwards. Who knows, but it made for entertaining content this week 🙂
Think about it like this: in 2015, we all lost our proverbial minds at the idea of the Kazakhstan government mandating the installation of root certificates on their citizens' devices. We were outraged at the premise of a government mandating the implementation of a model that could, at their bequest, allow them to intercept traffic without any transparency or accountability. The EFF said the following at the time:
If the country's ruling regime were to successfully implement this plan, it would be able to snoop on, impersonate, and alter the online communications of anyone within their borders—effectively performing a Man in the Middle attack on its entire population.
Now watch the video, listen to Scott and ask yourself how different the technical capacity he discusses is from the Kazakhstan situation. Not from a policy perspective or the intentions of the respective government bodies, but rather it terms of the capabilities and lack of transparency it results in. It's nuts. But hey, it's a good time to be in this industry!
Most of this week's video went on the scraped (and faked) LinkedIn data, but it's the ransomware discussion that keeps coming back to mind. Even just this morning, 2 days after recording this live stream, I ended up on nation TV talking about the DP World security incident and whilst we don't have any confirmation yet, it has all the hallmarks of another ransomware case. In advance of that interview, I was trawling through various ransomware Tor sites and the volume of big names appearing there is just staggering. It does get me thinking: how many other individuals and corporations alike are being exposed through these and are never told about it? I wonder...
Yes, the Lenovo is Chinese. No, I'm not worried about Superfish. Yes, I'm running windows. No, I don't want a Framework laptop. Seemed to be a lot of time this week gone on talking all things laptops, and there are clearly some very differing views on the topic. Some good suggestions, some neat alternatives and some ideas that, well, just seem a little crazy. But hey, I'm super happy with the machine, it's an absolute beast and I expect I'll get many years of hard work out of it. That and more in this week's video, enjoy 😊
So I wrapped up this week's live stream then promptly blew hours mucking around with Zigbee on Home Assistant. Is it worth it, as someone asked in the chat? Uh, yeah, kinda, mostly. But seriously, having a highly automated house is awesome and I suggest that most people watching these vids harbour the same basic instinct as I do to try and improve our lives through technology. The coordination of lights with times of day, the security checks around open doors, the controlling of fans and air conditioning to keep everyone comfy, it just rocks... when it works 😎
I did it again - I tweeted about Twitter doing something I thought was useful and the hordes did descend on Twitter to tweet about how terrible Twitter is. Right, gotcha, so 1.3M views of that tweet later... As I say in this week's video, there's a whole bunch of crazy arguments in there but the thing that continues to get me the most in every one of these discussions is the argument that Elon is a poo poo head. No, seriously, I explain it at the end of the video how so constantly the counterarguments have no rational base and they constantly boil down to a dislike of the guy. Ironically, continuing to use Twitter to have a rant about stuff just shows that Twitter is just the same as it always was 🤣
There seemed to be an awful lot of time gone on the 23andMe credential stuffing situation this week, but I think it strikes a lot of important chords. We're (us as end users) still reusing credentials, still not turning on MFA and still trying to sue when we don't do these things. And we as builders are still creating systems that allow this to happen en mass. All that said, I don't know how we build systems that are resilient to a single person coming along and entering someone else's (probably) reused credentials into a normal browser session, at least not without introducing additional barriers to entry that will upset the marketing manager. And so, I'm back at the only logical conclusion I think we can all agree on right now: it's a great time to be working in this industry 😊
This must be my first "business as usual" weekly update since August and damn it's nice to be back to normal! New sponsor, new breaches, new blog post and if you're in this part of the world, a brand new summer creeping over the horizon. I've now got a couple of months with very little in the way of travel plans and a goal to really knock a bunch of new HIBP features out of the park, some of which I talk about in this week's video. Enjoy! 🍻
Ah, home 😊 It's been more than a month since I've been able to sit at this desk and stream a weekly video. And now I'm doing it with the glorious spring weather just outside my window, which I really must make more time to start enjoying. Anyway, this week is super casual due to having had zero prep time, but I hope the discussion about the ABC's piece on HIBP and I in particular is interesting. I feel like this whole story has a long way to go yet, hopefully now having a few months at home will give us an opportunity to lay the foundation for the next phase. Stay tuned!
Well that's it, Europe is done! I've spent the week in Prague with highlights including catching up with Josef Prusa, keynoting at Experts Live EU and taking a "beer spa" complete with our own endless supply of tap beer. Life is good 🍻
That’s it - we’ve peaked - life is all downhill from here 🤣 🍻 #BeerSpa pic.twitter.com/ezCpUC6XEK
— Troy Hunt (@troyhunt) September 21, 2023
All that and more in this week's video, next week I'll come to you from back home in the sunshine 😎
The victim shaming website operated by the cybercriminals behind 8Base — currently one of the more active ransomware groups — was until earlier today leaking quite a bit of information that the crime group probably did not intend to be made public. The leaked data suggests that at least some of website’s code was written by a 36-year-old programmer residing in the capital city of Moldova.
The 8Base ransomware group’s victim shaming website on the darknet.
8Base maintains a darknet website that is only reachable via Tor, a freely available global anonymity network. The site lists hundreds of victim organizations and companies — all allegedly hacking victims that refused to pay a ransom to keep their stolen data from being published.
The 8Base darknet site also has a built-in chat feature, presumably so that 8Base victims can communicate and negotiate with their extortionists. This chat feature, which runs on the Laravel web application framework, works fine as long as you are *sending* information to the site (i.e., by making a “POST” request).
However, if one were to try to fetch data from the same chat service (i.e., by making a “GET” request), the website until quite recently generated an extremely verbose error message:
The verbose error message when one tries to pull data from 8Base’s darknet site. Notice the link at the bottom of this image, which is generated when one hovers over the “View commit” message under the “Git” heading.
That error page revealed the true Internet address of the Tor hidden service that houses the 8Base website: 95.216.51[.]74, which according to DomainTools.com is a server in Finland that is tied to the Germany-based hosting giant Hetzner.
But that’s not the interesting part: Scrolling down the lengthy error message, we can see a link to a private Gitlab server called Jcube-group: gitlab[.]com/jcube-group/clients/apex/8base-v2. Digging further into this Gitlab account, we can find some curious data points available in the JCube Group’s public code repository.
For example, this “status.php” page, which was committed to JCube Group’s Gitlab repository roughly one month ago, includes code that makes several mentions of the term “KYC” (e.g. KYC_UNVERIFIED, KYC_VERIFIED, and KYC_PENDING).
This is curious because a FAQ on the 8Base darknet site includes a section on “special offers for journalists and reporters,” which says the crime group is open to interviews but that journalists will need to prove their identity before any interview can take place. The 8base FAQ refers to this vetting process as “KYC,” which typically stands for “Know Your Customer.”
“We highly respect the work of journalists and consider information to be our priority,” the 8Base FAQ reads. “We have a special program for journalists which includes sharing information a few hours or even days before it is officially published on our news website and Telegram channel: you would need to go through a KYC procedure to apply. Journalists and reporters can contact us via our PR Telegram channel with any questions.”
The 8Base darknet site also has a publicly accessible “admin” login page, which features an image of a commercial passenger plane parked at what appears to be an airport. Next to the airplane photo is a message that reads, “Welcome to 8Base. Admin Login to 8Base dashboard.”
The login page on the 8Base ransomware group’s darknet website.
Right-clicking on the 8Base admin page and selecting “View Source” produces the page’s HTML code. That code is virtually identical to a “login.blade.php” page that was authored and committed to JCube Group’s Gitlab repository roughly three weeks ago.
It appears the person responsible for the JCube Group’s code is a 36-year-old developer from Chisinau, Moldova named Andrei Kolev. Mr. Kolev’s LinkedIn page says he’s a full-stack developer at JCube Group, and that he’s currently looking for work. The homepage for Jcubegroup[.]com lists an address and phone number that Moldovan business records confirm is tied to Mr. Kolev.
The posts on the Twitter account for Mr. Kolev (@andrewkolev) are all written in Russian, and reference several now-defunct online businesses, including pluginspro[.]ru.
Reached for comment via LinkedIn, Mr. Kolev said he had no idea why the 8Base darknet site was pulling code from the “clients” directory of his private JCube Group Gitlab repository, or how the 8Base name was even included.
“I [don’t have] a clue, I don’t have that project in my repo,” Kolev explained. “They [aren’t] my clients. Actually we currently have just our own projects.”
Mr. Kolev shared a screenshot of his current projects, but very quickly after that deleted it. However, KrebsOnSecurity captured a copy of the image before it was removed:
A screenshot of Mr. Kolev’s current projects that he quickly deleted.
Within minutes of explaining why I was reaching out to Mr. Kolev and walking him through the process of finding this connection, the 8Base website was changed, and the error message that linked to the JCube Group private Gitlab repository no longer appeared. Instead, trying the same “GET” method described above caused the 8Base website to return a “405 Method Not Allowed” error page:
Mr. Kolev claimed he didn’t know anything about the now-removed error page on 8Base’s site that referenced his private Gitlab repo, and said he deleted the screenshot from our LinkedIn chat because it contained private information.
Ransomware groups are known to remotely hire developers for specific projects without disclosing exactly who they are or how the new hire’s code is intended to be used, and it is possible that one of Mr. Kolev’s clients is merely a front for 8Base. But despite 8Base’s statement that they are happy to correspond with journalists, KrebsOnSecurity is still waiting for a reply from the group via their Telegram channel.
The tip about the leaky 8Base website was provided by a reader who asked to remain anonymous. That reader, a legitimate security professional and researcher who goes by the handle @htmalgae on Twitter, said it is likely that whoever developed the 8Base website inadvertently left it in “development mode,” which is what caused the site to be so verbose with its error messages.
“If 8Base was running the app in production mode instead of development mode, this Tor de-anonymization would have never been possible,” @htmalgae said.
A recent blog post from VMware/Carbon Black called the 8Base ransomware group “a heavy hitter” that has remained relatively unknown despite the massive spike in activity in Summer of 2023.
“8Base is a Ransomware group that has been active since March 2022 with a significant spike in activity in June of 2023,” Carbon Black researchers wrote. “Describing themselves as ‘simple pen testers,’ their leak site provided victim details through Frequently Asked Questions and Rules sections as well as multiple ways to contact them. ”
According to VMware, what’s particularly interesting about 8Base’s communication style is the use of verbiage that is strikingly familiar to another known cybercriminal group: RansomHouse.
“The group utilizes encryption paired with ‘name-and-shame’ techniques to compel their victims to pay their ransoms,” VMware researchers wrote. “8Base has an opportunistic pattern of compromise with recent victims spanning across varied industries. Despite the high amount of compromises, the information regarding identities, methodology, and underlying motivation behind these incidents still remains a mystery.”
Update, Sept. 21, 10:43 a.m. ET: The author of Databreaches.net was lurking in the 8Base Telegram channel when I popped in to ask the crime group a question, and reports that 8Base did eventually reply: ““hi at the moment we r not doing interviews. we have nothing to say. we r a little busy.”